

# MOZAMBIQUE



## Recovery from Recurrent Floods 2000-2013

### Recovery Framework Case Study

August 2014

Conference Version



# CONTENTS

■ <b>INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDIES SERIES</b>	<b>ii</b>
■ <b>ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS</b>	<b>iii</b>
■ <b>RECURRING DISASTERS IN MOZAMBIQUE</b>	<b>1</b>
■ <b>POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR RECOVERY</b>	<b>3</b>
CONCEPT OF RECOVERY	3
■ <b>INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR RECOVERY</b>	<b>6</b>
■ <b>COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION MECHANISMS</b>	<b>11</b>
■ <b>RECOVERY FINANCING AND MANAGEMENT</b>	<b>14</b>
ALTERNATIVE FINANCING MECHANISMS FOR RECOVERY	16
■ <b>MANAGING RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION</b>	<b>18</b>
VULNERABILITY REDUCTION THROUGH RELOCATION	19
RISK REDUCTION AND READINESS AS PART OF DISASTER RECOVERY	21
■ <b>MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOVERY</b>	<b>22</b>
■ <b>RECOMMENDATIONS FROM CASE STUDY PARTICIPANTS FOR STRENGTHENING THE MANAGEMENT OF POST-FLOOD RECOVERY</b>	<b>24</b>
DISASTER RECOVERY POLICY	24
INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS	24
PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT	26
MONITORING RECOVERY	27
FUNDING	27
■ <b>CONCLUSION</b>	<b>28</b>
ANNEX 1: CONTINGENCY FUND ALLOCATIONS, BY MINISTRY AND PROVINCE, 2013 -2014	29
ANNEX 2: ESTIMATED COSTS OF POST-DISASTER RECONSTRUCTION IN 2013	30
ANNEX 3: CONTRIBUTORS TO CASE STUDY	31



## INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDIES SERIES

The World Bank's Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the European Union (EU) are working on a guide for developing disaster recovery frameworks (DRF). This guide aims to help governments and partners plan for resilient post disaster recovery while contributing to longer term sustainable development. It is based on practices gleaned from country experiences in disaster recovery around the world. Hence, the development of the DRF Guide entailed the development of country-level case studies as well as thematic case studies on disaster recovery.

These case studies have been designed to collect and analyze information on: i) disaster recovery standards and principles adapted by countries for specific disasters; ii) planning efforts for making such recovery efficient, equitable and resilient; iii) policies, institutions and capacities to implement and monitor disaster recovery; and iv) ways and means for translating the gains of resilient recovery into longer-term risk reduction and resilient development.

Importantly, these case studies aim to learn from, and not evaluate, country reconstruction initiatives. Practices learned from each country's experience will inform the contents of the guide for developing a DRF. Additionally, the case studies examine the planning processes and not the implementation details of recovery experiences. As such, they do not seek to offer a comprehensive account of the post-disaster recovery program, but instead provide details and insight into the decision-making processes for reconstruction policies and programs.

*Disclaimer:* This document is the product of work performed by GFDRR staff, based on information provided by GFDRR's partners. The findings, analysis and conclusions expressed in this document do not necessarily reflect the views of any individual partner organization of GFDRR, including, for example, the World Bank, the Executive Directors of the World Bank, UNDP, the European Union, or the governments they represent. Although GFDRR makes reasonable efforts to ensure all the information presented in this document is correct, its accuracy and integrity cannot be guaranteed. Use of any data or information from this document is at the user's own risk and under no circumstances shall GFDRR or any of its partners be liable for any loss, damage, liability or expense incurred or suffered which is claimed to result from reliance on the data contained in this document.

# ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>CCGC</b>	Coordinating Council for Disaster Management
<b>CENOE</b>	National Emergency Operations Center
<b>CLGRC</b>	Local Risk Management Committee(s)
<b>CPCCN</b>	Coordinating Council for Preventing and Combating Natural Disasters
<b>CTGC</b>	Technical Council for Disaster Management
<b>DPCCN</b>	Department for Preventing and Combating Natural Disasters
<b>DRM</b>	Disaster Risk Management
<b>GACOR</b>	Office for Reconstruction Coordination
<b>HCT</b>	Humanitarian Country Team
<b>INGC</b>	National Institute for Disaster Management
<b>MPD</b>	Ministry of Planning and Development
<b>PARP</b>	Poverty Reduction Action Plan
<b>PDGC</b>	Master Plan for Disaster Management
<b>PES</b>	Socio-Economic Plan
<b>PESOD</b>	District-level Socio-economic Plan
<b>SETSAN</b>	Technical Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition
<b>UNAPROC</b>	National Civil Protection Unit



## RECURRING DISASTERS IN MOZAMBIQUE

The three biggest floods recorded in Mozambique happened in the 21st century: the first in 2000/2001, the second flooded Central Mozambique in 2007/2008, and most recently the 2013 floods. By its location on the southeastern coast of Africa, and located downstream from several major rivers, Mozambique is considered to be extremely prone to recurrent natural hazards, namely floods, tropical storms, drought, and earthquakes. Nine of its rivers have sources in neighboring countries, requiring cross-border coordination for early warning alerts. Sixty percent of the population lives along the coastline and are therefore vulnerable to tropical storms.

Economic gains in the country are significantly undermined as a result of recurrent water and weather related hazards; consequent economic losses are estimated to average 1.1 percent of GDP annually. Worse, natural disasters such as floods and cyclones have a lasting impact that affects disproportionately the poorest. The World Bank estimated the relative impact of various shocks on poverty: floods and cyclones were estimated to have the strongest impact at the household level, reducing expenditures by about 32 percent and contributing more than 2 percentage points to the poverty rate. When facing a shock, poor households are often forced to sacrifice their long-term interests for the sake of immediate needs, for example by withdrawing children from school to supplement household labor, or by selling or consuming productive capital. In the long run these coping mechanisms make households poorer and even more vulnerable, and may transmit these adverse effects to future generations through their impact on education and health outcomes<sup>1</sup>.

The 2000 floods were caused by heavy rainfall in the Southern Africa region that lasted for five weeks, exacerbated by tropical cyclones. For the first time in recorded history, simultaneous and major flooding occurred in all of the major rivers that flow into the Indian Ocean through Mozambique – impacting the population in the southern half of the country, from the Limpopo River basin to Maputo (the capital). The flooding of the Limpopo, Incomati, Umbeluzi, Save, Buzi and Pungue rivers were also one of the costliest disasters in Mozambique's history. At least 700 people died, up to 650,000<sup>2</sup> were displaced and 4.5 million were affected, totaling a quarter of Mozambique's population. GDP fell from a forecast 7 percent to 1.5 percent.

The rainy season of 2013 recalled the year 2000 in terms of the height to which the flood waters rose, but with much lower impact on the population. Southern Mozambique was again devastated: 30 people died as a direct consequence of floods<sup>3</sup> in the Limpopo River basin, and up to 186,000 were evacuated. Damages were estimated to exceed US\$250 million; of which 50 percent on the road network and 30 percent in the agricultural sector.

<sup>1</sup> Ninth Poverty Reduction Support Credit, World Bank, June 19, 2013, paragraph 114.

<sup>2</sup> Relatório do Balanço das cheias de 2013

<sup>3</sup> A total of 117 deaths were registered by INGC from October 2012 to 4 March 2013. Other causes of death include being struck by lightning, electrocution, house collapse.

Most of the infrastructure on the Lower Limpopo flood plains was built in the 1950s, before increasingly severe flooding needed to be factored into engineering designs. At the same time, the population of Chókwe has nearly doubled since 1997, and infrastructure development has increased rapidly in the lower Limpopo – making more people and material assets vulnerable to climatic risk.

The impact from the two flood events are compared in Table 1. The sharp decrease in fatality rates and the impact of natural disasters indicates that disasters are being managed more effectively. This reflects lessons learned in the prior decade, including flood forecasting, early warning systems and trans-boundary cooperation. Most importantly, national investment and international cooperation in strengthening institutional capacity and readiness has noticeably reduced the devastating impact of disasters on human lives and housing.

