

EVALUATION
REPORT
APRIL 2014

**RETROSPECTIVE
EVALUATION
OF THE GFDRR
PROGRAM
IN A SAMPLE
OF DISASTER-PRONE
COUNTRIES**



DARA

Evaluation Report April 2014

Retrospective evaluation of the GFDRR program
in a sample of disaster-prone countries

This report has been commissioned
by GFDRR. The opinions expressed are
those of the Evaluation Team members, and
do not necessarily reflect those of the GFDRR.
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responsibility of DARA.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the findings of an evaluation of the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). It focuses on GFDRR's work in five countries (Guatemala, Malawi, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Vietnam) and the contribution the Facility has made to improve disaster risk management (DRM) in those countries. In particular, the evaluation highlights GFDRR's contribution to overcoming obstacles to effective disaster risk reduction, it explores the challenges faced in measuring the Facility's specific outcomes and points at the importance of its partnership strategy -particularly with the World Bank- in light of the facilitating role GFDRR plays at national level.

Despite a wide recognition of the need to invest in improving DRM by both vulnerable countries and the international community, a gap persists between high-level political commitments and actual achievements on the ground. In this context, this evaluation sought to fulfill following objectives¹:

- (a) Identify if program outputs are contributing to expected (and unexpected) improvements in DRM performance in a sample of priority, disaster-prone countries participating in the GFDRR;
- (b) Test whether the assumptions made in defining expected program effects hold true; and
- (c) Draw lessons learned and make recommendations on:
 - i. The M&E framework², including whether (and how) to adjust indicators for improved program design and evaluation; and
 - ii. The development of the program theory of change.

¹ As per the Evaluation Terms of Reference (see Annex 1 of the Evaluation Report)

² GFDRR Work Plan, page 52

1 FINDINGS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF GFDRR IN COUNTRY CASE STUDIES

The evaluation found that GFDRR is delivering outputs that correspond to a good extent to what is expected in the Facility's M&E framework, especially in the areas of risk identification and risk reduction. Within its area of "direct accountability" GFDRR is delivering reasonably as expected. Based on findings from the five countries, the main outputs from GFDRR's programs at the national level are:

GFDRR MAIN OUTPUTS

- Improvement of the disaster risk knowledge base in all five countries (i.e., risk mapping, assessments, exposure modelling and DRM profiles);
- Development of DRM capacities and tools within national institutions in all five countries (i.e., knowledge exchange, training of public officials and the development of risk management tools, such as modelling systems and loss and damage assessments);
- Risk-financing options explored in all five countries (i.e., DRM funds, insurance instruments and contingency mechanisms);
- Development of policy products to inform decision-making and regulatory frameworks in four of five countries (i.e., policy analysis, revision of regulations, risk-mitigation options and investments prioritization, and land-use plans);
- Improvement of risk knowledge dissemination in two of five countries (i.e., access to information on vulnerability and risk communication materials);
- Improvement of equipment for preparedness and response in two of five countries (i.e., early warning systems and rescue equipment); and
- Improvement of access to DRM data in two of five countries (i.e., technical upgrades, open source management systems).

Beyond these outputs, the evaluation also found that GFDRR has made a valuable contribution to broader DRM performance at the national level. With a different degree of development in each country, GFDRR triggered policy processes at the national level, facilitated some of the necessary conditions for risk reduction, promoted government readiness, and leveraged support for DRM at the country level. The main contributions observed in the five countries are:

GFDRR MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS

- Increasing understanding and engagement of government departments in DRM (all five countries)
- Developing DRM policy and regulatory frameworks, including sector and national policies (all five countries)
- Increasing understanding of financial vulnerability and risk financing mechanisms (all five countries)
- Facilitating clearance to World Bank infrastructure investment projects (all five countries)
- Increasing in-house capacities for DRM at the government level (four of five countries)
- Mainstreaming DRM in development planning (three of five countries)
- Increasing mobilization of funds for risk mitigation actions (three of five countries)
- Increasing public awareness of risk, vulnerability and DRM, including at community level (three of five countries)
- Increasing availability of risk information to end-users (three of five countries)

With the exception of Malawi, findings suggest that GFDRR activities over the 2007-2012 period have often been opportunistic, rather than based on a systematic diagnosis of DRM challenges and opportunities at the national level, oriented toward a programmatic approach or inspired by a conceptual theory of change. In most countries, it was difficult to discern national strategies seeking to articulate the different streams of GFDRR support (only parts of national strategies were found as products of GFDRR activities under programs already under implementation).

2 OBSERVATIONS ON GFDRR'S THEORY OF CHANGE, M&E FRAMEWORK AND PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY

THEORY OF CHANGE

The evaluation assessed the extent to which the assumptions (as defined in the Facility's M&E framework) hold true by analyzing the obstacles and enabling factors encountered in the field. Through these lenses, it becomes apparent that for several of the assumptions to hold true, some of the main obstacles observed in the field would need to be removed. A closer look at GFDRR contributions suggests that, in the countries studied, GFDRR is addressing a number of the obstacles encountered.

Based on the dynamics observed, it would seem accurate to describe GFDRR's contribution to DRM performance in terms of "removing obstacles", "creating an enabling environment and conditions" and "generating potential" for the achievement of higher and collective DRM goals set for the whole community of practice and country-level.

M&E FRAMEWORK

Key informants in the field generally recognized GFDRR's added value in improving DRM performance at national level. Yet, the evaluation observed that GFDRR specific contributions to progress in DRM performance could rarely be captured only through the outcome indicators formulated.

The M&E framework currently provides result-based outcome indicators, but the nature of contributions observed would also require that process indicators be included.

GFDRR provides grants to generate knowledge, build capacity and implement reforms. In other words, GFDRR seeks to positively influence processes. Therefore, the Facility's contributions to DRM at the national level would be better reflected by intermediate outcomes, which could be incorporated into the current M&E framework. These would show the casual chain that links program activities and the ultimate outcomes these seek to influence.

Intermediate outcomes should be tailored to the Facility's scope and type of work. The Hyogo Framework for Action and the Climate Investment Funds have faced similar needs and could provide some inspiration for the development of relevant policy and process indicators for GFDRR.

PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY

According to its Partnership Charter³, GFDRR was not conceived as a direct implementer, but its grants could be channeled through different streams: "The recipients of (...) funds include country governments, United Nations agencies, International Financial Institutions, regional inter-governmental organizations or research organizations." Findings from the case studies suggest that GFDRR tends to prioritize the relationship with the World Bank at the national level.

This preference may be explained by a combination of strategic and operational factors. For example, the Bank implements large investment portfolios in developing countries and offer GFDRR opportunities to risk-proof these operations. The Bank administers the Facility at the global level and partnerships at the national level may be efficient from a transaction cost point of view and provide open access to the Bank's technical capacity. In most countries, the synergy between World Bank and GFDRR has delivered results, especially in the areas of risk reduction and financial protection.

In some countries, national stakeholders reported that GFDRR programs were perceived as being part of World Bank investments. The close alignment between the two partners may prove confusing to national partners and it could be limiting GFDRR's leverage over the government or third parties. The implications of GFDRR's Partnership Strategy at the country level need to be further researched to better inform the Facility's theory of change.

Looking forward, when conceiving GFDRR as a catalyzing actor within the broader theory of change, it becomes more relevant to identify the comparative advantages of the different stakeholders and potential executing partners. Partnership strategies and implementation arrangements for GFDRR programs may be more effective when informed by an ex-ante DRM diagnosis of the country, including a political economy analysis of the DRM community.

³ https://www.gfdr.org/sites/gfdr.org/files/publication/GFDRR_Partnership_Charter_2010.pdf

RECOMMENDATIONS

► **1** The Facility constituencies need to better understand and further acknowledge GFDRR's valuable role as a facilitator of progress in DRM performance at the country level. GFDRR performance at national level should not be measured against ultimate common goals (outcome level in the M&E framework). **The Facility would be held accountable more fairly by assessing its performance in terms of its specific added value** (progress made in creating an enabling environment for DRM performance). To this aim, **intermediate outcomes with process-based indicators should be included in the M&E framework.** ◀

► **2** Considering the nature of GFDRR contributions (mostly enabling actions, generating knowledge, developing institutional capacities, promoting policy frameworks, etc.) **reporting on GFDRR results may need to be based on mid- to long- term scenarios,** rather than short timeframes. Expecting visible outcomes in the two or three year period of program duration, or even the five year period (covered by this evaluation) may be overly ambitious, particularly in developing country contexts. ◀

► **3** GFDRR's current M&E framework assumes that, at global level, sufficient and timely financial support will be made available for DRM. **Donors need to fulfil their commitments.** ◀

► **4** The facilitation role that GFDRR plays at the country level should be integrated in the theory of change and acknowledged in the M&E framework. The generic assumptions made at the country level should be revisited. **An assessment of initial obstacles and enabling factors should inform the design of a GFDRR strategy at the national level.** This way, soft investments and interventions could be tailored to the national challenges and GFDRR could be more effective in creating an enabling environment and further contributing to progress in DRM performance. ◀

► **5** **The implications of GFDRR's partnership strategy should be further explored and used to inform the theory of change.** Executing partners should be selected based on their comparative advantages and the country context. In the meantime, maintaining an open and diversified approach to implementation arrangements and partnership at the national level may be the best way to tap into the potential and added value of each stakeholder and executing partner. ◀

► **6** Beyond the overarching theory of change for the Facility, **country-specific strategies should be further developed to increase the effectiveness of national programs.** These should include:

