

PHILIPPINES



Typhoon Yolanda Ongoing Recovery

Recovery Framework Case Study

Post Yolanda Reconstruction Case Study

Revised Final Version

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Background and Objectives of the Case Study

The World Bank's Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), the United Nations Development Program and the European Union are working on a guide for developing disaster recovery frameworks. This guide aims to help governments and their partners plan for resilient post disaster recovery while contributing to long term sustainable development. It is based on experiences of various countries that have recently faced large scale disaster impacts and whose practices are documented in eight country case studies.

These case studies have been designed to collect and analyze information on: i) disaster recovery standards and principles adapted by countries for specific disasters; ii) planning efforts for making such recovery efficient, equitable and resilient; iii) policies, institutions and capacities to implement and monitor disaster recovery; and iv) ways and means for translating the gains of resilient recovery into long-term risk reduction and resilient development.

Importantly, these case studies aim to learn from, and not evaluate, country reconstruction initiatives. Practices learned from each country's experience would inform the contents of the guide for developing a DRF. Additionally, the case studies examine the planning processes and not the implementation details of recovery experiences. As such, they do not seek to offer a comprehensive account of the post-disaster recovery program, but instead provide details and insight into the decision-making processes for reconstruction policies and programs.

This case study is unique as it documents ongoing recovery since the occurrence of Typhoon Yolanda (international name: Haiyan) on November 8, 2013. This report was prepared from May to December 2014, capturing recovery planning phase and initial implementation. The findings and conclusions are emerging and evolving as recovery continues to take place in the Philippines.

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Currency Equivalents

Currency Unit = Philippine Peso (Php)

Average Exchange Rate for 2014

US\$ 1.00 = Php 43.39

US\$ 0.23 = Php 1.00

Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
COA	Commission on Audit
CRRP	Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan
CSF	Credit Support Fund
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DA	Department of Agriculture
DBM	Department of Budget and Management
DILG	Department of the Interior and Local Government
DPWH	Department of Public Works and Highways
DRF	Disaster Recovery Framework
DRRM	Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
EMPATHY	Electronic Monitoring Platform Accountability and Transparency Hub for Yolanda
ERFP	Enterprise Rehabilitation Financing Program
FAiTH	Foreign Aid Transparency Hub
GFDRR	Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
Kph	Kilometer per hour
LDRRMC	Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
LDRRMF	Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund
LGU	Local Government Unit
MSME	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
NCCDP	National Community-Driven Development Program
NDRRMC	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
NDRRMF	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund
NEDA	National Economic and Development Authority
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NHA	National Housing Authority
OCD	Office of Civil Defense
OPARR	Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery
PARR	Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery
PDNA	Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
PDRF	Philippine Disaster Recovery Foundation
Php	Philippine Peso
QRF	Quick Response Fund
RAY	Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda
USD	US Dollar

1. Introduction

1. **The Philippines is highly vulnerable to the impacts of natural disasters.** Located within the Pacific Ring of Fire and the typhoon belt on the North Pacific Basin, it is prone to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis and typhoons. An average of 20 typhoons enters the Philippine area of responsibility each year. Since 2008, typhoons that make landfall in the Philippines have become stronger and more devastating. Two of the most recent ones, Typhoon Pablo (Bopha, 2012) and Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan, 2013) were considered category 5 storms with winds exceeding 252 kilometer per hour (kph), the most devastating according to the Saffir–Simpson hurricane scale.
2. **Super Typhoon Yolanda made landfall in the Philippines on November 8, 2013 with wind speed of more than 300 kph and storm surges of over four meters, causing unprecedented damage to 9 regions, covering 591 municipalities and 57 cities spread across 44 provinces.**¹ About 16 million persons (more than 3.4 million families) were affected, of which approximately 4 million (about 890 thousand families) were displaced.² The sheer strength of the typhoon damaged 1.1 million houses, of which more than 550,000 houses were totally destroyed.³ Eighty percent of the reported 6,000 casualties were from Eastern Visayas – the second poorest region in the country. Countless more, especially those in the rural communities, lost their livelihoods. Vital infrastructure and private investments were similarly damaged. The Government placed the initial estimates of total damage and loss from the typhoon at around USD 12.9B.⁴ Table 1 provides a brief profile of the impact of typhoon Yolanda.

Table 1: Disaster Profile

Number of severely affected province	14 provinces^a
Population affected	16 million ^b
Number of fatalities	6,293 reported casualties ^b
Number of injuries	28,689 ^b
Most affected sectors (based on needs)	Housing, Industry and Services ^c
Estimated overall damage (USD)	9.6B ^c
Estimated overall impact (% of Gross Domestic Product)	0.90% ^c

Sources:

^a Office of the Presidential Assistant for Recovery and Reconstruction (2014). *Yolanda Rehabilitation and Recovery Efforts*.

^b National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council Situational Report No. 108 re Effects of Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan).

^c National Economic and Development Authority (2013). *Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda: Build Back Better*. Total estimated damage is USD9.6 B above, while total loss is estimated at USD3.3 B, totaling to USD12.9 B as the total damage and loss from Typhoon Yolanda.

¹ National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC). *SitRep No. 108 Effects of Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan)*, April 3, 2014 (available from www.ndrrmc.gov.ph).

² Ibid.

³ Estimated totally damaged houses is at 550,928 while partially damaged is at 589,404. See NDRRMC *SitRep No. 108 Effects of Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan)*, April 3, 2014 (available from www.ndrrmc.gov.ph).

⁴ NEDA, *Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda, 2013* (<http://www.neda.gov.ph/?p=1921>)




Figure 1. Map of Affected LGUs within the 100km Radius of the Storm Track of Typhoon Yolanda
 (Source: RAY, 2013)

2. Institutional Framework for Recovery

3. **The institutional framework for disaster risk management is provided in the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) Act of 2010⁵.** The Act establishes the National DRRM Council (NDRRMC) which is composed of around 40 government agencies and leagues of local government units (LGUs)⁶, private sector, and civil society organizations (CSOs). The NDRRMC is responsible for setting policy, coordinating and overseeing DRRM activities, and conducting monitoring and evaluation. The National Council is chaired by the Secretary of National Defense and is supported by the Office of Civil Defense (OCD), as its Secretariat. The Chairman works with four vice chairs, each overseeing a specific DRRM thematic area:
 - a) Preparedness – Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG);
 - b) Response – Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD);
 - c) Prevention and Mitigation – the Secretary of the Department of Science and Technology; and
 - d) Rehabilitation and Recovery – Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA).

4. **The institutional framework supports the decentralized governance system of the Philippines whereby LGUs have significant autonomy on policy making and implementation.** The structure of the NDRRMC is mirrored at the local level (*i.e.*, provincial, city, and municipal levels) where the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils (LDRRMCs) are formed and chaired by their respective Local Chief Executives (*i.e.*, governors and mayors). A Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, on the other hand, assumes the task of coordinating, integrating, supervising and evaluating LDRRMC activities. At the smallest administrative division, the *Barangay* Development Council assumes the role of the *Barangay* DRRM Committee.

5. **The DRRM Act also mandates the creation of the National DRRM Plan⁷ which identifies NEDA as the lead agency in carrying out recovery functions, with the support of other national government agencies, LGUs, and CSOs.** These recovery functions include:
 - ✓ Assessment of damages, losses, and needs (through OCD);
 - ✓ Restoration, strengthening and expansion of economic activities (through the department whose sector is most affected by the disaster);
 - ✓ Integration of DRM elements in human settlements (through the National Housing Authority (NHA));

⁵ <http://www.gov.ph/2010/05/27/republic-act-no-10121/>

⁶ In the context of the Philippines, Local Government Units include barangays, municipalities, cities and provinces.

⁷ http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/41/NDRRM_Plan_2011-2028.pdf

- ✓ Reconstruction of infrastructure (through the Department of Public Works and Highways, DPWH); and
- ✓ Provision of risk protection measures to vulnerable populations (through the Department of Health and the DSWD).

6. **Despite NEDA’s mandate to oversee recovery activities, the President deemed it necessary to create an ad-hoc structure to focus exclusively on recovery due to the magnitude of Typhoon Yolanda’s impact and scale of recovery needs.** The Government appointed a Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (PARR) to unify efforts of the government and other institutions involved in rehabilitation and recovery. Signed on December 6, 2013, Memorandum Order No. 62 provided for the functions of PARR. With a mandate of two years, the PARR is tasked with developing an overall strategy and the integrated short-, medium-, and long-term recovery plans and programs. Specifically, the PARR is mandated to:

- ✓ Coordinate with the NDRRMC and its member agencies, as well as consult with affected LGUs in the formulation of plans and programs for rehabilitation, recovery, and development of affected areas;
- ✓ Propose funding support to the President for the implementation of recovery plans and programs; and
- ✓ Monitor and evaluate program and project implementation together with NEDA and other oversight agencies such as the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and the Commission on Audit (COA).

Table 2: Recovery Key Facts

Authority coordinating the recovery, rehabilitation, and development process	Presidential Assistant for Recovery and Reconstruction
Institution implementing the recovery, rehabilitation and development process	Member agencies of the five (5) Clusters and the affected LGUs.
PDNA conducted	Yes
Donor conference held⁸	Yes
Amount Pledged in cash and in kind(USD)	US\$ 1,643,038,277.66 ^a

Source: a/Foreign Aid Transparency Hub (FaiTH), <http://www.gov.ph/faith/> as of March 2015. FaiTH exchange rate is US\$1=PhP44.617

7. **The government bureaucracy and external stakeholders were mobilized to support the function of recovery and reconstruction.** MO No. 62 called on government departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities, such as government owned and controlled corporations and government financial institutions, as well as the private sector and non-

⁸ The Government launched RAY on December 18, 2013 in a briefing for donors, after more than a month when Yolanda struck on November 5. This briefing is in lieu of the traditional pledging session. The Government has long abandoned the concept of a donor pledging sessions either for development or emergency purposes. The Government focuses on the discussion rather than on the pledging of resources, which oftentimes do not come in the amount committed during pledging sessions.

government organizations (NGOs) to support the exercise of the PARR's mandate. The said MO enabled the engagement of consultants, experts, and professional advisors to support the PARR. An operational team likewise supported the daily administrative and technical operations of the PARR, which was beefed up by staff hired under technical assistance programs of international organizations. This operational team, while not mentioned in the MO, came to be known as the Office of the PARR or OPARR⁹.

