

GOVERNANCE



PDNA GUIDELINES VOLUME B



CONTENTS

■ INTRODUCTION	1
■ THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS	1
■ THE ASSESSMENT PROCESSS	3
■ PRE-DISASTER BASELINE AND SECTOR OVERVIEW	11
■ ASSESSMENT OF DISASTER EFFECTS	16
■ ESTIMATING THE VALUE OF THE EFFECTS OF A DISASTER	23
■ ASSESSMENT OF DISASTER IMPACT	27
■ CROSS-SECTOR LINKAGES INCLUDING CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES	30
■ SECTOR RECOVERY STRATEGY	33
■ KEY REFERENCES	46
■ ANNEXES	47

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BBB	Building Back Better
CBO	Community-based organisation
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (World Bank)
DALA	Damage and Loss Assessment
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EC	European Union
FTS	Financial Tracking Service
GT	Governance Team
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IM	Information Management
LG	Local Government
NGO	Non-Governmental organisation
NRM/B	National Recovery Management/Body
PDNA	Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
RS	Recovery Strategy

INTRODUCTION

There is no unique definition of governance used by all Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) partners, yet each recognises that it is closely linked to the exercise of power and related decision-making processes involving different state and non-state actors in the provision of public goods and services. State actors comprise public administration at central and local levels, the legislature, local governments (at all existing levels of territorial administration), the judiciary, and public security bodies while non-state actors can include non-governmental and religious organisations, traditional structures, community-based groups and the private sector.

Governance is considered a cross-cutting sector within the context of a (PDNA) because each of the sub-sectors of the social, productive and infrastructure sectoral groupings includes an assessment of the disaster-induced disruption to the specific governance processes of the sub-sectors. However, governance also includes non-sector-specific core government functions needed to enable recovery and reconstruction:

- Piloting the overall national recovery process;
- Managing public, private and international aid for recovery;
- Restoring local governance functions;
- Maintaining the rule of law in disaster-affected areas.

A fifth optional core function in post-disaster settings is related to civil service management, in particular for replacement, redeployment and payment of benefits for injury or death, in cases of severe impact of the disaster on the public sector workforce, especially in central government institutions, as was the case in Haiti (2010) and Aceh (2004), for the provincial government. However, in most cases, the disaster impact on the central management of civil service will be marginal and hence, is not covered with other core functions.

The main purpose of this chapter is to provide general guidance on conducting needs assessment and recovery planning for core government functions within the context of a PDNA. Guidance on specific governance assessments under each sub sector is provided in the corresponding chapters. Additional details on the conceptual framework defining core government functions are presented in Section 2.

This chapter proposes an integrated approach to the PDNA, elaborating on the recovery needs of institutions that contribute to delivering core government functions. A strong emphasis is put on ensuring that these institutions are capable of achieving a strong national ownership over all aspects of the post-disaster recovery phase.

The chapter describes the six steps for the formulation of the Recovery Strategy (RS):

- 1) Providing sector overview and pre-disaster baseline;
- 2) Assessing disaster effects;
- 3) Presenting macroeconomic and human development impact;
- 4) Determining recovery needs, including needs for Building Back Better (BBB) approaches;
- 5) Formulating recovery strategy and action plan;
- 6) Estimating recovery costs.

¹ UNDP defines governance as comprising the mechanisms, processes and institutions, through which citizens and groups articulate interests, exercise legal rights, uphold obligations and mediate differences (UNDP, *Governance for Sustainable Human Development*, UNDP Policy Document, New York, 1997). The World Bank views governance as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development (World Bank, *Governance*, Washington, D.C., 1993). For the EU, governance concerns “the state’s ability to serve the citizens. It refers to the rules, processes and behaviour by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in society.” (http://ec.europa.eu/development/center/repository/com2003_0615en01_en.pdf).


² In certain countries, traditional leadership structures have been integrated into the formal governance structure and hence play an official role in decision-making and administrative processes. PDNA teams would have to ascertain early on what the exact nature of the structure is.

THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS

FRAMEWORK AND SCOPE OF THE GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT

The core government functions form critical inter-related building blocks to achieve the main goals, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Core Government Functions and Overall Goals within the Context of a Post-Disaster Situation



This governance framework allows linking recovery planning with the longer-term development goals specific to the Governance Sector, in particular, building trust-based and responsive state-society relationships, capitalising on the transformative potential of post-disaster periods on governance arrangements.

The framework applying to the governance PDNA must also differentiate between core government functions, covered in this chapter, and sub-sector specific governance aspects covered by other chapters. This is the distinction made in Figure 2, where the former appear in blue and the latter in orange.


The core government functions that are the main object of the governance PDNA are critical to the overall success of the recovery process in all sub-sectors for the following reasons:

- **National recovery management:** This refers to the country's institutional infrastructure and capacities to provide the necessary leadership to coordinate the PDNA, including defining a recovery vision and integrated strategic plan in order to raise and appropriate the necessary financial and non-financial resources for implementing the plan, to maintain coherence and effectiveness in the government response, especially among sectoral actors, to build public confidence on the adequacy of the response and integrity of its management and to monitor and report regularly and transparently on progress made. This overarching function may be played directly by the centre of government (i.e. the cabinet) or delegated to a permanent or ad hoc national recovery body, or a combination of both. It is inevitably a highly political function that cannot be outsourced.
- **Aid management:** In many post-disaster contexts, aid is a major part of the recovery budget, and aid organisations become a major source of policy orientations; thus, aid management becomes an essential part of the wider recovery agenda, albeit with unique challenges.

- Maintaining the rule of law: Disasters often create situations of chaos and breakdown in the rule of law and have a direct impact on the functionality of law and order institutions. Without proper security on the ground, recovery is impeded. Security and justice services are also important to guarantee the protection of groups made vulnerable by the post-disaster consequences, including by responding to needs to replace lost ID and property papers.
- Local governance: Functioning local governments and participatory local governance processes at all relevant sub-national levels (e.g. governorate, county, municipality) are needed to plan and implement local recovery plans that are relevant to local needs and to increase local ownership. Local governments in particular have a crucial role to play in coordinating interventions prepared and delivered by sub-sectors at the community level. Their performance in a post-disaster context has a great bearing on public confidence in the state's response.



FIGURE 2. Core Government Functions in the Context of a Post-Disaster Situation



NOTE: Dotted lines refer to processes in decision-making, implementation and monitoring that involve the participation of and coordination between state and non-state actors, and central and local levels. Depending on the context, the strength of these multi-stakeholder processes, as opposed to centrally-controlled governance of all recovery aspects will vary. The figure also describes a situation where local governments have an important role in leading and managing recovery at the local level, which is not systematically the case because at times this echelon of governance is bypassed by national institutions and aid providers.

This is an example and does not include the full scope of government business that is carried out in additional productive sectors, such as manufacturing, oil/natural gas, trade and tourism, and in infrastructure sectors, such as transport and electricity.

PLEASE NOTE: In decentralised environments, local governments are usually responsible for part or all of basic service delivery (e.g. primary education or primary health care), hence restoring their operational capacities will be an essential part of the recovery plan for the sub-sectors concerned. Yet, to avoid double-counting, basic service delivery by local governments should be covered in PDNAs of corresponding sub-sector (e.g. health, education). The part of local governments’ operations that is addressed by the governance chapter are the higher-level functions (leadership, coordination, administration, communications, political representation). In addition, there may be certain services provided by local governments that will not be reported in a sub-sectors but are important to recovery and will have to be researched under governance, for example, issuing or/replacing business licences, work permits, driving licences, operating market places or cemeteries (if not already reviewed by the Community Infrastructure sub-sector), etc. At the onset of the PDNA, after the initial context analysis, the PDNA teams will have to meet and agree on how functions and services provided by local governments are divided among themselves with the aim of avoiding double-counting. For the rest of this chapter, services provided by local governments and not reported under sub-sector analysis will be referred to as “other local government (LG) services”.

In terms of institutions, Table 1 provides a distinction between primary (or core) and secondary institutions involved in each function. This will help prioritise data collection work, in particular for infrastructure and physical aspects. It is a model that needs to be adapted to the legal and institutional reality of each country.

Table 1. Institutional Stakeholders and Core Government Functions

Function	Primary / Core institutions	Secondary institutions
National recovery management	Chief Executive’s Office, National Recovery Management Body, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning, Army	Statistics Agency Central Bank Treasury National Parliament
Aid management	National Recovery Management Body Ministries of Foreign Affairs/Planning and Finance, donor coordination group(s)	NGO coordination
Local governance	Ministry of Local Administration, provincial governments, local governments	Local government associations, civil society, private sector
Rule of Law	Higher Judicial Authority, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior, the National Police	Bar Association Prison administration Human rights organisations Customary authorities

No two disasters have the same effect on governance functions because the physical consequences of different natural disasters on national and local governments differ according to the nature and scale of the disaster. Some disasters grossly disrupt central governance functions (e.g. Haiti 2010 earthquake), while others have more localised consequences (e.g. the 2010 Mt. Merapi eruption in Indonesia). Hazards such as earthquakes, tsunamis and hurricanes may cause widespread damage in a limited geographical area and tend to have extensive negative impacts on local governance institutions. Other hazards such as droughts have very limited impact on physical institutional assets, but can overstretch human and financial service delivery capacities given the potential huge

needs for relief, livelihoods and other supportive services to those affected by the crisis. While most disasters affect some or all local governance functions, major disasters will also affect core central government capacities to govern the recovery process and manage the political pressure caused by the disaster.

Since assessing governance needs in the context of a PDNA may involve the review of the disaster effects and impact on a large number of institutions and governance processes, in order to stay within the time limits imposed for a PDNA, the Governance Team (GT) will need to prioritise its scope of work using the following criteria:

- **Location of the disaster:** A disaster that hits a national capital area will potentially much more profoundly disrupt the core government functions than a disaster striking only provincial area(s). In the former case, the PDNA Team will need to include a detailed review of the disaster impact on central government institutions playing a key role in delivering core government functions, such as the President's Office, the Cabinet, the Ministry of Finance (including the Treasury), the Central Bank, the Ministry of Planning, etc. In all cases, regardless of the impact of the disaster on central government institutions, assessing the disaster impact on local governance systems in the areas hit by the disaster is required. Furthermore, where a disaster triggers large movements of the population, the Assessment Team should also review the needs of local governance systems in hosting areas, even if they were not affected indirectly by the disaster.
- **Pre-disaster capacity:** Capacity gaps in core government institutions existing prior to a disaster will usually become more acute after a disaster. For example, if the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) was known to have lacked the capacity to support effective inter-ministerial coordination and policy formulation, this weakness will undoubtedly be aggravated after the disaster when pressure for effective coordination is even higher, and therefore an appropriately tailored response to fill this gap should be devised rapidly. The pre-disaster sector overview (see Chapter 3) will help gauge the critical pre-disaster capacity gaps in order to prioritise areas of assessment.
- **Pre-disaster local governance arrangements:** The architecture of the sub-national governance system as well as its regulatory framework determine the role that local institutions will play in the recovery phase. Local government systems can be complex, involving different administrative levels (e.g. state, province, region, department, county, municipality, borough, village), with intricate divisions of responsibilities in service delivery. A higher level of decentralisation normally implies a response to the disaster more prominently engineered and delivered from the local level. However, central and/or provincial governments will most probably bear the major responsibility in the disaster response and should be prioritised in the assessment in settings with weak and poorly resourced local governments, and/or with limited devolution of responsibilities.

COORDINATING THE PDNA PROCESS FOR GOVERNANCE

The PDNA, both in its assessment and recovery planning process for governance should be led by a core team, the Governance Team (GT), under the leadership of the national Focal Point (FP) designated for coordinating the overall process. GT members should be primarily made of FPs designated in each of the national institutions deemed essential in delivering the core functions prioritised for the governance PDNA (see 2.1). It would typically involve Ministries of Finance, Planning, Interior, Justice, Local Administration (or equivalent), Foreign Affairs (if the designated body for aid coordination) and the Statistics Agency, and possibly other bodies. At the sub-national

³ In the worst case, such as in Haiti in 2010, some of these institutions will have lost almost all operational capacity, bringing the country's core government functions almost to a halt.

level, provincial governments of affected areas should also be represented in the GT. For lower-level local governments in these areas, their number and potentially difficult access might make it impractical to involve them directly into the GT; as a proxy, a representative of the national local government association, if existing, can be invited to join the GT. A small number of representatives of prominent civil society organisations or academic institutions as well as private sector (e.g. business associations) can also be invited to take part in the GT. The GT will, in any event, consult with a wide number of stakeholders at the national and local levels during the PDNA process; hence, it is not necessary to involve all possible actors in its composition.

After a request is made for a formal governance PDNA process and a GT is formed, it will be supported by UNDP, the World Bank and the European Union, which will need to deploy public sector and local governance experts with senior expertise in post-disaster settings. Other relevant governance development partners, i.e. UN agencies can be invited to join the GT, e.g. UN-Habitat, United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), and United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), development banks, donors or non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Clear roles and responsibilities should be developed and assigned to different stakeholders involved.

Governance is not part of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) cluster coordination system for United Nations agencies in humanitarian crises. Yet, if governance is deemed an important aspect for the recovery response (i.e. not just governance within the sectors covered by the cluster system), it may be included in a Gap Cluster, which looks at areas of needs not covered elsewhere in the IASC structure. If so, the GT will need to be represented in the Gap Cluster for increased efficiency of coordination. Also, to allow cross-sector coordination on governance issues, it is recommended that each of the sectoral PDNA teams (for health, education, etc.) designates a governance FP who will liaise closely with the GT, provide data when needed, and ensure that governance aspects in his/her sector's recovery strategy are consistent with the overall core government functions in recovery strategy developed by the GT. For certain sub-sectors teams such as Housing (for issues related to land use rights/rule of law), Community Infrastructure (CI), or Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), closer coordination mechanisms may be needed to avoid duplication of efforts and guarantee coherence in response.

Finally, GT members should represent both men and women, and at least one of the team members should have specific experience in gender and governance.

ASSESSMENT METHODS

The data collection strategy and information requirements for the Governance Sector recovery should ideally be seen as a process and placed in the cycle of disaster management. Accordingly, assessments and information required for recovery build on the data that was collected before the disaster used as pre-disaster baseline, and build on rapid assessments in the early post-disaster phase. It should then become a monitoring system of the governance system recovery performance.

The scope and depth of the assessment is constrained by the limited time in which it needs to be accomplished and the potentially large array of institutions, processes and locations to be surveyed, especially for local governance aspects. The GT needs to make use of available post-disaster data whenever possible and decide on critical additional information that needs to be collected specifically for the PDNA. Among data that may have already been collected through the network of sub-national government and state institutions are government

⁴ An example is the Civil Service Management body if there has been a serious impact on the public sector workforce.

statistics on the state of damage to public administration buildings, civil service presence in areas affected, public financial management data, as well as crime statistics. Basic governance data may also have been collected by humanitarian actors, although they are usually very limited in scope.

In general, governance-related data are more commonly qualitative than quantitative and is not individual or household-based. It makes it therefore more prone to accuracy issues and subjective interpretations. Quantitative performance analysis of governance systems is notoriously complex and requires a long design time that is not suitable for a PDNA. Therefore, rather than relying only on dubious statistical models, a governance PDNA should be highly consultative in order to triangulate governance-related information from different sources. The political economy dimension cannot be ignored in the governance especially related to core government functions. Therefore, the GT should be able to include an analysis from the information collected.

Qualitative analysis methods involve focus group discussions, interviews and perception surveys that can also be used to gauge popular expectations, fears and the degree of tensions/risks of violence. UNDP's Institutional and Context Analysis (ICA) protocol evaluates the capacity of governance systems through a political economy lens in order to respond effectively to population needs. The World Bank's Social Impact Analysis (SIA) is another method that can be applied to identify impacts on social relations, local institutions and leadership. Ensuring that rigorous methodological standards are used for the qualitative analysis will be critical to the credibility of the information collected. Whatever method is used, care must be taken to ensure that women and men from the affected community can participate equally. Specific arrangements that may be required to facilitate women's participation in particular include the gender balance of the Assessment Team, separate, private interviews with men and women, and attention to the time and venue of the assessment, etc. When possible, governance data can be disaggregated by sex and age. In particular, the degree of participation and leadership roles of women and men in local, regional and national governance must be assessed.