An ex-ante assessment of the country's DRM performance, challenges and opportunities; a roadmap/timeline to sequence activities in a way that promotes complementarities and synergies; a map of DRM stakeholders to clarify their roles and priority actions and to help identify GFDRR's niche and priorities at national level; and the establishment of a baseline and targets for GFDRR intermediate indicators according to each country's timeframe for intervention. ◀

Considering the extent to which governance factors can either facilitate or hinder progress on DRM performance, the country strategy should also be informed by an analysis of political economy at the country level. This analysis would help identify obstacles (to be avoided) and enabling factors (to be incorporated). ◀

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ACRONYMS

AECID	Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation
AGIES	Guatemalan Association of Structural and Seismic Engineering
APRT	Adaptation Prioritization Tool
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
CAPRA	Central American Probabilistic Risk Assessment
Cat DDO	Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option
CBDRM	Community Based Disaster Risk Management
CEPREDENAC	Central American Integration System for natural disaster prevention, mitigation and response
CG	Consultative Group
CIF	Climate Investment Funds
CONRED	National Coordinator for Disaster Reduction of Guatemala
COSEFIN	Council of Ministers of Finance of Central America, Panama and the Dominican Republic
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DaLA	Damage and Loss Assessment
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DMC	Disaster Management Center (Sri Lanka)
DoDMA	Department of Disaster Management Affairs of Malawi
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EC	European Commission
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
EM-DAT	Emergency Events Database
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GFDRR	Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
GIZ	German Society for International Cooperation
GLOF	Glacial Lake Outburst Flooding (Nepal)
HCMC	Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam)
HDI	Human Development Index
HFA	Hyogo Framework for Action
IDA	International Development Association
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group (World Bank)
IFI	International Financial Institutions

IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IPCC	International Panel on Climate Change
ISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
IT	Information Technology
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LIC	Low Income Country
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MGDS	Malawi Growth and Development Strategy
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NDMCC	National Disaster Management Coordinating Committee (Sri Lanka)
NDRMP	National Disaster Risk Management Policy (Malawi)
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NRRC	Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD-DAC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development–Development Assistance Committee
OFDA-USAID	Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance – United States Agency for International Development
OSM	Open Street Mapping
PDNA	Post Disaster Needs Assessment
RBMS	Results Based Management System
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SDN	Sustainable Development Network
SE-CEPREDENAC	Secretariat of the Central American Integration System for natural disaster prevention, mitigation and response
SE-CONRED	Secretariat of the National Coordinator of Disaster Risk Reduction (Guatemala)
SEGEPLAN	Secretariat of Presidential Planning and Programming (Guatemala)
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SLLRDC	Sri Lanka Land Reclamation and Development Corporation
TA	Technical Assessment
TAG	Technical Advisory Group
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNISDR	United Nations office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UNRCO	United Nations Resident Coordinator's Office
VFL	Views from the Frontline
WB	World Bank

INTRODUCTION



1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE EVALUATION

THE GLOBAL FACILITY FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

1. The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) is a partnership of 41 countries and eight international organizations, including the World Bank, United Nations and the European Union. It was established in 2006 to help countries reduce disaster losses by 2015, in response to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), agreed at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction in 2005.
2. The GFDRR “supports national and local efforts to build resilient societies who can manage and adapt to emerging disaster risks, in order to reduce the human and economic impacts of disasters. GFDRR is a grant-making facility – not a direct implementer – and as such works through partners to stimulate policy reform and public investment that can better protect people from the natural hazard risks they face.”⁴
3. GFDRR has several financing and programming mechanisms: Track I focuses on international and regional partnerships (not subject to assessment in this evaluation⁵), Track II is dedicated to mainstreaming disaster risk reduction and Track III focuses on sustainable recovery, which normally takes place at the country level. In its 2013-2015 strategy document, GFDRR classifies its activity into five Pillars, which are related to but not the same as the HFA Priority Actions.⁶ GFDRR Pillars are: (1) Risk Identification, (2) Risk Reduction, (3) Preparedness, (4) Financial Resilience and (5) Resilient Recovery. Activities under the Pillars are divided into three categories summarized as (a) knowledge management, (b) capacity building and (c) assistance for disaster risk management (DRM) reform.
4. The World Bank hosts the GFDRR Secretariat, which administers the GFDRR Trust Fund.⁷ This Fund is not integrated into World Bank accounting, monitoring, and evaluation (M&E) systems and can develop independent M&E systems.
5. The World Bank works with a range of international partners—including UN agencies, Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), the Organization for Economic

⁴ As per Terms of Reference, Annex 1.

⁵ The Disaster Aid Tracking initiative developed by GFDRR in partnership with the United Nations Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), OECD-DAC, and the non-profit organization, Development Gateway, is already providing the tools and analysis to demonstrate needs and assess gaps in financing disaster risk management in current development and humanitarian assistance. GFDRR, “Disaster Aid Tracking,” GFDRR, 2014, <https://www.gfdr.org/DAT> (accessed April 25, 2014).

⁶ HFA Priority Actions are: (1) Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation; (2) Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning; (3) Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels; (4) Reduce the underlying risk factors; and (5) Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels. Priority Action 1’s reference to institutional/ governance issues around DRM represents a significant difference between HFA and GFDRR.

⁷ Based on World Bank Group, *Managing Disaster Risks for a Resilient Future: The Sendai Report*, World Bank Group, 2012 <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/23283830/DC2012-0013%28E%29DRM.pdf>. (Accessed April 25, 2014).

Cooperation and Development–Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), bilateral donors, private foundations, and civil society organizations (CSOs) on harmonizing the reporting of DRM-related financing, and tracking progress and impact. It also supports GFDRR as a global partnership and multi-donor financing mechanism that facilitates donor coordination for DRM mainstreaming.

DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT CONTEXT

6. Developed shortly after the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004, the HFA generated momentum that provided impetus for national and international commitments to DRM. In order to assess progress in DRM, national governments have produced a series of self-assessment reports using the HFA Monitor. These have provided a starting point to assess progress in DRM performance at the country level and explore its potential relationship with GFDRR activities.

7. The gap between high level commitments and actual achievements on the ground is a theme captured in surveys carried out since 2009, organized by national civil society. The Views from the Front Line (VFL) Project⁸ cites a number of obstacles to the full realization of DRM including: (i) lack of resources to build local state and non-state capacities; (ii) lack of budgets dedicated to DRR; (iii) difficulty managing DRM across public sector agencies at different levels of government; (iv) lack of focus on actions that generate risk; (v) the role of vested interests in resource allocations and (vi) the prioritization of rapid economic growth over reducing people's exposure to risks.

8. VFL's 2013 report concludes that progress may depend on how power and authority are dispersed horizontally and vertically across government. Decentralization may give greater authority and responsibility to local governments, but not necessarily the corresponding budgets. Weak performance by governments is identified as the single most important factor to explain limited progress of the HFA. A recent conference paper concludes: "While the governance arrangements for disaster risk reduction may be backed by policies or even legislation that requires risk sensitive development, the translation into on the ground implementation has met with mixed success, even in many high-income countries."⁹

9. The World Development Report 2014, focusing on the management of risk, highlights similar problems, as well as the importance of political economy considerations: "The state may not undertake more aggressive prevention and preparation in part reflecting limited political returns to ex ante risk management. This may also be difficult to implement owing to political capture and opposition by powerful interest groups. Lobby groups may prevent innovation by unduly influencing regulation, thus making it difficult for competing technologies to reach the market."¹⁰

10. This brief summary of widely recognized challenges to DRM indicates that GFDRR should consider how to address the obstacles and include enabling actions in its intervention strategies.

⁸ VFL is a "participatory monitoring programme designed to strengthen public accountability for DRR policy execution by providing the first independent global review of progress towards the implementation of disaster risk reduction at the local level. VFL gathers a broad cross-section of perspectives from communities, local authorities and civil society organisations who are most affected by disaster." Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction, Views from the Frontline, 2013, <http://www.globalnetwork-dr.org/views-from-the-frontline.html>, (accessed April 25, 2014).

⁹ Allan Lavell and Andrew Maskrey, *The Future of Disaster Risk Management* (San José: FLACSO/UNISDR, 2013).

¹⁰ World Bank, *World Development Report 2014: Risk and Opportunity: Managing Risk for Development* (Washington DC: World Bank, 2013).

1.2 THE EVALUATION OBJECTIVE, PROCESS, SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

OBJECTIVE

11. The present evaluation was commissioned by the GFDRR Secretariat on behalf of the Consultative Group (CG) represented by the Technical Advisory Group¹¹ (TAG) as part of the learning efforts undertaken by the GFDRR and partners to understand the added value of the GFDRR, how resources can be best allocated and progress measured in the countries GFDRR seeks to support.

12. According to the Terms of Reference (ToR) (see Annex 1), this evaluation is considered a “first step in a longer term effort to move towards better defining and measuring the impact of the program (...) that will help estimate program causes and effects, test the validity of the current M&E Framework and provide inputs to an evolving program theory mode.”

13. More specifically, as per the ToR, the evaluation sought to:

- a. Identify if program outputs are contributing to expected (and unexpected) improvements in DRM performance in a sample of disaster prone countries participating in the GFDRR program; (see Chapter 2)
- b. Test whether the assumptions made in defining expected program effects hold true; (see Chapters 2 and 3); and
- c. Draw lessons learned and make recommendations on (see Chapters 3 and 4):
 - i. The M&E Framework, including whether (and how) to adjust indicators for improved program design and evaluation; and
 - ii. The development of the program theory model.