8. **The PARR positioned himself as the bridge between the national government and other stakeholders, especially among the affected LGUs.** The PARR established multi-agency clusters that would lead the sectoral coordination, representing the main sectors that were affected by the typhoon, namely Infrastructure, Resettlement, Social Services, and Livelihood. These clusters were tasked to consolidate the sectoral plans and implement recovery activities. A fifth cluster called Support Cluster was tasked to coordinate policies and provide oversight support to the sectoral clusters. Each cluster is headed by a lead national government agency which coordinates the recovery efforts of government agencies, LGUs, civil society, private sector, international and local development partners, and other stakeholders. Figure 1 presents the organizational structure of established by PARR.
9. **Providing for functions, such as the PARR's and creating an entity, such as OPARR, dedicated to deal with a large-scale disaster that affected multiple administrative regions of the country are not unprecedented.** The Government established Task Force Pablo after Typhoon Pablo struck Mindanao and the Visayas on December 4, 2012. Typhoon Pablo affected 6.2 million people, equivalent to more than 700,000 families (see Box 2 for comparisons between Typhoons Pablo and Yolanda). This highlights the government's recognition that large-scale disasters require special authority to mobilize the full resources of the country and to expedite the decision-making process under the direct authority of the President. The coordinating powers vested in the PARR and past presidential task forces supersedes the mechanism prescribed under the DRRM Act.
10. **Because the PARR reports directly to the President and has the rank equivalent to a cabinet secretary, the PARR has stronger authority and influence over the implementing agencies.** With the PARR's mandate to act as over-all manager and coordinator of rehabilitation, recovery, and reconstruction, government institutions involved in recovery processes have been quick to comply with PARR's mandates and requirements. On the other hand, the OCD, headed by an undersecretary and tasked under the NDRRM Law to undertake agency coordination, does not have the same influence over actions of other government institutions. Rather than a decision-making entity, the current set-up of the Council operates as a coordinative platform at the technical level, which is considered a weakness of the current NDRRM system.
11. **To address gaps in the current institutional arrangements for recovery and reconstruction, a sectoral approach has been adopted to facilitate coordination and implementation (Figure 2).** The PARR organized sectoral clusters, similar to other task forces initiated in the past. This approach was rather practical as national government agencies are given

⁹ The OPARR, instead of PARR, is mentioned when the concern mentioned pertains to the work of the clusters, instead of an individual action by the appointed PARR.

mandates over major sectors such as infrastructure, social services, and housing, consistent with existing implementation conditions. Working along the development sectors institutionalized in government operations, is applicable to small, medium and large scale disaster recovery. PARR used this cluster approach as a method to maximize the coordination among the different agencies and promote complementation among sectoral needs and interventions.




Figure 2. Cluster Framework of OPARR
(Source: OPARR)

12. **The scale of Yolanda prompted the Government to exercise flexibility in reorganizing its institutional structures for a more efficient recovery coordination.** One of the outcomes of the establishment of the PARR is that it facilitated the development of sectoral and local recovery plans, providing the basis for the Government to allocate and release funds to national and local agencies, enabling them to take action on the ground. However, this process took some time to complete as the PARR sought to demonstrate that the process is above board. The Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (CRRP) was submitted to the President in August 2014, five months after the disaster.
13. **LGUs replicated the PARR’s sectoral cluster set-up to foster stronger coordination with national government agencies.** Notwithstanding the presence of local DRRM Councils and Offices in Yolanda-affected LGUs, many of them further aligned their disaster recovery structures along the sector cluster system to smoothen the vertical linkage with the PARR. This facilitated the consultation between national and local authorities by having the same government counterpart around the table. Figure 3 illustrates the difference in local level structures pre- and post-Yolanda.

**Box 1. Creating Government Bodies to Deal with Recovery
after Large-scale Disasters: The Case of Indonesia and Pakistan**

The creation of a single temporary body to address recovery challenges brought about by a large-scale disaster has been an observed practice among other governments, especially in terms of managing and coordinating the efforts of state and non-state actors. In these countries, these central organizations established in the absence of a central coordination agency that can oversee large scale reconstruction.

- In Indonesia, after the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami, the Agency for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (BRR) was formed to coordinate and implement the rehabilitation and the reconstruction in Aceh and Nias among field agencies and donors.
- In Pakistan, the Earthquake Rehabilitation and Recovery Authority (ERRA) was established to coordinate the activities of government agencies, donors and CSOs participating in reconstruction and rehabilitation, after the 2005 Kashmir Earthquake.
- In Sri Lanka, the Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN) was formed following the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004. It served as the apex reconstruction entity that was later on replaced by the Reconstruction and Development Agenda (RADA).

Governments that face the gargantuan task of reconstruction recourse to three typical models for reconstruction: (a) establish new institutions as in the example of OPARR and the three countries above; (b) tap existing government institutions; and (c) mobilize a composite team drawn from government and/or external institutions. Subject to scale of events, resources that are available to governments, and governing policies on reconstruction, among others, these models have their own variations. These models have their both advantages and disadvantages. Some of them are:

Model	Positive	Negative
Existing institution	Experience and knowledge of institutions and country systems Understanding of existing challenges and concerns	May be tied up to existing bureaucratic constraints and poor coordination Lack of necessary/adequate experience and expertise Multiple functions and mandates
New institution	Compatible skills and expertise May be given greater flexibility and room to innovate Very focused mandate If lifespan is predetermined or adhoc, reconstruction may not be linked to long-term development	Could take some time to fully take off and fit existing operational mechanisms Inadequate knowledge of bureaucratic constraints and challenges
Composite team	Allows combining skill sets to deliver tasks	May suffer from weak links to bureaucracy and lines of authority/accountability

Box 2. Impact of Typhoon Pablo and Typhoon Yolanda

With Typhoon Pablo affecting 10 regions and Typhoon Yolanda affecting 9 regions, the national government took the lead in coordinating emergency response and relief.

Affected	Typhoon Pablo	Typhoon Yolanda
Regions	10	9
Provinces	34	44
Cities	40	57
Municipalities	318	591
Barangays	2,910	12,139
Number of Persons	6.2 million	16 million

Source: NDRRMC SitRep # 38 December 25, 2012; SitRep #29 July 26, 2014; and SitRep #60 April 3, 2014

14. **The Philippines has had a long history of active engagement with the private sector and civil society, including disaster risk management.** Forging partnerships with external stakeholders is not new to the Government. Following Typhoons Ondoy (Ketsana), Pepeng (Parma) and Frank (Fengshen),¹⁰ the Government entered into a cooperation agreement with a private sector coordinating body called the Philippine Disaster Recovery Foundation (PDRF). It is composed of large private sector entities and their socio-civic units to participate in government-led efforts, bringing their own resources, partnerships and expertise.
15. **The private sector and NGOs also play a crucial role in recovery.** The PARR encouraged large private companies to adopt communities as recipients of programs/projects that they will fund, as part of their initial engagement. This enabled PARR to focus on which communities did not have a private sector “sponsor.” For Yolanda, the PDRF and other private firms coordinated closely with the OPARR clusters and have been involved in setting up cash for work programs, providing transitional shelters, rebuilding classrooms, and providing start-up capital and basic financial training to micro-entrepreneurs, among other activities.¹¹ As this partnership evolved, the PARR promoted the CRRP as guide for determining new focus areas for continued support by the private sector and NGO partners.
16. **As government implementing agencies and LGUs were extremely overwhelmed by demands to restore services, the private sector and non-government organizations helped bridge gaps in implementation capacity.** Many NGOs also received direct funding from government to scale up their projects and reduce the gaps on the ground. The private sector and NGOs have been able to implement recovery programs relatively faster because of less bureaucratic restrictions, more flexible procurement policies, and adaptive delivery mechanisms. However, the scale of their interventions is limited and targeted.

¹⁰ Presidential Executive Order 838 of 2009

¹¹ PDRF(2014). <http://pdrf.org/index.htm>. [accessed August 25, 2014]

17. **Other local governments, in a spirit of solidarity, also provided support to LGUs affected by Yolanda.** On November 13, 2013, five days after typhoon Yolanda struck, the Metropolitan Manila Council passed MMC Resolution No. 2, series of 2013. The Council unanimously signed the resolution that calls on each LGU in Metro Manila to adopt at least two or more worst-hit localities and assist them in post-disaster recovery. Under this LGU-to-LGU partnership scheme, Metro Manila cities assisted the relief operations of affected towns and also fielded heavy equipment, technical and engineering experts to support long-term recovery efforts.¹² The adopt-a-town program is not part of a formal government process but was instigated by the MMC in solidarity with their Yolanda-affected counterparts. Outside the MMC structure, LGUs can similarly pass their own resolutions to adopt other LGUs in times of crisis.