**Table 1: Flooding Key Facts**

	<b>2000</b>	<b>2013</b>
<b>Area Most Affected</b>	Southern half of Mozambique, from Limpopo River to Maputo	Districts of Chokwe, Guija, Chibuto, Xai-Xai
<b>Affected Population</b>	4.5 million of which 500-650,000 displaced	478, 892 of which 186,000 displaced
<b>Number of Fatalities</b>	700	117
<b>Most Affected Sectors (based on needs)</b>	Housing; health; agriculture; education;	Education (schools); transport infrastructure; agriculture
<b>Estimated Overall Damage (US\$ at exchange rate of that year)</b>	\$449.5 million (approx. \$620m in 2014 dollars)	US\$521 million
<b>Percentage of GDP</b>	14.4	3.4




## POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR RECOVERY

### CONCEPT OF RECOVERY

A natural disaster is an event that disrupts normal life, causing physical damage and loss to property and infrastructure, and possibly causing emotional trauma and loss of livelihood to impacted communities. Recovery is the process of responding to that disaster, in order to return to normal life as quickly as possible. Post-disaster recovery is specific to each affected person and community, and its duration may be relatively short or long, depending on the magnitude of the event. The resources that are applied to recovery may be used in ways that can reduce future risks and/or mitigate damage.

Figure 1: Post-Disaster Phases



As sketched in Figure 1, recovery planning gets underway even as emergency programs are ongoing. It includes the restoration of basic services infrastructure, and markets that will support the phase down of emergency support. It is a transition period that bridges to development, that continues to merit special conditions for mobilizing resources and skills in order to help affected populations to resume their daily routines.



## MOZAMBIKAN CONTEXT

After independence in 1975, Mozambique was affected by various natural disasters, notably flooding along the banks of the Limpopo River in 1977 and other rivers in 1978/79, as well as widespread drought in 1982/83. The government largely reacted to each disaster as it occurred, and depended upon international assistance for humanitarian relief and recovery.

By adopting a Disaster Management Policy in 1999, however, the Government of Mozambique started to introduce proactive measures for disaster management, using early warning systems with community involvement, allocating funds for contingencies and supporting livelihood recovery through labor-intensive strategies. This policy was part of a broader post-independence development strategy to shift from supply-driven service delivery to a demand-driven approach involving effective community participation in making decisions and managing systems.

This 1999 national policy is based on six guiding principles:

1. Support affected communities in the development and implementation of disaster management activities;
2. Assess risks to manage disasters better;
3. Donations to be distributed to the most vulnerable populations;
4. Focal points to be identified at all levels for all types of activities, so that state coordination agencies can exercise adequate authority during emergency situations;
5. Avoid the creation of parallel institutions by managing disasters through multi-sectoral capacities, in order to maximize scarce resources;
6. Active involvement of civil society in responding to national disasters.

This national policy promotes mainstreaming of disaster risk management through national and sector development planning. It also emphasizes the importance of inter-sectoral coordination in disaster prevention and response.

From 2005, the spirit of self-esteem (or “*auto-estima*”) gained ground as a guiding principle for national development. This changed the focus in how the government would henceforth manage disasters – moving from dependence on foreign aid to strengthening national capacity. While funding would most likely continue to be sought from external sources, assessment and planning could be undertaken more proactively by national institutions.

The Master Plan for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Disasters (2006-2014)<sup>4</sup> serves as the key reference for disaster risk management in Mozambique. It clearly links disaster mitigation and recovery with poverty and vulnerability reduction in an agriculture-based economy. For example, water resource management includes considerations for both irrigation to improve crop production and control of water levels to mitigate the impact of floods and droughts. Food security considerations extend beyond strategic reserves of seeds and emergency rations, to advocate for introduction of drought-resistant plants that can be used industrially to alter the structure of the rural economy in semi-arid areas. Disaster readiness is based on early warning, information management, communication and trained capacity for search and rescue. The implementation strategy for this plan is decentralized, so that local and traditional governments as well as civil society are engaged as primary managers of information and risk. INGC has been updating this plan for disaster risk management since mid 2013.

<sup>4</sup> INGC, Master Plan for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Disasters (in Portuguese), 2005.

The first National Relocation and Reconstruction Plan was elaborated in 2007. The Government's main strategy was to resettle the populations in locations less prone to flooding and with potential for economic growth. In urban areas, relocation programs would include sewage and drainage protection. For the past six years, the post-flood program to resettle, recover and reconstruct has been reducing the vulnerability of populations residing in flood plains.

Disaster risk management (DRM) is also explicitly incorporated into the five-year Development Plans since 2005 and the Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PARP) since 2006. Through these documents, the Government recognizes that successful disaster risk management not only mitigates the negative impact of recurrent weather-related events; risk reduction is inextricably linked to poverty reduction of populations who are most exposed to such disasters. The Master Plan, discussed above, is thus an integral part of the government's strategy for poverty reduction. The Policy gives communities an important role to play in planning, organizing and implementing DRM activities through Local Disaster Risk Management Committees (CLGRC). In addition, it emphasizes the importance of regional coordination for managing natural hazards that cross national borders.

Given the negative impact that natural disasters pose for achieving national program goals, and with the objective of ensuring the rapid return to normal life for the affected population and the national economy, government strategy has been refined to divide post-disaster action into four categories:

- Emergency Actions – supplementing the Contingency Plan and budget to ensure continuity of humanitarian assistance and disease control
- Immediate (early) recovery
- Post-disaster reconstruction
- Vulnerability reduction

The government uses these categories to inform the development of realistic objectives, reallocating resources from the 2013 national budget when necessary to respond to priority needs, or to mobilize additional resources from traditional partners to respond to emerging needs.

Since April 2014, Mozambique has a legal instrument that obligates every sector or stakeholder to take action for disaster risk management<sup>5</sup>. With the President of the Republic signing Disaster Management Law 15/2014, there exists a window of opportunity to clarify policies and responsibilities for disaster recovery. The government has six months to elaborate the regulations for responsibilities related to disaster risk management, including the implementation of activities that follow resource mobilization.

---

<sup>5</sup> Boletim da Republica, publicacao oficial da Republica da Mocambique, 20 de Junho de 2014, Series 1, numero 50, pp1291-93.



## INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR RECOVERY

The Coordinating Council for Preventing and Combating Natural Disasters (CCPCCN) was created by presidential decree no. 44/80 on 3 September 1980. Its executive arm, the Department for Preventing and Combating Natural Disasters (DPCCN), had the mandate to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees and internally displaced people, as well as to drought-impacted populations.

In 1999, a new national government policy on disaster management was promulgated, replacing DPCCN with the National Disaster Management Institute (INGC) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This reflected the country's dependence on foreign assistance for funding and the importance of donor coordination to recovery from disasters.

Although floods were known to pose a risk by September 1999, human and financial resources were limited both in preparing for the floods of 2000 and in recovering from them.<sup>6</sup> The country did not have a large corps dedicated to disaster management on standby, but instead had to mobilize personnel both within and from outside the country and when the situation demanded.

Between 2005 and 2009, INGC gained credibility as a leader and manager in emergency relief and disaster mitigation, particularly through effective operations in response to floods during the rainy seasons of 2007 and 2008 in central Mozambique (along the banks of Zambeze, Buai and Save rivers). During this time, INGC was shifted from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of State Administration, enabling closer collaboration for relief and recovery with line ministries and provincial governments. It was also restructured to focus on the two areas of emergency response and vulnerability reduction.

Structurally, INGC was authorized in 2006 to create a National Emergency Operations Center (Centro Nacional de Emergência, known as CENOE) to coordinate overall humanitarian support, and a civil protection unit known as UNAPROC to support search and rescue operations. At the same time, the legal basis for INGC's work was strengthened through judicial statutes (2007 and 2008) and approval of internal regulations by the Council of Ministers (2009).

CENOE functions at four different levels of alert:

1. Green alert, when it is the department of INGC that monitors potential disaster risks, organizes technical training and simulation exercises for disaster readiness of the population. This is not an emergency or alert phase.
2. Yellow alert, when there is a potential emergency on the radar, and institutional actors move to a state of alert and stand-by for response.

<sup>6</sup> Frances Christie and Joseph Hanlon, Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000, 2001.