14. Through a retrospective analysis of GFDRR programming, the evaluation sought to address the following guiding questions (as per the ToR): (a) What is the nature and level of contribution that program activities have made to outputs, outcomes and impacts consistent with the M&E Framework and any additional program effects not captured through this framework? (b) What evidence exists of the catalytic role of GFDRR activities in leveraging policy commitments and investment in disaster risk management by governments and/or their development partners (including the World Bank)? What is the observed or forecasted impact of these investments? (c) Where program effects are observed, what enabling factors are most important? How did GFDRR cultivate these? (d) Where program effects are not observed or minimal, what obstacles are most apparent? How did GFDRR mitigate these?

15. It should be noted that the exercise undertaken did not seek to evaluate impact in the traditional sense.¹² It was a retrospective evaluation, based on findings from a

¹¹ TAG members include: Government of UK (Chair), ACP Secretariat, Government of Sweden, Government of Switzerland and independent experts.

¹² As per the Inception Report (12): “The evaluation will assess how the inputs provided by GFDRR result in foreseen outputs and the extent to which these lead to intended or unintended outcomes. The evaluation’s focus is to measure performance at outcome level, not at impact, although the evaluation team will explore at the sub-national level the likelihood that stated outcomes will contribute to long-term effects on the population and communities (impacts) as expected in the M&E Framework.”

selection of five countries that sought to capture the various GFDRR work-streams. The value of this exercise lies in helping understand the difference the Facility is making in the countries it supports, testing the validity of the current M&E Framework and providing inputs to an evolving theory of change. Recommendations are provided at that level.

16. This is not a comprehensive evaluation on DRM performance in Guatemala, Malawi, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Vietnam or on their respective governments' role in managing disaster risk. Only elements of this have been integrated into the analysis, to the extent they may contribute to the actual objectives of this evaluation (see above). The objective was also not to undertake a global evaluation of GFDRR¹³ and it should not be assumed that findings in the five countries apply across the board to the Facility's programs.

17. The analysis of findings in this evaluation report is presented in Chapter 2 ("Country Case Studies" with the identification of program achievements and assessment of GFDRR's contribution to the improvement of DRM performance in five case study countries: Guatemala, Malawi, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Vietnam) and Chapter 3 ("Analysis" based on the cross-country assessment of findings and exploration of the evaluation guiding questions, including those referring to the M&E Framework and the theory of change). Further lessons learned about GFDRR's modus operandi and the role this plays at the national level have also been captured in order to inform emerging recommendations to refine the M&E Framework and enrich the theory of change in Chapter 4 ("Lessons Learned and Emerging Recommendations"). It should also be noted that GFDRR is working to further develop and articulate its theory of change. This will be a separate conceptual piece of work, but nonetheless has informed the evaluation process to some extent.

PROCESS

18. As illustrated in Figure 1, the evaluation consists of four phases: 1) Inception Phase, 2) Case Studies, 3) Analysis and Reporting and 4) Editing, Communication, and Dissemination.

¹³ As per the Inception Report (17): "The current evaluation is not a global evaluation of GFDRR as was the case with the 2010 evaluation in relation to the period 2007-9 and the subsequent IEG [Independent Evaluation Group] review in 2012. Instead it is an examination of a sample of case study countries and great caution should be taken to avoid extrapolating findings to GFDRR as a whole."

Figure 1. Evaluation Process



SCOPE

19. The time period covered by this evaluation is 2007 – 2012, that is, from the inception of the program to the end of the last strategy period. Exceptionally, when assessing programs that cover a period beyond 2012, the evaluation also sought to understand achievements in 2013 that could be the result of activities programmed during previous years.¹⁴ The evaluation included both retrospective and forward looking aspects, which for evaluation purposes, therefore required a considerable degree of continuity between the strategies for the previous periods and for the new strategy and workplan for 2013 onwards.

¹⁴ As per the Inception Report (16): “In practice, activities begun in 2007 may still be moving forward towards results and measurements may vary at different times. Activities begun at the end of the evaluation period or even in 2013 can still be assessed for their potential.”

20. GFDRR programming (activities implemented and budget executed during the evaluation period, see Table 1) was examined for a selection of five countries: Guatemala, Malawi, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. Evaluators also looked into implementation schemes (such as management arrangements and partnership strategies) and explored factors in the country context that were potentially relevant to GFDRR's work. GFDRR program achievements were documented when possible (evidence of deliverables and products) and their contributions to DRM performance at the country level were inferred from observations, perceptions of interviewees and expert judgment. GFDRR's financial support in the selected countries is presented in Table 1:

TABLE 1. SCALE AND DURATION OF GFDRR SUPPORT BY CASE STUDY COUNTRY


COUNTRY	ALLOCATION (US\$)	% TRANSFERRED	% DISBURSED	# OF ACTIVE PROGRAMS	# OF COMPLETED PROGRAMS	START OF GFDRR SUPPORT
Sri Lanka	1,654,087	64%	16%	1	1	2010
Nepal	2,873,400	77%	44%	2	2	2007
Malawi	1,946,522	100%	91%	1	1	2008
Guatemala	1,229,538	76%	70%	1	2	2008
Vietnam	4,353,726	84%	32%	2	1	2006

Source: Financial data. 2012 Updated country profiles. GFDRR.

21. During the case studies phase, desk research was undertaken and semi-structured interviews were conducted (see Annex 2 for more detail on the Methodology), with field trips to the five countries between October and December 2013: Vietnam (October 19th-30th, Hanoi and the Quang Tri province); Guatemala (November 16th-28th, Guatemala City and Santa Lucia municipality); Malawi (December 8th-18th, Lilongwe and the Shire River Valley); Nepal (December 5th-7th, Kathmandu) and Sri Lanka (December 8th-14th, Colombo).

22. The geographical scope of the case study phase responds to the selection criteria specified in the ToR: (i) three to five countries; (ii) GFDRR priority countries; (iii) diversity across regions (Latin America, Africa, Asia) and political and socio-economic context (Least Developed Country and Lower-Middle Income Countries); and (iv) scale and duration of GFDRR support (see Table 1). Annex 2 contains a full explanation of the country selection process.

Figure 2. Coverage of Case Studies



23. A total of 183 interviews were conducted with stakeholders from national and subnational governments, representatives of affected communities, World Bank staff, UN agencies, local and international NGOs, the donor community, academia, consultants. Annex 4 provides a list of interviewees by type of stakeholder in each country and the interview questions can be found in Annex 2.

24. As per the ToR (see Annex 1), the evaluation focused on GFDRR's primary role of supporting national governments. This was the emphasis of the case studies and analytical work. This is not to say that private/non-profit/civil society spheres are not important, but rather that the focus of the program has been on government-related activities and these offered the most fertile ground for evaluation. Other aspects of GFDRR strategy and positioning at the regional and global level fell outside the scope of this evaluation.

LIMITATIONS

25. GFDRR has worked in over 50 countries, and a selection of five case studies should not be considered a statistically representative sample: five countries could not hope to represent GFDRR's overall scope. Each of these five countries should also not be taken as being representative of a country type. Furthermore, country categories were not pre-defined. Instead, to the extent possible considering the limitations of time and resources for the evaluation exercise, the selection of five countries sought to mirror the diversity of national contexts in which GFDRR operates. Therefore, strictly speaking, statistical relevance of the findings and analysis in this report should not be expected and extrapolations across the board of GFDRR programming should not be inferred. The analysis and conclusions of this evaluation are based on the patterns and general trends observed in the selection of case studies.

26. The desk review and field interviews revealed that institutional memory of GFDRR activity was weak. Records on GFDRR funded activities were scanty and provided limited analytical inputs. It proved difficult therefore to assess GFDRR's contribution to DRM performance at the country level, especially in the earlier parts of the evaluation period. This means that the findings relate mainly to the period from 2010 onwards, and less to the earlier period.

27. Admittedly, five years is a short period of time to assess achievements and contributions to DRM through GFDRR investments ("grants to generate knowledge, build capacity and implement DRM reforms and investment," as per M&E Framework).¹⁵

28. The evaluation team was committed to a policy of triangulating evidence, using secondary data and sufficiently diverse groups of key informants (see Annex 2 for details on the methodological approach and the literature review). However, this objective could only partially be achieved due to the limitations of the reporting system and the fact that there were many cases in which GFDRR (and/or World Bank) staff was the primary source of information and the only possible corroboration was with government officials who also had a stake in the program's activities and results. It was difficult to identify independent third parties. When they were identified, they often

¹⁵ Considering the limited experience of some of the key interviewees (GFDRR focal points in particular) and weak institutional memory, the focus of analysis in some countries actually went beyond the formal 2007-2012 scope, so more recent (yet relevant) results and processes associated to GFDRR inputs could be considered and enrich the analysis.

had limited awareness of GFDRR activities and a hazy understanding of the distinction between GFDRR and the World Bank. In general, there was a lack of critical but informed voices in the five countries visited. Therefore, the assessment of GFDRR contributions had to rely more heavily on primary data (perceptions of the interviewees) and expert judgment than initially anticipated.

29. Finally, for logistical reasons, the field trip to Nepal was shorter than the evaluation missions to the other four countries (average of 10 days). The triangulation made in Nepal was less extensive than in other countries but the findings in Nepal are no less relevant for the analysis.


30. Despite these limitations, the evaluation team considers that the evidence collected through desk review and field visits can substantiate the findings of the evaluation, document the analysis and sustain the conclusions, lessons learned and emerging recommendations.