Figure 3. Comparative institutional arrangement pre- and post-Yolanda

¹² <http://www.mmda.gov.ph/news2013.html> (accessed September 03, 2014)




Figure 4. Re-alignment of institutional arrangement of LGUs with the sectoral one prescribed by OPARR

3. Recovery Framework

18. **The Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY)¹³ sets the Philippine government’s framework to guide the planning and implementation of the recovery effort.** The Philippine Development Plan is the overall blueprint for the development policies, programs and projects. Typhoon Yolanda derailed the targets of the national development plan, and therefore, the immediate objective of reconstruction and rehabilitation is to “recover lost ground and get back on track.”¹⁴ NEDA, by virtue of its role as the lead agency for rehabilitation and recovery in the NDRRMC structure and as the macroeconomic planning entity of the Government, formulated the RAY. This provided a recovery framework based on early estimates of damages and losses and informed the initial funding for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of affected communities. As Typhoon Yolanda struck at the tail end of the budget cycle, RAY became the basis for a Php14.6 billion (around USD 336 M supplemental allocation to the 2014 annual budget to fund the immediate needs for relief and early recovery.¹⁵

Box 3. Core Recovery Principles Outlined in RAY

- Local governments will be responsible for implementation, to ensure that recovery is tailored to local conditions and promotes community participation, ownership and sustainability.
- The national government will take charge of oversight and coordination but will make sure that there is flexibility in local implementation.
- Recovery programs will promote inclusiveness and sustainable livelihoods in order to address pre-existing poverty issues that drive disaster risk in the affected areas.
- Gender considerations will be incorporated into the design and implementation of recovery and reconstruction activities to address gender inequality and promote women’s empowerment.
- There will be an emphasis on fast tracking the implementation of programs and activities, but at the same time systems will also be put in place to track and assess performance, to ensure transparency and accountability.
- RAY is guided by the “build back better” principle, which focuses on sustainable efforts to reduce vulnerabilities and strengthen capacities to cope with future hazard events.

¹³ Please note the following timelines: RAY (three weeks from November to December 2014); PDNA (three months from January to April 2014); and CRRP (four months April 2014 to August 2014)

¹⁴ Interview with NEDA Undersecretary Emmanuel Esguerra, June 2014.

¹⁵ ABS-CBN News Corporation. (2014). <https://anc.yahoo.com/news/pnoy-signs-p14-6-b-supplemental-budget-for-yolanda-hit-areas-063600286.html>. [accessed August 17, 2014]

19. **RAY enabled the Government to determine appropriate policies and resources to reduce the social and economic cost from the disaster.** RAY focused on how much the Government needed to spend in order to respond to Yolanda. This information could not wait until the post disaster needs assessment (PDNA) process was completed, so the Government exercised flexibility and authority to formulate its own macro-economic assessment. Injecting liquidity in the economy was one of the major concerns of the Government in order to keep the economy on track.
20. **Under the DRRM Act, the OCD is tasked to conduct the PDNA within a month and a half following a disaster.** The development of the RAY before the mandated PDNA caused some initial confusion among national government agencies and international development partners. OCD mobilized multi-sectoral teams composed of representatives from national government agencies and local governments to collect and verify information on disaster impacts at the local level.¹⁶ The PDNA focused on generating feedback from the affected LGUs and communities on the principles and priority areas to fast track recovery on the ground. The PDNA was completed three months after Typhoon Yolanda and was formally transmitted by the OCD to NEDA on April 30, 2014. The PDNA only accounts for public sector damage and losses, while RAY includes damage and losses for both the government and private sectors. Table 3 provides a brief comparison between the RAY and the PDNA.
21. **Due to expediency of meeting the budget deliberations, the Government modified the usual sequence of assessment and planning.** Legally, the DRRM Law mandates the OCD to lead post-disaster assessments, while NEDA leads recovery planning. In terms of an ideal sequence, an assessment underpins recovery planning. Due to the urgency of meeting the Congressional requisite, NEDA submitted RAY, in agreement with the OCD, that a more thorough post-disaster assessment could commence in January 2014. The pace by which these assessments were prepared in the past would not be able to match up with the urgent budgetary process triggered by Congress at the time.

Table 3. Comparison between RAY and PDNA

	RAY	PDNA
Government Lead Agency	NEDA	OCD
Date of completion	December 2013	April 2014
Objective	Pass supplemental budget for 2013 and to reflect on 2014 annual budget	As part of requirements set forth by the DRRM Act
Approach	Top down	Bottom up

¹⁶Office of the Presidential Assistant for Recovery and Reconstruction, Yolanda Rehabilitation and Recovery Efforts, 2014

4. Recovery Planning

22. **The CRRP constitutes the overall blue print for the post-disaster planning system of the Yolanda recovery and reconstruction program, anchored on the development principles of the Philippine Development Plan.** From an institutional perspective, the alignment of the CRRP with the Philippine Development Plan represents a results framework that link inputs to outputs, outputs to outcomes, and outcomes to an overall goal. In particular, outcomes enunciated in the RAY are aligned to the sectoral cluster plans of the CRRP established by OPARR, which in turn, details national budget requirements, additional staffing needs, and supplemental technical and organizational capacity for successful implementation. The bottom up approach of the PDNA serves as a baseline for the local funding requirements (see Figure 4).




Figure 5. Planning System for Yolanda Rehabilitation and Recovery
(Source: NEDA)

23. **The CRRP consolidates the multiple layers of plans prepared by the national government agencies and LGUs.** The plan draws on the goals, principles, strategies, and results framework already established under RAY and the PDNA. The CRRP asserts the “build back better” as guiding principle for Government’s investment in the Yolanda affected areas. It

articulates the overall national strategic vision for rehabilitation and recovery across the 171 priority cities and municipalities, located within the 50 kilometer radius of the typhoons' path, as below. The CRRP estimates the investment requirement of Php171 billion from 2014 to 16.

- ✓ restore, rehabilitate or reconstruct damaged infrastructure necessary to sustain economic and social activities in the affected areas;
- ✓ repair houses or rebuild settlements and basic community facilities and services making them more resilient to natural calamities;
- ✓ restore livelihoods and the continuity of economic activities and businesses; and
- ✓ increase resilience and capacities of communities to cope with future hazard events.

24. OPARR undertook a consultative approach to allocation of funding and resources in which the Local Government Rehabilitation and Recovery Plans (LRRP) developed by affected LGUs get “vetted” by the experience and policies of the national government agencies.

The vetting process reconciles the local needs with the Government's objectives as indicated in the CRRP. Inputs from private actors such as businesses, NGOs or CSOs, local communities and households have also been incorporated through the consultation processes established by OPARR to develop the CRRP.

Box 4. The Availability of Updated Baseline Data and Development Plans Expedites Planning for Recovery

A month before the Yolanda disaster, the municipality of Tanauan had updated its baseline data and revisited their Comprehensive Development Plan. This ex ante exercise paved the way for the speedy formulation of its RRP, earning the distinction as the first local government unit to submit their RRP to OPARR.

25. Some LGUs benefitted from technical assistance to formulate their recovery and rehabilitation plans. In the absence of relevant government guidelines, many took the form of development plans wherein planned investments or activities do not operationally separate recovery, response, and long-term development. The level of technical rigor applied in the crafting of local recovery plans is uneven across LGUs, depending on whether the LGU had access to technical assistance from external partners. In many cases, the local recovery plans reflected 'wish lists' of all needs, and as such, prioritization has been critical to inform local resource allocation and implementation . These factors prompted OPARR to subject all plans to a vetting process to enable the objective assessment of priorities and appropriate use of resources.¹⁷

26. OPARR's consultative approach aimed to reconcile prioritization across provincial plans, the cluster plans, and the objectives of national sectoral agencies to ensure efficient use of national resources. The consultative approach adopted by OPARR enabled the stakeholders to understand the trade-offs and reach consensus, especially on the extent of support for local priorities.

¹⁷Post Yolanda Recovery Case Study Validation Workshop, August 27, 2014, World Bank Manila Office

27. **The multiple layers of recovery plans that emanated from Yolanda caused initial confusion and delays in finalizing the overall plan.** These multiple layers of planning were not deliberated ex-ante, but were borne by the government's improvisation of the process, as they tried to meet the demands of Congress for inputs to the budget, post-disaster assessment as mandated by law, and the need for sectoral, regional and local plan to confirm priority and establish transparency in the process. The RAY, PDNA, and CRRP built on each other to ensure consistency in policies, strategies, and priorities.
28. **Planning, while consultative, was also treated as a one-off process, with the recovery plan** as the final output of this process. The CRRP was therefore seen as the ultimate basis upon which all decisions for prioritization and budgeting would be founded. The view that CRRP has to be all encompassing and spotless entailed an iterative formulation process; the CRRP itself was submitted to the President in August 2014. The entire recovery planning from RAY to CRRP took nine months in all to complete. While it is difficult to prescribe 'ideal' timeframes within which to complete the recovery planning process, the principle of acting as swiftly as possible is fundamental. The reason that a less-than-perfect plan is good enough is hinged on the belief that plans are reviewed periodically in the course of its implementation. Moreover, the planning horizon is generally much longer as recovery takes a longer time to achieve, than the current prescription of two years.

5. Recovery Financing and Financial Management

29. **Financial resources for DRRM-related activities are commonly appropriated in the annual national budget.** These include:

- a) National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (NDRRMF) – a special purpose, lump-sum fund intended to cover aid relief and rehabilitation services to communities/areas affected by man-made and natural calamities, and repair and reconstruction of permanent structures, including capital expenditures for disaster operation, and rehabilitation activities.¹⁸ DBM administers the fund and releases monies directly to the implementing agencies (including LGUs) upon the approval of the President of the Philippines with the endorsement of the NDRRMC (in the case of local disasters) or the appropriate agency (for internal crisis).
- b) Quick Response Fund (QRF) – are built-in budgetary allocations that represent pre-disaster or standby funds for agencies to immediately assist areas stricken by catastrophes and crises.¹⁹ Agencies that have built-in QRFs include DPWH, DSWD, the Department of National Defense (Office of the Secretary and the OCD), the Department of Education, and the Department of Agriculture. The release and use of these funds are not subject to the President's approval and recommendation of the NDRRMC. Also, agencies may request the replenishment of their QRF to DBM subject to the approval of the Office of the President. QRFs were previously programmed as part of the NDRRMF, but have been decentralized among eligible national agencies since 2012.