3. Orange alert, when INGC coordinates CENOE to prepare a contingency plan for impending disasters with other government institutions. Communities are alerted to move to safety and bulletins are issued regularly to both communities and to the council of ministers through CCGC (see section on Coordination Mechanisms).
4. Red alert, when an emergency is declared, INGC proposes that CENOE be expanded beyond line ministries and specialized agencies, to include search and rescue through the Civil Protection Unit (UNAPROC), and impacted local governments. Depending on the magnitude of the event, emergencies are managed at district, provincial or national level. INGC will act as a technical advisor for district and provincial emergency levels. CENOE may be coordinated by its own national director or the Director-General of INGC, as warranted by the disaster's impact. In extreme cases, where it is necessary to declare a national state of emergency, there is a provision for the President of the Republic to coordinate CENOE<sup>7</sup>. During crises or critical moments leading up to an emergency, CENOE has up to twice-daily meetings with district and provincial levels, by teleconference, to review the day's events and to plan for the next. The entire community involved in emergency response participates in these meetings.

It is as the emergency response (Level 4) is being deactivated that CENOE has responsibility<sup>8</sup> for identifying and reporting on achievements and pending actions for **recovery**, as part of its final report on interventions related to specific disaster events. CENOE members and focal points also transmit sector-specific information to their home ministries.

When CENOE scales back to Level 1 operations and focusses on vulnerability reduction and disaster mitigation, it re-assumes its position as one department of INGC. Institutionally, this flexibility allows a permanent institution to respond to different types and magnitudes of disasters.

Distinct from its responsibilities for CENOE, INGC also coordinates the implementation of multisectoral recovery programs that are not explicitly covered by line ministries. To respond to the needs for relocation of flood-affected populations, an Office for Reconstruction Coordination (GACOR) was created within INGC in 2007<sup>9</sup> to work with sector ministries, provincial and district governments and other partners. They have concentrated the coordination on relocating vulnerable populations. This includes support to the construction of resilient houses far from flood zones, land use planning, provision of basic services and structures in newly established communities, livelihood support, water supply and sanitation infrastructure.

As can be seen in the organigram of INGC (see Figure 2 ), three regional offices (or “direcções regionais”) have been set up in northern, central and southern parts of Mozambique, which respectively suffer different types of natural disasters. Provincial departments of INGC have also been opened, to be closer to areas of potential disasters and to decentralize the institutional structures for disaster management. Their role is to support provincial governors and district administrators in the planning, coordination and implementation of provincial- and district-based programs.<sup>10</sup>


<sup>7</sup> INGC, Plano Director de Gestao das Calamidades (PDGC), 2006

<sup>8</sup> “Establishment and functioning of the National Emergency Operations Center,” Council of Ministers, Republic of Mozambique, October 2006, approved by the 25<sup>th</sup> session of the Council of Ministers, 17 October 2006.

<sup>9</sup> Boletim da Republica, 3 July 2008, Series 1, number 27, p216-(4).

<sup>10</sup> PDGC *op.cit*

Figure 2: Organigram of INGC



The restructuring and transformation of INGC in 2005 benefitted from the flexibility given to the new manager, in terms of creating a completely new team and introducing innovative processes. INGC recruited and trained new (mostly young) staff to implement the new vision of disaster risk management; civil servants who had preceded the introduction of the new philosophy were almost entirely transferred to other government sectors. The agency had room to experiment, train, and prepare for responding to the next emergency situation – as observed in the good quality of teamwork and coordination in the aftermath of floods in 2007 and 2008.

Notwithstanding INGC's achievements in the areas of readiness and disaster response, its role in post-disaster recovery is more ambiguous. The authority of INGC in drought-stricken areas is supported by local governments, but the implementation of recovery programs in flood-prone areas has been subject to questioning by line ministries and provincial governments. Furthermore, INGC's leadership mandate for disaster prevention and mitigation is distinct from coordination of recovery programs, in terms of skill sets and functions. For example, the coordination of rapid humanitarian assessments at the outset of an emergency draws upon field observations and provides information for immediate relief, whereas damage and loss assessments for post-disaster recovery draw upon secondary sources of information to estimate recovery and reconstruction needs. At this writing, INGC does not have the tools to coordinate the latter, nor does it have the staff structure in GACOR to coordinate decentralized multi-sectoral recovery, despite its name. In 2012, out of 167 staff in INGC headquarters, four were assigned to GACOR<sup>11</sup>, as of July 2014 there are nine staff.<sup>12</sup> INGC has a limited number of staff based in the high-risk provinces who are willing but poorly equipped to cover the large areas for which they are responsible.

<sup>11</sup> KPMG, Auditoria de Desempenho do Sector de Calamidades Naturais, 11 October 2012, page 126.


<sup>12</sup> Interview with Higinio Rodrigues and Leovigildo Marcos (GACOR/INGC), 17 July 2014.

Yet INGC is the only government agency with a dedicated department for reconstruction and relocation. Other sectors of government are not structured for recovery and reconstruction activities, yet they have responsibility for assessing disaster-related needs, estimating costs for addressing the needs, and developing projects for funding and implementation. This gray area of post-disaster responsibilities creates gaps between humanitarian action and development plans, raising issues of sustainability for normal development activities. For example, government-sponsored resettlement policies are implemented differently if related to disasters or development.<sup>13</sup> The mandates of INGC and the Environment Ministry (MICOA) also overlap and require public negotiation.

In fact, it is the Ministry of Planning and Development (MPD) that coordinates budget revisions to fund urgent recovery needs. Created in 2005 to lead and coordinate development planning, the MPD also oversees the integration of longer-term recovery actions into development plans with line ministries and external donors. MPD currently plays an important role in disaster recovery, through its function in coordinating with line ministries and sectors for the use of national resources and developing investment projects for external financing.

Within MPD, the Department for National Planning works with line ministries for budget revisions and reallocations, while the Department for Investment and Cooperation is more directly involved with the mobilization of resources for development of projects and programs which (might) include post-disaster reconstruction and rehabilitation. (See Figure 3).

Figure 3: Organigram of Ministry of Planning and Development



<sup>13</sup> Development-related resettlement triggers national decree 31/2012 and World Bank Resettlement policy OP/BP 4/12.

Institutionally, oversight of disaster recovery is transferred by default (in the absence of any regulation or directive on this matter) from INGC to MPD. Those government officials who serve as focal points for their respective ministries in CENOE collaborate with their respective planning departments to use their assessments in activities led by MPD as well. In 2013, the relocation activities implemented by GACOR/INGC were part of the recovery actions compiled by each sector and consolidated in one document by MPD, called “Preliminary Assessment of Post-Disaster Reconstruction Activities”.


Recovery assessments are thus being undertaken by each sector, and may or may not be addressed, depending on the level of urgency and related possibility of funding, as will be discussed in the section on Financial Management. In the process, disaster recovery shifts from emergency to development in terms of management perspective, financing, and processing. This will be discussed further in the section on Implementation Arrangements.



## COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION MECHANISMS

In times of disaster or emergency, INGC reports to an advisory body on disaster management, known as the National Council for Disaster Management (CCGC), of which its own oversight ministry (of State Administration) is a member. The CCGC<sup>14</sup> is a high-level body of the Council of Ministers, chaired by the Prime Minister, who meets regularly during emergencies to make policy decisions regarding government response. (See Figure 4).

Figure 4: INGC's Coordination Function



The CCGC role is to:

1. Propose projects, policies and strategies of disaster prevention and mitigation to the Government;
2. Approve the contents of disaster management, post-disaster reconstruction and development programs, including assistance to the victims and rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure;

<sup>14</sup> CCGC member ministries are: the Prime Ministry, Foreign Ministry; Ministry of State and Administration; Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries; Ministry for the Coordination of Environmental Affairs; Ministry of Women and Social Action; Ministry of National Defense; Ministry of Industry and Trade; Ministry of Tourism; Ministry of Internal Affairs; Ministry of Public Works and Housing; Ministry of Finances; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Transport and Communications; Representative of INGC.



3. Approve the revision of the National Disaster Management Plan;
4. Advise the President of the Republic on declaring a state of emergency;
5. Mobilize national and international communities for assistance and post-reconstruction;
6. Advise the Cabinet on the need for creating an emergency fund.