1.3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

31. The analytical process followed by the evaluation team has two main components, namely: (1) analysis per case study (see Chapter 2), and (2) cross-country analysis and “reality check” to test the adequacy of GFDRR’s assumptions and M&E Framework (see Chapter 3). Figure 3 shows the Analytical Framework that was used in the evaluation:

Figure 3. Analytical Framework



Main focus on Evaluation

32. performance at the country level (see Chapter 2). As shown in Figure 3, the evaluation began by verifying the activities executed and the achievements resulting from them. The evaluation explored (i) the extent to which achievements correspond to the expected outputs (GFDRR area of accountability in the M&E Framework); (ii) the extent to which these achievements led to the expected outcomes and effectively contribute to improvements in DRM performance across the five Pillars of GFDRR (area of shared accountability in the M&E Framework); (iii) the extent to which the obstacles and enabling factors observed at the field level are actually contributing to the assumptions in the M&E Framework holding true; and finally, (iv) the evaluation explores dynamics regarding partnership strategies and the added value that GFDRR brings to the field. Findings from each country are presented in the Country Analysis tables (see Chapter 2).

33. In order to assess GFDRR's contribution to DRM at the national level, the evaluation team began by exploring the level of progress in DRM at the national level, and the challenges to this progress, during the evaluation period. In the absence of a baseline study informing GFDRR program formulation at the country level, the HFA National Progress reports¹⁶ were taken as a frame of reference to contextualise GFDRR contributions to DRM progress at the national level. The evaluation confirmed, nuanced or adjusted the reported HFA progress, following perceptions of key informants and other secondary data.

34. To signify the level of progress on DRM at country level a scoring scale of 1 to 5 was generated by the evaluation in which (1) represents “no significant progress perceived in attitudes, perceptions or actions regarding this outcome”; (2) represents “a national dialogue has started at government level regarding this outcome”; (3) represents “the government’s understanding and awareness of the importance of issues under this outcome has increased”; (4) represents “the government has designed/developed/adopted guidelines/policies/methodologies regarding issues under this outcome”; and (5) represents “an action plan and/or monitoring system/verification mechanism has been implemented by the government.”

35. In order to measure the relevance of the role played by GFDRR, perceptions of national stakeholders/ key informants and expert judgment were used to produce a second score, reflecting answers to the following interview questions:

1. What was the most important direct result (outcome) of the GFDRR activity?
2. Were there any obstacles or problems? Were these addressed?
3. Did GFDRR provide any further enabling help such as technical support?
4. Were there any other direct effects of the activity?
5. What is the likelihood that further effects may be achieved in the future?
6. Were there effects that could be described as synergy with other activities or facilitation of other investment?
7. In relation to the above would you describe the effect as “leverage”?


¹⁶ UNISDR has developed an evaluation tool to assist national governments in assessing their progress in building resilience to disaster, based on the principles of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), which is the world's universally-accepted guide for reducing disaster risk. HFA National Self-assessments capture key trends and areas of progress and challenges at all levels with regard to achieving the strategic goals of the HFA.

36. The score given to the relevance of the role played by GFDRR in contributing to national performance on DRM is based on a scale from 1 to 5 in which (1) represents “marginal”; (2) represents “partial”; (3) represents “important”; (4) represents “significant”; and (5) represents “fundamental”.

37. Both the progress made on DRM performance at the national level and the perceptions of the contributions made by GFDRR are presented in the tables called “Progress on DRM Performance and GFDRR’s Role” in each case study.

38. These findings inform the reflections on GFDRR’s theory of change. For the purposes of the evaluation, the best indication of a program theory of change was inferred from the five Pillars describing sectors of activity, the logical pathway from “inputs” to expected “outcomes” drawn in the M&E Framework and the set of assumptions underlying them (see Figure 9 in Chapter 3).

COUNTRY CASE STUDIES



2 COUNTRY CASE STUDIES

2.1 GUATEMALA

NATIONAL AND DRM CONTEXT IN WHICH GFDRR OPERATES

39. **National context:** Ranking 133rd in the Human Development Index,¹⁷ Guatemala has made significant progress in achieving macroeconomic and democratic stability. It is the largest economy in Central America but has one of the highest levels of inequality and poverty in the region (especially in rural and indigenous areas).¹⁸

40. **Disaster risk:** Guatemala is classified as one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world and is susceptible to a range of natural hazards, which include earthquakes, volcanic eruption, and hydrometeorological events. This fact is compounded by the country's structural problems and poverty. Historically the most notable disasters were the 1976 earthquake (which caused 23,000 fatalities); the 2002 drought; Tropical Storm Stan in 2005 (which caused more than 1,500 deaths and left many communities buried under landslides); Tropical Storm Agatha and the simultaneous eruption of the Pacaya volcano in 2010; and the 2012 earthquake in San Marcos.


41. These are examples of the extreme physical events that the country regularly experiences, which, when combined with the high level of exposure and vulnerability of many communities, leads to numerous disasters that affect the country. In rural areas, historical patterns of social exclusion and violence have meant that different indigenous groups occupy land with low agricultural productivity with high risk of disaster. In the city, people are forced to settle on unsafe land such as river flood plains, riverbanks and hill slopes, which expose them to high-risk conditions. Figure 4 presents a timeline of GFDRR interventions at country level in the context of the timing of extreme events, policy processes led by the government and the World Bank's main operations in connection to the GFDRR portfolio.

¹⁷ UNDP, Human Development Report 2013

¹⁸ World Bank, "Guatemala Overview," World Bank, April 9, 2014, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/guatemala/overview>, (accessed April 25, 2014)

Figure 4. Timeline of GFDRR Interventions in Guatemala

GUATEMALA



42. **DRM institutional context:** Since the 1990s, the country has attempted to increase the prominence of risk reduction and its underlying factors. This can be seen in the promotion of land use planning, strengthening of municipal governments, environmental management and financial protection. Many institutions, such as the Secretariat of Presidential Planning and Programming (SEGEPLAN), the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Finance, have increased their roles in DRM. The National Coordinator for Disaster Reduction (CONRED), created in 1996, is composed of an executive secretariat and relevant government institutions with DRM responsibilities. In 2010, a National Forum for Dialogue on DRM was established. With the present government (2012-2016) the development of a National Policy for DRM is underway and reforms to the CONRED function are also contemplated.

43. The challenges posed to the state by a multi-hazard scenario are significant, and require that progress be made in governance issues, including the strengthening of institutions, obtaining and transferring technical and scientific information, territorial planning, and the strengthening of local level capacities.

44. In order to provide a frame of reference for the DRM context in which GFDRR has operated during the evaluation period, Table 2 shows the main DRM challenges in Guatemala since 2007 and progress made (as reported in the HFA National Progress Reports).

TABLE 2. MAIN CHALLENGES AND PROGRESS IN DRM IN GUATEMALA

CHALLENGES	PROGRESS
2009-2011	2009-2011
Need to strengthen technical capacity	Effort to articulate issues pertaining to disaster risk reduction and climate change
Need to nationalize document containing the main vulnerabilities (9) affecting the country	The National Dialogue on Disaster Risk Reduction led to meeting space between civil society and nongovernmental and private sector actors
Need to develop municipal development plans with participatory risk estimation	
Implement reconstruction plans in 53 priority municipalities	Construction of Policy on Disaster Risk Reduction
Develop National Building Codes with special emphasis on education and health sectors	
2011-2013	2011-2013
Allocation of budget towards disaster risk reduction in rural communities	Achievement in incorporating risk reduction in some institutions like SEGEPLAN
Need to help all levels from local to national with a focus on DRR and gender equity	Implementation of the Política Nacional en Gestión de Reducción de Riesgo a los desastres
Need to move conceptually from disaster response to Disaster Risk Reduction Management	Formation of Plataforma Metropolitana para la Gestión de Reducción de Riesgo a los Desastres marked beginning of integration of DRR
	Prioritization of response to disasters

Source: HFA Country progress reports

45. **GFDRR programming:** In the evaluation period (2007-2012), GFDRR has implemented four programs in Guatemala: “Scientific Information for Municipal Preventive Planning” (2009-2011); “PDNA [Post Disaster Needs Assessment] Agatha, E-12 and Pacaya” (2010-2011), “Agricultural Insurance Market Development” (2012-present), “Earthquake Damage Assessment and Recovery Framework” (2012-present).

46. **Achievements and contributions:** Programs have largely achieved their expected outputs and some contributions to the improvement of DRM performance were made (particularly the updating of seismic-resistant building codes, the use of safety indexes to risk-screen some public infrastructure and the development of PDNAs to inform reconstruction plans). However, frequent requests to adjust the original program objectives and design has led to most of the originally proposed activities being later enlarged, making it difficult to identify results as per project proposals. This was most evident in the municipalities project.

GFDRR IN GUATEMALA

47. Partly in response to the frequent changes in government, GFDRR adopted an opportunistic approach to implementation (responding to requests generally more related to recovery than risk reduction rather than developing an ex-ante strategy for intervention). The expansion of activities and modifications of program design could be seen as positive in the sense of flexibility and sensibility to needs, but such a “spontaneous” implementation process added complexity from an evaluation perspective. Under the “Municipal Preventive Planning” program, progress was made on the original objective (hazard information gathering and mapping for four river basins and 12 municipalities and the development of territorial planning methodology) but these did not lead to changes in land use planning and risk controls in the 12 municipalities. On the other hand, this initiative contributed in coordination with other donors to support SEGEPLAN implementation and the design of a methodology to

incorporate DRM considerations into municipal development planning.¹⁹ Other activities were added and implemented within the program scope: indices for hospital and school security (which were applied to some infrastructure reconstruction), support to the establishment of a national platform for DRM (the *Mesa de Diálogo* that engages the Vice Presidency in DRM coordination) and investment in a risk reduction monitor. These had little relation with the central concern of the program and rather seemed to have been promoted in order to contribute to the fulfillment of conditions needed in order to approve a US\$85 million Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option (Cat DDO) contingency facility signed with the World Bank in 2010.