30. **At the local level, LGUs are mandated under RA 10121 to set aside no less than 5% of their estimated revenue from regular sources as their LDRRM Fund (LDRRMF) to support DRRM related activities.** The eligible use of the LDRRMF includes pre-disaster preparedness programs and training, purchasing life-saving rescue equipment, supplies and medicines for post-disaster activities, and for payment of premiums on calamity insurance. Thirty percent of the LDRRMF serves as the local QRF that can be spent for emergency purposes. Should the resources under the fund remain unspent, LGUs can set these aside in trust funds for a period of five years after which it can be reverted back to the LGUs' general fund. LGUs can also access funds from the NDRRMF to augment their budget for disaster response and recovery.

31. **Also, national government agencies and first income class LGUs are required under the Property Insurance Law (Republic Act 656 of 1951) to insure their properties against risks such as fire, earthquake, storm or other calamities.** The law caps the amount of insurance premiums to the premium charged by private insurance companies. A Property Insurance Fund, administered by the Government Service Insurance System, was established under the law to indemnify claims in the event of loss or damage to government property.

¹⁸ http://www.dbm.gov.ph/?page_id=2584

¹⁹ Ibid

Compliance, however, has been uneven as previous disasters (*e.g.* the Bohol earthquake which struck Central Visayas a month before Yolanda), revealing that many LGU properties were uninsured.²⁰

32. **Given the scale of the requirements to recover from Yolanda, the National Government assumed responsibility for funding the majority of the recovery requirements within its own budget. Downloading funds to the local level has proven to be challenging.** The bigger challenge lies in funding recovery needs out of LGU resources, even from their LDRRMF, especially for low-income municipalities (see Box 5). This is especially exacerbated when LGUs are confronted with disasters of Yolanda's scale, which can severely affect their tax base and cash flows. In the aftermath of Yolanda, there were no readily available mechanisms to download funds from the national level to the local levels.
33. **The existing transfer mechanisms were not up to task to support local recovery.** The IRA, the largest form of inter-governmental transfer, represents LGU share in national domestic revenues. These are transferred through budgetary instruments for the overall public administration of LGUs. These are not necessarily provided for the particular purpose of meeting post-disaster requirements, such that affected LGUs cannot expect that their share in the IRA would be increased in proportion to new needs brought about by recovery and rehabilitation. The conditions for transfer are likewise fixed, such as area of jurisdiction and population.
34. **The NDRRMF theoretically allows transfers for ex-post and ex-ante projects of either national government agencies or LGUs, securing funds for local recovery is uncertain.** There are at least two factors that make the NDRRMF a highly variable source of funds for local recovery. Securing OCD endorsement and presidential approval of a request for funding for LGUs is highly uncertain. Second, the annual allocation is generally inadequate to support the full year emergency operations of national government agencies, much less the LGUs and their recovery needs.
35. **To support LGUs planning to access financing, the National Government streamlined processes and requirements, especially pertaining to LGU access to available resources.** To reduce the administrative burden of LGUs in accessing funds from various available conduits, the Bureau of Local Government Finance was authorized by the Department of Finance to reduce the administrative requirements for LGUs to apply for Certificates of Maximum Capacity and Debt Servicing Capacity, allowing them quicker access to funds for recovery. The Department of Interior and Local Government also streamlined the certification process for LGUs to be eligible to tap national government grants and official development assistance. This streamlining process is expected to be in place the next two years.²¹

²⁰ <http://www.sunstar.com.ph/tacloban/local-news/2012/05/10/audit-tells-lgus-have-properties-insured-220773> [Accessed 12 Feb 2015]

²¹ Official Gazette (2014). <http://www.gov.ph/2014/05/28/dof-blgf-certifies-yolanda-lgus-capacity-for-p1b-own-loan-financing-bids/>. [Accessed 23 August 2014]

Box 5. Realities of the LDRMMF

To a certain extent, an effective response and recovery is dependent on the availability of financial reserves and contingency mechanisms, which are hardly available to the majority of LGUs. Section 21 of RA 10121 states that not less than 5% of the LGU's estimated revenue from regular sources shall be set aside as the LDRRMF to support disaster risk management activities. However, what is actually happening in the field is starkly different from this provision. Some LGUs, specially the low-income class municipalities, can hardly realize the estimated revenues as their actual collection is always lower than the estimated revenue. Therefore, even if LGUs exert utmost efforts to comply with the mandatory provision on LDRRMF, they do not usually back it up with actual cash.

Local governments are not equally exposed or vulnerable to disasters. Some local governments are more prone to disasters than others, which has a serious impact on their finances. However, the national policy for devolution of finances does not recognize these varying levels of vulnerabilities.

Source: "Disaster Management Practices in the Philippines – An Assessment" (Commission on Audit, 5 September 2014).

36. **The recovery effort is also taking advantage of existing government programs and mechanisms to disburse much needed financing to the LGUs for reconstruction and rehabilitation.** A major recovery initiative of the Government is the expansion of the coverage of its National Community-Driven Development Program (NCDDP) to include 500 communities affected by Yolanda, with funding support from Asian Development Bank (ADB) (USD 372.1 M) and the World Bank (USD 479 M). The NCDDP supports the target communities in planning, budgeting, implementing and maintaining local-level infrastructure projects such as water systems, school buildings, day care and health centers, as well as roads and bridges.²²
37. **Non-traditional conduits were also identified to support local recovery.** The government explored the possibility of tapping government financial institutions as conduits of funds and technical assistance to support local recovery. Transferring funds to these public institutions was explored, leveraging national funds with existing fiduciary and technical capacities of these institutions to ensure transparency in the distribution of funds and strict adherence to technical quality check. This scheme offered a lot of promise, as the government wanted to draw lessons from this pilot implementation to expand options for support to local recovery. However, government appraisal was not favourable to this scheme, not because of its lack of technical merits, but because the nearing local elections were feared to create more questions on this scheme.

²² Department of Social Welfare and Development (2014). <http://www.dswd.gov.ph/2014/06/national-community-driven-development-program-to-prioritize-yolanda-hit-areas/>. [Accessed 23 August 2014]

38. Time-bound credit programs were instituted to specifically support the recovery of affected enterprises. The

Government established initiatives such as the Enterprise Rehabilitation Financing Program (ERFP) and the Credit Support Fund (CSF) to support livelihood recovery. The Small Business Corporation of the Department of Trade and Industry launched the ERFP to support the recovery of micro-, small- and medium-scale enterprises (MSMEs).²³ The CSF is a USD 45.40 M assistance program managed by the Land Bank of the Philippines that is intended to provide loans to approximately 416,000 micro-entrepreneurs for livelihood activities such as farming, raising livestock, and the establishment of neighborhood stores.²⁴

Box 6. Sourcing Funds for Recovery in Indonesia, 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami and the 2005 Sumatra Earthquake

In response to the Government of Indonesia's request to coordinate recovery support from donors in the affected areas, following the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami and the subsequent 2005 Sumatra Earthquake, the Multi-Donor Fund (MDF) for Aceh and Nias was established in April 2005. Harnessing partnerships between government, donors, communities and other stakeholders, the MDF proved to be a successful model for post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction. It managed to generate 10 percent of the overall recovery funds amounting to US\$655 million in contributions from 15 donors.

Source: "From Rebuilding to Revitalizing: Five Years After the Tsunami - Building Capacity for a Stronger Future in Aceh and Nias" (World Bank, December 2009).

39. The CRRP pegged the overall recovery funding requirement for years 2014-2016 to Php171 billion (about USD 3.9 billion) to bring the country back on track to meet the targets set by the Philippine Development Plan.²⁵ Multilateral agencies and international organizations have pledged loans of USD 2.93 B and grants of USD 213 M to assist in the recovery efforts.²⁶ The largest donor is the ADB, which has pledged around USD 1.12 B in the form of grants and loans. When the Government called for budget proposals for 2015, it has recognized that a significant amount of the recovery requirements will likely be unfunded. Implementing agencies were enjoined to reprogram existing budgets to accommodate the Yolanda reconstruction needs within budgetary constraints and explore the possibility of cancelling or deferring less urgent activities and projects or those that can be undertaken by the private sector.²⁷ In December 2014, the President signed the General Appropriations Act for 2015, which allots Php21.7 billion (approximately USD 500 M) for rehabilitation requirements for Yolanda. A 2014 supplemental budget of Php 22.4 billion (USD 516 M) was also signed to fund mostly Yolanda-related reconstruction projects.

²³ It is a USD 15.90M loan program where MSMEs can loan between USD 4,500 to USD 0.11 M, payable in five years with annual interest rates of five to six percent, and with a one-year grace period on both principal and interest payments.

²⁴ Department Official Gazette (2014). <http://www.gov.ph/2014/05/07/aquino-admin-rolls-out-p2b-for-yolanda-hit-entrepreneurs-to-jumpstart-livelihood-recovery/>. [Accessed 23 August 2014]

²⁵ Yolanda Comprehensive Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan, OPARR, August 1, 2014

²⁶ OPARR, 2014

²⁷ National Budget Memorandum No. 119, 23 December 2013 <http://www.dbm.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/Issuances/2013/National%20Budget%20Memorandum/NBM119/NBM119.pdf>

6. Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation

40. **The quick adoption of the Supplemental Budget in January 2014 enabled the National Government to mobilize the much needed resources into the recovery process.** As LGU capacities were greatly weakened in the aftermath of Yolanda, national government agencies took a central role in implementing immediate recovery projects at the local level to normalize LGU operations. For example, an initial Php 2.1 billion (USD 48 M) was released to DILG for the repair and reconstruction of vital local facilities and structures (specifically for provincial, city, and municipal buildings, public markets, civic centers and barangay facilities) that were damaged.²⁸ To implement, DILG entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with DPWH for the reconstruction, rehabilitation and repair of these priority LGU structures. Savings and unprogrammed funds from the 2013 budget were disbursed for the immediate restoration of power in affected areas (undertaken by the National Electrification Authority) and provision of early recovery requirements, such as livelihood support (DA, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources), and other forms of social protection schemes (DSWD).²⁹
41. **Implementation was saddled by weakened capacities of implementing agencies, absence of ex-ante implementation mechanisms and tools, and delays in addressing bottlenecks that arose during implementation.** The fiscal position of the government created a space to absorb the fiscal and economic impact of disasters. Since the typhoon occurred, the government has had continued access to liquidity to support identified recovery priorities. After all, the public sector requirement constitutes no more than 20% of the recovery needs.