There is no single source that can provide all the necessary information on core governance functions: the PDNA exercise will involve a large number of stakeholders (see Annex 1). The main sources for the PDNA are key informants, for example from core government offices and ministries (offices of the chief executive, finance, planning, interior, local administration, etc.), provincial and local governments, and development partners. Focus group discussions should be organised with stakeholders, including civil society and the private sector, and relevant experts, complemented by simple institutional performance surveys, in particular of local governments. Citizen perceptions surveys can be useful to gauge the level of support to the government disaster response and identify potential risks that may entail a loss of confidence and breakdown in the rule of law – but citizen surveys are notoriously difficult to organise in crisis contexts. For any type of surveys, sampling of locations will be purposive in the initial phases towards representative sampling in later phases. Table 2 presents an overview on the mix of assessment methods that can be used to research the different core government functions.

5 Managing the recovery process of core government functions has both technical and political challenges. Given the criticality of the functions considered, and the need to involve a number of key high-level institutions of government, the governance PDNA process should preferably be led from the centre of government (e.g. Prime Minister or President's Office). If a National Recovery Management Body (NRMB) already exists at the time of launching the PDNA, whether it is permanent or ad hoc, it should then perform the coordination function.

6 www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/OGC/UNDP_Institutional%20and%20Context%20Analysis.pdf

7 <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPSIA/0,,contentMDK:20467256~menuPK:1108016~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:490130~isCURL:Y~isCURL:Y,00.html>

Table 2. Summary of Assessment Methods for a Governance PDNA

Function	Key Informants	Methods
National recovery management	President's / Prime Minister's Office National Parliament National Recovery Management Body (if applicable) Ministries of Planning/Finance Ministry of Defence (if the army is involved) Statistics Agency Humanitarian and development partners Civil society, private sector	Interviews Secondary data Workshop
Aid management	President's /Prime Minister's Office National Recovery Management Body (if applicable) Ministry of Planning /Finance Ministry of Foreign Affairs Humanitarian and Development partners	Interviews Secondary data Workshop
Local governance	National Recovery Management Body (if applicable) Ministry of Planning/Finance Ministry of Local Administration Provincial and local governments (including the Association of Local Authorities) Civil society	Interviews Secondary data Workshop Focus groups Infrastructure surveys Sample performance assessments Citizen surveys
Rule of Law	President's / Prime Minister's Office Ministries of the Interior, Justice, Defence (if the army is involved) Judicial authorities Civil society/human rights groups Academic institutions	Interviews Secondary data Workshop Focus groups Infrastructure surveys Citizen surveys

Priority should be given to using existing national and local information collection systems because this would provide a unique opportunity to strengthen these systems when needed.

Finally, a PDNA is not the time to conduct in-depth capacity assessments of a large number of public institutions and national governance systems. Such capacity assessments can be prioritised for the future as an output of the recovery response to governance needs, in particular for building back better (BBB).

EXPECTED OUTPUTS

The first is a summary as a contribution to the overall PDNA report. The sectoral components are usually no more than 3 to 4 pages.

The second output is a 15-20 page document that provides a more detailed report from the assessment, and a more detailed strategy for the recovery. The time horizon for the recovery strategy is determined by the government, but usually ranges from 2 to 5 years. Subsequently, the more extensive Governance Sector Recovery Strategy and Plan can then be used as a basis to review and revise as required local governance plans in the areas affected.

PRE-DISASTER BASELINE AND SECTOR OVERVIEW

A detailed understanding of governance systems and practices applicable to core government functions before the disaster will make it possible to compare with post-disaster conditions and to measure the extent of the disaster impact. An understanding of the pre-disaster political, legal and institutional environment explains some of the outcomes of disasters, helps to focus attention on how different parts of government are affected, and, crucially, indicates how support should be provided to help govern the recovery process. It will also help to ensure that recovery efforts do not undermine local or national structures and capacities. It is in particular crucial to understand the legal and institutional framework applicable at the time of the disaster for managing the recovery and reconstruction process. Baseline information may be obtained either directly from government officials or through secondary sources. The scoping exercise at the onset of the PDNA planning process will help limit the breadth of information needed, staying within the limits of the core functions defined, and focus on the most important sources of information. Annex 2 presents a detailed list of possible sources of baseline information for governance indicators in general and more specifically for each core function.

CONTEXT ANALYSIS

For governance aspects, in contrast with other sub-sectors, political, legal and institutional aspects are the most important determining factors in the context analysis, rather than the socio-economic situation at household level – although the latter also has an evident bearing on service delivery needs and the quality of relations between state and citizens. Nevertheless, GT will be able to make use of the socio-economic context analysis carried out by other sub-sectors teams.

The context analysis should therefore focus on the main following elements:

- Legal and institutional frameworks;
- Social cohesion, security and conflict.

For the legal and institutional framework, the GT needs to gather the following elements relevant to core government functions. Most of this information should be attainable from secondary sources or key informants. It should not require broader consultation processes.

Table 3. Legal and Institutional Context

Function	Key Informants	Methods
General	<p>Constitutional basis for division of powers and roles of the executive branch, as well as accountability principles.</p> <p>Bill of human rights (in particular women’s rights).</p> <p>Main public sector reforms underway possibly impacting directly on the disaster response capacity and modality.</p> <p>Press and civil society freedoms legislation.</p>	<p>Interviews</p> <p>Secondary data</p> <p>Workshop</p>
National Recovery Management	<p>Organic law of National Recovery Management Body (NRMB) (if exists) or decree establishing National Recovery mechanism (NRM).</p> <p>Other laws defining the Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) sector.</p> <p>Public Finance Management (PFM)-related legislation.</p>	<p>Overview on institutions involved in policy formulation and public financial management (national planning and budgeting), procedures followed (in particular for intersectoral coordination) and the role of parliament.</p> <p>Modalities for integration of vertical (sector based) planning with horizontal (area-based) planning.</p>
Aid management	<p>Legal provisions for aid management, both public (ODA) and private (NGOs, corporations), including control of aid flows and recipients, aid coordination and aid reporting in national budget.</p>	<p>Existing aid management structures and mechanisms, at the national and sub-national levels.</p>
Local governance	<p>Regulatory framework defining administrative, political and fiscal decentralisation, with a focus on division of responsibilities for disaster response, infrastructure and service delivery.</p>	<p>Sub-national government structure and presence on the ground.</p> <p>Overview of local governments’ operational capacities (including human and financial).</p> <p>Civil society presence and strength in disaster-hit areas.</p>
Rule of law	<p>Military and police mandates.</p> <p>Constitutional basis for civil-military relations.</p> <p>Laws pertaining to protection of vulnerable groups against violence (in particular women).</p> <p>Citizenship and property laws.</p> <p>Prevalence of customary laws.</p>	<p>Structure of the judiciary branch.</p> <p>Structure and role of different security forces, in particular control and command structure.</p> <p>Presence of security and justice facilities at the local level.</p> <p>Civil registry/land and property management institutions.</p>

Understanding the social cohesion, security and conflict context is a critical element of the governance PDNA. Existing or potential tensions or conflict between different population groups or political parties, weak governance or lack of transparency in governance, discrimination based on sex, age, ethnicity, religion, caste, etc. and other conditions have important implications for needs and for the recovery process. The GT should analyse the prevalence of violence in society prior to the disaster and of conflict between citizens and the state or between groups (ethnic, religious, political, IDPs, etc.). Conflict drivers should be identified, including those that relate to serious problems of unemployment, access to justice, human rights abuses and political competition. The status of women vis-à-vis violence and risks of increased threats to women should be identified. If the country is undergoing a formal peace process, its progress and challenges should be analysed to the extent they might influence the recovery operation.

An underlying feature of the context analysis should be adopting a political economy analysis angle to determine drivers of political behaviour, how they shape particular policies and programmes and what the implications are for recovery strategies and programmes. Rather than assuming a priori that ‘everyone wants recovery’ or

that ‘everyone wants it the same way’, a political economy analysis recognises that recovery and development interventions succeed when key players in society have an incentive to make them succeed; if such actors feel threatened, they will use their power and influence to make them fail. This, in turn, helps identify areas where change is more likely to occur and areas where change is very unlikely to occur unless other conditions shift beforehand, providing a basis for prioritisation and strategic planning. The political economy of recovery is largely based on pre-disaster realities in terms of political power and institutional authority. In post-disaster settings, international actors operate under compressed timeframes and tight deadlines, with the pressure to spend and show results quickly. There is ample evidence that, focusing on delivery without cross-checking the assumptions on the context with the analysis can do harm. Understanding the context is an essential component of recovery planning even at the early stages of post-crisis response. The PDNA Governance Sector Team will have to make sure that the overall intent of political economy analysis approach is mainstreamed in the content of the PDNA. Given the time pressure and delivery imperatives, a full analysis will not be feasible. Rather, the GT will have to be opportunistic in including certain critical aspects within its PDNA process. For this, available UNDP and World Bank methodological resources are valuable sources of inspiration. In many cases, political economy analyses may have already been carried out in the country or area considered for the PDNA. The conclusions that were drawn from such an exercise, even if conducted in a development rather than recovery paradigm, would remain largely valid and useful for a recovery context.

DESCRIPTION OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND ASSETS

The inventory and mapping of government buildings in disaster-hit areas is needed, and out of it, the GT can identify those facilities that pertain to institutions involved in the core government functions. If a disaster did not hit the nation’s capital area, the likelihood is that only sub-national branches of the central administration and local government buildings have been hit. Table 1 provides a list of priority institutions that should be surveyed for their infrastructure and physical assets. It is more than likely that the details of the effects on government structures and assets held at the national and sub-national levels will be captured by the Infrastructure Team of the PDNA. The information should be shared with the GT if collected. It is also expected that the estimation of damage will also be undertaken by the Infrastructure Team. The estimation of the losses may be strengthened through an examination of the details of the effects on the delivery of and access to services.

DESCRIPTION OF GOVERNANCE FUNCTIONS, SERVICE DELIVERY AND ACCESS TO SERVICES

Table 4 shows some of the main data requirements with regard to pre-disaster performance levels and process indicators related to the delivery of core government functions. This is only a limited set of indicators that are directly relevant to post-disaster/recovery situations; they do not exhaustively describe the delivery of services and issues possibly faced by these functions. For the last two functions (local governance, rule of law), data collected should focus on disaster-hit areas and be compared with national averages or /standards.

8 For example, if a disaster occurs towards the end of an elected government’s term, it is more likely that efforts will be made by political actors to use the management of relief and reconstruction processes to gain political points or to spoil an opponent’s electoral prospects.

9 UNDP (www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/oslo_governance_centre/Institutional_and_Context_Analysis_Guidance_Note); World Bank (<http://sitere-sources.worldbank.org/EXTGOVANTICORR/Resources/3035863-1281627136986/PGPEProblem-drivenGPEanalysis-GoodPracticeFramework12-2009.pdf>)

Table 4. Pre-disaster Indicators

Function	Key Informants	Methods
National Recovery	In case of previous disaster: timeline for producing recovery framework and plans, funding and execution rate, alignment with national budget, access of local governments to national recovery planning process.	Strength of government coordination in prior disaster situation, alignment of sectoral recovery plans, frequency of the use of 'extraordinary' executive measures for recovery management.
Aid management	Yearly aid flows, % of aid projects captured in national database, level of contribution of aid to priority development outputs.	Existence and type of aid information tracking systems, number of aid coordination bodies led by national actors, regularity of analysis reports on external aid, % aid as budget support.
Local governance	% state budget expanded through local governments (recurrent/capital), % execution rate of local investment budgets, % of local investment resources funded from own-revenues (taxes and other sources), trends in central government transfers, service delivery figures for other local government services (not covered in sub-sectors)	Coordination of local governments with decentralised administrations, modalities for intergovernmental relations, capacities of local governments for information management and communications.
Rule of law	Crime statistics, sex- and gender-based violence (SGBV) figures, police force per capita, prison population, % citizens without ID papers, % undocumented property ownership, reported human rights abuses, citizen perception surveys on insecurity, access to justice indicators for disadvantaged and marginalised groups (women, minority, others), speed of restoring full security in previous post-disaster situations (if applicable)	Use, type and effectiveness of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms Prevalence of militias and neighbourhood vigilance groups for security maintenance at local level Access to registration and property for marginalised groups

In general, whenever pre-disaster capacity assessment or profiles on the set of core public institutions occur as described in Table 1, the main findings should be used to understand the issues likely to constraining higher and better delivery levels of core functions.

DESCRIPTION OF GOOD GOVERNANCE PARAMETRES

The two main qualitative dimensions to be researched on the governance processes linked to the core functions above are participation (with inclusiveness) and accountability. Table 5 gives some indications on how these can be analysed in relation to the pre-disaster context. Understanding how participatory and accountable the delivery of core functions was prior to the disaster is critical to understanding the risks of further erosion to these important dimensions of good governance in a context of post-disaster crisis. Recovery processes that provide limited opportunities for inclusive participation and remain opaque from public scrutiny can generate instability.

Table 5. Good Governance Parametres

Function	Key Informants	Methods
National Recovery Management	Level and modalities of civil society and private sector participation in national policy-making on development priorities and budget. Importance given to gender-sensitivity in policy-making tools	Integrity and government effectiveness indicators (Transparency International, World Bank, OECD – see Annex 2) Level of compliance with open government principles Citizen perception surveys General characteristics of the government’s strategic communications capacities
Aid management	Adherence to the Paris Principles for aid management (ownership, harmonisation, alignment) and openness of aid management structures to non-governmental actors.	Level of public access to aid figures and reports, mutual accountability frameworks in place with donor groups
Local governance	Use of community-based planning processes for local development, the involvement of local civil society organisations (CSOs) and the private sector, gender and youth representation in local decision-making. Role and effectiveness of participatory processes in previous post-disaster operations, if applicable. Access of women and youth to other local government services (not covered in sub-sectors). Citizen perception surveys on local governments (openness, participation).	Citizen perception surveys (integrity, corruption). Local government corruption indices. Use and type of strategic communications by local governments. Accountability frameworks applying to local government expenditures.
Maintaining the rule of law	Policies on and frequency of use of community policing, participatory planning for citizen security plans, involvement of communities in fighting gender-based and other forms of social violence, attitudes of citizens towards security maintenance during previous post-disaster situations.	Citizen perceptions on integrity of police and judicial sectors, confidence levels. % of cases of human rights violations leading to prosecution. Capacities of local media to report on human rights violations

RISKS AND VULNERABILITIES

The main risks and vulnerabilities linked to the exercise of core government functions in a post-disaster context are:

- political determinants that could lead to increased popular strife, opposition with government and conflict in the case of a breakdown in state’s capacities for maintaining the rule of law and/or if perceived or real discrimination in access to humanitarian and recovery assistance managed by the state;
- increased exclusion in access to needed services and recovery assistance for specific population groups already marginalised before the disaster in case sufficient safeguards for inclusive participation and accountability in the planning and management of recovery at all levels are not included;
- increased opportunities for and possibly lower levels of control against the misuse of public and donor resources, be it by government and non-government bodies and individuals, due to extraordinary conditions, fast-track measures in public financial processes (to accelerate delivery of assistance), a sudden influx of external aid onto possibly weak aid management systems, and the general state of disturbance in the rule of law system (depending on the extensiveness of damages).

As seen under section 3.1, the socio-political and security context needs to be carefully analysed to evaluate the likelihood of the above-mentioned risks. The risks level are qualitative by nature in the area of governance, and their analysis usually consists in identifying the various pre-existing and ongoing drivers of instability, violence and mismanagement of public affairs. It is important in particular to evaluate the popular legitimacy of the government authorities in place, at national and local levels, and how this legitimacy – or the lack of it – may interfere with the recovery process.