48. Some of the expanded activities were relevant for the strengthening of risk reduction in the country. The activities added to the PDNA conducted following the earthquake (land use planning and territorial organization methodologies, and building construction techniques and trainings). The seismic building norms developed by AGIES (under the municipal program) have been applied in Guatemala City and the seismic security index for hospitals was widely applied. The agricultural insurance program has not yet resulted in the articulation of an insurance market, but it has raised awareness and engagement, mostly from the Ministry of Agriculture and private sector.

49. To complete the assessment of GFDRR contributions at the country level, the evaluation captured further insights on perceptions from key informants on progress in DRM performance and GFDRR's role at the country level. By applying the evaluation scoring tool (see Chapter 1 and Annex 2), the results in Table 3 present a quantitative indication of the relevance of GFDRR contributions.

TABLE 3. PROGRESS ON DRM PERFORMANCE AND GFDRR'S ROLE IN GUATEMALA²⁰

GFDRR M&E PILLARS	PROGRESS ON DRM PERFORMANCE			GFDRR ROLE	
	PROGRESS LEVEL	SCORE	AT NATIONAL OR SUBNATIONAL LEVEL?	RELEVANCE	SCORE
Pillar 1. Improved identification and understanding of disaster risks	Government's understanding and awareness of the importance of issues under this Outcome has increased	 3	National	Partial	 2
Pillar 2. Avoided creation of new risks and reduced existing risks in society	Government's understanding and awareness of the importance of issues under this Outcome has increased	 3	National	Important	 3
	Government has designed/developed/adopted guidelines/policies/ methodologies regarding issues under this Outcome	 4	Subnational (Guatemala City)	Important	 3
Pillar 3. Improved warning and management of disasters at national, subnational and community level	Non Applicable		Non Applicable	Non Applicable	
Pillar 4. Increased financial resilience of governments and private sector	Government's understanding and awareness of the importance of issues under this Outcome has increased	 3	National	Significant	 4
Pillar 5. Quicker more resilient recovery	The Government's understanding and awareness of the importance of issues under this Outcome has increased	 3	National	Partial	 2

50. Overall, in the 2007-2012 period, Guatemala appears to have made particular progress under Pillar 2 (Risk Reduction), and to a lesser extent in the other Pillars. In general, GFDRR contributions are not clearly perceived by key informants (they find it difficult to discern GFDRR from World Bank). The role of GFDRR is mostly acknowledged in connection to Pillar 2 (Risk Reduction) and in connection to Pillar 4 (Financial Resilience).

¹⁹ DRM in Public investment is implemented by the inclusion of: (i) DRM assessments and projects in development plans; and (ii) DRM cost/benefit analysis in the project cycle.

²⁰ The score on progress made in DRM performance is based on a scale from 1 to 5, in which (1) represents "no significant progress perceived in attitudes, perceptions or actions regarding this outcome"; (2) represents "a national dialogue has started at government level regarding this outcome"; (3) represents "the government's understanding and awareness of the importance of issues under this outcome has increased"; (4) represents "the government has designed/developed/adopted guidelines/policies/methodologies regarding issues under this outcome"; and (5) represents "an action plan and/or monitoring system/verification mechanism has been implemented by the government." The score on the relevance of the role played by GFDRR is based on a scale from 1 to 5, in which: (1) represents "marginal"; (2) represents "partial"; (3) represents "important"; (4) represents "significant"; and (5) represents "fundamental".

51. **Enabling factors and obstacles:** The mobilization of World Bank technical expertise and its dedication in Guatemala was probably the most relevant enabling factor for GFDRR activities. Direct outcomes and impacts have frequently been limited due to a lack of political will and technical knowledge/skills and a persistent lack of data. Changes in political leadership (the current government that took office in 2012 was the third since GFDRR began program implementation) and reactive approaches to disaster management have also hindered further contributions from GFDRR.

52. **Partnership strategy:** High levels of disaster risk have generated considerable international support (from United Nations Development Programme, UNDP; the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance – United States Agency for International Development, OFDA-USAID; the German Society for International Cooperation, GIZ; the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, SIDA; the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, SDC; the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation, AECID; and the European Commission, EC) for preparedness and risk reduction in the country. Despite an open dialogue and some interactions with regional institutions (the Council of Ministers of Finance of Central America, Panama and the Dominican Republic, COSEFIN and Central American Integration System for natural disaster prevention, mitigation and response, CEPREDENAC), little collaboration is seen between GFDRR and stakeholders other than the World Bank (executing partner) and the government. GFDRR activities are not seen as independent from the World Bank portfolio, which may be limiting opportunities for engagement, since a number of national stakeholders expressed resistance to World Bank activities and objectives.

53. **Looking ahead:** Advances to change the CONRED law have not prospered and hinder a shift from disaster management into risk reduction at the national level. Therefore, full advantage must be taken for ongoing PDNA programs to foster sustainable recovery and not merely impact assessment, along with the development of processes and methods that could have a wider impact on risk reduction in the future and in moments of calm. The development of recommendations on territorial planning and building processes currently fomented by the earthquake PDNA is an example of this. Areas that still require attention are the improvement of government coordination and collaboration, greater awareness of the needs and options for risk reduction, better data collection and storage, and methodological developments.

ACTIVITIES (IN PROGRAMS)	ACHIEVEMENTS	CONTRIBUTION TO DRM PERFORMANCE	ASSUMPTIONS TEST		PARTNERSHIPS AND ROLES			PILLAR
			OBSTACLES	ENABLING FACTORS	GOV. MAIN PARTNER	OTHER PARTNERS	GFDRR	
(2008-2011) MUNICIPAL AND RIVER BASIN INFORMATION AND TERRITORIAL AND RISK REDUCTION PLANNING								
Municipal and river basin information and strengthening institutional setting	Mapping of hydrometeorological hazards in 4 water sheds and 12 municipalities. Advance with one land use plan in one municipality. A national DRM Platform ("Mesa de Diálogo") was established and a DRM indicator to track DRM investments was created by the Ministry of Finance	National institutions (SEGEPLAN) and local authorities (municipalities of Santa Lucía Cotzumalguapa, Champerico, Retalhuleu and others) have developed their planning capacities and awareness on DRM . Methodological guidelines for land use planning have been developed. Planners in other municipalities have also taken up issues relating to territorial planning. The information is being uploaded in the National System for Territorial Planning (publicly accessible website). As a result of the program's achievements, DRM pre-conditions required for the approval of the Cat DDO were met and the contingency loan scheme was endorsed by the WB in 2010. The "Mesa de Diálogo" facilitates coordination and engagement at Vice-Presidential level.	Political instability (3 different governments during the last 5 years and all of different colours and parties) has limited the continuity of engagement by decision makers and upper level technical staff. Similar turnover occurred at municipal level and discontinuity of political engagement affected land use planning processes. Institutional coordination between national and subnational level of SEGEPLAN was inefficient with difficulties in communication flows and information sharing.	Political will and engagement initially existed at municipal level, which allowed for the planning processes to trigger out.	Vice-Presidency of Guatemala, the Executive Secretariat of the National Coordinator of Disaster Reduction (SE-CONRED), technical agencies (the Secretariat of Planning and Programming- SEGEPLAN), line Ministries and local authorities	UNDP, CEPREDENAC, AGIES, AECID, La Ceiba Insurances (private sector).		1
Review of seismically-resistant building norms	Seismically-resistant building norms have been updated	Guatemala City has institutionalized the use of seismic-resistant building codes , that should be enforced through the construction licence system (autorización de licencias de construcción). With time, it is expected other municipalities will follow a similar process. The activity contributed to meet the pre-conditions for Cat DDO approval.	Accountability of control systems at the local level is weak and there is a lack of staff with technical capacity to ensure the enforcement of the building codes, possibilities for upscaling may be at risk.	Highly specialized and committed technical staff and operational capacities at the Asociación Guatemalteca de Ingeniería Estructural y Sísmica (AGIES), with leverage capacity over other national institutions and donor community.	AGIES (with support from CONRED)		US\$ 740,000, representing 49% of total GFDRR funds in the country so far	2
The Safe Hospital Index	The Safe Hospital Index created by PAHO was implemented in four hospitals	Several hospitals at national level were risk-screened and assessed with the PAHO Safe Hospital Index methodology. The activity contributed to meet the pre-conditions for Cat DDO approval.	Limited applicability of the PAHO index and methodology ex-ante, since hardly any new hospital construction projects exist. (Upscaling should focus on risk-screening the complete list of existing hospitals).	Sustained interest and high engagement in risk-screening exercises as a result of the persistent memory of consequences of 1976 earthquake. High level of awareness of the structural issues in public infrastructure.	Ministry of Health	CEPREDENAC as Executing Partner (with support from WHO/PAHO and NORAD)		1
Educational Centers Safety reinforced	Educational Center Safety Index was developed based on PAHO hospital index and used to risk-screen several schools . Results from pilots informed the revision and updating of the School Construction Manual .	Increasing understanding and acknowledgment of DRM at Gov. level and its implications for public infrastructure design, leading to an update of construction guidelines. The activity contributed to meet the pre-conditions for Cat DDO approval.	Several changes and reshufflings in the Ministry of Education have compromised the continuity of the political engagement and the information flow within the process. The Safely Index is conceived for large Educational Centers rather than medium or small size ones, which are the most common ones in Guatemala, this limits the applicability and wider upscaling of the risk-screening.	There are some indications that the Educational Center Safety Index initiative may be absorbed by DIPECHO and widely applied in Central America.	Leadership of CONRED and the Ministry of Education, with involvement of other line Ministries (MCIV, MSPAS), several technical agencies (AGIES, INSIVUMEH, SEGEPLAN) and the University (USAC)	CEPREDENAC as Executing Partner (with support from WHO/PAHO and UNDP)		2