The CCGC is advised in its oversight role by the Technical Council for Disaster Management (CTGC), which is chaired and coordinated by INGC. According to the existing regulation, the CTGC is the national platform for disaster management. It is comprised of directors (department heads) and technicians who are oriented toward disaster management within the line ministries and sectors responsible for development and vulnerability reduction. This structure is replicated at the provincial and district levels where the technical councils report to the Provincial Governor and district administrators respectively. By ministerial decree, one of the focal points from each line ministry may also be seconded to CENOE during emergency situations.

Both CTGC and CENOE are organized into four sectors: Information management and planning, Communication, Infrastructure, and Social Services, as per Table 2:

**Table 2:** Post-Disaster Coordination, Organized into Four Sectors

SECTOR I – Information and planning Led by the Ministry of Planning and Development (MPD)	SECTOR II – Communication Led by State Information Office (GABINFO)
Planning Information Resources	Equipment maintenance INGC website updating and maintenance Publications Social Communication
SECTOR III – Infrastructure Led by Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MOPH)	SECTOR IV – Social Services Led by Ministry of Health (MISAU)
Transport Public works and engineering Energy	Social Welfare Medical and health services Food and potable water Manage volunteers and donations

Overall, CENOE and CTGC are involved in mobilizing resources, ensuring linkages between the emergency and rehabilitation phases, and keeping the ministerial level CCGC informed of rehabilitation activities. The humanitarian country team<sup>15</sup> clusters are embedded in these four sectors in support to coordination of relief operations during emergencies. These clusters include: Shelter, Telecommunications, Logistics, Protection and Education; Food Security, Health, Nutrition, Water and Sanitation and Early Recovery.

Of particular interest in this case study is the first sector, for Information Management and Planning, which is led by MPD, and has representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture, Finance, Foreign Affairs, and the National Institute of Meteorology, Water and Geology Departments, and Information Office. The National Meteorological Services and the National Water Department in turn coordinate with their international affiliates, so that meteorological, fluvial and geophysical information is constantly available and monitored for possible impacts on the country. As predictive capacity increases, room for unpleasant surprise is reduced.

<sup>15</sup> The humanitarian country team (HCT) is a forum comprised of United Nations agencies, the Red Cross and international non-governmental organizations led by the UN-designated Humanitarian Coordinator.

The objectives of the sectors are to:

- coordinate the efficient and effective use of resources, avoiding waste and duplication of effort;
- provide timely information for decision-making both to the field and within CENOE;
- provide resources to enable emergency assistance and disaster relief.

Their function within CENOE includes:

- planning for prevention, mitigation and response to natural disasters;
- recommending adequate resources for responding to such events;
- recommending the appropriate level of response to such events;
- analyzing, updating and disseminating timely information.

The Infrastructure sector also assesses damage caused by disasters as part of its functions.

INGC's role in CTGC as well as CENOE is key in both of the coordinating bodies, one for advising government and the other for executing emergency response and recovery operations, as depicted in Figure 2 above.

Coordination with the private sector and civil society has been limited during emergency periods to early warning and the distribution of emergency supplies. To coordinate with communities at times of disaster, the government first invested in the creation of Local Risk Management Committees (CLGRC) in areas identified as being at high risk of disasters. CLGRC members are elected by communities and composed of respected local leaders. They receive and communicate early warning information and coordinate emergency response locally. In 2006, simulation exercises were introduced to maintain community-level readiness in high-risk areas. The CLGRC also received training and equipment for disaster prevention and mitigation.

The know-how of communities and their resilience capacity can be strengthened further. For example, communities often monitor the water level of rivers in ways that are dissimilar from government monitoring methods, but which effectively serve for local evacuation alerts. Their desire to remain close to their places of livelihood has contributed to adjustments in government relocation strategies.

Grievance redressal mechanisms, which exist through INGC during emergencies, disappear after the emergency phase ends. Communities are expected to use the CLGRC to provide feedback regarding post-disaster management. Local administrations and district authorities must be involved in developing, disseminating and enforcing such mechanisms.



## RECOVERY FINANCING AND MANAGEMENT

Financing post-disaster recovery in Mozambique must be considered within the country's macro-economic context. Mozambique's economic performance has been strong since the end of the civil war in 1992, with GDP growth from 1993 to 2013 averaging 7.4 percent. Its strong performance is attributed to sound macroeconomic management, a number of large-scale foreign-investment projects ("megaprojects"), and significant donor support.<sup>16</sup> Public debt growth reflects the government's plan to temporarily boost infrastructure investment through the increased use of external non-concessional financing. This highlights the importance of maintaining prudent macroeconomic policies and continuing to pursue structural reforms to strengthen debt management and ensure efficiency in public investment, building on progress achieved under the current IMF- and World Bank-supported programs.<sup>17</sup>

To manage recovery from the floods and cyclones of 2000 and 2001, the government set in motion a post-flood reconstruction programme with the support of external donors and managed largely through the national budget system. This avoided complex and multiple funding arrangements while strengthening national accountability and transparency mechanisms.<sup>18</sup>

Following the donors' conference in 2000, government officials signed agreements with all donors who had pledged resources, to have legally binding contracts with a schedule of financial disbursements, corresponding reconstruction activities and reporting procedures. Donors were encouraged to channel funds through the government budget and not through the establishment of a donor trust fund or parallel funding arrangements. Managing donor assistance through the Treasury gave the government full responsibility for using the funds as well as for ensuring accountability and supervision. It also meant that the reconstruction programme would be fully integrated into the public sector financial management system. Strong government ownership and commitment to the goals of the recovery programme seem to have provided incentives for donors to pledge agree to work largely through the national system.

Fund management was consequently handled through SISTAFE, the national system for financial administration. Assistance was disbursed rapidly, totaling over 90 per cent in late 2002. Establishment of a parliamentary task force to oversee the programme further ensured that the government was held to account by both its external partners and national legislators. SISTAFE was upgraded in 2004 to be accessible on-line (as e-SISTAFE), and provides transparency in the management of public revenues.

<sup>16</sup> World Bank, Second Climate Change Development Policy Operation (CCDP02), June 2014, paragraph 2.

<sup>17</sup> Report N. 75117-MZ, International Development Association program document for a proposed credit in the amount of sdr 73.4 million (us\$110 million equivalent) to the Republic of Mozambique for a ninth poverty reduction support credit, June 6, 2013. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management - AFTP1 Africa Region.

<sup>18</sup> Christie and Hanlon, "A casebook of experiences and lessons."

By 2013, the Government of Mozambique had opted to work with donor partners through existing programs of cooperation, and without appealing to donors specifically for disaster recovery needs through donor round tables, for example. Continuing the practice from the previous decade, funds are channeled through SISTAFE as much as possible, after negotiation with donors.

Following the floods in 2013, MPD provided guidance to line ministries for organizing information regarding post-disaster recovery by sector; actions for addressing damage and replacement; and estimated cost of reconstruction. Total estimated costs exceeded USD521 million, of which 68 percent was for public sector reconstruction and vulnerability reduction. (See annex 2).

**Funding needs** for post-disaster infrastructure refurbishment and inventory replacement were grouped into the following four categories:

1. **Emergency** actions to be realized by October 2013, using the national contingency fund, were largely humanitarian in nature, and includes the distribution of food and non-food emergency items, as well as health and education services.
2. **Early Recovery** needs identified by line ministries, funded from reallocations of the national budget, included the repositioning of infrastructure, service delivery and revitalizing production (through agriculture, fishing, industry and commerce).
3. **Post-disaster recovery**, namely the reconstruction of infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, and health clinics. Detailed engineering studies were required to include measures to reduce future risk and increase resilience, cost estimates, and possible sources of financing. Funding for this category was not immediately available through the state budget; MPD encouraged external resource mobilization.
4. **Measures to reduce vulnerability**, or structural and non-structural interventions, based upon engineering studies designed to mitigate the impact of future disasters, including slum upgrading or relocation of slum residents. Funding for such actions would be identified outside of the national budget.

## SOURCES OF FUNDING

Government-managed funding for disasters takes a number of forms, including ex-ante and ex-post budgetary provisions for disaster response, recovery and reconstruction.