ASSESSMENT OF DISASTER EFFECTS

The disaster effects on core government functions consist of:

- Damage to facilities and assets of public national and local institutions, as well as their direct implementing partners from civil society or the private sector, involved in performing the core government functions. This will be collected and estimated by the Infrastructure Team, but can be presented in the section of the report on governance.
- Change in flows of income including:
 - Decline in the quality, quantity and timeliness of delivering these functions and services;
 - Lower revenues and higher costs of performing these functions;
 - Unexpected expenditures to meet additional demands for these functions, in terms of volume and/or quality, i.e. new dimensions or skills that these functions were not addressing before due to lack of capacity or awareness (direct link to the Building Back Better concept). The GT is best placed to elaborate and determine the change in flows.

The added complexity when assessing disaster effects on governance is that:

- The estimated effects may accrue mostly from changes in flows in income/revenue rather than damage, especially for core government functions as these may run mostly from central government level, which do not usually suffer from extensive damages to their facilities;
- The losses involved are rarely immediately quantifiable for core government functions as these functions do not produce services as such to be used by citizens but rather enable service delivery by sectoral institutions (covered in other chapters);
- Large share of the losses may be identified in institutional capacity, which is not easily defined (e.g. also influenced by political considerations) and which may take time to become evident; hence, some may not be captured during the PDNA process.

Annex 3 presents a template for recording the effects, which will then be used for estimating corresponding values and change in flows.

EFFECTS ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND PHYSICAL ASSETS

The main types of assets considered for core government functions are:

- Buildings: public administration buildings and facilities housing institutions at the central, provincial and local levels;
- Equipment and vehicles;
- Cash assets: in cases where some were held by concerned institutions in their facilities rather than in a banking institution. This may be common in countries with a limited banking system and/or where local governments play a basic financial management role and only perform small cash-based transactions and hold a safe in their office. The same may apply to local courts and police stations.

Documents and records held by governance administrations are crucial to their good functioning. They can be in hard or soft copies. The loss of records can limit, for example, a government institution's capacity to issue certificates affecting personal welfare of individuals or income of businesses (for activities requiring government licensing). However, since documents and records do not have a market value, they cannot be counted as damages; their replacement is counted as a loss.

Physical assets relevant for the government sector are not necessarily held only by state institutions. When a non-state actor plays an important and direct role in the delivery of a function, its assets should be accounted for. In terms of core government functions, this is mostly relevant for the rule of law function (justice and security), where NGOs and the traditional authorities may play an important role and local Governance Sectors and where local governments may be contracting NGO or private sector partners to assist in community mobilisation and strategic communications, or in the delivery of certain other public services (not already covered in sub-sectors PDNAs).

There must be careful coordination between PDNA teams to avoid double counting of damages on public administration buildings and assets at the sub-national level. While institutional facilities are fairly sector-specific at the central level, it is not always the case at the sub-national level. For example, a governorate administration building may host the governor and his/her office (considered as a local government institution) as well as the departments of education, health and agriculture, etc. that would be reported under the corresponding sub-sectors. When reporting damage on such a multi-purpose administrative complex, it should be pro-rated under the different concerned sub-sectors or reported entirely under the local governance line item, in particular if the whole cost of the building replacement and maintenance will be borne only by the provincial/governorate budget, which would apply in advanced devolution of service delivery to the local level.

Table 6. Examples of Key Buildings and Assets Relevant to Core Government Functions

Function	Institutions	Building Types	Equipment Types	Other Assets
National recovery management	Chief Executive's Office, National Recovery Management Body (NRMB) (if exists), Ministries of finance and of planning, the army	Central offices and provincial/local branches	Office furniture Office and IT equipment Vehicles	
Aid coordination	NRMB, Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Planning, Ministry of Finance	Office of the institution hosting aid coordination services	As above	
Local governance	Ministry of Local Administration, provincial governments, local governments	Central offices for ministries, Provincial/governor's offices and assembly, local / municipality offices and local council.	As above + technical equipment needed to deliver other services (not covered in other sub-sectors)	Cash reserves (if applicable)
Rule of law	Higher Judicial Authority, Ministries of Justice, and of the Interior, the National Police Court system	Central offices (ministries, police, higher courts), sub-national branches of the police, prison and judicial administrations, police stations, prison and detention centres, local courts	As above + arms/ammunitions (police) + all inmate care-related equipment (for prisons)	Cash reserves (for local offices)

EFFECTS ON DELIVERY OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS, SERVICES AND ACCESS

Damage to the infrastructure and physical assets of institutions delivering core government functions have a direct effect on the performance of the latter. In addition, disaster affects these functions by causing:

- changes in the workforce (death, injury, displacement, re-assignments) of institutions responsible for delivering the function, which is not accounted under damages; therefore, a separate inventory of the disaster's effects on workers of relevant national and local institutions will need to be carried out (including displacement, deaths and disabilities). It will be used to evaluate:
 - the cost of compensatory benefits for incurred event (death, injury) to be paid from the state's budget;
 - the cost of replacing missing staff (recruiting new staff, re-training existing staff);
 - the effect on the institutions' capacities to deliver their assigned functions.

To determine the number of civil servants missing or displaced, and the number and type of public records destroyed, the team will meet public officials at different levels of government and review administrative records. Data should be recorded disaggregated by sex.

- The need for a higher and/or more complex level of delivery than usual. This entails the recruitment of more personnel, purchase of more equipment, use of larger facilities, or increase in the operating budget to reflect a higher level of activities or to procure external services, including for staff training. In this case, the loss of functions is linked to the mismatch between institutional capacities and the demands generated by the disaster. Generally, the functional capacities most critical to the recovery—and most likely to be impacted by the disaster in the institutions involved in core functions are:

- Capacity to assess needs including to disaggregate needs according to gender and age;
- Capacity to collect, store and manage information;
- Capacity to produce evidence-based strategies, policies and plans;
- Capacity to coordinate multi-stakeholder actions;
- Capacity to maintain strategic communications to the public;
- Capacity to disburse funds for relief and recovery timely and with integrity;
- Capacity to re-establish, maintain or increase revenue collection to support public finances;
- Capacity to quickly reassign resources (financial, human and technical) according to disaster response needs;
- Capacity to adapt administrative and business processes for greater rapidity of action.

The GT also needs to measure to what extent the effects on core government functions affect sectoral recovery and the services delivered through them such as healthcare, schooling and housing materials. For example, if the aid coordination function of central government is not capable of effectively allocating incoming aid to the main priorities of the health sector (thematically or geographically), then the recovery of the health sector will be impeded in terms of time and quality. As a result, certain populations might lose access to services for longer periods than justified by the direct disaster effects on the health sector. While these effects can be evaluated qualitatively, it will be very difficult in most cases to give a costing value.

Table 7 provides examples of common effects of disasters on the delivery of core government functions and their effects on the recovery of other sectors. The GT will need to verify the applicability of the listed effects to the situation researched and the extent of the effect(s), and collect basic quantitative elements in order to cost the corresponding change in flows (see Section 5).

¹⁰ Capacity is broadly defined here as the ability of organisations (not individuals) to effectively and efficiently (i.e. in terms of quality, speed and cost) carry out, programmes of coordinated action in pursuit of formally agreed goals. An organisation has capacity when it can: (i) identify, plan, prioritise, implement, monitor, and learn from specific courses of action; (ii) mobilise, deploy and where necessary, motivate resources (assets, people, money and information) consistently and continuously on agreed public priorities; and (iii) discipline a heavily constrained system to pursue agreed objectives collectively.

TABLE 7. Common Effects of disasters on Core Government Functions

Core Function	Immediate Effects	Secondary Effects
National recovery management	A sudden increase in the need for this function requiring additional facilities, personnel, equipment, operating budget. There may be a need to (re-)open local offices in affected areas. Strong political support also needed to engineer cross-sector coordination. Depending on the scale and complexity of the disaster, certain competencies might be missing in the National Recovery Management Body (NRMB) and need external support. Some key ministries for the NRMB mission (Finance, Planning, Interior) might be partially incapacitated as well as suffered damages from disaster. The main effect could be delays in engineering a national recovery strategy and plan, which is also essential to attract donor support.	The longer the establishment/activation time for the National Recovery Management Body (NRMB), the higher the possibility of a lack of coordination between sub-sectors and between national/local institutions for recovery planning. This may also affect the channelling of donor resources to areas in need for reconstruction as an overall priority strategy and plan. If the NRMB is not equipped, the required capacities, the recovery plan might be of poor quality, affecting all aspects of recovery funded from national budget and donor contributions. Ultimately, people's confidence in their government can be severely dented.
Aid management	As above, a sudden influx of aid flows in response to disaster, which could overwhelm existing aid management capacities in-country, requiring additional staff, equipment, space, software and training. In countries with a poor track record of accountability in public finance management, additional regulatory measures might be needed to increase donor confidence, or a new aid management structure might need to be jump-started.	If aid management is not effectively handled, aid efficiency will be reduced, which means poorer recovery results (reconstruction, improved livelihoods) per dollar of aid invested. More donors will direct aid outside of government channels and plans, increasing the probability of aid duplication or aid orphans (i.e. geographical locations or thematic areas of recovery needs that are not covered). Public confidence in the recovery process, including in the role of aid organisations, could be affected negatively, creating unrest.
Local governance	Due to direct damages and/or limited capacities, inability of local governments to evaluate needs of affected communities quickly or reliably enough, design local recovery plans that can be used to coordinate sectoral inputs, execute reconstruction activities or communicate clearly to population on recovery plans. Infrastructure repairs, equipment, staff renewal or increase, higher operating budgets, etc. are urgently needed. Capacity to collect local revenues also affected and tax base diminished, leading to severe shortfalls in local budgets and need for higher indebtedness. Decreased delivery for services directly under local governments' responsibility.	Sector interventions less aptly aligned to local needs, possible duplications, slow mobilisation of communities, conflict may arise over difficult communications between communities and aid providers /central institutions, in the absence of effective local governments as intermediaries. Problems with accountability of local governments' management of recovery funds (public or aid) limit effectiveness of recovery process and create local instability, and can trigger centralization of decision making.
Rule of law	Damages to the judicial, police and prison facilities opening the door for an increase in crime and disorder, with higher risks for vulnerable groups (women in particular). Police forces may be insufficient to keep law and order in situations of post-disaster chaos. Judicial services under high pressure to renew missing documents adjudicate property disputes (in higher numbers following disasters, especially in informal tenure areas) and provide protection to populations at risk (e.g. widows, orphans, IDP).	Failure to re-establish swiftly law and order in disaster-hit areas means a lower capacity to implement recovery projects, a slow recovery for economic activities (as mobility of goods and people affected, as well as investments) and increased hardship for stressed populations, in particular women and children. Inefficient renewal of IDs may limit individuals in accessing government-aid benefits/inheritances and lack of settlement of property disputes discourages investing in reconstruction.

The effects listed above will be felt at the national and local levels. For the local level, a breakdown is necessary according to the administrative divisions of the affected areas. It may also be necessary to consider local government units outside of the disaster area in cases where a large influx of IDP caused by the disaster overburden neighbouring hosting communities that were spared by the disaster (e.g. Haiti 2010).

EFFECTS ON THE GOVERNANCE OF CORE FUNCTIONS

Inclusive participation: the GT needs to evaluate how the disaster impacts the capacity of all institutions covered to conduct their tasks with sufficient and inclusive participation of beneficiaries and other sectors of society (civil society, private sector, traditional authorities, etc.) according to the relevance of their involvement. In general, the post-disaster phase will create opportunities (and demand) for accrued participation. Lessons learned also show that participation is a guarantee of better reconstruction, recovery and resilience-building in the long term. In countries with limited experience and practice in participatory decision making, such demand for participation post-disaster cannot be met by national and local government institutions without serious policy and capacity-building efforts from the government and donors. Where participatory processes are already politically and institutionally well-engrained, fewer efforts will be needed to energise them in the post-disaster period because existing mechanisms and competencies can be used immediately. In all cases, fomenting and increasing participation in recovery represents additional costs to the overall recovery budget, since managing participatory decision-making processes involves extra government staff time, logistics, equipment and other operating expenses. Disasters can generate empathy among institutions and the public for the plight of the most vulnerable, but they can also trigger more self-centred attitudes, not just within individuals, but also within communities and small regions. In order to ensure the inclusion of marginalised and vulnerable groups, and not just undefined participation, above all it is essential that there be a strong political will at the national and local levels, which aid providers can help catalyse. It is equally important that there be increased investments in capacity building (e.g. to build gender-sensitive recovery plans) and awareness-raising programmes among the public on the needs of the most affected and vulnerable following the disaster and on why the provision of aid needs to be targeted, especially in the recovery phase.

Accountability: Post-disaster periods can seriously challenge a country's accountability frameworks, given the conjunction of increased pressure for rapid delivery (requiring short-cuts in administrative procedures for expending public funds), the sudden increase in aid flows while, at the same time, the administrative capacity of the overall government machinery, and most certainly of local governments, is impacted negatively by the disaster. Nevertheless, there are high expectations for high standards of transparency and accountability in the management of public funds available for supporting reconstruction and recovery among the public and the donor community when the latter resorts to budget support or other forms of monetary assistance to recovery through country systems. As concerns participation, countries with strong pre-existing accountability frameworks and records will sustain better this situation of higher demand against lower capacities, while in countries with poor track records of accountability in public finances, additional robust measures will need to be taken to avoid fuelling opportunities for corruption, meaning slower recovery for affected communities, and possibly social and political unrest if the mismanagement by government institutions is made public. These measures could entail recruiting the services of external auditors and financial management experts, setting up separate administrative systems for the management of recovery aid (e.g. Haiti 2010), and increasing communications to the public through media campaigns, among others.

Box 1. Finance, Planning, Revenue Collection, Accounting and Auditing

Disasters heavily impact government finance, planning and accounting, by placing additional pressure on the Planning and Finance Departments to process and approve new schemes and monitor performance of executing agencies, as well as on other support functions such as accounting and auditing. The effect of a disaster on revenue collection, at the central and local levels, should also be measured, in the short and long term. Budget deficits will increase following a disaster, not only because of increased expenditures to support recovery, but also because of a significant decrease in revenue collected (taxes, fees, services) due to destroyed property and assets, slowed economy and increased unemployment. Also, tax cuts are usually awarded to affected families following a disaster. In the immediate timeframe, the effect of decreased revenues on the capacity of essential institutions to maintain their staffing level and operations has to be measured. The example below demonstrates the importance of public financial management (PFM) considerations in post-disaster situations:

Advancing Transparency in Recovery Operations, Aceh

The Chairperson of the Agency of the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction for the Region and Community of Aceh (BRR) Agency sent a clear message that he was firmly committed to ensuring that all aid and government resources would be used transparently and accountably. He backed this up with an Anti-Corruption Unit and by asking UNDP to support it to develop the Recovery Aceh-Naas Database (RAND). This became operational later than was ideal (about seven months after the disaster), but it ultimately provided a powerful tool to track all aid programmes and projects. Efforts were made to account for domestic resources as well as international assistance, and also to link supply with needs. A housing geospatial database was also developed, which included photographs with geographical coordinates of all houses built, which was later extended to cover other assets. The 2009 Tsunami Legacy analysis credited this and other measures with having made the recovery more 'leak-proof'. The report also recognised that early designations of grievance focal points and an adequate budget for grievance facilitation were critical for reporting abuses and corruption, and for empowering affected communities to understand and use these mechanisms. The RAND system is now in the process of being adapted to support all aid coordination in the country for longer-term aid effectiveness.