ACTIVITIES (IN PROGRAMS)	ACHIEVEMENTS	CONTRIBUTION TO DRM PERFORMANCE	ASSUMPTIONS TEST		PARTNERSHIPS AND ROLES			PILLAR
			OBSTACLES	ENABLING FACTORS	GOV. MAIN PARTNER	OTHER PARTNERS	GFDRR	
(2010-2011) PDNA AGATHA, E 12 AND PACAYA								
PDNA Agatha, E 12 and Pacaya	Damage and loss assessment conducted and technical assistance provided to the government for the overall recovery efforts. Promotion of PDNA program of methodologies for territorial organization.	Increasing awareness and understanding of the implications of DRM at Gov. level and increasing leverage capacity of institutions with DRM responsibilities within Gov. structures (a training of artisan builders in safer building techniques was organised after the program). Recovery and reconstruction opened opportunities to introduce risk reduction measures and methods.	Limited appropriation of the PDNA methodology by national institutions (that expected further transfer of methodological tools and capacities after the primary data and field-work was gathered and shared by them).	ECLAC's support (on the use of its DaLA methodology) was facilitated by GFDRR and was considered as a key factor of success.	SEGEPLAN as an executing partner (with direct support from CONRED)	CEPREDENAC, ECLAC	US\$ 75,000, representing 5% of total GFDRR funds in the country so far	5
(2012-2014) AGRICULTURAL INSURANCE								
Agricultural Insurance	Development of a strategic plan for the setup of an insurance market, technical assistance and knowledge transfer for the risk database design and analysis of options.	Increasing awareness of relevant Gov. institutions of the relevance of risk transfer mechanisms for food security and sustainability of livelihoods. As a result, large engagement in the revision of policy/regulatory frameworks to develop an agricultural insurance market.	Limited coverage of meteo-stations network. Therefore, the hydromet information available is insufficient to respond to the data needs of parametric insurance . Insitutional coordination is missing. Legal insecurity and lack of credit for smallholders.	Active engagement of private sector in the development of risk transfer mechanism. The Ministry of Agriculture is prioritizing the protection of smallholders .	Ministry of Agriculture (with support from INSIVUMEH) and engagement of La Ceiba Insurances (private sector)		US\$ 500,000, representing 33% of total GFDRR funds in the country so far	4
(2012) PDNA EARTHQUAKE								
PDNA Earthquake	New building codes and guidelines for safe reconstruction are developed (by AGIES) and approved. Guidelines publicly available in the National land use planning system site. Planners in Guatemala City start enforcing building codes and apply recommendations on land use planning .	Increasing leverage capacity of institutions with DRM responsibilities . Developments in regulatory framework for DRM .	Reconstruction requires large hard investments , funds mobilization and time. The recovery process is expected to be long and impacts of soft investments will take time to be realized.	Recovery and reconstruction offer an opportunity to introduce disaster reduction measures .	Ministry of Planning (SEGEPLAN) implemented, with support from Civil Protection (CONRED), Vice Presidency and Coordinator for Earthquake Reconstruction. Some Gov. ministries gave input to the DaLA. Engineering assessment of causes of earthquake damage (conducted by EERI and AGIES).	IADB and ECLAC provided support	US\$ 190,000, representing 13% of total GFDRR funds in the country so far	5

Acronyms: AGIES: Guatemalan Association of Structural and Seismic Engineers; AECID: Spanish Cooperation and Development Agency; Cat DDO: Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option; CEPREDENAC: Center for Coordination of Natural Disaster Prevention in Central America; CONRED: National Coordination for Disaster Risk Reduction; DaLA: Post-Disaster Damage and Loss Assessment; DIPECHO: Disaster Preparedness Program of the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid department; DRM: Disaster Risk Management; ECLAC: UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean; EERI: Earthquake Engineering Research Institute; IADB: Inter-American Development Bank; INSIVUMEH: National Institute of Seismology, Volcanology, Meteorology and Hydrology; MCIV: Ministry of Communications, Infrastructure and Housing; MINEDUC: Ministry of Education; MSPAS: Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance; NORAD: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation; PAHO: Pan American Health Organization; PDNA: Post-Disaster Needs Assessment; SE-CONRED: Secretariat of the National Coordinator of Disaster Risk Reduction; SEGEPLAN: President's Secretariat of Planning and Programming; UNDP: United Nations Development Program; USAC: University of San Carlos de Guatemala; WHO: World Health Organisation; WB: World Bank

2.2 MALAWI

NATIONAL AND DRM CONTEXT IN WHICH GFDRR OPERATES


54. **National context:** Malawi is a democratic, unitary, multi-party nation, with a president elected every five years. The country is landlocked and scarce in mineral resources. The country is nearly 90 percent rural; it lies in the lowest quintile of the Human Development Index (HDI),²¹ and over 60 percent of the population lives in poverty. A peaceful country, in 2012, Malawi was ranked seventh of all sub-Saharan countries in the Ibrahim Index of African Governance.

55. **Disaster risk:** Malawi suffers from recurrent drought, floods and landslides. A GFDRR sponsored study in 2009 estimated a 1.7 percent annual loss in GDP due to floods and drought.²² Drought is commonly associated with difficulties overcoming poverty in a country where rural employment is predominantly in rain-fed agriculture. The 2010 Karonga District earthquake rekindled consciousness as to the quake-prone nature of the country. Climate change and changes in patterns of climate variability are of great concern to this rural, agriculture based, energy scarce country. Figure 5 presents a timeline of GFDRR interventions at the country level in the context of the timing of extreme events, policy processes led by the government and the World Bank's main operations in connection to the GFDRR portfolio.

²¹ UNDP, Human Development Report 2013, The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World, New York: UNDP, 2013

²² GFDRR, Malawi: Economic Vulnerability and Disaster Risk Assessment, Washington DC: GFDRR, 2009.

Figure 5. Timeline of GFDRR Interventions in Malawi



56. **DRM institutional context:** Currently, the Office of the President and Cabinet, through a National Disaster Preparedness and Relief Committee, directs the Department of Disaster Management Affairs (DoDMA) and supporting technical committees to coordinate Disaster Risk Management activities throughout the country. These structures are determined by the 1991 Disasters Preparedness and Relief Act and are still dominated by response as opposed to risk mitigation concerns. Malawi’s vision towards disaster risk management and disaster risk reduction in particular is spelled out in development policies including the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS). Disaster risk management has also been linked to climate change as illustrated in the National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA) of 2006. The ongoing development of a National Disaster Risk Management Policy (NDRMP) is seen as a major step in defining roles and coordination, in favor of legal reform of the DRM context and in fostering specific resource allocation. The lack of formalization of this policy to date is seen to hinder DRM.

57. In order to provide a frame of reference for the DRM context in which GFDRR has operated during the evaluation period, Table 5 shows the main DRM challenges in Malawi since 2007 and progress made (as reported in the HFA National Progress Reports).

TABLE 5. MAIN CHALLENGES AND PROGRESS IN DRM IN MALAWI

CHALLENGES	PROGRESS
2007-2009	2007-2009
Lack of financial resources for policy formulation, building capacity, getting committed staff	Department of Disaster Management Affairs (DoDMA) spearheading through sensitisation meetings the mainstreaming of DRR into policies, Programs and plans
Availability of funds for strengthening of institutions, mechanisms and capacities at all levels	Restoration and reorientation of Civil Protection Committees at district, area and village levels
Lack of funds for conducting DRR activities	Project to mainstream DRR in mitigation and preparedness programming developed and being implemented in Nsanje and Chikwawa districts
2009-2011	2009-2011
Lack of human and financial resources for policy formulation, building capacity, and skilled personnel	Projects have been implemented with capacity building components at national, district and local levels
Lack of adequate funds for mainstreaming and implementation of DRR and lack of policy framework	National Framework on DRR developed
Lack of funds for DRR activities because of lack of clear DRR mandate for DoDMA, so nonexistent budget lines and donor community hesitant to allocate funds towards DRR	
2011-2013	2011-2013
Need for more DRR awareness across sectors	DRR mainstreamed into the Draft National Disaster Risk Management Policy
Localised risk maps lack resolution to effectively inform mitigation of disaster risks	Staff stationed in 14 of 28 districts to ensure further integration of DRM principles
Lack of adequate staff	Forum organized for information sharing over DRM and climate change
Achievement of resilience difficult due to poverty and lack of stakeholder coordination	Tools and mechanisms for incorporation of risk reduction preparedness, response and recovery Programs being adopted and development in government with stakeholders
	Awareness raising activities aimed at reducing risks

Source: HFA Country progress reports

GFDRR IN MALAWI

58. **GFDRR programming:** In the period of evaluation (2007-2012), GFDRR has implemented four programs in the country: “Mainstreaming Disaster Reduction for Sustainable Poverty Reduction” (2006-2010); “Karatonga Earthquake DaLA [Damage and Loss Assessment]” (2009-2010); “GFDRR Malawi Disaster Risk Management” (2011-2013) and “Mini-Loss and Damage Assessment - PDNA” (2012). Details on program activities are provided in the Country Analysis Table (see Table 7).

59. **Achievements and contributions:** In Malawi, GFDRR managed to plan sequentially, moving from one program to the other and from diagnosis to methodologies, training and further study and support. GFDRR interventions were well administered. The Situation Analysis of Disaster Risk Management Programs and Practices” (November 2008), the “Flooding Study in the Lower Shire” (November 2008), and the “Malawi: Economic Vulnerability and Disaster Risk Assessment” (August 2009) studies generated a baseline situation analysis on economic impacts. Studies on the river basin increased awareness among key sectors and set the scene for further developments in DRM. Risk-reduction needs assessments and opportunities have been made more apparent to relevant stakeholders, while DoDMA established wider options and objectives for DRM. International technical assistance, in the form of knowledge products for both the hydromet and insurance sectors was highly useful.