²⁸Department of Budget and Management. (2014). P32-B in Total Aid Released as of Mid-May; Abad: Ample Funds Remain for post-Calamity Efforts. <http://www.dbm.gov.ph/?p=9054>

²⁹ Ibid.

42. **Government procurement and contracting policies were relaxed to expedite recovery activities.** The Government Procurement Policy Board waived prior clearance requirements for government contracts of less than Php500 million (USD 11.5 M) for as long as documentation of the transactions is submitted at the end of every month. It similarly allowed government entities to procure goods and infrastructure projects via negotiated procurement for as long as these expenditures are covered by an approved budget for a contract of at least Php 500 million for the purpose of rescue, recovery, relief and/or rehabilitation during the state of calamity.³⁰

Box 6. Public-Private Partnership in Yolanda Recovery

An example of effective public private partnerships can be seen with the mass housing project in the northern part of Tacloban City. The land (covering 12 hectares) where the new houses are being built is owned by the City Government and the construction of the houses are being supported by a private foundation, the GMA Kapuso Foundation and the international NGO Habitat for Humanity. The development of the site (provision of roads, water and power) will be covered by the National Housing Authority, a national government agency. The local government supported the selection and mobilization of beneficiaries, who in turn, provided labor equity during construction.

43. **In light of the magnitude of resources involved in the relief, recovery and rehabilitation efforts and the relaxation of some controls during the period state of calamity, immediate post-audit of all disaster-related transactions were carried out to ensure that all transactions were undertaken above board.** The audit covered the sources and receipts of foreign aid, releases of local funds by DBM, Office of the President, NDRRMC and other agencies, inter-agency transfer of funds, procurement and logistics and the distribution of goods and services.³¹

44. **COA mentioned that during disasters, government officials tend to struggle between adhering to accountability mechanisms and the need for rapid response.** COA subsequently issued accounting and reporting guidelines for utilization of the NDRRMF, donations (in cash and in kind) from local and foreign sources and funds allocated to the DRRM program to establish controls and emergency procedures during disasters. COA noted the following weaknesses during the emergency operations for Yolanda:

- Procedural lapses/ deficiencies in accounting for receipt and utilization of funds
- Procurement and contracting issues (*e.g.*, possible abuse of expedited transactions such as distribution of good could not be substantiated in paper, foregoing competitive public bidding for goods, and inability to provide timely reports)
- Documentation and recording issues such as lapses in documenting donations and movement of supplies
- Management of Inventory, supplies and warehousing, issues (reliable inventory is crucial in the determination of the volume of relief goods to be ordered as well as timeliness in placing orders)

³⁰ Resolution no. 34-2013 on November 14, 2013

³¹ GPBB Resolution No. 2013-2014 on November 20, 2013

- Loading, shipments and logistics management issues leading to delays in the delivery of relief goods. These partly stem from government officials being too afraid to violate the law or at the least incur the possibility of a certain transaction being disallowed. A lot of the conditions created by the aftermath of the typhoon are unexpected and therefore awaiting a new set of guidance.

45. **COA issued additional guidelines in order to address these observations.** With funding from USAID, COA also held seminars for government agencies around May 2014 regarding enhancing audit of disaster management systems and on defining accountability and responsibility over the DRRM fund. The report did not provide any information, however, on any other follow-up actions aside from guidelines and awareness building exercises and whether charges were made against erring officials. It is recognized that these delays and weaknesses are exacerbated by the weakened capacities on the ground. Hence, the challenge has been making the implementing agencies understand and apply these guidelines ex-ante.
46. **Around ninety percent of the disaster impact was borne by the private sector, especially the private households and the small and medium enterprises.** Unfortunately, the policies and implementation mechanisms of the Government to address the needs of low income private households and small businesses are not adequate to meet the scale of the disaster impact. Restoring local economic activities that were destroyed by the disaster takes time, harnessing the competencies of the private sector and market mechanisms. The government's approach to distribution of inputs and restoring basic production facilities are necessary, but not necessarily sufficient to support local economic development.
47. **With over 1 million homes damaged due to the disaster, housing remains the biggest challenge for the Government.** For example, the Government has successfully implemented community-driven housing recovery after small localized disasters in the past. But this approach has not been tested in the face of 500k homes that were totally damaged by typhoon Yolanda. For this scale, the government's main approach focuses on resettlement, and not necessarily overall housing needs.
48. To facilitate resettlement activities, the Office of the President issued Administrative Order No. 44 on October 28, 2014 to cut down the number of days required for the issuance of permits, licenses and clearances for housing and resettlement projects in Yolanda-affected areas. The Department of Agrarian Reform likewise streamlined the application processes (for applications up to June 30, 2016 only) for land use conversion for the construction of resettlement areas.³² As per the CRRP, the Government has committed to support resettlement of over 200,000 households living in declared unsafe zones. However, implementation remains a challenge due to land availability and tenure and the lack of large-scale delivery mechanisms.

³² DAR Administrative Order No. 9 series of 2014 (10 November 2014)

49. Resettlement is a complex process and may not always be necessary.

CSOs working in the housing cluster emphasized that a more resilient and participatory approach should be taken that focuses on the actual needs of the community.³³ Resettlement is but one among the many options that could be offered to restore housing and communities. Practices related to community-based and community-driven housing recovery are present, but have been mainly limited to CSOs and to such agencies as the Social Housing Finance Corporation and DSWD.

Box 7. Implementing Programs through Existing Network of Civil Society Organizations

The Inter-Church Organization for Development Cooperation (ICCO) office has donated funds of about €3.6 million for projects in areas not covered by other organizations. Projects focus on community-identified needs, which include enterprise development, psycho-social support, and initiatives addressing land rights issues. The network works closely with LGUs and the DA in selected projects. Effective implementation is ensured through regular monitoring, conducted through field visits and project reports.

50. A major challenge being faced by local governments in their resettlement program is the provision for livelihood support to those internally displaced by Typhoon Yolanda.

Displaced households who used to derive their income from the coastal areas and nearby city establishments now find themselves with limited livelihood opportunities. This burden is heavier for “widowed” households – families who lost their main income earners because of Typhoon Yolanda.³⁴ Weeks after Yolanda struck, it was gathered that LGUs such as Tacloban City has undertaken the profiling of these households and an inventory of their skills set in order to plan livelihood programs that are better suited to their conditions.

51. Through the leadership of PARR, an implementation approach that integrates housing and livelihood restoration is being planned to cover around 4,000 families in select LGUs. An initial partnership agreement among NHA, SFC, pilot LGUs, and CSOs has been formulated to identify the roles and responsibilities of the partners. Lessons from implementation will inform the refinement of policies that can guide future recovery efforts especially from large-scale disasters.

52. Stakeholders have expressed that there is a prevailing lack of capacity, particularly for LGUs, to implement projects that are being funded by the national government and other donors. Some respondents in the study have expressed that more than the availability of funds, the absorptive capacity of LGUs to carry out projects poses a bigger concern. This is especially true for lower income class municipalities that have no trained municipal engineers and have limited experience in implementing projects that require hiring contractors. There is an expressed need to invest in capacity building activities alongside major investments, such as infrastructure and housing, to ensure investment viability and sustainability.

³³Post Yolanda Recovery Case Study Validation Workshop, August 27, 2014, World Bank Manila Office

³⁴ Respondents reported that the husbands and eldest sons stayed behind to look after their houses while the wives, females in the family, and younger children, left for higher ground when residents are being asked to evacuate because of the typhoon.

53. **NEDA released RAY 2 (Implementation for Results)³⁵, which outlines the monitoring and evaluation framework for the Yolanda recovery.** Primary oversight functions were initially planned to be shared among OPARR (for the monitoring of the implementation of CRRP), NEDA (for monitoring Yolanda outcomes in relation to the Philippine Development Plan) and DBM (for monitoring budget releases and the utilization of budget allocations). Regular progress monitoring will be conducted using the agreed results framework outlined in RAY2 as well as periodic evaluation to assess overall progress. Once the mandate of the PARR expires, the monitoring functions will be transferred to NEDA.

54. **Several tools have been developed to facilitate a more transparent monitoring of implementation:**

- ✓ **OPARR developed the eManagement Platform: Accountability and Transparency Hub for Yolanda (eMPATHY) as a tool to monitor the progress of activities related to Yolanda recovery.** Operating on a web-based platform, eMPATHY is envisaged as a centralized system for tracking down expenditures and implementation progress of the CRRP. Implementation agencies are given access to the platform and tasked to provide updates on their respective activities and projects. OPARR envisaged eMPATHY as its legacy as the design of its database interface can be applied to monitoring recovery efforts for future disasters. The eMPATHY will consolidate all rehab and recovery projects and ensure that all agencies and stakeholders are looking at one common platform and one common project listing.
- ✓ **Monitoring geared towards improving transparency in the flow of funds from donors is done through a tool called Foreign Aid Transparency Hub (FAiTH), which is administered by the DBM.** FAiTH is an online portal that provides information primarily on humanitarian assistance pledged or given by countries and international organizations, as well as donations coursed through the Commission on Filipinos Overseas' Lingkod sa Kapwa Pilipino program, and in the future, donations coursed through Philippine embassies abroad.³⁶
- ✓ DBM also launched the Open Reconstruction, an open platform system that tags expenditures related to Yolanda once it enters the budget ticketing system and tracks and monitors progress through procurement, implementation, and auditing. The system has been realigned to pull out data from eMPATHY.
- ✓ The OPARR website (oparr.gov.ph) also provides updates on the status of the implementation of the sectoral targets of its four clusters (see Annex 4 for further details).