Contingency funds for disaster response and short-term recovery are made available to line ministries, local government, and the National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC) through two mechanisms:

- *Central reserve provisions*: the Ministry of Finance withholds 10 percent of each sector and local government budget in reserve for unforeseen expenditure, such as disaster losses. If the funds are not used for contingency spending, they are released for planned expenditure in the last three months of the fiscal year.
- The *Contingency Plan*: Each year since 2008, the government has allocated US\$3.5 to 4 million to cover a percentage of spending needs estimated for disaster response and early recovery, based on population exposure, historical activity and meteorological forecasts under three different scenarios presented in the annual contingency plan. The state provision is typically sufficient to fund the first 72 hours of a disaster; the remaining funds are provided by international cooperation partners. INGC is allocated more than half of the total budget, given its disaster response and coordination responsibilities.

Funds for longer term recovery and reconstruction are sourced separately. Budgets for multi-year recovery needs, particularly in categories (c) and (d) above, are largely folded into the rolling national development plan and macro economic framework as articulated in the Medium Term Fiscal Framework (CFMP or Cenário Fiscal de Médio Prazo) every year. In this way, reconstruction needs are incorporated into the regular budget cycle, and managed as medium to long-term development projects through existing mechanisms. For example, World Bank loans for the national productive social action program or the roads and bridges management both include the financing of recovery or rehabilitation after the 2013 floods. The 2014-16 includes post-flood reconstruction among the priorities to be funded, in order to attain poverty reduction goals.<sup>19</sup>

Other funding for recovery from external sources may be managed off-budget, in parallel to the national system, directly by the funding organizations. ODAMoz<sup>20</sup>, or the electronic database maintained by the local United Nations Resident Coordinator's office, contains categories for donor funds received by Mozambique which distinguish between emergency response, reconstruction relief and rehabilitation, and disaster prevention and preparedness. It is probable however that the amount reflected under "reconstruction relief" is under-stated, since other project categories, such as infrastructure and education, have tranches which are being used for rehabilitation activities.

## ALTERNATIVE FINANCING MECHANISMS FOR RECOVERY

In addition to existing mechanisms for financing post-disaster recovery, the Government of Mozambique has been considering other possibilities. This includes:

1. **A mechanism to spread disaster losses over time**, given low uptake of insurance for public assets, and redistribution of contingency budget balances at the end of the fiscal year for other purposes. A proposal for a national fund for disaster risk management (Fundo de Gestão de Riscos Naturais) and climate change adaptation has been drafted and is under discussion within the CCGC. This fund would aim to create a source of funding independent of the budget cycle, accumulate across years; bypass normal budget disbursement procedures to increase flexibility and speed of access for funding for disaster response and recovery; and introduce more efficient coordination, oversight and tracking of donor and government funds applied to DRM<sup>21</sup>. This pooled fund would mobilize national, regional and international resources, with credible and flexible mechanisms for receiving, channeling, and monitoring such funds, as well as building internal capacity to absorb these funds.
2. Programs for **risk transfer** to respond to severe events, using established scientific parameters to index insurance for calamitous events. In other words, this mechanism would classify disaster events to support the future use of financial instruments that link payouts to event severity.
3. A **national safety-net scheme** is also under consideration to reduce the burden on the central government for post-disaster response financing. This would take the form of a National Program for Productive Social Action in response to chronic food insecurity and vulnerability to climatic shocks, price fluctuations, and the seasonal variability of agricultural production.

<sup>19</sup> "Cenário Fiscal de Médio Prazo 2014-2016," República de Moçambique Ministério da Planificação e Desenvolvimento e Ministério das Finanças, Maputo June 2013, paragraph 10.

<sup>20</sup> ODAMoz 2.0 is the updated version of the original EC funded electronic data base that provides information on Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Mozambique. The original version was created in response to the Paris Declaration advocating for strengthened coordination and harmonization among Donors and alignment with the Government of Mozambique. ODAMoz track donor and United Nations agency projects and programs in the country: where they are operating, who finances them, and which organization implements them.

<sup>21</sup> World Bank, Mozambique: Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance (DRFI) Country Note, June 2012.

Another possible mechanism for financing post-disaster response and recovery is PREVINA.<sup>22</sup> Since the restructuring of INGC in 2006, it was envisaged as an account where the balance of contingency funds could be deposited at the end of each fiscal year, and it has long been envisaged as an account where the balance of contingency funds at the end of each fiscal year, and non-earmarked monetary donations would automatically be transferred.

The possibility of temporary tax suspensions and subsidized access to credit to promote post-disaster recovery also exists.

Budgets for sector development, coming from both national resources and partner contributions need to be aligned with disaster risk management. A culture of prevention and adaptation is gradually being introduced to Mozambican society, to create a foundation for national development that is based on its own resources. What requires more work is rapid financial execution – decentralized and specialized – of recovery funding, obligating the application of exceptional budgetary execution measures as recognized in the Disaster Management law.

---

<sup>22</sup> When INGC was created in 1999, all transport equipment of the extinguished agency – DPCCN—was liquidated and proceeds were deposited in an account called PREVINA.



## MANAGING RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION

As discussed in an earlier section on the institutional framework, both INGC and MPD have coordination roles in post-disaster recovery. Neither of their respective assessments of recovery needs are actively used however to monitor or evaluate the completion and impact of actions undertaken.

Relocation-related activities that are under the direct responsibility of GACOR are clearly monitored, as will be discussed below. Other actions to rehabilitate damaged infrastructure are enfolded into development projects and are not labeled as post-disaster recovery programs per se, even when resources for recovery come from donor funds earmarked for emergency.

A sampling of projects that include recovery components are the Safer Schools Project jointly financed by the EU, UN-Habitat and GFDRR, the Baixo Limpopo Development Project financed by the African Development Bank; and two projects financed by the World Bank for (1) Roads and Bridges management and maintenance and (2) a national productive social action program.

During emergencies, the Government applies accelerated procedures for procurement of goods and services, to enable INGC to assist disaster victims as soon as possible. Customs duties and taxes are suspended for the importation of emergency supplies. After the emergency phase is over, INGC is obligated to reconcile these exceptions with the fiscal authorities. (This responsibility is eased somewhat by the participation of tax authorities within CENOE.)

In the absence of a defined recovery phase, recovery projects are subject to standard financial management procedures that have been constructed for transparency and embedded with safeguards for accountability – but which are not time sensitive to the aim of returning to “normal” as quickly as possible. This can frustrate the expectations of partner organizations that adjusted their funding to address a post-disaster situation, but find that disbursements are not treated with any urgency.

During consultations for this case study, it was suggested by both government and funding partners that more pro-active measures be applied for recovery activities. Procurement processes under normal development conditions can take at least three to six months – quite long for recovering from disasters. Donors can urge that projects managed within the government system use accelerated procurement and management mechanisms for recovery activities. Projects managed off-budget, or outside of the government system by donors or civil society organizations can explicitly be designed to address recovery needs, and be managed through the funding organizations’ expedited processes.

## VULNERABILITY REDUCTION THROUGH RELOCATION

The Government of Mozambique has long had a policy of “reassentamento”<sup>23</sup>. This policy has been implemented after disasters as well as for development projects since independence, and subsequently means different things to different people and areas in the country. Relocation policy, as currently implemented through INGC, represents a government initiative to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters among rural populations<sup>24</sup>, through provision of plots of land<sup>25</sup>, construction of resilient housing for vulnerable population groups, provision of basic social services, and an effort to increase income generation opportunities.

The guiding principles for relocation are to:

- Engage the affected population to return to “normal” life, with government and civil society facilitating this process;
- Mobilize national capacity to support this process, through the use of military personnel, volunteers, students and civil society;
- Protect the vulnerable, by according the elderly, disabled, chronically ill, and orphaned children priority in housing.

INGC involvement in relocation activities began after the Council of Ministers approved the Chimoio Plan and “Preliminary Assessment and Post-Disaster Reconstruction” plan in April 2007. These documents defined the main relocation support activities as the demarcation of plots of land 30 x 40 meters, the construction of estaleiros (or lumberyards), the procurement of construction materials and the construction of houses for 30,000 families, at a cost of 193 million meticaís (MZN) or USD 7.9 million, at exchange rate of 2007. The government could finance one third or 66.5 million MZN, from available resources, out of which 92 percent was earmarked for the four affected provinces of Sofala, Manica, Tete and Zambezia.

Responsibility for program implementation was initially attributed to the Ministry of Public Works, provincial governors and concerned districts. The role of INGC was limited to working with communities on disaster management, and coordinating with the Ministry of Science and Technology on income generation activities. However, the Prime Minister designated INGC as the overall coordinator of the relocation process in 2008, and GACOR was created for this purpose; their first disbursements took place in 2009.