EFFECTS ON RISKS AND VULNERABILITIES

Pre-existing risks of institutional failure in delivering public goods and services in a participatory, inclusive and accountable manner, and at a level commensurate with the actual needs of populations are increased in a post-disaster scenario. Vulnerabilities of certain regions and/or groups in society to be excluded from or inequitably treated during the recovery phase can also increase in situation of pre-existing marginalisation generated by poor governance systems – in particular in core government functions. Disasters can increase competition between regions and groups to access relief and recovery assistance, and aggravate political economies working against effective and equitable recovery for the most affected. Disasters also create opportunities for criminal activities of all kinds and more dangerous spaces for vulnerable populations, above all, women and young children. Although it is difficult to quantitatively evaluate the increase in risks of mismanagement of public funds, violence and unrest, exclusion and so forth, there are possible mitigation measures may be taken and their costs will have be accounted in the recovery plan and budget. (See previous paragraphs regarding increasing transparency, restoring law and order, and increasing the protection network around vulnerable groups, etc.)

ESTIMATING THE VALUE OF THE EFFECTS OF A DISASTER

Converting the effects of a disaster on core government functions into a numerical value can be challenging given how intangible some of the disaster effects on governance are. For example, how can the increased risk for mismanagement of public funds be monetised? It is equally difficult estimate the value of induced secondary effects of constraints faced post-disaster in the delivery of core functions onto sub-sector recovery (e.g. health, education, agriculture, etc.). Nevertheless, using the Damage and Loss Assessment (DaLA) methodology, generic cost items can be defined to help GT turn the evaluation of effects into a monetary value, as detailed in the next sections. The method to calculate the costs of damage and loss is described in further detail in separate guidance notes (World Bank, 2010).

For change in flows, as for damages, the distinction should be made between public and private/civil society sector damage in order to determine where the weight of the recovery and reconstruction effort will fall.

ECONOMIC VALUE OF TOTAL/PARTIAL DESTRUCTION OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND ASSETS

This is based on the damage analysis explained in section 4.1. The sequence of actions is as follows:

- a) Scope the extent of damage relevant to each core government function, with sampling visits for example and secondary data;
- b) Conduct in-depth surveying and data collection for those functions most affected. For example, if the disaster did not hit the capital city and its central government facilities, the GT can focus all attention on local administrations of core ministries, local governments, police and justice system in the disaster-affected areas.
- c) In principle, damage assessment is conducted on a facility-by-facility basis, usually based on detailed estimates of numbers of square metres of the infrastructure damaged (disaggregated for roofing, floors, walls, etc.), with average unit costs per square meter for repair. In general, public administration offices are not so numerous that an exhaustive survey cannot be organised. It should not be necessary, therefore, to extrapolate damage levels on these facilities for proxies (such as damage on housing), as is sometimes done for service delivery facilities (schools, health care centres). For equipment and other moveable assets, previous inventories can be used (if available) or alternatively, an approximation needs to be established based on number of staff working in the administration and type of work conducted. For cash assets, data will need to be sourced from administrative personnel or saved financial records. Only qualitative assessment of lost official documents, archives and records can be conducted.

Table 8. Economic Value of Damages

Type	Itemized Costs	Mode of Calculation
Total destruction of buildings	Cost of replacement	Unit cost for full reconstruction of building (as it was prior to the disaster)
Partial damage to administrative public building	Cost of repair works	Unit cost for repair of partially damaged administrative facilities, either based on detailed assessment, or in case of large numbers of facilities affected, on a percentage of full reconstruction costs.
Equipment, vehicles and supplies	Cost of replacement with new items (except for vehicles when repairs are possible and less costly than replacement)	Unit cost for replacement of equipment and furniture Unit cost for repair of vehicles Unit cost for replacement of office supplies (based on annual recurrent budget of concerned administration.
Cash assets	Cash amounts lost	Use the most recent financial records or interview financial staff. If not possible, use average based on previous year data.

VALUE OF CHANGES IN FLOWS DUE TO CHANGES IN DELIVERY OF FUNCTIONS AND SERVICES, AND ACCESS TO SERVICES

Changes in the financial flows of the sector may occur due to the temporary absence of infrastructure, assets and staff and to increased or new demands for the delivery of core government functions to support sub-sectors and affected populations and territories. These changes are estimated based on the change in operational costs for the provision of post-disaster government functions, including other local government services not covered by sub-sectors; they normally include higher expenditures over and above the normal budgetary appropriations for the administrations concerned and lower revenues. Typical examples for these changes in flows are shown below and can be applied to each core function depending on the disaster observed and anticipated disaster effects for each function.



Table 9. Value of Change in Flows of Income Due to Changes in Delivery of Functions and Services

Type	Details	Basis for Calculation
1. Increased expenditures for:		
Infrastructure	Removing debris, mud and other hazardous materials from the destroyed or damaged facilities.	Unit cost per m ³ of rubble to remove to next adjacent street for collection. Cost of transport and disposal of rubble included in environment sector assessment.
Facilities	Establishing temporary facilities for essential administrations (including prisons, police stations, courts) that suffered heavy damages and/or increasing size of existing facilities due to increased demand for function (needing increase in workforce). Procuring additional office and other equipment and vehicles, improving connectivity to sustain increased demand in delivery.	Market value for office rental or purchase of prefab facilities. Retrofitting costs for new temporary facilities. If existing (and unused), government facilities maybe used instead to accommodate needs for additional space; only retrofitting costs are to be considered. Market value of additional equipment and other moveable assets needed.
Staffing	Recruiting and induction training (if needed) for new staff (temporary or long-term) to replace missing staff and/or to face increased demand. Redeploying staff from other administrations. Paying compensatory benefits to injured staff or life insurance benefits to families of deceased staff.	Recruitment costs calculated in HR staff time or costs of outsourced recruitment service company (if applicable). Increased payroll costs due to recruitment of extra staff (over pre-disaster staff numbers) and/or increased salaries (to reflect hardship conditions). Costs of living expenses paid to civil servants redeployed out of normal duty station into disaster areas. Calculation of benefit payments as per applicable civil service regulations according to inventory of injured / deceased staff. Costs of induction training for new staff.
Operating budgets	Energy, supplies, travel, fuel, meeting, communications and other operating costs in excess of previous pre-disaster budget because of logistical constraints created by disaster and/or because of increased level of function delivery needed (e.g. increased need for aid coordination activities, or increased needs for security maintenance in disaster areas).	Cost increase measured from comparing pre- and post-disaster operating budgets of concerned institutions at local and national level, incorporating the impact of increased expected delivery levels and increased unit costs of different expenditures (e.g. fuel prices increasing due to the disaster).
Documents and electronic records	Cost of re-issuing documents (if back-up data available) in terms of staff time / services /supplies.	Estimate number of person-days of work for replacement retrieval + other supplies needed.
2. Change in flows of revenues		
Local government revenues – service fees	Revenue losses for local governments (and their sub-contractors) from the temporary cessation of other local public services (not accounted under sub-sectors), such as building, land and business registration, traffic fines, parking fees, other certificate issuance fees, sports and culture facility use fees, etc. Losses in solid waste management fees may apply unless already accounted under community infrastructure.	Based on local government law and practices, a list of concerned services can be established and surveying of affected localities to see where such services have stopped, been reduced or continue but without fee collection and evaluate losses based on pre-disaster collection levels. The losses should take into account possible increased fees collected from other services provided by local governments.

Type	Details	Basis for Calculation
Local government revenues– local taxes	Cost of not collecting local taxes, or delaying collection, or tax payers defaulting on dues, due to disaster impeding administrative capacity for collection and/or tax relief decided by national/ local governments due to the disaster’s impact on household and business incomes.	Estimates can be calculated on the basis of pre-disaster fiscal year revenue (applying an increase based on the annual average increase rate over the last 5 years).
Non-governmental organisation (NGO) and private sector revenues	Financial losses of government sub-contractors (NGOs, private companies) due to suspension or cessation of projects/programmes by government in governance and other service areas not social / economic sub-sectors (accounted by other teams). It could be civic education, awareness-raising, community mobilisation, sports and recreation, culture, etc.	Remaining payments on contracts liquidated by government contracting authority (directly related to one of the core government functions).

ECONOMIC VALUE OF CHANGES IN THE GOVERNANCE OF CORE FUNCTIONS

The effects of disasters can threaten good governance parameters such as inclusion, participation, transparency and accountability. But post-disaster periods can also represent opportunities to achieve higher levels of these parameters at the central level in policy-making and in the management of aid received for recovery, and at the local level as well. It is usually not possible to evaluate the financial loss involved with a lessened or increased participation, inclusion, transparency and accountability at the time of a PDNA – or any time at all – given the intangibility of concepts such as trust, social cohesion, or institutional coherence (referring to capacity of central and local governments to adopt unified policies for recovery).

Maintaining or increasing good governance aspects in the management of recovery, aid coordination, local governance and maintenance of rule of law is mostly achieved through technical assistance, capacity building and possibly, social accountability initiatives run by civil society groups or the contracting of independent auditing services. These costs would be considered a recovery need rather than a pure loss because many of these activities might not have taken place before the disaster and are not essential, strictly speaking, to re-establishing the said government function – for example, while much more preferable, the participation of communities in drawing recovery plans is not a sine qua non condition for the appropriation of public and donor resources for recovery.

VALUE OF CHANGE IN FLOWS TO RISKS

Three risks are identified for core government functions: (i) mismanagement of recovery resources; (ii) increased insecurity and violence; and (iii) political unrest. In general, only the second one can be translated into a loss value in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. It can include:

- Extra costs incurred by central and local governments to prevent further decay of law and order following a number of chaotic days immediately after the disaster (see Haiti 2010, Chile 2010) and to rapidly reduce the risk level. It can involve extra police/army officer deployment, positioning and use of arms and ammunitions, establishment of temporary detention facilities (if not counted already as a loss in service delivery) and additional costs for rapid prosecution of violators of public order in this period;
- Costs of information campaigns through mass media and direct canvassing of affected communities (since access to media information might be severely curtailed following a disaster) to spread awareness on security measures taken (e.g. emergency state, curfews) and promote good citizenship attitudes with respect to damaged public and private properties;

- Costs of special measures for the protection of vulnerable groups (women, widows, orphans and isolated children, disabled) such as setting temporary shelters, delivering social assistance, providing dedicated security personnel to areas of concentration, extra efforts at campaigning against sex- and gender-based violence (SGBV) and child abuse, increasing access to legal aid through paralegals, etc. if such expenditures were not accounted under the Health, Education or other sub-sectors. The extra costs for replacing ID and property papers in priority for vulnerable categories are already accounted for under “operating costs” in Table 10;
- Losses to public and private properties due to post-disaster looting, which requires surveys among affected businesses, households and administrations. Care must be taken not to account twice loss of assets though (once as direct disaster damage and another time as a risk-related loss).

Usually, the main disaster-related risks to law and order can be quickly tamed. However, in areas already under difficult political and security circumstances (e.g. Pakistani tribal areas), the destabilising effect of a major disaster can take longer to quell as the management of recovery by state authorities can provide more fuel to pre-existing political unrest.

ASSESSMENT OF DISASTER IMPACT

As seen in Section 5, disasters can significantly lower the capacity of governance institutions to plan, manage and monitor the recovery process. The longer-term impact of the disaster on core government functions will depend on a complex array of parameters, including:

- The type of disaster;
- Pre-existing structure and capacities;
- The political economy of managing the recovery process;
- The amount of policy and programming support that will be devoted to core government functions;
- Additional challenges that may arise during the post-disaster phase, such as conflict, major economic or social crisis (e.g. large-scale epidemics) or political instability in the government.

The impact analysis will provide the basis of the recovery strategy. The specificity of governance, compared to other sub-sectors, is that the disaster impact can develop more slowly and not provide clear early warning signs – as would, for example, a sudden degradation in the health status of disaster-affected populations. Therefore, the GT will have to build different impact scenarios at the time of conducting the PDNA, using lessons learned. Table 10 provides indications on how the level of response may influence the different impact scenarios can be (based on the assumption of a major disaster hitting a country with rather weak governance institutions at central and local level, e.g. Haiti in 2010), using the level of policy and programming response as the main parameter.

¹¹ Evaluating expected losses due to corruption in the use of public and donor funding for recovery, due to weakened accountability systems (after the disaster) and/or increased opportunities for corruption (see 4.3) is both politically and technical highly sensitive. In general, losses due to the misuse of public funds are known months if not years after the post-disaster recovery assistance has been provided.

Table 10. Different Possible Impact Scenarios on Core Government Functions

Core Function	No Response	Restoration of Previous Capacity Only (Mostly Infrastructure)	Restoration and Development Of Capacities
National recovery management	Recovery is entirely managed by sectors, without an overall strategy, leaving possible gaps in area coverage, duplications and contradictions, poor use of financial resources and lack of public communication, leading to slow recovery, and loss of confidence in public and among donors. External actors (donors, NGOs) remain the main drivers of the recovery, each with its own vision and approach.	Some coordination takes place for strategic planning, but limited capacities (lack of staff and budget to extend presence at sub-national level of the National Recovery Management Body [NRMB] impede a proactive leadership during implementation, where silo to recovery approaches take over, especially if local governance is not supported as well. Insufficient communications and limited impact on public confidence.	There is strong national leadership over planning, implementing and monitoring the recovery, with good integration of sectoral responses guided by long-term national development plan and governance reforms. Capacity to better deal with future disasters is built and important steps are taken to increase national resilience against disasters once the major phase of the recovery is over. All disaster areas have received assistance and vulnerable groups were supported effectively.
Aid management	Aid management system is quickly overwhelmed by the influx of aid following the disaster. Most aid is extra budgetary and is programmed with little involvement of government, leading to duplications and aid orphans. National development plan is not sufficiently considered during recovery, creating long-term negative impact on poverty alleviation and public sector reform. Allegations of misuse of foreign aid abound.	Official aid tracked but other aid sources (NGOs, decentralised, private) are not captured, leading to reduced aid effectiveness in certain locations. Aid Information Management Systems (AIMS) not able to provide reliable real-time analysis to the NRMB to support its work. Monitoring of aid-funded programmes is basic and incomplete, making reporting difficult. Aid coordination structures are in place but not all parts are functioning.	Aid is captured accurately, not only at the time of commitment, but also during implementation. Results are regularly reported, facilitating a critical dialogue between beneficiaries, government and donors. National ownership is increased, and a growing part of aid is included in the budget (or will be included during the next disaster). The government is also able to decentralised aid management to better coordinate non-ODA flows.
Local governance	There is reduced participation of communities in planning and managing aid, and recovery plans mostly designed at central level. On the ground, there is little or no coordination between sectors / aid providers. Certain service needs are neglected and community cohesion unravels. Local revenues remain extremely depleted, limiting investment capacities of crippled local governments.	Local governments can maintain visible state presence during crisis and take part in various recovery activities, but not all can take a leadership position. In many locations, NRMB or sectors have the lead. There is some participation, but it is not systematic and women/youth are excluded. People have little understanding of the recovery process. Resumption of service delivery by LGs remains stunted.	The Recovery Plan truly incorporates local aspirations while reflecting national development goals. Issues in implementation are quickly dealt with due to good coordination of LGs with sectoral actors and NRMB. Aid projects are aligned with local policies (not just national). People gain confidence in their local governments as they are regularly informed of and see progress happening. Local revenues are quickly re-established and invested.

Core Function	No Response	Restoration of Previous Capacity Only (Mostly Infrastructure)	Restoration and Development Of Capacities
Maintaining the rule of law	Security chaos that may have followed disaster sets in and disaster areas become crime zones where illegal activities develop. Women and children cannot circulate safely, loss in livelihoods /education opportunities. Small disputes degenerate quickly into larger conflicts and businesses are discouraged to resume activities.	Order is re-established and communities do not fall into more violence, but the general environment remains difficult for women and children. Victims of human rights abuses, including the spoliation of property, are not adequately supported. Access to justice is not swiftly restored; leaving customary justice to dominate.	Not only is law and order quickly retrieved on the streets, but community security improves over what it was before, capitalising on increased security presence and positive social cohesion following disaster. There are better police and judicial facilities. SGBV is aptly confronted by authorities and community leadership. The local police better prepared for the next disaster.