55. **The discord that exists in the financial management system of government is a real concern as this undermines the effective monitoring system that links outcomes to outputs, budgets and expenditures, and accomplishments across agencies remains a challenge.** There are tools that exist within agencies and those that were designed after

³⁵ http://www.neda.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/ray_ver2_final.pdf

³⁶ (<http://www.gov.ph/faith>)

Typhoon Yolanda, such as the FAITH, Empathy, and Open Reconstruction in response to the public clamor to know where the resources are being spent. However, these systems do not necessarily convey a comprehensive picture of how much resources have actually been made available for post Haiyan needs.

56. **The underlying system for coordination, monitoring, and reporting remains weak.** The Government recognizes that systems for planning, budgeting and disbursements, implementation, accounting and auditing need to be tightened to achieve sustainable and effective monitoring and evaluation. The tools currently available are seen as initial platforms that can be improved over time, along with improvements in institutional arrangements.

7. Conclusions and Way Forward

Figure 5 provides a summary of the recovery milestones and challenges based on information and available data collected during the study.




Figure 6. Summary of Recovery Milestones and Challenges

57. **The strength of the post-Typhoon Yolanda recovery process is reflected in the Government's flexibility to re-organize its institutional mandates to adapt to a given circumstance.** The Philippines is accustomed to several small and medium scale disasters that affect the country repeatedly within a year; however, the impact of Typhoon Yolanda was unprecedented. Existing institutional arrangements may be adequate for disasters of smaller scale but were severely strained in dealing with disasters of Yolanda's scale. The Government has since considered Yolanda as the "new normal" that sets the benchmark for reviewing policies and implementation strategies related to disaster risk reduction.

"If there is one important lesson that the rest of the world can learn from our experience with Yolanda, it is that we cannot make rules and expect all situations to adapt to them- especially when we are dealing with disasters."

- Secretary Baliscan, Asia Europe
Manila Conference on Disaster
Risk Reduction and Management
June 5, 2014

58. **The impact of the disaster has forced the Government to seriously rethink its institutional framework to effectively deal with large-scale disasters.** There may be a valid justification for formalizing the management of disasters through a dedicated permanent government institution to coordinate and manage all kind of emergencies and disasters, particularly for a country as vulnerable as the Philippines. This entity (*e.g.*, a permanent "OPARR" inspired structure) would not substitute or duplicate existing line agencies of government, but would be in charge of three important functions: 1) distributing and monitoring the additional funds related to the declaration of disasters; 2) undertaking the important job of prevention and risk reduction to reduce losses in the long term; and 3) beefing up the capacities of implementers during large scale disasters. Unlike the current OPARR, the evolving institutional structure ideally possesses the full authority and mandate to influence outcomes. There are several bills drafted by the Philippine Congress promoting various models aiming to establish an "OPARR"-inspired entity, akin to United States' Federal Emergency Management Agency and other models. The current thematic approach espoused by the NDRRMC structure is likewise being reviewed to align better with the institutionalized sectoral implementation norms in government.³⁷

59. **The permanence of this institution cannot be overemphasized enough, as the regime of creating ad hoc institutions has the tendency to proliferate overlapping structures with diluted contributions to effective recovery.** Creating these structures consumes time and resources that do not necessarily contribute to the speed and efficiency of recovery implementation. Establishing a permanent institution whose capacity and knowledge can be built over time has advantages that far outweigh the benefits of multiple institutions with time bound existence.

³⁷ Post Yolanda Recovery Case Study Validation Workshop, August 27, 2014, World Bank Manila Office

60. **Yolanda has also revealed that existing institutional bottlenecks need to be addressed especially as they undermine the effective implementation of recovery and reconstruction activities.** Issues that pertain to national- local government relations and intergovernmental transfers, land management and resettlement, and support to private sector and private households, among others have serious implications on addressing urgent and large scale implementation of recovery programs. Since these issues have far-reaching impacts beyond disaster management and reduction, they need to be discussed with a broader constituency both within and outside government.
61. **Systems for emergency response, recovery and rehabilitation would also need to be reviewed vis-à-vis the lessons learned from Yolanda.** The Government has the ability to streamline and relax procedures and policies to fast track the implementation of Yolanda-related activities. Lessons from Yolanda recovery identify which of these flexible and innovative processes can be institutionalized as the government increases its capacity to address disaster impacts. One example cited by COA is the need to simplify the process flow and longer availment window of DRRM funds to ensure that national government agencies and LGUs can easily allocate resources for disaster-related activities.³⁸ There is also the challenge of engaging quick action that takes full consideration to transparency and accountability. For instance, COA has found many examples wherein LGUs were not able to quickly access funds due to long-standing issues on procedural lapses and deficiencies in fully accounting for internal funds used for disaster risk management and/or for funds transferred to them by national government agencies. Policies and mechanisms, if set ex-ante, can balance the need for timely response to disasters with the governance requirements set at the central level.

Box 8. Hazard Mapping and Land Use

In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, many sectors necessitated instruction to build back better. The Government was compelled to revive past instructions that relate to no build zones per the Water Code of the Philippines (Presidential Decree No. 1067 of December 31, 1976). However, the Government and its partners recognized the difficulty of implementing the instruction and modified the guidance that now prescribes regulations corresponding to identified hazards.

In line with the modified guidelines, the Government is fast tracking hazard assessments to inform a more resilient land use.

62. **As the timeframe of the CRRP only lasts two years, a major concern is sustaining and funding rehabilitation and recovery beyond 2016.** Recovery implementation is a process that takes time, ranging from five to 10 years, especially for large and complex disasters like Yolanda. To ensure that recovery is sustainable and durable, a recovery plan ideally covers the short to long-term requirements that can be reviewed eventually especially by changing political leadership. Instead of limiting the planning horizon to two years, a process for review and updating could have been provided to enable a more transparent decision-making on how the plan can be supported despite changing political landscape.

³⁸ Commission on Audit, Disaster Management Practices in the Philippines: An Assessment, September 5, 2014

63. **A streamlined process for post-disaster assessment and recovery planning is also crucial to set and sustain the momentum for recovery implementation.** The speed by which the Government delivered RAY was watered down by the fact that implementation and disbursement of funds became tied to a one-off master planning exercise. Revisiting the roles of agencies and local protocols is an important next step following lessons from Yolanda. Energy of implementing agencies and stakeholders on the ground cannot be wholly spent on assessment and planning, as implementation needs more attention. Government leadership and ownership of this process is likewise key to ensure their linkage with the budgeting process.
64. **Yolanda recovery highlights the global debate on how to define recovery.** Many have expressed that response and recovery and development should be thought of as overlapping processes instead of defined, rigid steps. These terms and definitions affect every process of recovery, from response, to planning, to financing, to implementation, to monitoring.
65. **Stakeholders, from government officials to civil society representatives, have stressed the urgency of and necessity for a refined policy on meeting the housing needs.** A more holistic approach is critical, to address not just resettlement and infrastructure rehabilitation, but also restoration of livelihoods and access to services. Efforts are underway to establish initial policies that can inform pilot implementation of these integrated schemes.
66. **A transparent and unified system for monitoring and evaluation is very critical.** The current discord in the financial management, procurement, and delivery systems of government undermine monitoring and evaluation. It is important that all stakeholders – from implementors to general public can refer to a unified platform across government that provide consistent information on the progress of recovery and reconstruction. Having such a system is critical to ensure the credibility of the recovery process.
67. **The Government is using its existing mechanisms for coordination, like the Philippine Development Forum, as a platform to coordinate the local and international development community.** The Government’s leadership and ownership of this process has facilitated quick coordination with the development partners and encouraged them to work within these set processes and mechanisms. Adhering to external mechanisms is not sustainable because they do not build local and national capacity, but rather undermine government ownership of the recovery process.
68. **The experience with Yolanda has taught communities and the Government the importance of preparation and coordination to avert disasters.** The country’s system for disaster preparedness was tested in December 2014, when Typhoon Ruby (international name Hagupit) entered the Philippine area of responsibility. Communities themselves wasted no time in undertaking the necessary preparations with the aid of local governments. The NDRRMC introduced a pre-disaster assessment to ensure that all necessary resources and actions are well in place before the typhoon starts ravaging the communities. A category 4 typhoon, casualties from typhoon Ruby were kept at a minimum. The UN reports that it is one of the largest evacuation efforts ever done since the Second World War.

69. Lessons on recovery continue to unfold, and partnerships continue to be forged to help the residents, communities and local governments start over and build back better.

Implementation mechanisms and procedures are being enhanced to facilitate quick actions on the ground. The Government is now looking at establishing a program for LGU catastrophe risk insurance, and improving the insurance of public assets specifically public schools. It has also started to undertake the review of the DRMM law and it is expected that the lessons from Yolanda and other large-scale disasters will provide invaluable insights to strengthening the disaster recovery framework currently in place.

Box 9. Postscript

The President issued Memorandum Order No. 79 on April 22, 2015, which modifies the institutional mechanism for monitoring and rehabilitation of rehabilitation and recovery of Yolanda-affected areas. As the conditions on the ground continue to normalize, the former functions of the PARR have now been subsumed under the NDRRMC, as provided by the National DRRM Law.

This instruction draws on the leadership of NEDA, as the Vice-Chair for Recovery and Reconstruction under the NDRRMC structure. NEDA's mandates includes the coordination, monitoring, and evaluation of all disaster-related programs, projects, and activities (PPAs) previously under the PARR, and representation in all clusters to be able to validate, integrated and prepare regular reports on recovery and reconstruction. NEDA may also draw on both government and non-government players in the conduct of its function. A Project Monitoring Office may be created to beef up internal NEDA capacity.

The implementation arrangement remains the same, drawing on the sectoral agencies to implement identified priorities and existing budgetary and auditing practices of government.