As a result of relocation activities, the population faces visibly reduced risk of being victimized by floods, as compared to those of 2000 and 2007. A performance audit conducted by KPMG recognizes positive performance indicators<sup>26</sup>. For example, 99 communities were settled along the river basins of Zambeze, Punge, Save, Buzi and Limpopo. Socio-economic infrastructure (e.g. health centers and schools) was also rehabilitated and repositioned in these areas. Also, economic conditions in the resettled areas have improved somewhat, as indicated by the development of local markets for bricks and the local construction capacity.

At the same time, GACOR-INGC have learned important lessons for disaster recovery through the relocation process:

- First, *each relocated community has unique specifications and characteristics*. Thus the amount of time and effort invested in each location is highly variable. Contrary to the quick jump from emergency to development phases in other areas of post-disaster activity, GACOR is much slower to formally bring relocation activities to a close. Therein lies some ambiguity about what is recovery versus what is development.

<sup>23</sup> GACOR/INGC - Plano para a II Fase do reassentamento pós-cheias 2007

<sup>24</sup> KPMG op.cit

<sup>25</sup> All land is the property of the state; title is granted to legal persons. Its use is regulated by a mixture of traditions, concessions and local customs. Lei de Terras, number 19/97.

<sup>26</sup> KPMG op.cit



- *Economic opportunity is a critical part of recovery.* People opt to relocate when the socio-economic gains are understood; conversely they may prefer to continue living in (unsafe) flood zones when economic opportunities in the new communities are fragile. Some families hedged their bets by continuing to cultivate their fertile traditional fields near the (flood-prone) riverbanks, as well as initiating plots near their relocated community.
- *District government must be involved.* Local leaders play a critical role in coordination and interaction between government, communities, and relocation partners. They play a bridging role in identifying (vulnerable) individuals who merit special assistance, and priorities for replacing or repairing damaged infrastructure and equipment<sup>27</sup>. In one relocated community, the move of the public school, the proximity of the trunk road, and availability of jobs at a juice factory seemed to motivate a wholesale shutdown of the flood-prone location. In another location, the school continued to function in the original community and few had started to exercise their right to live on newly allocated plots of land.
- *Community participation increases consumer satisfaction.* While the size and allocation of land parcels may not be negotiable, families who customize the standard brick-based resilient house design can introduce space for chicken coops, animal pens or a terrace and garden. Some civil society organizations use owner-driven contributions as the criteria for providing additional support to relocation; for example, Caritas provides doors, windows and paint to selected families who have produced a minimum number of bricks.
- *Building Back Better: relocation is more than reconstruction.* The families and households who opt to relocate recognize the opportunity to live in housing that is designed to be more resilient and secure than where they lived prior to the floods. In the two areas visited for this case study, the government funded the construction of houses for vulnerable populations, as per the principle mentioned above. After the plots of land were designated, activities focused on housing construction, led by the Ministry of Public Works and Housing. Social services (education and health) and an accessible market are equally important for helping communities to adjust to life in new locations.
- *Logistics management is critical.* The government tries to provide construction material for a certain number of houses, and expects the relocating families to produce reinforced bricks for housing construction. This requires fuel wood to fire brick-making ovens, which may not be easily available in new relocation areas; and without transport to deliver fuel wood to the construction areas.

The MPD guidelines for planning post-disaster needs specifies<sup>28</sup> that settlements located far from flood plains be considered a definitive solution to eliminate risks, and to substantially reduce loss of property, given that no dyke or dam can guarantee total protection to cities and settlements in case of catastrophic floods. Options for transferring social infrastructure and public administration services to new locations are being identified, together with the allocation of enough land to progressively transfer to inhabitants in these same areas. The locations under consideration are small and medium-size cities and settlements along the banks of the major rivers.

Other views for reducing vulnerability and risk, as proposed by some cooperation partners, are seen through a paradigm of learning to live with floods in situ (introducing different building techniques and designs), instead of moving communities away from flood zones to reduce their vulnerability.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Raúl M. Chambote and Boaventura S. Veja, "Reassentamento pela Metade no Vale do Zambeze: O Caso de Mutarara," Um Estudo Independente sobre a Abordagem de Reassentamento Pós-Cheias em Moçambique à Luz da ERR 2007/8, Oxfam, May 2008.

<sup>28</sup> MPD, Guia para o Diagnostico Preliminar, 2013.

<sup>29</sup> "Focus on Mozambique: A Decade experimenting disaster risk reduction strategies," UN-HABITAT, 2012, p.9

## RISK REDUCTION AND READINESS AS PART OF DISASTER RECOVERY

Disaster risk reduction is another area that has been led by INGC. Measures to improve early warning and public disaster awareness have improved after each disaster in the past decade – translating into reduced expenditure on response. This has been particularly evident in the cost of evacuation;

- In 2007, INGC had two days of advance warning to evacuate around 150,000 people, and disbursed an estimated US\$5 million for this effort;
- In 2008, they had five days of warning to evacuate the same number of people, and US\$3 million was disbursed;
- In 2011, with ten days of warning before an event similar in scale to 2007/2008, INGC disbursed less than US\$1 million.

The government's commitment to risk reduction and disaster readiness has been evident in the annual budget allocation to the contingency plan. Also, District Disaster Risk Management Committees have been set up in areas prone to flooding; they have played an important role in sensitizing the population to disaster warnings and evacuation procedures. With strong monitoring mechanisms, the benefits of investing in recovery would also be more visible.



## MONITORING AND EVALUATION

SISTAFE and ODAMoz have been mentioned in an earlier section as financial management tools and databases. These systems help to monitor funding at a national level, but do not provide correlations between available funding and post-disaster needs, let alone the overall state of recovery from the most recent disaster.

Nevertheless, the 2013 guide for preliminary assessment of post-flood damage stipulates that recovery, reconstruction and vulnerability reduction should merit priority attention of all sectors, and consequently will be periodically monitored by the Council of Ministers. Progress reports are prepared by MPD, in coordination with the Ministry for State Administration (MAE), for review by the Council of Ministers, with the possibility of mid-course corrections if the reviewers deem it necessary.

The early recovery strategy defined by key international partners is not monitored by either INGC or MPD. Within the humanitarian country team, composed of international organizations and led by the United Nations, the Early Recovery Cluster working group considers this strategy to have been developed for fund-raising purposes, and does not use it (or any other baseline) to track how recovery needs are being addressed after each disaster in Mozambique, even if they are incorporated into and financed as development projects that are coordinated by the MPD.

Similarly, long-term recovery needs are not explicitly included when defining government development priorities or socio-economic plans. Thus there is no certainty that the needs identified in post-disaster assessments are implemented or financed. Within the MPD guidelines, line ministries are responsible for reconstruction within their respective mandates, but they each face the challenge of limited resources and balancing between recovery needs and those already identified in socio-economic development plans (e.g. PES, PESODs). For World Bank-financed projects that contain tranches of recovery activities, it is possible to envision the eventual inclusion of monitoring indicators for recovery. For example, the Safer Schools project will note locations for more resilient schools that are slated to be constructed in areas already affected by past floods. The Second Climate Change Development Policy Operation will monitor the number of households in climate vulnerable districts who benefit from the National Productive Social Action Program, and the percentage of district roads that are re-constructed or upgraded from 2014 onwards in pilot provinces (Gaza and west Inhambane) in compliance with revised guidance and design standards.

Insufficient financing for rehabilitation of major infrastructure such as dykes and dams has resulted in disasters which could have been avoided. Also, when funding for infrastructure is sourced through budget reallocations, it is likely to cover a return to the status quo ante, but rarely to a “build back better” standard that is resilient for the next disaster, let alone one of a greater magnitude, such as the dam breakage in Chokwe in 2013. New projects with concessional financing are more likely to be developed with consideration of disaster-sensitive safeguards.

The resources allocated to INGC for recovery are subject to monitoring and control by the same institutions and mechanisms that monitor line ministries and development activities. While the active participation of a comptroller (from the Finance Ministry) within CENOE creates room for maneuver during the emergency phase, the Administrative Tribunal who audits state accounts reviews accounts only years after the disaster – when appreciation for the special circumstances has long dissipated. With the promulgation of the Emergency Law, there is an opportunity to resolve many of these issues, giving INGC greater financial autonomy with appropriate mechanisms and safeguards.