The macro-economic impact analysis for governance mostly relates to the weight on public finances of change in economic flows and recovery needs. For example, government budgets may have to bear the heavy cost of paying compensation benefits for a large number of civil servants (injured or dead), such as in Aceh in 2004, and local revenue losses will place more burden on national budgets to subsidise local governments, while national revenues are also affected because of the economic impact of the disaster. To measure the impact on macro-economic variables, analyses are usually performed on the post-disaster performance on gross domestic product (GDP), the balance of payments (BOP) and the fiscal sector.

The human development impact is the difference between pre- and post-disaster levels of human development directly resulting from the disaster. It also includes the cumulative deficits accruing until human development has recovered and losses to the advancement of human development during the disaster and recovery period. The impact on human development is the disaster impact on the quality of human life in the medium and long term as measured through indexes such as the Human Development Index, the Gender Inequality Index and the Multidimensional Poverty Index. In addition, the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) can provide a framework for a macro assessment of the human development effect of disaster damage. It is difficult in a short time after a disaster to measure impact on human development for any sectors, particularly for governance, since the impact of failing governance systems (due to a disaster) will make itself felt in the long-term only and often in a diffuse manner that is not easy to quantify. It would require a level of baseline and research that is not feasible in the framework of a PDNA. The only certainty is that for sectoral responses to be effective, a positive enabling institutional and fiscal environment is needed, which can only be provided with strong core government functions; hence, a severe impact on some or all of these functions will inevitably cause an impact of reduced progress on higher human development levels.

CROSS-SECTOR LINKAGES INCLUDING CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

Cross-sector linkages between governance – prioritised in core government functions in post-disaster situations – and sub-sectors has already been largely addressed in Section 2.1 (See Figure 2) and throughout the disaster effect and impact sections. In summary:

- Governance is both cross-cutting to all sub-sectors and a sub-sector in its own;
- Being a cross-cutting element, governance is discussed directly in each sub-sector chapter as well as in the PDNA Guide (Chapter B). It deals mostly with the administration of service delivery, from central level to service delivery facility;
- Governance as a sub-sector deals with the core government functions that provide the necessary enabling political, institutional and fiscal environment for the delivery of recovery support in social and economic activity sub-sectors. A main focus is the coordination of sub-sector delivery, on the one hand, at the policy and funding level (central government role), and on the other hand, at the needs assessment, planning and implementation level (role of local governments and other local governance stakeholders). Ensuring that cross-cutting governance imperatives of participation, inclusion and accountability are also embedded in all recovery operations is also a task ultimately attached to core government functions, but also reflected in sub-sector governance processes.
- Maintaining law and order in disaster-affected areas rapidly decreases risks of violence against vulnerable individuals and groups, and ensures continued access of affected populations to justice to deal with disaster-related legal issues (e.g. land and property issues, reparations). A secure environment where wrongdoing against individuals and legal entities (e.g. organisations, companies, local governments) is investigated and punished according to the law – rather than according to mob rule – is beneficial to recovery activities in all other sub-sectors and to social cohesion, and helps build trust of affected populations in their state institutions.
- Special care must be taken in avoiding double-counting between core government functions and sub-sectors in damages on public buildings and loss of revenues from service delivery (by local governments). The latter can be more problematic in contexts of high-level of devolution of service delivery to local governments. For this reason, prior analytical review of the government institutional framework with all sub-sector teams is needed in all cases to delineate areas of surveying under core government functions.

Below are considerations relating to cross-cutting issues affecting as well the Governance Sector. The assessment should indicate how these issues can be addressed in the recovery process, and should establish cross-sector arrangements as required with other sector teams to ensure that they are adequately addressed in the Recovery Strategy.

DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

DRR considerations should be mainstreamed in the way that core government functions are delivered in the future, especially for local governance.

First, to ensure that the recovery process builds back better, it is important to ensure that sufficient understanding of the necessity and modalities to integrate DRR into the recovery planning and implementation process be present in institutions involved with core government functions.

Below are other suggestions of elements to consider for DRR as it relates to governance:

- Identify national and local institutions and technical specialists responsible for DRR that should participate in the recovery planning process to ensure it integrates DRR and builds back better;
- Identify national and local governance processes that organise territorial development planning, from national down to local levels, and how DRR concerns can be better mainstreamed in these processes;
- Identify needs for technical assistance, human resources, guidance materials and other capacity development resources that will build the government's capacity to mainstream DRR into recovery planning and implementation across all sectors as well as longer-term territorial development planning;
- Assess the need for further technical assessments in affected areas, such as hazard and risk mapping, environmental impact assessments and other similar studies needed to facilitate sustainable land-use planning;
- Identify the existence of policy and legal frameworks that can support the integration of DRR into core government processes, and any adjustments that may be required to enable the process;
- Estimate the financial resources required for integrating disaster risk management (DRM) and BBB, and integrating these in national and local governments' budgets;
- Strengthening local government's capacities in DRR and DRM is essential to help them lead the process of local recovery and BBB.

In promoting BBB, the assessment should consider what is needed to enhance governance, such as a professional, proactive, modern and efficient public administration system and follow good governance principles, such as:

- Improved infrastructure when rebuilding or repairing damaged government infrastructure;
- Improved public service functions and efficient management systems;
- Improved public service provision;
- Improved institutional arrangements, policies and procedures;
- Improved gender mainstreaming and community governance participation mechanisms inclusive of women and men.

THE ENVIRONMENT

Coordination is necessary with the Environment Team to avoid double-counting in the assessment of environment-related governance activities. For example, environmental concerns should be integrated high up in the policy development chain for recovery. This would require close involvement of the Ministry of Environment or a similar body in the national recovery coordination mechanism and process. The costs associated with this involvement and the support activities that it will entail should be reflected in the Environment PDNA chapter (since the Ministry of Environment is not one of the ministries involved in core government functions). However, the leadership and the content of these overall policy planning and coordination activities fall under the gover-

nance sub-sector. This is actually the case with any other sub-sectors with respect to sub-sector participation in developing an overall recovery vision and participating in the overall management of the recovery process. Also, certain environmental services, such as solid waste management and the protection of natural areas, may be directly under local governance (if it is a prerogative of local governments), or under community infrastructure, and should not be reported twice.

GENDER

Governance systems determine the relationship between state and citizens. Citizen interaction with the state is not gender-neutral. Governance systems reflect the power dynamics in a society and therefore often determine citizens' ability to access services and resources, and to raise their voices to demand and make their government accountable.

Gender relations and women's realities often limit their ability to negotiate with the state including through civil society organisations. Factors obstructing women's ability to benefit from the recovery process and outcomes, build capabilities, and exercise their rights include discriminatory practices, gender-based violence (GBV), and women's unpaid and informal work, among others. These structural barriers are often deepened by non-responsive legal systems, ineffective public policy design, inadequate service provision and investments. Disasters can exacerbate these barriers and create new ones. Thus, in order to ensure that these barriers are taken into account in the recovery phase, it is necessary to ensure that women's needs, interests and priorities concerning service delivery and institutional arrangements, policies and procedures are voiced. The assessment can help identify how core government functions and services can be improved in a manner that responds to inequalities, addresses imbalances in programming and investment, and eliminates biases in public policy and processes that deepen the exclusion of women. This also includes ensuring that sufficient priority is given to protecting women and girls against increased risks of violence and spoliation of assets and property rights in the aftermath of a disaster.

It is essential to promote a stronger understanding of gender equality among institutions involved in core functions since these institutions are leaders in shaping policies, plans and upholding accountability of state institutions. Biases against women need to be addressed and accountability mechanisms put in place to monitor the adequacy and impact of public investments and service provision for a more equitable outcome for women. The participation of women's organisations as well as consultations with women, girls, boys and men in the assessment and the development of the Recovery Strategy can ensure that service delivery is more demand-driven and more effectively targeted and financed. It is also a critical element of ensuring legitimacy and effectiveness of governance systems (UN Women, 2012). Also, gender balance in capacity-building programmes for staff of governance institutions, both as providers and recipients, must be emphasised.

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

In cases where there is an existing internal conflict or conflict potential, the Governance Team should conduct the assessment through a conflict-sensitive lens, and integrate conflict mitigation objectives in the recovery strategy. As with other sector teams, the focus should be at a minimum on the 'do no harm' principle by managing and ensuring that national and local tensions along social, political or ethnic lines are taken into account while assessing needs and planning recovery strategies. However, in violence-prone and politically fragile contexts, it will be important for each sector assessment to refer to the qualitative section of the Governance Assessment (i.e. analysis of political process and risks for socio-political tensions in the post-disaster context) to evaluate the potential impact of socio-political processes on the sector's recovery strategy, and vice versa. In conflict-prone

settings, as already underlined, the governance PDNA should pay particular attention to assessing capacities for participatory recovery and identifying risks of exclusion since excluding certain groups from disaster recovery processes can only exacerbate the conflict risk. Similarly, confidence-building measures that can improve the hold of the social contract between governance institutions and the people, especially during the phase of reconstruction where expectations run high but governance capacities are depleted, will be of particular importance. The GT will need to highlight where and what confidence-building measures are the most needed.

THE SECTOR RECOVERY STRATEGY

The Recovery Strategy for the Governance Sector follows the guiding principles, objectives and consultative process of the overall PDNA as outlined in Volume A. As such, the Sector Recovery Strategy will include the following four core components:

1. The agreed vision and guiding principles for the overall recovery process of the sector;
2. Outline of recovery needs in governance based on results of the assessment;
3. Outline of results-based recovery plan for governance;
4. Outline of implementation arrangements.

VISION AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES

The recovery vision is developed jointly during a consultative process (see below), which ensures the support of key stakeholders for the recovery strategy. The recovery vision serves as a guide for the recovery process and provides the overall direction and goal that the stakeholders desire to achieve.

The overall goal of the recovery of core government functions is to enable an integrated and coherent overall recovery and reconstruction process that produces timely and effective improvements in the living conditions of disaster-affected populations, including their security. This would uphold the core principles of inclusion and integrity. The recovery of the machinery of government (core government functions) aims to strengthen national ownership and leadership over the planning and implementation of recovery across all areas of intervention, especially if the humanitarian phase has been mostly led by external actors. It also aims to correct the negative impact of disasters on core institutions of the national and local governance systems. This would result in safer institutional infrastructure and better preparation for coordination in order to more effectively and accountably respond to future disasters. However, efforts to improve the governance of recovery should strengthen the social contract that binds state and society.

The recovery vision for governance should be guided by the country's public sector reform objectives, which may be framed in a single public sector reforms strategy document and/or within the National Development Plan. If a decentralisation reform is underway, it will also provide broad parameters with which the recovery of the local Governance Sector should be aligned. Finally, if a security sector reform and/or judicial reform are underway, these would guide elements of the recovery strategy pertaining to re-establishing the rule of law in disaster-affected areas. At times, the recovery process can be used to accelerate the implementation of the above-listed

reforms. Indeed, the post-disaster period offers important – but not unlimited and often short – windows of opportunities for governance reforms. The enthusiasm for reconstruction may be high, the generosity of donors considerable, and resistance to change reduced.

Significant pre-disaster constraints in the performance of core government functions need to be taken into account, and planning for recovery should include further analysis to address them where relevant. However, stakeholders involved in PDNAs need to be cautious about introducing institutional and regulatory reforms or to aiming for significant improvements in short periods to attain better accountability and effectiveness in governance. The need for reform needs to be balanced with what can be practically achieved in the context of a disaster recovery strategy and critically evaluated in the light of the current political economies at national and local levels. Major reforms will rarely work in such contexts, and governments should be cautious of the encouragement of international consultants or influential donors to introduce sweeping new policy approaches that may not be appropriate or realistic for the context.

Guiding principles for governance recovery should be defined to inform the sector recovery strategy. These should be agreed to within the GT under the leadership of the government. Examples of recovery guiding principles in governance include the following (see Annex 4 for additional details):

- Government commitment, leadership and ownership at all levels are critical for successful overall recovery, and use process to strengthen their capacity to assume such leadership role;
- Planning governance system recovery should start very early, given the criticality to establish national systems and capacities to steer recovery interventions as soon as the humanitarian phase concludes;
- Central coordination of recovery should be underpinned by a greater responsibility of local governance institutions in the implementation of recovery and reconstruction interventions;
- Institutional arrangements should be promoted that facilitate the participation of women and men of all ages, in particular the most vulnerable sub-groups of the affected populations in order to understand and take into account their distinct experiences of the disaster, as well as their specific needs and priorities for reconstruction and recovery;
- Sound financial management, transparency and accountability at all levels of governance should be encouraged;
- Channel funds should be provided to those with the strongest incentives to use them for the intended purposes;
- Civil society and the private sector should be engaged to establish partnerships aimed at gains in efficiency and effectiveness;
- Communication should be used to promote awareness of rights and entitlements during recovery and reconstruction;
- In politically divided contexts, a response should be provided to the diverse, sensitive views of stakeholders, especially the government;
- Conflict sensitivity should be used in recovery and appropriate strategies to promote social cohesion and political stability.

STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS

Similar consultation arrangements than used during the needs assessment phase should be followed while developing the recovery strategy. At the helm of the consultation process remains the Governance Sector Team led by the National Recovery Management Body and including representatives of key institutions involved in core government functions (see Section 2.4). The GT is supported by experts from United Nations agencies, World Bank, the European Union and other donors.

The pressure to produce a recovery strategy swiftly will likely be high following the completion of the needs assessment phase, and hence a more condensed and workshop-based consultation process may be needed.

1. The starting point of the consultation process on the proposed governance recovery strategy should be at the central level, with a broad representation of core institutions (including some representation of sub-national governance actors) and sub-sectors teams. Results of the PDNA, an outline of the strategy (with key objectives) as well as a draft budget should be presented. Major donors should be invited to attend but could also be consulted subsequently in a separate occasion.
2. A round of consultations is then held at the local level in different disaster-struck areas in order to more closely engage local governments, civil society and the local private sector.
3. On the basis of feedback received during the first two steps, a complete recovery strategy can be finalised by the GT. It would then most probably be incorporated in the overall recovery strategy including all sub-sectors and cross-cutting areas, which will be presented by the government to donors and the public.

RECONSTRUCTION AND RECOVERY NEEDS, INCLUDING BUILDING BACK BETTER

Reconstruction and recovery needs are informed by the assessment results and the overall recovery strategy, distinguishing the needs to restore functionality of core government processes from the needs to increase and improve the delivery of these functions in order to catalyse the recovery process across all sectors, strengthen DRM and reduce risks and vulnerabilities of mismanagement, violence and political unrest.

The most common reconstruction and recovery needs for governance concern:

- Rebuilding and improving facilities and equipment to face surges in the demand for functions/services;
- Replacing missing staff and recruit additional temporary ones;
- Strengthening managerial and technical capacities for critical tasks needed during recovery;
- Organising coordination, consultation and outreach activities.

It needs to be emphasised that, in the case of core government functions, possibly as opposed to other sub-sectors, restoring operational capacity (facilities, staff, budget) to pre-disaster levels and even beyond, from a qualitative point of view, is often not sufficient for a successful recovery, especially in countries which had a poorly functioning public administration prior to the disaster and/or countries that have never experienced disaster response and recovery before. The need for capacity development, as part of a BBB approach, then becomes the principal feature of the recovery strategy. Generally, across all categories of core government functions, the following capacities may need support in the form of technical assistance and training:

- Information management –to collect higher amounts of data and handle higher information flows, and provide analysis by sector, geographic area, beneficiary groups and institutions in order to facilitate cross-sector and spatial analysis at the national and local levels and to support decision-making, overall planning and coordination;
- Planning, in particular, multi-sector integrated planning processes and participatory planning;
- Coordination, in particular for complex operations and multi-stakeholder processes involving international actors;
- Project implementation and monitoring;
- Accountable financial management, including by strengthening financial tracking systems and auditing capacities;
- Monitoring progress with tangible indicators and reporting on progress (related to IM capability);
- Resource mobilisation and advocacy;
- Public outreach and social marketing in order to build confidence and mobilise civic participation and positive attitudes towards recovery (respect for rule of law, volunteerism);
- Gender mainstreaming and compliance with human rights commitments;
- Conflict sensitivity;
- Human/citizen security.