Annex 1 List of Key Informant Interviews

National Government

1. Hon. Panfilo Lacson, Secretary, Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery
2. Hon. Arsenio Balisacan, Secretary/Director General, National Economic and Development Authority
3. Hon. Rogelio Singson, Secretary, Department of Public Works and Highways
4. Ms. Heidi Mendoza, Commissioner, Commission on Audit
5. Mr. Emmanuel Esguerra, Deputy Director General, National Economic and Development Authority
6. Ms. Rosemarie Edillon, Assistant Director General NDO, Policy and Planning Division, National Economic and Development Authority
7. Ms. Vilma Cabrera, Assistant Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development
8. Mr. Romeo Fajardo, Deputy Administrator, Office of Civil Defense
9. Mr. Rene Manantan, Director and Yolanda Project Manager, Department of Agriculture
10. Ms. Ruby Aguas, Department of Trade and Industry
11. Ms. Mylene Rivera, Director-Asset Reform Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
12. Ms. Lorna M. Seraspe, Group Manager - Visayas Management Office, National Housing Authority
13. Engr. Zaldy Mediavillo, Regional Manager – Visayas Area Management Office, National Housing Authority
14. Ms. Meylene Rosales, OIC-Division Chief of the Policy Formulation and Planning Division, National Economic and Development Authority Region 8
15. Ms. Bernadette San Juan, Regional Director, Department of Agriculture Region 8
16. Mr. Rolando Asis, Regional Director, Department of Public Works and Highways 8
17. Ms. Blanche Gobenciong, Director, Office of Civil Defense Region 8
18. Ma. Delia Corsiga, Chief - Business Development Division, Department of Trade and Industry Regional Office 8
19. Mr. Pedro Bimbo Tan, One Town-One Product Coordinator, Department of Trade and Industry Region 8
20. Gen. Edwin Corvera, Provincial Rehabilitation & Recovery Coordinator (Leyte), Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery
21. Mr. Restituto Macuto, Director III / Head DSWD Disaster Risk Reduction and Operations Office, Department of Social Welfare and Development Field Office 8

Local Government

1. Hon. Alfredo Romuladez, Tacloban City
2. Hon. Pel Tecson, Municipality of Tanauan

Private Sector and Civil Society

1. Mr. Rene Meily, President, Philippine Disaster Recovery Foundation
2. Ms. Ma. Christine Reyes, Program and Grants Director, Philippine Disaster Recovery Foundation
3. Ms. Veronica Gabaldon, Program Manager, Philippine Disaster Recovery Foundation
4. Ms. Holly Fuller, Program Manager/WASH Recovery Project, Catholic Relief Services
5. Mr. Edwin Philip Horca, Director for Program Development and Quality, Save the Children
6. Mr. Pedro Rico Cajife, Junior Program Officer, ICCO Cooperation South East Asia and Pacific

Development Partners

1. Mr. Maurice de Wulf, Country Director, United Nations Development Programme
2. Mr. David Sevcik, Head of Office - European Commission DG for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, Delegation of the European Union to the Philippines
3. Mr. Arghya Sinha Roy, Disaster Risk Management Specialist (Climate Change Adaptation), Asian Development Bank
4. Mr. Joven Balbosa, Senior Country Specialist, Philippine Country Office, Asian Development Bank
5. Mr. Joel Mangahas, Social Sector Specialist/ Acting Head of Extended Mission to Yolanda Affected Areas, Asian Development Bank

Annex 2 List of Attendees in Case Study Validation Workshop

August 27, 2014, World Bank Office Manila

1. Mr. Maurice Dewulf, Country Director, United Nations Development Programme
2. Mr. Romeo Fajardo, Deputy Administrator, Office of Civil Defense
3. Ms. Rowena Mantaring, Social Development Specialist, Asian Development Bank
4. Ms. Ruby Aguas, Department of Trade and Industry
5. Ms. Mylene Rivera, Director for Asset Reform Group, Housing and Urban Development Council
6. Ms. Ma. Christine Reyes, Program and Grants Director, Philippine Disaster Recovery Foundation
7. Ms. Susan Warren-Mercado, Multilateral and Bilateral Relationships Manager, Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery
8. Mr. Charles Dean, Shelter Advisor, Save the Children
9. Mr. Rene Manantan, Director and Yolanda Project Manager, Department of Agriculture
10. Engr. Zaldy Mediavillo, Regional Manager, National Housing Authority – Visayas Area Management Office
11. Ms. Loida Garcia, Livelihood Chief A, National Housing Authority – Visayas Area Management Office
12. Mr. David Sevcik, Head of Office, European Commission DG for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, Delegation of the European Union to the Philippines
13. Ms. Esther Geraldoy, Social Worker IV, Disaster Risk Reduction and Response Operations Office, Department of Social Welfare and Development
14. Mr. Pedro Rico Cajife, Junior Program Officer, ICCO Cooperation South East Asia and Pacific
15. Ian Carlo Ramos, Yolanda Project Office, Department of Trade and Industry
16. NJ C. Bernardo, Planning Staff, League of Municipalities of the Philippines

Annex 3. Damage, Loss, and Needs from RAY and PDNA

	RAY (Dec 2013)	PDNA (Apr 2014)
DAMAGE & LOSS		
Infrastructure	33,983.00	12,198.79
Economic	178,107.10	51,364.53
Social Sector	354,718.50	61,330.62
Cross-Sectoral	4,300.00	7,463.76
Total	571,108.50	132,357.70
Infrastructure	28,325.80	28,201.49
Economic	89,480.20	24,431.17
Social Sector	220,388.90	42,981.52
Cross-Sectoral	22,700.00	9,030.69
Total	360,894.90	104,644.87

In order to meet the immediate demand of providing Congress with estimates to inform budgetary requirements for post-Yolanda reconstruction, NEDA embarked on a DALA-based process to come up with comprehensive estimates of the total damage, loss, and needs covering both the private and the public sector. The RAY estimates were delivered in December in time for Congressional deliberations.

RAY was basically a centrally-driven process. Drawing on its planning function, NEDA mobilized the central agencies of Government to undertake their own separate assessments, prescribing the DALA parameters. There were training sessions held at the national level to orient agencies on DALA. Each sector was supported by experts from development partners. The central agencies transmitted these instructions to their field offices, and vetted the figures as they are returned to the central offices. Ultimately, there was a singular clearing house for the results of the field surveys.

Led by the OCD, a PDNA process was triggered in January 2014 and was concluded in April 2014. The process adopted localized guidelines that prescribed common data templates, assumptions and estimation parameters. This process was similarly supported by experts who helped bridge data gaps. The PDNA was completed in a process of 4 months and were relying on the cascading structures of the government agencies, i.e. central to regional field offices. The PDNA mobilized around 100 personnel from LGUs and designates of national government agencies and fielded them to the affected communities.

However, the PDNA process was primarily a bottom up process that drew responses from affected local governments and their communities. The feedback gathered focused mainly on

the support expected from the Government and the financing needs to address the immediate restoration of services and the basic physical facilities to deliver them.

The PDNA noted that due to time constraints and the need for field validation, some data were not completely represented in the report (RAY I4R, 2014). To avoid confusion, the Government presents the RAY estimates as the full set of damage, loss, and needs from Yolanda.

Annex 4. Updates on Implementation (OPARR)

Updates on implementation of [sectoral](#) targets are reflected in the OPARR website (oparr.gov.ph and <http://www.gov.ph/crisis-response/updates-typhoon-yolanda/>), as reflected below.

Infrastructure

Goal: To build back better by rehabilitating and improving infrastructure to support recovery and rehabilitation as well as the enhancement of disaster resiliency of affected communities.

Indicative Cluster Amount: Php 35,148,634,408

Programs, Projects & Activities:

- Upgrading of Minimum Performance Standards and Specifications for the design and structural components as well as materials for public infrastructure such as schools, public markets, municipal/city and community halls, bridges, etc.
- Repair and rehabilitation of infrastructures Social infrastructures (e.g. schools, classrooms, technical vocational institutions, health facilities), essential infrastructures (e.g. roads, bridges, airports, seaports), and livelihood infrastructures (farm-to-market roads, post-harvest facilities and warehouses, agricultural demo farms and laboratories, fish warehouses, and tourism roads and facilities)

Status

As of March 2014, power supply has been restored in 155 out of 196 barangays in the municipalities of Palo, Babatngon, and Tacloban (115 out of 138 barangays in Tacloban City, 17 out of 33 barangays in Palo, and 23 out of 125 barangays in Babatngon). Another ongoing project is the procurement of 61 generator sets, with 23 sets completed, and another 23 are still ongoing. The target for this is at least 15 generator sets by 2015.