60. The hydromet work conducted in the Lower Shire River Basin (the flooding study and the design of the Water Management Plan conducted as part of the first and

second GFDRR programs respectively) have informed the Water Management Program in the Lower Shire funded by the World Bank. This program is likely to bring different sectors together to plan, develop and manage the natural resources in one of the areas of Malawi that is most in need as it seeks to promote a strong local culture for DRM and support local structures (such as village and area development committees) and civil protection committees. These efforts at the local level would be complementary to the open data source approach that brings transparency and technical support to DRM actions. The Malawi Karonga Earthquake DaLA exercise leveraged support for a project on strengthening data for preparedness and recovery (to be funded with World Bank grants) and it also led to the production of a short housing reconstruction handbook on building housing to earthquake resistant standards. Trainings on PDNA led to the setting of a national task force (which developed a “mini-PDNA” exercise at the district level after the 2012 floods), but will need time to consolidate within the government. The DRM finance note produced for the insurance sector was found to be a useful start in a country with little regulation or tradition in this regard.

61. Articulation with local and regional consultants and national universities (mostly for post impact assessments and seismic risk identification) has increased local capacities and buy-in. The naming of a focal point for GFDRR in 2010 has significantly contributed to improving DRM planning. The open data source process will bring greater analytical options and transparency in DRM actions. To complete the assessment of GFDRR contributions at the country level, the evaluation captured further insights on perceptions from key informants regarding progress in DRM performance and GFDRR’s role at the country level. By applying the evaluation scoring tool (see Chapter 1 and Annex 2), the results in Table 6 present an assessment indicating the relevance of GFDRR contributions.

TABLE 6. PROGRESS ON DRM PERFORMANCE AND GFDRR’S ROLE IN MALAWI²³

GFDRR M&E PILLARS	PROGRESS ON DRM PERFORMANCE			GFDRR ROLE	
	PROGRESS LEVEL	SCORE	AT NATIONAL OR SUBNATIONAL LEVEL?	RELEVANCE	SCORE
Pillar 1. Improved identification and understanding of disaster risks	Government has designed/developed/adopted guidelines/policies/ methodologies regarding issues under this Outcome	 4	National	Significant	 4
Pillar 2. Avoided creation of new risks and reduced existing risks in society	Government has designed/developed/adopted guidelines/policies/ methodologies regarding issues under this Outcome	 4	Subnational	Important	 3
Pillar 3. Improved warning and management of disasters at national, subnational and community level	Government has designed/developed/adopted guidelines/policies/ methodologies regarding issues under this Outcome	 4	Subnational	Partial	 2
Pillar 4. Increased financial resilience of governments and private sector	Government’s understanding and awareness of the importance of issues under this Outcome has increased	 3	National	Significant	 4
Pillar 5. Quicker more resilient recovery	Government has designed/developed/adopted guidelines/policies/ methodologies regarding issues under this Outcome	 4	National	Important	 3

62. Overall, in the 2007-2012 period, Malawi appears to have made progress under Pillar 1 (Risk Identification), Pillar 2 (Risk Reduction), Pillar 3 (Preparedness) and Pillar 5 (Recovery). Key stakeholders at the national level considered that GFDRR made a fundamental contribution to increasing financial resilience. Despite the increasing understanding of this matter, government developments were less substantial.

²³ The score on progress made in DRM performance is based on a scale from 1 to 5, in which (1) represents “no significant progress perceived in attitudes, perceptions or actions regarding this outcome”; (2) represents “a national dialogue has started at government level regarding this outcome”; (3) represents “the government’s understanding and awareness of the importance of issues under this outcome has increased”; (4) represents “the government has designed/developed/adopted guidelines/policies/methodologies regarding issues under this outcome”; and (5) represents “an action plan and/or monitoring system/verification mechanism has been implemented by the government.” The score on the relevance of the role played by GFDRR is based on a scale from 1 to 5, in which: (1) represents “marginal”; (2) represents “partial”; (3) represents “important”; (4) represents “significant”; and (5) represents “fundamental”.

63. **Enabling factors and obstacles:** The emergence of a climate change adaptation agenda,²⁴ especially in a country where drought and flooding are dominant concerns, has helped promote risk reduction within government structures. Local and regional expertise (mostly related to academic institutions) supported by GFDRR and other stakeholders for hydrometeorology aspects was an enabling factor for the development of risk assessments. The professional background of the GFDRR focal point (a technical expert in hydrology) gave saliency and presence to the hydromet and water planning.

64. On the other hand, the low political profile and lack of resources available to DoDMA for risk reduction functions was an important obstacle to progress in DRM performance. Lack of understanding and integration of risk mitigation by sectors and lack of technical and financial resources at the local levels have also hindered further advancement of DRM agendas. For example, informality in the construction sector and the lack of resources to establish a system of monitoring and supervision makes the enforcement of building codes practically impossible. Dissemination of good practices was promoted (printed materials and a few television and radio emissions), but further efforts would be necessary to reach communities across the most exposed areas of the country. GFDRR plans to revise guidelines and intensify dissemination efforts in the next program.

65. Problems with access to institutional data (due to lack of homogeneity in hydromet information, reluctance to share valuable data by some Ministries and poor internet connections) have reduced the efficacy of open data management programs to date. The lack of widespread knowledge on DRM from other stakeholders (both CSOs and international partners) did not help promote GFDRR goals. The Shire River Basin Management Program (and other World Bank funded operations) are seeking to support the development of information technology (IT) infrastructure, and UNDP is providing support to the same goal.

66. **Partnership strategy:** DoDMA and the Ministry of Irrigation and Water Development have been GFDRR's main partners at the government level. The World Bank was the most prominent executing partner and a synergy among Programs has been achieved in Malawi, including a number of World Bank operations (Shire River Management Program, Strengthening Market Based Agricultural Risk Management Strategies, Climate Smart Agriculture Project Preparation). UN Habitat and the Malawi Red Cross sought GFDRR support for the dissemination of knowledge products resulting from their work on housing construction standards. UNDP reported to have identified opportunities for collaboration but these were not pursued by GFDRR.

67. **Looking ahead:** New legal and policy frameworks for DRM need to be approved (the law from 1991 has not been revised and the existing DRM policy document that currently informs actions has not been formally endorsed yet). The lack of these frameworks holds back resource allocation for DRM, the assignment of mandates and roles and prevents coordination for new DRM, as opposed to DRR, functions. GFDRR has the scope to support policy developments. For example, the diagnostic studies for risk identification could be better disseminated to inform decision-makers. There is also a need for more capacity development on DRM, considering that the availability of trained staff at both central and local levels is far from optimum.

²⁴ Through the development of its National Adaptation Programmes of Action, Malawi undertook a country-wide vulnerability to climate change assessment which informed the identification of key adaptation needs (including enhancing DRM capabilities) and the prioritization of urgent actions. Malawi, Ministry of Mines, Natural Resources and Environment, Environmental Affairs Department, Malawi's National Adaptation Programmes of Action's (NAPA): Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), First Edition, February 2006, Lilongwe: Environmental Affairs Department.