Table 11 presents a list of possible reconstruction and recovery needs that frequently apply in post-disaster contexts. Because of the specific nature of governance processes and interventions, there is no distinction made among recovery needs between sub-categories used until now to analyse damages and losses, namely: function delivery and access, governance and risk limitation. These are not sufficiently clear-cut conceptual categories when defining recovery needs in governance processes, which imply overwhelmingly capacity development interventions that can serve all these three purposes at the same time.

Table 11. Reconstruction and Recovery Needs for Core Government Functions

Core function	Reconstruction Needs	Recovery Needs
National recovery management	Repairs or reconstruction (including refurbishing with equipment) of facilities of core ministries and NRMB involved in piloting the recovery process.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Setting up temporary facilities (during reconstruction). New facilities if the NRMB is new entity (preferably use of existing building to avoid delays) – national / sub-national levels. • Replacing missing staff and recruiting additional temporary ones (including through public sector re-assignments, UN Volunteers, consultants) to face a surge in demand for functions. • Strengthening capacities for strategic planning and recovery policy formulation, gender mainstreaming, leadership and coordination, public communications/ media relations, results-based monitoring and financial auditing. • Establishing strong intersectoral coordination mechanisms • Organising broad-based consultations with civil society, private sector and local governments. • Conducting outreach campaigns on recovery strategy and results, including through social media tools. • Reinforcing capacities of state audit organs and/or contracting external independent auditing capacity.
Aid management	Aid management usually hosted by a unit in one of the core ministries or the NRMB, hence reconstruction needs covered in the first function of this table .	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Setting up temporary facilities (during reconstruction) and/or extensions (including equipment) to respond to increased demand. • Replacing missing staff and deploying additional temporary ones. • Organising effective donor coordination and producing resource mobilisation materials. • Strengthening capacities in aid modalities, aid tracking and databases, aid effectiveness, coordination, donor and public relations, and results-based monitoring, reporting. • Developing ICT and software solutions.
Local governance	<p>Repairs/reconstruction of seats of provincial, district, municipal governments, refurbishing (including vehicles), restoring connectivity.</p> <p>Replacing technical equipment needed for local governments' services not covered under other sub-sectors</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Setting up temporary facilities (during reconstruction) and/or extensions (including equipment) to respond to increased demand. • Replacing missing staff and deployment of additional temporary staff. • Providing short-term budgetary support to compensate loss of local revenues (and/or debt relief or soft loans). • Strengthening the local government' and non-state partners' capacities for leadership and coordination, needs assessment and data management, recovery planning, participatory processes, gender mainstreaming, conflict resolution, advocacy and public outreach, financial management, results-based monitoring. • Setting up (or upgrading) participatory mechanisms for planning, implementation and monitoring. • Conducting outreach campaigns, including through social media, on community mobilisation, recovery plans and results, DRR and resilience. • Implementing social accountability initiatives of civil society to monitor the use of recovery aid at the local level.

Core function	Reconstruction Needs	Recovery Needs
Re-establishing the rule of law	Repairs/ reconstruction of central/local administrations of government offices such as interior, police, justice, as well as police stations, district courts, prisons, civil registry, land and property administration. Re-equipping the national and municipal police forces with vehicles, weaponry and ammunitions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Setting up temporary facilities (during reconstruction) and additional ones in sensitive locations. • Increasing mobility of the civil registry, police officers and justice personnel in locations isolated by disaster effects. • Replacing missing staff and deploying additional temporary ones. • Strengthening capacities for community policing, child and women protection (including against trafficking), SGBV, conflict resolution in land and property disputes, human rights and increased risks faced during post-disaster situations. • Conducting outreach campaigns, including through social media, on civic attitudes in post-disaster situations, law and order, sex-and gender-based violence (SGBV), land and property dispute resolution, etc.

THE GOVERNANCE RECOVERY PLAN

PRIORITISING AND SEQUENCING RECOVERY NEEDS

A proposed formulation of outputs for the Governance Recovery Plan, structured around the four priority core government functions, is presented below. They will need to be revisited against the reality of each country's context, the chosen recovery strategy and available financial resources.

- a) A country-led effective management of reconstruction and recovery, ensuring coherent interventions and financial investments among sectors, building back more resilient communities and systems, and guaranteeing an accountable use of the related earmarked national and donor resources.

The national authorities need to have the capacity to plan strategically for the reconstruction and recovery of disaster-hit areas, guide sectoral planning accordingly, implement programmes, and supervise implementation by other actors, monitor the recovery and report on it transparently. The NRMB is the centrepiece of a strong nationally owned and led recovery process.

- b) All aid, including international assistance for recovery, is coordinated, tracked and reported on in a timely, transparent and accountable manner, achieving the recovery and development results for which it was intended.

The government needs to establish or strengthen its aid management and co-ordination architecture so as to ensure strong national ownership that will support alignment of recovery assistance with national development priorities, harmonisation of donor strategies and modalities, and higher efficiency of aid contributions. The management of aid needs to be highly accountable, to the people and to donors, requiring robust information management and excellent reporting and communications capacities.

- c) An effective delivery of recovery assistance at the local level, directly relevant to local needs and aspirations, is managed with community participation and scrutiny, and for which local governments play a significant leadership and coordination role.

Local actors need to: assess and aggregate reconstruction and recovery needs collected from affected communities; accordingly draft local recovery plans and initiatives with community participation; advocate with sector ministries and the NRMB to ensure uptake of local needs in recovery response; mobilise resources from the central government, national/ international NGOs and donors; coordinate incoming assistance in support of the

plan; communicate effectively and transparently on the recovery efforts; and promote positive civic attitudes among the population.

- d) A rapid restoration of law, order and security in disaster-hit areas, building upon social capital and community-based crime and conflict prevention mechanisms, and providing safe spaces for the recovery of individual livelihoods, in particular that of groups more vulnerable to post-disaster violence and abuses.

State institutions, and in particular its security forces, must be able to quickly restore and strengthen law and order in areas hit by the disaster and to minimise violence on individuals and looting of private and public properties. Community-based approaches to preserving security should be supported by the government, donors and civil society, and rapid efforts made to make public spaces safe again for women, youth and other vulnerable groups. Judicial and local authorities and civil society also need to effectively respond to the rising needs of the affected populations for the replacement of lost personal documentation, including property titles, and the arbitration of the many property-related disputes that typically arise after a disaster.

The Governance Sector recovery strategy will be formulated following a results-based model, detailing each intervention under agreed-upon outputs. It will include: (i) priority needs; (ii) interventions required; (iii) expected results; (iv) recovery costs; and (v) intended outcomes. Table 12 provides an example of this process.

Table 12. Example of Recovery Intervention Formulation

Priority Need	Interventions	Expected Results	Cost	Intended Outcomes
Restore the basic functionality of five local governments (front office + planning unit) in X province.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Open temporary office facilities. • Replace missing staff with local consultants. • Replace missing equipment. 	The mayor’s office and his/her planning unit have facilities and are staffed and equipped to the pre-disaster level.	\$US50,000 (repairs / prefabs) \$ 90,000 (3 staff per year) \$100,000 (3 vehicles, IT and power supply). Total per LG =\$240,000 Total: \$1,200,000	Local governments able to start coordinating recovery process and resume basic service delivery.

Recovery needs in the Governance Sector will have to be sequenced (short-, medium- and long-term, as appropriate), particularly in view of the multiple needs across all sectors and limited resources. A general set of considerations for prioritisation is presented in Chapter B of this PDNA Guide and are applicable as well to governance recovery. In situations of disasters in conflict areas, conflict sensitivity and the imperatives of peace building will also feature high among prioritisation criteria, especially for geographical targeting. Table 13 shows an example of prioritisation of interventions, separating restoration from BBB needs, which could apply to the case of a country hit by a major disaster, including over its capital city (hence creating damages on its central government institutions).

Table 13. Sequencing Recovery Needs for the Governance Sub-sector

Function	Phase					
	Short-term (0–3 m)		Medium-term (4–18 m)		Long-term (18 –36 m)	
National Recovery Management	<p><u>Infrastructure</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Remove rubble Retrieve archives Set-up temporary office Replace essential equipment 	<p><u>Other Needs</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Issue decree on NRMB mandate Restore workforce Establish inter-sectoral coordination structure Set up communications capacities Lead PDNA Capacity assessment Build capacities for PDNA and planning 	<p><u>Infrastructure</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Complete repairs and retrofitting of NRMB and core ministries in need Finish re-equipping Increase facilities (if needed) Improve ICT infrastructure 	<p><u>Other Needs</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restore workforce Outreach on recovery plan Recruit additional staff Build capacities for managing recovery Consultations on recovery strategy 	<p><u>Infrastructure</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Complete reconstruction of NRMB and core ministries (if applicable) integrating DRR measures 	<p><u>Other Needs</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Outreach on recovery results Build capacities for DRM and long-term national resilience building Draw on lessons learned on disaster response Network with international DRM platforms and south-south exchange
Aid Management	<p><u>Infrastructure</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Remove rubble Retrieve archives Set-up temporary office Replace essential equipment 	<p><u>Other Needs</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restore workforce Design Aid Information Management System (AIMS) Conduct a capacity assessment of aid management body (AMB) Build capacities for information exchange and organisational management 	<p><u>Infrastructure</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Complete repairs and retrofitting of Aid Management Body (AMB) Finish re-equipping Increase facilities (if needed) Upgrade ICT infrastructure 	<p><u>Other Needs</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restore workforce Procure and operate AIMS software Coordinate with sectors and local authorities Consult with humanitarian and development actors Recruit additional staff Build capacities for aid management 	<p><u>Infrastructure</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Complete reconstruction of Aid Management Body (AMB) (if applicable) integrating DRR measures 	<p><u>Other Needs</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conduct outreach on aid effectiveness results within NRMB reports) Build capacities for aid management Draw on lessons learned on DRR Set up a Users' Surveys Network with international aid effectiveness platforms and south-south exchange
Local Governance	<p><u>Infrastructure</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Remove rubble Set up temporary facilities Replace essential equipment (mobility, communications, power) 	<p><u>Other needs</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restore communications with central government Restore workforce Restore fiscal transfers (if stopped) Carry out vulnerability mappings Map civil society and private sector capacities Conduct capacity assessments Build capacities for needs assessment and planning 	<p><u>Infrastructure</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Complete repairs of damages to local government buildings Replace equipment for other local government services Set up temporary additional facilities (if needed) Improve ICT infrastructure 	<p><u>Other needs</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restore workforce Advocate local needs into national plan Implement fiscal measures to offset loss of LG tax revenues Recruit temporary staff Establish local coordination for interventions Strengthen national / local dialogue Strengthen participatory processes in communities Build capacities for managing recovery 	<p><u>Infrastructure</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Complete reconstruction of local government administrative complexes integrating DRR measures 	<p><u>Other needs</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restore local taxation and other own revenues Build capacities for DRM and long-term resilience building in communities Draw on lessons learned on disaster response

Function	Phase					
	Short-term (0–3 months)		Medium-term (4–18 months)		Long-term (18 –36 months)	
Restoring Law and Order	<u>Infrastructure</u>	<u>Other needs</u>	<u>Infrastructure</u>	<u>Other needs</u>	<u>Infrastructure</u>	<u>Other needs</u>
	Remove rubble. Set up temporary facilities. Replace essential equipment (power supply, mobility, communications, arms).	Restore workforce. Conduct citizen security risk assessments. Deploy additional security forces. Build capacities for security maintenance in disaster situations. Provide human rights and sex- and gender-based violence (SGBV) prevention training.	Completely repair damages on police / judicial buildings. Replace other equipment. Set up temporary additional facilities (if needed). Improve ICT infrastructure.	Restore workforce. Replace lost ID and property documents. Adjudicate property disputes. Carry out SGBV / child abuse prevention campaigns. Strengthen citizen security structures. Build capacities for community policing. Provide human rights and SGBV training for police and justice. Support legal aid initiatives.	Complete reconstruction of new police / justice facilities integrating DRR measures.	Replace lost ID and property documents. SGBV prevention campaigns. Build capacities for rapid post-disaster security response. Support legal aid initiatives. Draw on lessons learned on disaster response.

NOTE: Red font relates to BBB needs.

COSTING

Costing estimates for recovery and reconstruction include the costs required to repair or replace damaged infrastructure and assets of institutions involved in the delivery of core government functions. Additionally, funding is required to re-establish their functionality (equipment, staff, logistics), support their governance and management capacity with technical assistance and training, and to support coordination, consultation and communications. The total required budget should be realistic and take into account the existing total budget of these institutions and their absorption capacity. Costing for the Governance Sector should be presented separately for each core government function.

The difference between the economic impact and the cost of the proposed response should not become too large. For post-disaster donor pledging conferences, the development partners are accustomed to looking at the total effect, consisting of the value of damage and change in flows, and pledge accordingly. However, experience has shown that most of donor investments are dedicated to repairing disaster-related damages, and there is usually little funding remaining left for aspects of improved governance, access, participation and accountability. Rule of law aspects may also not be prioritised unless there are situations of pre-existing conflict. Therefore, the costing of governance interventions should remain realistic, and prioritisation is crucial to be able at least to establish a sufficient national capacity for recovery management, aid coordination and local governance. At the same time, strong advocacy by national governments and PDNA partners will be needed to raise the profile of governance priorities, considering that without a sound enabling institutional and governance environment, the effectiveness of sectoral investments and national ownership of recovery will be put in danger.

Costing of infrastructure is relatively straightforward and is mostly performed through a bottom-up approach, using the methodology and tools for assessing damage and loss, as the costs for reconstruction is equal to the costs of the damage. Moreover, additional costs may need to be included to make public administration buildings more disaster-resilient – not only so that they will remain standing after a disaster, but also that they be fully functional. Often, such additional costs are calculated as a percentage of a building’s original cost. Given that

administrative buildings for core government functions have no specific, costly specification needs, as would hospitals, schools or power plants, it should be relatively straightforward for the GT to establish country costing standards for repairing infrastructure of core government institutions.

There should also be national standard unit costs available for police stations, court buildings and prisons, which are common buildings in any country; yet, not all countries apply best practices in this area with regard to ensuring that the design of these facilities preserve the human rights of victims, suspects and detainees. As far as possible, as part of the BBB approach, the opportunity should be taken when costing infrastructure repairs and reconstruction for the rule of law sector to increase compliance with human rights-based norms for such facilities, and not only to DRM concerns.

Costing for delivery, access, governance and risk limitation needs includes mostly 'soft' expenditures for human resources, technical assistance, training, service contracts and logistics. The process for costing these expenditures is very similar to that used when costing a development programme budget. Consultation should take place with major in-country donors to access unit cost data for development-type activities. For human resources, staff payrolls should only be included when above pre-disaster payroll levels. Temporary staff are usually paid higher than permanent civil servants, and most governments have pay scales for short-term contracts. For a start, temporary employment should be limited to 12-18 months only, since government staffing numbers should go back to pre-disaster levels once the main surge linked to planning and implementing recovery has receded. Donors should use government pay scales and not theirs to calculate the costs of temporary staffing. Compensation payments for injured and killed government staff are not part of the recovery plan budget, but are accounted among the losses. Capacity development activities will have to be costed in a broad manner, since not enough details will be available at the during the PDNA to build elaborate training and technical assistance plans that make costing easier. At minimum, the GT should try to identify the number of personnel under each function that will require training and roughly the intensity of the training inputs. This would provide a total number of individual training days to which a realistic average cost can be applied, given the country's experience with training activities for government staff. To reflect increased unit cost for transport, accommodation and logistics in general in a post-disaster environment, the training day unit cost in normal conditions should be augmented by a percentage of at least 10-20 per cent. The same applies to procuring foreign technical assistance where an estimation of the number of expert-days required to support core government institutions for the most serious capacity gaps will need to be provided by the GT.