Completed:

26 km national roads	28 airports (including facilities)
57.69 km farm-to-market roads	29 public markets
158.5 km bridges	33 cooperatives with power restored 100%
2 flood control structures	3 health facilities in government hospitals
101 newly constructed classrooms	25 health facilities in regional health units
833 renovated classrooms	96 health facilities in barangay health stations
79,245 school furnitures	1 rural health unit
370 has irrigation facilities	168 State Universities and Colleges
5 national irrigation systems	
13 communal irrigation systems	
2 potable water systems	
14 rehabilitated seaports	

Ongoing:

9 km national roads
185.63 km farm-to-market roads
887.2 bridges
35 flood control structures
1,095 newly constructed classrooms
42,705 school furnitures
1,200 has irrigation facilities
12 national irrigation systems
4 communal irrigation systems
5 potable water systems
8 rehabilitated seaports
7 airports (including facilities)

59 public markets
257 barangay health stations
19 rural health units
3 LGU hospitals
1 DOH facility
9 health facilities in government hospitals
23 health facilities in regional health units
69 health facilities in barangay health stations
2,647 renovated classrooms
672 State Universities and Colleges

Cluster Member Agencies:

Chair: Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)

Members:

Department of Agriculture
Department of Agrarian Reform
Department of Education
Department of Energy
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Department of Trade and Industry
Department of Health
Department of Science and Technology
Department of Transportation and Communications
Department of Interior and Local Government
Office of Civil Defense
Local Water Utilities Administration
Commission on Higher Education
National Irrigation Authority
National Electrification Administration

Livelihood

Goal: To achieve inclusive, sustainable business and livelihoods in affected areas

Indicative Cluster Amount: Php 30,631,237,230

Programs, Projects & Activities

- Support to Agriculture (Livestock and poultry production; Provision of Farm tools and equipment; Coconut Planting/Replanting, Timber Disposal and Utilization, Intercropping; Provision of various seeds for high value crops, rice, corn, vegetable and fruit production)
- Support to Fisheries and Aquaculture (Provision of fishing boats, motor engines, fishing gears and other paraphernalia, seaweed dryers and seaweed farm implements; Aquaculture rehabilitation and development)
- Support to Industry and Services (Small & Medium Enterprise Roving Academy (SMERA) Program; Providing Access to Finance Project; Business Investment Enabling Environment Project; Marketing Assistance; Product Packaging, Design, and Labelling Assistance)
- Emergency Employment and Livelihood Assistance
- Science and Technology Support to Agriculture, Fishery and Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs)
- Vocational education, technical (VocTech) skills training and capacity development

Status

As of October 30, 2014, the following are the status of livelihood efforts in the areas affected by Yolanda:

- 4,981 families out of the targeted 517,214 families with partially damaged houses have been provided with cash-for-work assistance.
- The number of families that received cash for building livelihood assets (CBLA) met the target of 236,916
- 2,254 families have received livelihood assistance using Community-Driven Enterprise Development (CDED) Approach, surpassing the target of 1,908 families.
- 33,283 beneficiaries, out of the targeted 34,692, have benefited from the Emergency Employment Program.
- 33,338 beneficiaries, out of the 44,778 target, have benefited from various forms of livelihood assistance.
- 15,409 micro, small, and medium enterprises, out of the targeted 32,359, have been assisted by the government.
- Vocational Education, Technical Skills, Training and Capacity Development
 - Target (2014): 24,535 persons trained
 - Completed: 21,843 persons trained
 - Ongoing: 2,692 persons trained
- Assistance to MSMEs
 - Ongoing: 16,950 MSMEs assisted

Cluster Member Agencies

Chair: Department of Trade and Industry

Members:

Department of Social Welfare and Development

Department of Labor and Employment

Department of Agriculture

Department of Tourism

Department of Science and Technology

Department of Agrarian Reform

Department of Environment and Natural Resources

Office of Civil Defense

Housing and Urban and Development Coordinating Council

National Commission on Indigenous Peoples

Office of Presidential Adviser on Peace Process

National Anti-Poverty Commission

National Housing Authority

Philippine Coconut Authority

Technical Education and Skills Development Authority

Government Finance Institutions

Resettlement

Goal: To relocate affected families living in hazard prone areas to safe areas and to develop sustainable and disaster resilient settlements

Indicative Cluster Amount: Php 75,678,683,100

Programs, Projects & Activities

Resettlement Sites

- Construction of disaster resilient houses that can withstand a wind load of 250 kph
- Development of new settlement sites with basic community facilities
- Capacity building programs for affected families such as community management and self-help training programs

Status

	2014	2015	2016	Total
Start of Construction	120,000	85,128		205,128
Completion	3,000	117,000	85,128	205,128

Based on the November 5, 2014 report, out of the target 8,629 housing units, 1,252 housing units have been completed. The rest (7,377) is estimated to be built by March 2015. The following are the other updates on the resettlement efforts in the affected regions:

Funding	Program/ Project/ Activity and Status	Units
	TOTAL TARGET	205,128
2.4B(8,629 housing units)	Completed (November 2014)	1,252
	On-going land development and housing construction (To be completed by March 2015)	7,377
11B(Released October 14, 2014)	Bid-out and awarded(To be completed by November 2015)	37,500
1.3B(For release)	Identified sites with proposed builders; schedule of bidding Nov 2014; award of project to be done after SARO release; all awarded projects will be completed one (1) year from date of award	4,439
7.7B(For release)	Identified sites with proposed builders; schedule of bidding Nov 2014; award of project to be done after SARO release; all awarded projects will be completed one (1) year from date of award	26,261
12.64B(Balance requirement)	Projects with identified sites with proposed builders(Schedule of bidding: November – December 2014)	43,171
11.16B(Balance requirement)	With identified sites undergoing validation and evaluation	40,000
13.22B(Balance requirement)	For site identification	45,128

At the same time, there were 14,096 out of 449,127 families that received emergency shelter assistance for totally damaged houses in safe zones and 24,111 out of 517,214 families for partially damaged houses.

Cluster Member Agencies

Chair: Housing and Urban and Development Coordinating Council

Members:

National Housing Authority

Department of Public Works and Highways

Department of Agriculture

Department of Agrarian Reform

Department of Education

Department of Environment and Natural Resources

Department of Interior and Local Government

Department of Health

Department of Science and Technology

Department of Social Welfare and Development

Office of Civil Defense

Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board

National Commission on Indigenous Peoples

Office of Presidential Adviser on Peace Process

National Anti-Poverty Commission

Social Services

Goal: To facilitate delivery of basic services such as education, health, and social protection services to affected communities as well as provide healthy environment and strengthen capacity to cope future hazards and disasters

Indicative Cluster Amount: Php 26,406,233,815

Programs, Projects & Activities

- Basic and Higher Education Support
- Health and Nutrition
- Food Security (Food distribution to vulnerable groups, insurance subsidy to farmers)
- Environmental Protection (Mangrove Rehabilitation, Reforestry and Agroforestry development)
- On-site Shelter Assistance (Emergency Shelter Assistance, Cash-for-Work, shelter assistance for Indigenous People (IP) communities; Land-Use Planning)

Status

- As of July 28, 2014, they have been able to provide 4,631,382 families with food packs from November to December 2013.
- On January 6, 2014, classes in Tacloban City resumed, by virtue of DepEd Order No. 10, s. 2013.
- On January 10, 2014, DepEd reported a 91% student attendance rate in five affected areas (Samar, Leyte, Tacloban, Eastern Samar, and Ormoc City), with a 96% teacher attendance.
- As of September 30, 2014, 187,411 water disinfectants have been distributed to affected households.
- As of October 30, 2014, 77,739 families have been given food assistance in the form of 50 kilograms of rice per household. Meanwhile, two potable water systems have been completed; five potable water systems are being constructed.
- Based on government agencies' reports as of October 30, 2014, the following programs, projects, and activities have been completed:
 - 840 essential medicines and supplies for primary care (CAMPOLAS kits) have been distributed.
 - Four doctors and 391 nurses were deployed to augment and complement human resources for health needs in rural underserved/hard-to-reach areas.
 - 135,089 poor women of reproductive age have been given Family Planning Services.
 - 115,432 out of 353,266 poor pregnant women were given iron supplementation
 - 99,017 out of 303,030 poor postpartum women were given iron supplementation
 - 24,800 out of 75,897 children with malnutrition (6-11 months) were given multiple micronutrient powder (MNP) supplementation
 - 36,500 out of 111,704 children with malnutrition (12-23 months) were given multiple micronutrient powder (MNP) supplementation
 - 236 out of 468 midwives were deployed to augment and complement human resources for health needs in rural underserved/hard to reach areas

As of Nov 2014:

TARGET	ACCOMPLISHMENTS		
	COMPLETED	ONGOING	
Provision of textbooks	6,470,984	–	6,470,984
School feeding for target students	84,835	–	84,835
Provision of computer packages	134	134	
Provision of learning kits	339,745	337,754	1,991
Assistance and scholarship grants to college students	45,045	37,044	8,001

Cluster Member Agencies

Chair: Department of Social Welfare and Development

Members:

Department of National Defense

Department of Agriculture

Department of Agrarian Reform

Department of Education

Department of Environment and Natural Resources

Department of Health

Office of Civil Defense

Housing and Urban and Development Coordinating Council

Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board

National Commission on Indigenous Peoples

Office of Presidential Adviser on Peace Process

National Anti-Poverty Commission

National Housing Authority

Support Cluster

Chairs: Department of Budget and Management and National Economic Development Authority

Members:

Department of Foreign Affairs

Department of Finance

Department of Justice

Department of Social Welfare and Development

Office of Civil Defense

Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office

Presidential Communications Operations Office

Presidential Management Staff

Office of the Executive Secretary

Office of the Cabinet Secretary

Office of Political Adviser

Commission on Audit

Department of Environment and Natural Resources

Department of Interior and Local Government

Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board

Department of Public Works and Highways

Support to Disaster Risk Reduction

- The government is going to build the Tacloban-Palo-Tanauan Road Dike project, which will span 27 square kilometers in length.
- The Department of Environmental and Natural Resources (DENR) has implemented a “no-build zone” along coastal communities in Eastern Visayas. Specific areas with a 40-meter easement are off-limits to residents and any infrastructure.
- As of February 2014, Project Nationwide Operational Assessment of Hazards (NOAH) has completed the high resolution 3D mapping of the topography of Tacloban City and its adjacent areas.
- The DOST and the DENR jointly launched last May 17, 2014 the Yolanda Rehabilitation Scientific information Center (YoRInfoCenter), a one-stop shop for government agencies and private organizations that provides latest satellite images and high resolution hazard maps that can be used as reference in rehabilitation efforts.
- According to Project NOAH Executive Director Mahar Lagmay, a storm surge warning system should be ready by December 2014.
- The DENR has also implemented projects that will make Eastern Visayas less vulnerable to typhoons, such as planting mangroves and developing beach forests in coastal areas, earmarking P347 million for this project. Under the National Greening Program, 19 million seedlings and propagules from mangrove trees and beach forest species will be planted in over 1,900 hectares of coastline.