## RECOMMENDATIONS FROM CASE STUDY PARTICIPANTS FOR STRENGTHENING THE MANAGEMENT OF POST-FLOOD RECOVERY

This case study was prepared through a combination of literature reviews and discussions with organizations active in the area of post-disaster management in Mozambique, between March and July 2014. The following recommendations are a synthesis of the discussions. The names of all of who were consulted for this study are listed in Annex 3.

### DISASTER RECOVERY POLICY

The 2013 floods demonstrated that challenges faced by INGC in managing, leading and coordinating the recovery process are primarily due to the absence of national recovery policies. Currently, the post-disaster emergency phase is immediately followed by resumption of development mode, despite outstanding needs to be addressed and people's lives still in disarray. The Law 15/2014 ratified by Parliament in April 2014 established the legal basis for managing disasters, including prevention, mitigation, relief, reconstruction and recovery in affected areas. The regulations and strategy for implementing this law should serve to articulate national recovery policy.

With regards to disaster-related relocation, this law needs to be harmonized with MICOA-led resettlement and Decree 31/2012, to ensure consistency in the safe and sustainable handling of resettlement in Mozambique. (The difference between disaster-related and development-related resettlement is not clear to the general public and even within government.) The distinction ought to be defined so as to ensure that citizens who relocate from disaster affected zones can recover and smoothly transition towards sustainable livelihoods over time.


### INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS

1. Re-examine the national disaster management system, particularly regarding competencies and authority for post-disaster recovery. The legal basis and parameters of INGC's role and authority need better definition, particularly for the period after deactivation of CENOE when INGC reverts to normal operations (or Code Green) and reconstruction activities are underway.

If the disaster recovery framework were elaborated to encompass four phases – from the event (disaster) through emergency response, post-disaster needs assessment, to programming for and implementation of recovery and institutionalization; it would be depicted in a circle (see Figure 5).

By identifying the Mozambican institutions that are responsible and/or active at each of these phases, it is possible to identify where further definitions are necessary. Starting from the disaster event (at "11:00" in the circle, INGC is clearly leading the response. CENOE is conducting an assessment of post-disaster needs, as is MPD. As discussed earlier, MPD is currently the most active institution in Phase II of this graphic, although they do not prioritize recovery any more than other strategic objectives. This results in fracturing recovery among the respective sector ministries through Phase III, with no consolidated overview nor monitoring and evaluation relative to the initial assessment – as noted with question marks in Figure 5. INGC again comes into a visible role in Phase IV.

Figure 5: Developing Disaster Recovery Frameworks to Facilitate Resilient Recovery & Development



2. Establish a “CENOE for Recovery” in order to continue coordinating and monitoring recovery activities after the emergency phase is declared over. Such coordination would form a bigger and more coherent scenario of recovery actions and programs that are currently dispersed between INGC, MPD and sector ministries. It would introduce a monitoring mechanism to maintain an overview of recovery activities, much like CENOE during the emergency phase. Recovery should be clearly articulated under the responsibility of INGC.
3. Clarify the responsibilities of CTGC and “CENOE for Recovery” regarding recovery operations – as distinct from development programs. CTGC members clearly continue to contribute to the definition of recovery actions, even as CENOE phases down. Therefore, they should all be involved in pre-disaster recovery planning and more explicitly in the management of recovery processes. Currently their contributions are rendered invisible by being re-absorbed into development programs.
4. Involve the Ministry of Women and Social Affairs more actively from the beginning of recovery planning, so as to plan an Exit Strategy for INGC from communities that transit from Disaster to Recovery and to normalcy. This Exit Strategy ought to be factored in and developed with an estimated funding and budget.
5. Concentrate INGC’s “core business” on coordination, instead of managing activities in sectors where others have the competence and mandate. The INGC mandate should extend around the full circle (see above Figure 5), between Prevention-Recovery-Mitigation/Prevention- Preparedness. Achievements in vulnerability reduction, prevention, communication with communities, and teamwork have made INGC an acclaimed national institution, despite its small number of staff and limited budget, and this should continue.

MPD should continue to contribute to recovery, as a member of CTGC and CENOE (for recovery), in working with the Ministry of Finance to make financial resources available for recovery within the rolling development plans and CFMP. This would not replace the importance of INGC for on-the-ground coordination.

## PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT

6. Train national and local authorities and other relevant partners to ready for recovery by reviewing and adapting PDNA guidelines to Mozambique’s characteristics and structures. A consolidated post-disaster assessment of damage and needs is sine qua non to plan for recovery and reconstruction. Therefore, the final report prepared by CENOE/INGC in its phase down from level 4 needs to be harmonized with the preliminary assessment coordinated by MPD, as well as those used by key partners and NGOs. One multi-sectoral report of recovery priorities and implementation framework would be more transparent and efficient to organize funding, planning and monitoring.
7. GACOR’s involvement in relocation should be better defined, so that their direct involvement is phased down to encourage local authorities to assume responsibility for community well-being and development.
8. Increasingly sophisticated meteorological sciences open the possibility of multi-annual contingency plans that could include projected reconstruction needs and cost. The “needs assessment” that follows a disaster would then be refined rather than constructed from scratch after a disaster event, and the road between emergency and development would be fore-shortened.

## MONITORING RECOVERY

9. Create a consolidated database of (demographic, geographic, infrastructure) information collected through the assessments of CENOE and MPD. Databases should be regularly updated in order to be able to provide a credible baseline on short notice. INGC can also establish formal agreements with other agencies (e.g. INAM) and line ministries that collect data on disaster risk loss and exposure, to ensure the sharing of this data and its consolidation.<sup>30</sup> This can be supplemented with data on exposed assets, covering private buildings, crops and infrastructure with characteristics including location, replacement value, and construction type/crop type.
10. Clarify accelerated mechanisms for recovery, while maintaining transparency and accountability, by working ahead of the next floods with donors who can use their existing emergency procedures in the recovery phase.
11. Monitoring of post-disaster recovery and reconstruction is not yet conducted consistently. The mechanisms for monitoring should be developed to link recovery activities with the allocated budget, such as the Reconstruction Plan of 2013-2015 and related plans of action.
12. Include recovery-related action within the national monitoring/ evaluation framework of CCDPO2. Given that MPD is overseeing the post-disaster budget revisions, and categorizing what activities fall into longer-term recovery and resilience-building measures, this would seem feasible, even if not the same type of activity.

## FUNDING

13. Funding for recovery should be labeled in its own category, in both ODAMoz and e-SISTAFE, regardless of the source of funding, so that it can be compared to the estimated cost of post-disaster reconstruction such as in Annex 2. This would facilitate monitoring or recovery activities. For example, within the Safer Schools Project, schools that are rehabilitated in flood-affected areas or built in communities that have been relocated due to permanent risk of floods would be recognized. The purpose of tracking is to ensure that the need identified in the post-disaster assessment have been addressed, preferably before the next event.
14. The private sector has been able to mobilize resources more easily than public institutions, and to more quickly help markets return to normal. As such, it is in the interest of both government and the private sector to work together in post-disaster recovery and reconstruction.

---

<sup>30</sup> An initial database was created for disaster losses in the last 20 years, using the DesInventar methodology through UNDP/BCPR's Global Risk Identification Program (GRIP). This work can be scaled up by having relevant sectors contribute their existing information to feed a national database on disasters.





## CONCLUSION

Today, coordination is palpable and visible in Mozambique during an emergency, but not so visible in the recovery/reconstruction phase. Without a dedicated recovery program, subsequent natural disasters may further aggravate the risk to populations and infrastructure. This makes it urgent to carry out reconstruction plans more systematically. The recommendations provided by government and international stakeholders to this case study show that Mozambique is ready to further institutionalize post-disaster recovery measures.

The transition between emergency and development is a dynamic and distinct process. Although the normal planning and development process can accommodate some exceptions and emergencies, the situation must be publicly defined and articulated in order to qualify for special treatment. The transition from emergency to development should be treated as an interim phase, called Recovery. INGC is well-placed by its institutional mandate to coordinate recovery policy and programs – working with sector ministries, provincial and district governments, international partners and civil society organizations. The stakeholders in Mozambique are urged to take advantage of recently approved Disaster Management Law to debate, define and formalize the roles and responsibilities of individuals, organizations, and institutions, to ensure that recovery needs caused by recurrent disasters be fully funded, implemented and monitored.