Normally, a PDNA costing exercise requires separating restoration from BBB costs. Such a distinction has been tentatively made in Table 13. However, it is not such a clear-cut process for governance activities because these are mostly related to capacity development. The GT will have to evaluate the usefulness and applicability of such a distinction when performing the costing, otherwise separating the costing of infrastructure needs with other needs seem sufficient. The following two recommendations are useful when considering costing for other aspects than infrastructure:

- Develop a good plan with clear activities to ensure appropriate costing and its justification based on agreed priorities, with realistic sequencing over time.
- Be realistic in the development of budgets; try to estimate the resource envelope from donor pledges, take into account the current total expenditures of the concerned governance institutions, and look at the possible absorption capacity.

IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

The sector recovery strategy should describe the implementation arrangements, including the following:

PARTNERSHIPS, COORDINATION AND MANAGEMENT

The implementation of the different components of the Governance Recovery Plan may have to be divided between different government entities, such as the NRMB for the first two functions (national recovery management and aid coordination), the Ministry of Local Administration / Development for local governance and the Ministry of Interior should be responsible for all aspects related to law and order. Yet, it is strongly recommended that an overall Steering Committee be established, under the leadership of the NRMB (or similar) and with representation of all the component team leaders, as well as other core ministries as the ministries of finance, economy, planning or justice, to keep a strong coherent integrated approach to the recovery of core government functions.

Partnership opportunities for supporting needs analysis in governance in post-disaster environments, presented in Section 2.2, apply also to implementation of the sector recovery plan.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The monitoring system should make use of specific indicators directly related to the type of interventions planned (for example, to monitor progress of capacity building activities or restoration of workforces). In addition, in order to measure impact at the outcome level, pre-disaster national governance performance indicators could be used if available rather than global indicators such as the World Bank Government Effectiveness Index. As far as possible, the set of indicators used to analyse the pre-disaster situation should be maintained in the sector's monitoring and evaluation (M & E) framework. As a last resort, the use of global governance indices can be envisaged, but they are heavier to use and often fail to incorporate the specific challenges to crisis situations.

It is also necessary to ensure that the monitoring of recovery includes a feedback loop directly from the communities. Participatory monitoring will increase the likelihood of a successful recovery and reconstruction process. The local administration, especially at the lowest tiers of government, is in a unique position to ensure that beneficiaries participate in a meaningful way in the recovery programme monitoring given their proximity to their constituencies. This will require devising community-based monitoring systems and conducting opinion surveys at different points of the recovery phase to gather people's views on the governance aspects of recovery (mostly participation, inclusion, equity and accountability).

Monitoring and evaluation requires staff and an operations budget. Approximately 3 to 5 percent of the recovery and reconstruction budget for governance should be set aside for this purpose.

LINKS TO DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Links to humanitarian assistance: There is no governance cluster in the IASC coordination structure during a humanitarian crisis, but IASC policies recommend setting up 'gap' clusters to address other context-specific recovery priorities not covered by the standard cluster system, if needed. Governance is typically an area that may call for such an ad hoc coordination mechanism between humanitarian actors if there is a sizeable amount of support during the humanitarian phase to restoring the capacities of government institutions. This is usually not the case, although an increasing number of humanitarian agencies seek to support local governments in playing a more significant role in the delivery of humanitarian aid. In case a governance or local governance cluster is

set up during the humanitarian phase, it will be a necessary port of call for the GT during the PDNA phase and afterwards, at the time of preparing the recovery plan.

Links to development: Where there is a national Governance Sector development coordination mechanism, the GT and subsequent implementation coordination body should be closely connected to this group, and the development partners need to be consulted to assist in the PDNA process. If such sector-wide development coordination mechanism does not yet exist, the PDNA process can be used as an opportunity to initiate one. Linking implementation of the recovery plan with development processes ensures optimal harmonisation and alignment of the Governance Recovery Strategy to national public sector reform priorities, and vice versa. This would also ensure that strategies and work plans established by these groups incorporate the disaster impact for the concerned areas and take into account the fiscal impact of the disaster on the government's capacity to continue implementing ongoing governance reforms.

RESOURCE MOBILISATION MECHANISMS

Reaching a consensus on funding mechanisms often poses a major challenge during the recovery phase. Decisions on which funding mechanisms to use should be based on the local context and aim at achieving the best efficiency. Such decisions should be based on dialogue between the national government and international partners, and should consider the pros and cons of each decision to develop a funding mechanism that is agreeable to all parties. Financial modalities are often influenced by the Financial Management Assessment carried out by the World Bank, and the funding preferences of specific donor(s). The result is often a mix of budget funding mechanisms, and may include pooled funding arrangements such as Multi-Partner Recovery Trust Funds. The modalities chosen should support the governance role of the main institutional partners, at the national and local levels, in financial management. Adequate financial tracking mechanisms for pledges, disbursements and actual expenditures need to be established.

RISKS AND CHALLENGES

The risks and challenges in the implementation of the Sector Recovery Strategy are:

- The governance recovery plan are limited to reconstructing local government offices and will neglect the support needed in terms of capacities for good governance, as well as the support needed by core government functions at the central level;
- Ambitious investment plans may be embarked upon without a comprehensive analysis of absorption capacity and available resources;
- The same governance systems that were partially at the root of the crisis may be reproduced, or not addressing the underlying institutional weaknesses and imbalances may not be addressed (for example, between regions, or between central and local levels in terms of fiscal and human resource capacities) that may have contributed to the impact of the disaster;

¹² Coordination links may be maintained with several such reform support groups, for example, for public finance management, decentralisation or security sector and judicial reforms.

- When national policy making capacity is still weak, dominant international stakeholders can push politically oriented policy options or apply standard solutions that may have worked elsewhere but may fail in the country. This is particularly relevant for the model used to organise intersectoral and donor coordination;
- The timeframe for the PDNA is usually limited, which leads to limited consultation of all stakeholders, while governance issues are by definition complex to grasp and analyse properly in a short time and require a prior knowledge of the local political economies (which country offices of development partners may be able to provide to the PDNA Team);
- Unreliable and incomplete information is always a major challenge in countries with fragile and conflict situations;
- Assessments and recovery planning may be done in isolation, not sufficiently embedded in either the development cooperation mechanisms established to support governance reforms;
- Not tailoring support to local governance to the actual level of decentralisation and capacities of local governments (for example, neglecting local governments in the planning and management of recovery, to the advantage of the NRMB, in contexts where local governments have already achieved significant levels of autonomy and capacity);
- The Governance recovery plan cannot focus only on government institutions, because it would be ignoring the roles played by non-state actors as well in important governance processes, especially at the local level, to make decision-making more participatory and accountable. Customary institutions may also play an important role in security, peace-building and justice. Identifying these non-state actors and their needs, including in the recovery plan, and advocating for assistance to them is necessary. However, this may add an extra burden to the PDNA process and may be seen by government as a competition over scarce donor resources allocated to governance priorities.

¹³ This was the case in the Pakistan in 2011 during the post-flood recovery where the central government appointed unelected administrators to take over the planning and implementation of recovery from the elected heads of local executives. Subsequently, this was heavily criticized during the lessons learned exercise .

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http://www.recoveryplatform.org/pdna/key_documents/past_pdnas_and_recovery_frameworks

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ANNEXES

ANNEX 1. SELECTING STAKEHOLDERS FOR A GOVERNANCE PDNA

1) NATIONAL/CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

Among the national government institutions, the GT should consider the following institutions that are usually not covered by other sub-sectors:

- Executive Branch: As the most crucial element of government for planning and responding to recovery needs, it is the primary focus of a Governance PDNA. The following components of the Executive Branch should be consulted:
 - leadership and coordination bodies, consisting in President's Office, Prime Minister's Office/Cabinet secretariat (including spokesperson);
 - Inter-sectoral planning entities;
 - Public finance management consisting in Ministry of Finance, Treasury, Central Bank, Audit Board;
 - Civil service management consisting in Ministry of Public Administration or Civil Service Commission, civil service training institutions;

- Human rights system, which includes the national human rights institution, the ombudsman’s office, the government body responsible for gender issues/women’s affairs;
 - Electoral management body, if elections are scheduled within 12 months after the disaster;
 - Law and order institutions consisting in the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the police and the army.
- Judicial Branch:
 - District courts;
 - Ministry of Justice (see also under the Executive Branch);
 - Correction facilities (in particular for juvenile/women’s detention).
 - Legislative Branch: extraordinary measures assigning special executive powers to the president or prime minister, or the national recovery agency, and appropriating public resources to the recovery effort, as well as the overall recovery strategy, should be discussed in parliament. Legislatures also play an important role in overseeing public administration efforts to respond to the needs of affected populations in a rapid, effective and inclusive manner. In certain cases, commissions of inquiry may be established by legislatures to look into allegations of neglect or misconduct by the government in preventing and/or responding to a disaster. Rebuilding the capacity of legislatures, if they have been significantly affected by a disaster, is considered an important confidence-building measure since it increases the accountability and transparency of the government-led recovery process. It is usually not a priority in the immediate post-disaster period, however.

2) LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN AFFECTED AREAS

Local governments/authorities need to be consulted and involved not only at their lowest and most directly impacted level in the disaster areas (e.g. municipalities, villages), but also at provincial or governorate levels, since these play an important linking role between central and local governance levels.

“Local authorities or governments” refer to the following institutions:

- The office of the mayor or governor (political head);
- The office of the chief executive officer (when this is a separate function from that of the mayor or governor);
- The local council of representatives (designated via elections or else) and its sub-committees;
- The technical and administrative units organising the services delivered by the local government to citizens. These services may be reporting directly to the local authority (mayor/governor) or to the central line ministries (in which case, they will be referred to as ‘deconcentrated services’ or subject to dual reporting);
- Local offices of government agencies, in particular the National Disaster Management Agency, but also Regional Development Corporations, the Water Authorities, the Transportation Authority, the Housing Authority, the Environmental Authority, etc.).

3) COMMUNITY-BASED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND CIVIL SOCIETY:

In developing countries with a limited presence of the state outside of urban areas, community governance structures prevail in the management of local affairs. It is also often the case in informal urban areas. The PDNA needs to cover the disaster impact on such structures to ensure that they receive the support needed in order to assess needs of, mobilise, inform and organise affected populations during the recovery phase. Attention should be given to analysing possible exclusion of women, youth and other minority groups from community-based governance systems and whether supporting them may exacerbate such exclusion.

Local community-based organisations (CBOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) are important for the same purpose and for providing social services when state institutions are not present/weak in doing so or when service delivery is (partially) outsourced to non-state partners. Community structures, CBOs and local CSOs are prime sources of information in assessing the disaster impact on social relations and social cohesion of a disaster-affected community. They will also provide invaluable insights into the community's capacity to self-organise for recovery.

National and local NGOs are crucial as implementing partners for humanitarian and development partners and for state institutions. During the PDNA, the Governance Team (GT) should at least gather some information on the management capacity of main NGO interlocutors and include them in the recovery response if their experience is relevant. NGOs are also important for advocacy and monitoring.

The GT should also consult with the main political party leaders (not just those in the government but in the opposition as well) to hear their views on the recovery process. In certain countries, large political parties maintain an important social and charitable infrastructure that can be very active during the recovery period. Political parties also play a crucial role in maintaining social cohesion during hardship, and their attitude can greatly influence the confidence that people have in their government's capacity to respond to their recovery needs. By consulting with political parties, especially those that might be affiliated with particular minority groups that may feel discriminated against during the recovery phase, the GT would help prevent future tensions and conflicts that would adversely affect the recovery phase.

4) THE MEDIA

The media is at the centre of many crucial information flows during the post-disaster phase, by: (i) reporting and consolidating impact on the population, infrastructure and economy; (ii) conveying the needs of the affected population to those institutions in charge of providing assistance and planning for recovery; (iii) monitoring the delivery of recovery assistance and progress in recovery programmes; (iv) ensuring accountability of assistance providers and identify cases of possible neglect and wrongdoing; and (v) educating citizens about disaster risks and risk reduction measures, and helping disseminate important factual information on recovery programmes, contributing to confidence-building and to managing expectations of affected populations.

The GT should look for data on media consumption by women and men of all ages prior to the disaster so that the most strategic media outlets can be targeted during the recovery process for public messaging. It should also look at the extent of media presence at the local level and media capacities. For example, following disasters, people – especially women, children, and disadvantaged groups – require information through channels and in accessible formats to be able to claim their rights and entitlements. An unresponsive or weak media can hinder the provision of protection to all, especially to the marginalised sections of society.

5) THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Businesses, small and large, play a very important role in post-disaster recovery. A vibrant business community at the local level is essential for economic recovery. The private sector also often plays an important role in public service delivery (health care, education, solid waste management, public transportation, etc.) in its own capacity or through public-private partnerships. Larger corporations, including state-owned enterprises, also have an important corporate social responsibility to play in rebuilding disaster-hit areas and in providing assistance to affected communities. They can contribute essential technical and management expertise, such as civil engineering for example, to local governments that have been badly affected in their technical capacities by the disaster. The private sector will be heavily involved in the reconstruction efforts funded by government and donors.

6) THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Disasters often lead to an influx of international organisations and NGOs into affected areas. Many act to supplement basic government capacity and functions in affected areas. They may work with varying degrees of independence, though their effectiveness depends considerably on the support they receive from national and sub-national governments. They may advocate for transparency and accountability in the use of relief funds, or at times, they work in isolation, leading to duplication and overlapping. The Assessment Team should consider the degree to which NGOs and international organisations work in concert with government agencies or in isolation, and the consequent impact on the capacity of local institutions.

The GT should also seek to carry out a quick mapping of governance-related interventions and programmes run or supported by the international community and see how these relate to immediate and mid-term needs of the Governance Sector for recovery. Such resources and programmes can be of invaluable use to tackle immediate needs if agreement can be reached on their reprogramming and recalibration. Usually, such information would be available with the aid management structure in the central government and/or with donor coordination platforms.