## ANNEX 1: CONTINGENCY FUND ALLOCATIONS, BY MINISTRY AND PROVINCE, 2013-2014

	('000 MZN)
<b>Central Level Organs</b>	<b>Value</b>
Ministry of Agriculture	1.900,00
Ministry of Public Works and Housing	2.025,00
Ministry of Education	740,00
Ministry of Health	1.100,00
Ministry of Women and Social Action	1.100,00
Ministry for Coordination of Environmental Action	800,00
National Institute of Meteorology	800,00
<b>Total</b>	<b>8.465,00</b>
	<b>('000 MZN)</b>
<b>Provincial Organs</b>	
Provincial INGC Office, Niassa	1.900,00
Provincial INGC Office, Cabo Delgado	2.090,00
Provincial INGC Office, Nampula	1.800,00
Provincial INGC Office, Zambézia	7.334,81
Provincial INGC Office, Tete	2.090,00
Provincial INGC Office, Manica	1.450,00
Provincial INGC Office, Sofala	4.250,00
Provincial INGC Office, Inhambane	1.670,00
Provincial INGC Office, Gaza	9.700,00
Provincial INGC Office, Maputo	3.150,00
<b>Total</b>	<b>35.434,81</b>

## ANNEX 2: ESTIMATED COSTS OF POST-DISASTER RECONSTRUCTION IN 2013

Description	Total cost of Reconstruction ('000 MZN)	Cost of Public Sector Reconstruction ('000 MZN)
<b>Social Sectors</b>	<b>2 305 437.14</b>	<b>2 305 437.14</b>
Education	2 075 249.94	2 075 249.94
Health	188 687.20	188 687.20
Culture	41 500.00	41 500.00
<b>Economic Sectors</b>	<b>720 078.58</b>	<b>447 970.00</b>
Agriculture	529 315.00	365 775.00
Fishing	11 765.70	1 622.00
Industry and Commerce	178 997.88	80 573.00
<b>Infrastructure</b>	<b>8 765 140.23</b>	<b>4 176 114.60</b>
Roads and Bridges	3 337 398.90	3 337 398.90
Water and Sanitation	806 800.00	806 800.00
Railroads	4 322 055.00	-
Energy	266 970.64	-
Public Buildings	31 915.70	31 915.70
<b>Vulnerability Reduction</b>	<b>3 861 422.50</b>	<b>31 915.70</b>
Housing and Urban	1 253 900.00	1 253 900.00
Social Protection	45 557.50	45 557.50
Disaster Management	236 240.00	236 240.00
Water Resource Management	77 000.00	77 000.00
Meteorology	17 650.00	17 650.00
Hydraulic Infrastructure	967 075.00	967 075.00
Relocation	1 264 000.00	1 264 000.00
<b>Total ('000 MZN)</b>	<b>15 652 078.45</b>	<b>10 790 944.24</b>
<b>Total ('000 USD)</b>	<b>521 735.95</b>	<b>359 698.14</b>

## ANNEX 3: CONTRIBUTORS TO CASE STUDY

We wish to thank the following people who participated in the validation workshop, small group discussions, interviews, and review of drafts.

	Name	Government Organization	Email Contact
1	João Ribeiro	INGC	jrubeiro_moz@yahoo.com
2	Higino Rodrigues	INGC	higinorodrigues@hotmail.com
3	Leovegildo Marcos	INGC	lcruzmarcos@hotmail.com
4	Mauricio Xerinda	INGC	xerinda68@gmail.com
5	Bonifacio Antonio	INGC	bonyantonio@gmail.com
6	Rita Almeida	INGC	ritaalmeida_9@msn.com
7	Elias Massicame	INGC	ezmassicame@gmail.com
8	Marta Manjate	INGC	martamanjate@yahoo.com.br
9	Nadia Morar	INGC	nadia.morar@yahoo.com.br
10	Tereza Pinto	INGC	ginapinto27@yahoo.com.br
11	Fátima Belchior	INGC	jacintabelchior@hotmail.com
12	Xavier Chavana	MPD	xchavana@gmail.com
13	Ana Chichava	MICOA	
14	Telma Manjate	MICOA	
15	Guilhermina Amurane	MICOA	
16	Luís Varela	MICOA	
17	Lorna Gujral	MISAU	lgujral@misau.gov.mz
18	Amelia Zandamela	MISAU	melitazanda@gmail.com
19	Carlton Artur Lencol	MISAU/DNSP	lencol087@gmail.com
20	Abdul Alimo Ibrahim Issufo	MINT/SENSAP	abalissufo@yahoo.com.br
21	Ernesto Mafumo	MIC	carsolino64@gmail.com
22	Jaime Mavila	MIC	jmavila03@yahoo.com.br
23	Francisco Manhica	MINEC	chicomanhica@gmail.com
24	Atanásio Manhique	INAM	
25	Mussa Mustafa	INAM	
26	Acacio Tembe	INAM	acacio-t@inam.gov.mz
27	Zefanias Chitsungo	MOPH/DNHU	
28	Custódio Meque	MOPH/ANE	cmeque@anegov.mz
29	Rute Nhamucho	DNA	rnhamucho@dnaguas.gov.mz
30	José Malanço	DNA	zermalano@yahoo.com.br
31	Luísa da Conceição	DNA	
32	André Zibia	DNA	
33	Delário José Sengo	ARA-SUL	dsengo@ara-sul.co.mz
34	Sofia Ilale	ICS	ilale_sofia@hotmail.com
35	Clementina Zime	GABINFO	celmentinazime2002@yahoo.com.br

	Name	Government Organization	Email Contact
<b>United Agencies and International Partner Organizations</b>			
36	Jennifer Topping	UN	jennifer.topping@one.un.org
37	Titus Kuuyour	UNDP	titus.kuuyour@undp.org
38	Manuela Muianga	UNDP	manuela.muianga@undp.org
39	Fernando Ferreiro	UN-HABITAT	fernando.ferreiro@unhabitat.org
40	Tito Bonde	UNICEF	tbonde@unicef.org
41	Stuart Simpson	IOM	ssimpson@iom.int
42	Abdou Moha	WHO	
43	Bela Matias	European Union	bela.matias@eeas.europa.eu
44	Geert Haghebaert	European Union	geert.haghebaert@eeas.europa.eu
45	Erik Salas	GIZ	erik.salas@giz.de
<b>NGOs, national and international</b>			
46	Mirko Dotta	KULIMA	
47	Alvaro Juliao Matine	KULIMA	alvaromatine@yahoo.com
48	Margarida Simbine	Care International	
49	Luísa Sheila Chambal	CEDES	sheilachambala@gmail.com
50	Horácio Valoi	CEDES/Muxungwe	
51	Claudio Jamal	WORLD VISION	
<b>Red Cross</b>			
52	Marla Dava	CVM	marladava05@gmail.com
<b>Local Risk Management Committees (CLGRC)</b>			
53	Francisco Muchanga	Member CLGRC	
54	Anastacia Marta Nhate	Member CLGRC	
55	Atalia Cossa	Member CLGRC	
56	Lucia Joao	Member CLGRC	
<b>Residents of relocated communities</b>			
57	Alexandre Luis	Resident - Ferroviario	
58	Atalia Josia	Resident - Ferroviario	
59	Filomena Mabota	Community Leader	

	Name	Title
<b>World Bank reviewers and contributors</b>		
60	Isabel Soares	Sr Operations Officer
61	Cheikh A.T. Sagna	Sr Social Development Specialist
62	Paulo Sithoe	Environment Specialist
63	Kulwinder Rao	Sr Highway Engineer
64	Ross Hughes	Sr Climate Change Specialist
65	Jean-Baptiste Migraine	DRM Specialist
66	Louise Croneborg	Water Resources Management Specialist
<b>Case Study Preparation Team</b>		
	Paulo Zucula	Consultant
	Roberto White	Sr DRM Specialist
	Eunice Mucache	DRM Specialist
	Reiko Niimi	Case Study Team Leader