ANNEX 2. SOURCES OF BASELINE INFORMATION

Governance Areas	Potential Sources of Information for Assessment
National Level	
Development visions Planning and development systems Management of foreign aid/aid coordination	Ministry of Economy and/or Planning (or equivalent) Prime Minister's Office or Cabinet Secretariat (or equivalent) Inter-ministerial planning committees
Gender strategies	Ministry of Women's Affairs or the National Women's Council Women's caucus (parliament) National women's civil society coalitions and networks
Local governance system	Ministry of Local Government or Administration School of Public Administration and academia Local Government Associations Civil society coalitions and networks
Finance and budgeting	Ministry of Finance Treasury Central Bank
Auditing standards and systems	National Audit Office (or equivalent)
Governance Areas	Potential Sources of Information for Assessment
National Level	
Legal and institutional framework for disaster management	National Platforms or Offices for Disaster Risk Reduction National Offices for Disaster Preparedness National Disaster Management Authority
Role of the International Community	Leading international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) working in affected areas – including women's organisations INGO coordination forum Donor coordination committee
Rule of law, human rights issues/ women and children's rights/ entitlements, empowerment,	Ministry of Law, Justice, Human Rights National human rights institution Media, human rights groups, reports etc. UN Women, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), UNDP, etc. Women in politics
Vulnerability to/risks of disaster or violence	Ministry of Social Affairs Inclusive and wide ranging national stakeholders (academic institutions, civil society, government and opposition) National observatories
Civil society	Ministry of Interior or other ministry in charge of civil society affairs National Civil Society Organisation (CSO) Registry National CSO coalitions and networks
Private sector role in governance	National Business Associations, Chambers of Commerce Ministry of Economy Labour unions Academia
Local Level	
Provincial and local development plans Spatial plans / land-use plans Management of foreign aid/aid coordination	Ministry of Economy and/or Planning (or equivalent) Ministry of Local Government or Administration Planning Departments at provincial / governorate level Planning Office in Municipalities Governor's Office / Mayo's Office Provincial / Governorate Assembly – Local Assembly

Coordination, and communication processes	Governor's office; Mayor's office; Local development associations
Service delivery (for services not covered by other sectors)	Municipal administrations Citizen's monitoring groups / CSOs, local observatories
Law and order, access to justice	Police commissioners and police stations Prisons Local courts Lawyers' Associations, human rights associations
Vulnerability to/risks of disaster or violence	Women and men of all ages and sub-groups of the affected population living along potential lines of division (e.g. different livelihood activities, identities)
Civil society	Local CSO umbrella groups Women and men of all ages and sub-groups of the affected population, local organisations
Private sector role in local governance	Local business associations Micro-credit institutions Professional associations Municipalities Local economic development agencies or boards Chambers of commerce and agriculture

Recommended Global Governance Indicators

- Worldwide Governance Indicators (<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home>)
- Country Policy and Institutional Assessment CPIA (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.CPA.PUBS.XQ>)
- Sustainable Governance Indicator (http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-8F4259C0-24574219/bst_engl/hs.xsl/prj_52957_53423.htm)
- Afro barometer (www.afrobarometer.org)
- Civil Society Index (www.civicus.org/new/default.asp)
- Latino Barometro Surveys (www.latinobarometro.org)
- Global Barometer Surveys (www.globalbarometer.org)
- Media Sustainability Index (www.irex.org/msi/)
- Corruption Perception Index (www.transparency.org)

ANNEX 3. EXAMPLE OF TEMPLATE FOR RECORDING EFFECTS ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND ASSETS

DAMAGES

Institution	Infrastructure (No. and %)		Equipment (% only)		Vehicles (No.)		Other (Cash,	
	Partial	Total	Partial	Total			Partial	Total
National Recovery Management								
National Recovery Management Body (if present)								
Prime Minister's Office								
President's Office								
Ministry of Finance								
Ministry of Economy								
Ministry of Planning								
(Civil Service								
Commission Body)								
Aid Management								
Aid Management Body								
Local Governance								
Governorate / Provincial Level								
• Chief Executive Office (Governor) including the Planning Department								
• Land and property								
• Treasury and Audit								
• Civil registry								
• Courts and Judiciary								
• Police and Security								
• Provincial Assembly								
• Other (not covered by sectors)								
• Key civil society organisations (CSOs) for governance								
Municipal / District Level								
• Chief Executive Office/Mayor								
• Treasury and Audit								
• Legislature								
• Civil registry								
• Courts and Judiciary								
• Police and Security								
• Land and property								
• Other (not covered by sectors)								
• Key CSOs and private service providers (not covered by sectors)								

LOSSES: ONE PER KEY INSTITUTION(S) CONTRIBUTING TO EACH CORE GOVERNMENT FUNCTION

NAME OF INSTITUTION _____

FUNCTION _____

Item	Need		Details
	Yes	No	
Rubble removal			m3 to be removed and distance to disposal site
Facilities			
• Temporary facilities			No., type and size
• Extra office space			m2, not/fully/partially equipped
• Additional equipment			Type, specifications, number of units
Staffing			
• Missing staff due to death dead			Number, type (admin. / managerial / technical) and contractual status (to determine benefits)
• Missing staff due to injury			Number, type (admin. / managerial / technical) and contractual status (to determine benefits)
• Missing staff who abandoned post			Number and type
• Recruitments to replace missing staff			Number, type and recruitment process (secondment, consultant, civil service)
• Recruitments of additional staff (over pre-disaster)			Number, type and recruitment process (secondment, consultant, civil service)
• Induction training			Number of trainees, duration (days)
Operating budgets			
• Increased fuel and energy needs			Number of extra units /month or year during the recovery period
• Increased office and other supplies needs			Number of extra units /month or year during the recovery period
• Increased travel and logistics (for events, meetings)			Number of extra units /month or year during the recovery period
• Increased communication costs			Number of extra units /month or year during he recovery period
Documents and records			
• Loss of paper-based archives			Type and % of all archive lost. Options for replacement and how.
• Loss of electronic records			Type and whether back-up accessible. If not, possible options for replacement.
Loss of revenues			
• Service fees			Type of service(s) considered, estimation of amounts lost and loss per month or day
• Tax revenues			Type of tax(es) considered, estimation of amounts lost to date and loss per month
• Losses of contractors (NGO and companies)			Number, type of contracts, reasons for losses (suspension, cancellation), amounts

ANNEX 4. EXAMPLE OF GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE OF RECOVERY

COORDINATE CENTRALLY, IMPLEMENT LOCALLY

Central coordination is most critical for setting standards, policies and principles to support recovery and reconstruction. On the other hand, local government and communities represented by NGOs, CBOs, including women's organisations, labour unions, and the private sector are best placed to lead implementation. Thus, the Recovery Strategy that emerges from a PDNA exercise should facilitate central coordination and local implementation of recovery and reconstruction efforts.

ENCOURAGE TRANSFORMATION THROUGH FOCUS ON CAPACITY BUILDING OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS

Local government institutions are well placed to serve the needs of communities but they tend to lack technical, administrative, human and financial capacity to deliver services. Disasters worsen that capacity deficit. Thus, PDNAs should not only emphasize decentralised model for service delivery but also give blueprints for the capacity building of local government institutions. This should include strengthening the capacity of local governments to: (i) coordinate disaster response and relief operations; (ii) plan, coordinate and monitor the recovery and reconstruction activities undertaken by other government and non-government entities at local level; (iii) communicate to citizens on the recovery process and mobilise their active participation in it; and (iv) mainstream gender and women's rights. Further, it also involves engaging with communities represented by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society organisations (CSOs), women's organisations, labour unions, and private sector and strengthening their capacity to support reconstruction efforts.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

In order to prevent the reconstruction activity from being taken hostage by bureaucratic sluggishness, the pace of the project and the requisite sense of urgency must be instilled and emphasised. Countries usually have a financial management system in place before disasters for tracking pledges, commitments, disbursements and actual expenditures, as well as planned and actual results. The adequacy of such institutional arrangements for financial management, transparency and accountability is a significant requirement for aid coordination and effectiveness. International experience, however, shows that pre-disaster systems do not facilitate quick disbursement of funds to support recovery and reconstruction. While transparency and accountability are important concerns, they should in no way obstruct recovery and reconstruction. Similarly, while planning processes are typically long and drawn-out in normal times, such lengthy procedures need to be tweaked post-disaster to fit the urgency facing a country or a region.

CHANNEL FUNDS INTO THE HANDS OF THOSE WITH THE STRONGEST INCENTIVES TO USE THEM FOR THE INTENDED PURPOSES

Residual cracks in accountability mechanisms can be filled by handing over ownership of the projects to the affected communities through community-driven implementation arrangements. The beneficiary community becomes directly involved in creating transparency for funds allocation and germinating efficiency in reconstruction activities. However, attentions should be given to ensure that mechanisms are put in place for involving women and men of all ages as well as sub-groups of the population in project decision-making, and such practices should be continuously promoted with the community.

USE AN EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT SYSTEM FOR MONITORING

Although the government must have control over the reconstruction process, an independent board representing the interests of stakeholders should provide oversight on recovery and reconstruction efforts. This arrangement is of particular interest in a politically sensitive, post-conflict environment where competing groups do not trust each other. To strengthen oversight, a strong national information platform capturing the activities of donors, international and local NGOs, CBOs, and local government institutions should also be in place. The oversight board will ensure that activities envisaged in the Recovery Strategy are on track. The success of a monitoring system is based on a dedicated team of analysts, which can be held responsible for collecting, updating, analysing, aggregating, correcting and communicating the data. The design of information management system should ensure that data collected is disaggregated by sex and age. This allows state structures to respond to women and men's differential needs in the future.

USE COMMUNICATION TO PROMOTE AWARENESS OF RIGHTS AND ENTITLEMENTS DURING RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION

Communication can be a strategic tool to educate, warn, inform and empower people to take practical steps to minimise the impact of a disaster; the media plays a significant role in this process. Accordingly, public relations/outreach units of key government agencies as well as the media should be enabled, through capacity building initiatives, to create and sustain information flows that protect the rights and individuals and communities especially ones that are marginalised or disadvantaged like women, children, older persons, and others. Communication tools also inform people of the needs of those affected together with the constraints of service providers, thus creating expectation bands, within which the performance of service providers should be appraised.

ARRANGE FOR TEMPORARY INFRASTRUCTURE

Immediate actions should be taken to set up temporary public administration offices and rapidly restore essential services in accordance with the needs and barriers highlighted by women and men of all ages, or alternatively, they should be rapidly repaired to enable the functioning of core administrative and early recovery activities.

STRENGTHEN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ARRANGEMENTS

Assess the support needed to set up a financial tracking system to promote accountability and transparency, which may include the provision of technical expertise, equipment, software, etc. To secure the financial resources needed to support the country's recovery, the capacity for resource mobilisation strategies should be assessed and supported, which may include advocacy efforts, the organisation of a donor pledging conference, communication materials and media briefings, etc.

CONSOLIDATE COMMUNITY COHESION AS A DETERRENT TO POST-DISASTER VIOLENCE

Disasters create immense stress on communities and put their cohesion and resilience under pressure. In most cases, solidarity mechanisms will reinforce individual survival strategies and bring households closer together across social/income/identity groups. Yet, in areas where there were prior tensions between different communities in the disaster-affected area, rivalries can develop on the allocation of humanitarian and recovery assistance. Certain communities that are the most isolated can feel discriminated against if they do not receive what they consider as their share of the recovery package, even if it is mostly due to access issues. In short, the stress caused by the disaster can re-ignite old tensions or make conflict-prone situations tip into open conflict. Furthermore, post-disaster periods can sometimes witness a breakdown in community security, with an increase in opportu-

nistic criminality, a mismanagement of aid, trafficking and gender-based violence. All efforts must be made to support governance for recovery to analyse conflict risks and take pre-emptive actions, and at a minimum follow a 'do-no-harm' policy. The use of participatory processes, dialogue and an early focus on ensuring targeting towards the most disadvantaged groups can help diffuse early tensions before they escalate into confrontations.



ANNEX 5. THE ANALYSIS PROCESS

The recovery strategy for core governance functions addresses the standard five key dimensions of the effects of an event as shown below:

- Damage to infrastructure and assets of institutions and actors fulfilling the functions;
- Effects on delivery of functions;
- Effects on changes in demand for the functions;
- Disruption of decision-making processes involved with each function;
- Changes in risks and vulnerability of affected institutions and populations.

Together, these elements provide the information required for formulating a governance recovery strategy and costed action plan. It should be noted that the PDNA team, which collects data and information on Infrastructure, will most probably collect such information on public administration infrastructure as well and assets relevant to governance. When the Governance Team (GT) of the PDNA collects such information, it should be conveyed to the Infrastructure Team for inclusion in their report. It is with regard to the delivery of services that the Governance Team will be better placed to collect this data as part of the effects and estimate the costs of disruption of these services. There are no Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that can be directly linked to the governance functions analysed in this chapter, but this situation could change with the new set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which will address peace and governance aspects.

GOVERNANCE RECOVERY STRATEGY

In order to build the governance recovery strategy according to the template provided in Table 1 below, an analytical process that looks at the disaster's impact on the various core government functions is needed. Table 2 provides a standardised and systematic protocol for assessment data collection and analysis.

Table 1. Governance Recovery Strategy

Recovery Strategy			
Pre-disaster baseline			
	Disaster Effects	Governance Recovery Needs	
		Restore Pre-Disaster Conditions	Building Back Better
Infrastructure and assets	Damage of administrative buildings and other assets of state and non-state institutions (national, local) involved in core functions. Reconstruct and repair destroyed and/or damaged infrastructure, replace assets lost.	Establish temporary administrative facilities, including for law and order functions.	Ensure that all infrastructure is hazard-resilient. Rationalise the public administration network (e.g. integrated administrative complexes rather than separate buildings). Improve communications infrastructure between national/local administrations.
Delivery of functions	Reduced ability to deliver core functions, leading to disruption in service delivery by sub-sectors.	Restore capacity to deliver core functions and possibly to support higher levels of delivery to meet increased and possible new demands.	Address possible pre-existing capacity gaps and performance issues in institutions involved in core functions. Adapt the civil service workforce as required, create new skills and competences, and adjust availability of public financial resources.
Access and Demand	Increased demand for core government functions, but possibly limited access in certain geographic areas (especially for rule of law). Local governments face higher constraints to access central government support.	Ensure effective and equal access of affected local governments to central government support (regulatory, technical, financial). Ensure access to protection and justice services, in particular for old and new vulnerable groups.	Reduce pre-existing and new imbalances in the relationships between local and national government institutions and in access to security and justice within affected communities.
Good governance (participation, inclusion and accountability)	Reduced capacity of the state authorities to manage recovery with sufficient community participation, inclusive of vulnerable groups, and to uphold sufficient transparency and accountability in the use of public and aid resources for the recovery process.	Strengthen existing consultative and participatory decision-making processes at the national and local levels, including representation and oversight role of parliamentary bodies. Reinforce existing accountability frameworks, including the role of audit institutions. Support civil society and the media's roles in supporting social accountability.	Support legal reforms and capacity development of core government institutions involved with recovery response (national/local) to plan, implement and report on recovery with heightened participation and accountability.
Risks	Effects on pre-existing violence and conflict risks, political tensions between local and national governance levels and within the central government, heightened opportunities for corruption in public finance management.	Control and mitigate the impact of pre-existing and new risks to security, peace and corruption. Take specific measures to reduce security risks to vulnerable groups.	Support community resilience against insecurity and violence in crisis contexts. Strengthen accountability frameworks and develop crisis-sensitive measures to limit opportunities for corruption while maintaining rapid disaster response capacity (link with above).

Table 2. Analytical Matrix for Governance Aspects

Core government functions	Baseline indicators / Pre-crisis challenges	Effect of the disaster/Key challenges for recovery	Immediate response provided	Recovery response, including BBB, for the short and mid term	Key monitoring indicators	Estimated costs and resources required
<p>National recovery management</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assigning leadership • Setting a vision • Coordinating sectors • Appropriating resources • Executing plan • Maintaining accountability • Reporting and communicating 						
<p>Aid management</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aid coordination structures • Aid modalities • Tracking financial and non-financial aid flows (including private sources) • Linking aid to national policy and budget cycle • Transparency and accountability 						
<p>Local governance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local governments' operations • Leadership over local recovery planning and management • Coordinating sectors and aid providers • Participation and inclusiveness • Accountable management of recovery resources devolved to the local level • Delivery of other local government services 						
<p>Rule of law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policing and citizen security • Protection of public assets • Protection of vulnerable groups • Dispute resolution mechanisms • Access to formal justice • Personal and property documentation 						

14 However, while DAC members are required to report their ODA flows to the DAC, donors might only report inconsistently to the Financial Tracking Service (FTS). Definitions and reporting are not yet fully streamlined; therefore under-, over- or double reporting may occur.

Guided by the headings, examples and the indicators in the table, the GT collects and provides the information based on the best available data, evidence and/or professional expert judgments. The analysis of the effects and its impacts will then help in defining the overall governance recovery strategy to address the needs identified, including priorities for BBB.

There is a growing number of governance assessment tools and indicators in each country that relate directly to the core functions earmarked under the governance PDNA and will be useful to the GT, especially to establish baseline indicators. These are presented in the next section. However, there are few other standard governance specific assessments that are conducted systematically in the aftermath of a disaster, except for aid flow monitoring, such as OCHA's Financial Tracking Service (FTS) which provides real-time data on humanitarian funding at the project level. It also includes flows from non-DAC donors and private contributors.