ACTIVITIES (IN PROGRAMS)	ACHIEVEMENTS	CONTRIBUTION TO DRM PERFORMANCE	ASSUMPTIONS TEST		PARTNERSHIPS AND ROLES			PILLAR
			OBSTACLES	ENABLING FACTORS	GOV. MAIN PARTNER	OTHER PARTNERS	GFDRR	
(2006- 2010) MAINSTREAMING DISASTER REDUCTION FOR SUSTAINABLE POVERTY REDUCTION								
Country DRM Situation Analysis	Situation analysis produced, which included Historical overview of Malawi Disasters; Overview of current DRR in Malawi; Conclusion and Recommendations on Key Policy Issues in DRR in Malawi. Other stakeholders find the report a useful source of information, though it was not widely disseminated when produced.	Increased understanding and appreciation of disasters among policy officials and technical personnel. Served as a basis to design GFDRR strategy in the country (DRM country note).	The report was not widely disseminated. No existing national platform through which to share the findings in the report at that time. DRM efforts focus more on response than they do on risk reduction. DoDMA participated in the creation of the document, but little engagement of other ministries/ departments.	Growing concern for climate change adaptation and climate related disasters as documented in the 2006 National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPA) and confirmed through key informant interviews. The Karonga earthquake of 2009 increased the impulse for action.	DoDMA requested the analysis.	WB executed.	GFDRR provided US\$838,882 to its first program in Malawi	1
Flooding study in the Lower Shire	Study produced, which included Hydrology of Lower Shire; Socio-economic profile; Historic flood disaster; Historic flood mitigation measures and cost; Past projects development and financing.	The assessment has informed and pushed the design of the Shire River Basin Flood Management Program .	Little data availability at lower administrative levels. DoDMA participated in the creation of the document but little engagement of other ministries/departments.	Increasing concern about the impact and frequency of droughts and floods. The area is already recognized as a flood prone area (NGOs already working in it, though coordination needs to be improved).	DoDMA and Ministry of Irrigation and Water Development (MoIWR) through the Department of Water Resources (DoWR).	WB executed. The project generated information that served to inform WB funded Shire River Basin Management Program and National Water Development Program.	aiming to start by raising awareness and understanding of DRM through generating evidence on the issue and providing trainings to Gov. officials. So far, this first program accounts for 42% of GFDRR's total funds in Malawi in the period 2006-2013.	1
Economic Vulnerability and Disaster Risk Assessment in Malawi	Assessment produced and results shared with Gov. Developed a risk modeling framework for quantifying drought and flood risks to maize and tobacco in Malawi. Provided quantitative and scientifically-based outputs to inform decision makers engaged in climate risk management practices and policies, DRR, and risk transfer.	Served as a basis to design GFDRR strategy in the country (DRM country note) and especially to increase DRM awareness of different ministries (especially the Ministry of Agriculture), through the quantification of losses in economic terms.	Little data availability at lower administrative levels. DoDMA has not fully distributed the report and findings widely.	Increasing concern about climate change and the impact and frequency of droughts and floods.	DoDMA and Ministry of Irrigation and Water Development (MoIWR) through the Department of Water Resources (DoWR).	WB executed. The project generated information that served to inform WB funded Shire River Basin Management Program and National Water Development Program.		1
DRM Capacity Building to government officials	Senior government officials at national level trained on integrating DRR and RM concepts into development policies and planning; a training of trainers course on DRM concepts and approaches; and a study tour to Mozambique to learn about the DRM operations.	Awareness and understanding of DRM among government technical personnel increased.	The lack of a national DRM policy framework and multi-sector platforms at all levels or a National DRM focal point .	The growing concern for DRM as a key thematic area in the national development agenda (MDG I) coupled with the realization of inadequate technical and institutional capacity for handling DRM in an integrated manner.	DoDMA is the main partner agency, though Gov. officials at different levels from other ministries attended the training.	WB executed.		2
(2009- 2010) KARONGA EARTHQUAKES								
DaLA	Education and housing sector structural assessment and recovery needs assessment.	Increased awareness at Gov. level on the economic loss from unmitigated risk and the need to develop capacities for safer constructions (in contractors and also informal builders), and to raise public awareness on the relevance of building codes.			DoDMA.	WB executed.		5
Safer House Construction Guidelines	Technical support delivered for the production of the Safer House Construction Guidelines, targeting local communities and other actors in the construction sector. Guidelines published (over 1000 manuals and 1500 posters printed) and disseminated via radio and tv.	Government institutions are increasingly aware of the need for further education and assistance to enhance capacities of local communities in mitigating risk through their housing/construction practices.	The majority of constructions (outside of city centers) are informal and the authorities lack monitoring systems to supervise constructions . Building codes cannot be enforced. Dissemination efforts proved insufficient to reach communities across the most exposed areas of the country.	Increased awareness of the importance of safer building due to the extent of damage to housing caused by the earthquake (1000 houses), particularly to houses built by local builders compared to government buildings. Other donors (DFID, WB) and actors keen to support Gov. efforts and provided financial and technical support.	Ministry of Housing, TEVETA.	UN Habitat and Malawi Red Cross Society as main executers with collaboration from CCODE and Malawi Institute of Engineers.	GFDRR provided US\$122,000 (6% of total funds invested in Malawi in 2006-2013).	5
Vocational skills training	Training of over 223 artisans (from Karonga and Chitipa).	TEVETA is now considering including DRR in the vocational training curriculum.	The majority of constructions (outside of city centers) are informal and the authorities lack monitoring systems to supervise constructions. Building codes can not be enforced.	Increased awareness of the importance of safer building due to the extent of damage to housing caused by the earthquake (1000 houses), particularly to houses built by local builders compared to government buildings.	TEVETA undertook the trainings.	WB executed.		5

ACTIVITIES (IN PROGRAMS)	ACHIEVEMENTS	CONTRIBUTION TO DRM PERFORMANCE	ASSUMPTIONS TEST		PARTNERSHIPS AND ROLES			PILLAR
			OBSTACLES	ENABLING FACTORS	GOV. MAIN PARTNER	OTHER PARTNERS	GFDRR	
(2011 – 2013) GFDRR MALAWI DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT								
Integrated Flood Risk Management Plan for the Shire Basin	The project has begun but no implementation in the field has started yet, although it received 2 thirds of funding from WB.		Slow pace of implementation on the government side due to lack of capacity in the government.	The area is already recognized as a flood prone area (NGOs already working in it and coordination to be improved).	Ministry of Irrigation and Water Development is the agency that will implement the plan using a WB loan. DoDMA, DCCMS also involved.	WB executed. The project generated information that served to put together the WB funded Shire River Basin Management Program.	US\$ 825,000 approx. GFDRR focal point placed in the WB country office.	3
PDNA Training and DRM Awareness	Training on PDNA for Gov. technical staff from different ministries conducted.	Awareness of DRM issues increased. Capacities of people from different ministries to conduct PDNAs have been built.	Staff shortage at Gov. level: only one person per relevant ministry/department involved. If person not available, the ministry wouldn't participate in the PDNA. Representation in the National Team has not been consistent to effectively undertake future PDNAs.	Awareness increased by the Karonga earthquake.	DoDMA. Staff from the Department of Geological Survey and Department of Housing among others also involved in the training.	WB executed.	PDNA: US\$ 40,000 approx. High level sensitization workshop (travelling and staff costs): \$ 95,000 approx. GFDRR focal point placed in the WB country office.	5
Seismic Risk Assessment	Seismic Risk Assessment.					WB executed.	US\$ 35,000 approx. GFDRR focal point placed in the WB country office.	1
Review of Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance	DRM finance note created and future research topics identified, such as investigate reasons for decrease in insurance contracts among farmers.	Findings informed the WB funded projects "Strengthening Market Based Agricultural Risk Management Strategies" and "Climate Smart Agriculture Project Preparation".	Inadequate institutional framework for farmer related insurance. Lack of tradition and regulations around it.	Increasing concern due to the extent of crop losses associated with droughts and floods.	DoDMA.	WB executed.	US\$ 10,000 approx. GFDRR focal point placed in the WB country office.	4
Malawi Spatial Data Portal (MASDAP)	A first version of the MASDAP created and being disseminated. The platform software is being upgraded to a new version.	Information and data sharing has been initiated. Low information sharing so far but experts from different sectors actively participating in the upgrading process.	National internet connection poor (it will be upgraded). Software needs to be improved (bugs eliminated, more accurate scale, track of use system). Existence not sufficiently communicated. Outdated spatial data. Inexistence of law on data sharing (some ministries refuse to upload their data into it because data often is a source of remuneration for them.)	High recognition of the need for up to date spatial data. For the future: The platform software is being upgraded to version 2, which will allow for tracking of downloads and to eliminate several bugs. Ongoing discussions on how to improve MASDAP.	Department of Surveys (National Spatial Data Center). National Statistics department collaborating also. Other ministries are encouraged to share their data through it.	WB OpenDRI.	US\$ 85,000 approx. GFDRR focal point placed in the WB country office.	1
(2012) MINI POST-DISASTER NEEDS ASSESSMENT								
Mini PDNA	PDNA conducted and report produced "Nsanje District Floods 2012 - Disaster Impact Assessment and Transitional Recovery Framework ". PDNA team included national experts from Gov.	First PDNAs have been undertaken. The data collected contributed to inform the Integrated Flood Risk Management Project for the Shire River Basin (covered by an IDA loan) and was fed into the MASDAP.	Inadequate institutional framework (no policy, outdated law and weak institutional capacity) to consolidate stakeholder efforts towards DRM at national and sub national levels.	Increased recognition of floods as a major socioeconomic development challenge to Malawi and more specifically to the Lower Shire districts of Nsanje and Chikhwawa.	DoDMA. Experts from different ministries received the training and participated in the PDNA exercise. In kind support from Gov.	WB executed. In kind support from UNDP.	US\$ 30,000. GFDRR focal point placed in the WB country office.	5

Acronyms: CCODE: Center for Community Organisation and Development; DaLA: Damage and loss assessment; DCCMS: Department of Climate Change and Meteorological Services; DFID: Department for International Development; DoDMA: Department of Disaster Management Affairs; DoWR: Department of Water Resources; DRM: Disaster Risk Management; DRR: Disaster Risk Reduction; MASDAP: Malawi Spatial Data Portal; MDG: Millennium Development Goal; MoIWR: Irrigation and Water Development; NAPA: National Adaptation Program of Action; NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation; OpenDRI: Open Data for Resilience Initiative; PDNA: Post-Disaster Needs Assessment; TEVETA: Technical, Entrepreneurial and Vocational Education and Training Authority; UNDP: United Nations Development Program; WB: World Bank


2.3 NEPAL

NATIONAL AND DRM CONTEXT IN WHICH GFDRR OPERATES

68. **National context:** Nepal is emerging from a long period of destructive conflict. The political situation remains unstable and decision-making is generally driven by short-term political concerns. With local elections pending, current local governments are acting in the interim and are expected to change. In such a context, GFDRR has sought to involve CSOs (which are relatively strong) in looking for a more participatory approach to DRM.

69. **Disaster risk:** Comprised of a segment of land from the highest Himalayan peaks to the Indo-Gangetic plain, Nepal faces a high risk of flooding, including Glacial Lake Outburst Flooding (GLOFs) and soil erosion, both of which are exacerbated by climate change. Floods and landslides are the most recurrent hazards and are the main causes of casualties and economic loss. In addition, the Kathmandu Valley, including the densely populated capital, is the urban area most at-risk to seismic activity in the world. Rapid population growth compounds the problem. Other factors further aggravating vulnerability are poor enforcement of building codes (public and private constructions are largely unregulated), inadequate technical information about seismic risk and weak institutional arrangements. Although in Western areas drought is also a significant risk, the focus of attention for DRM has been on floods and earthquakes. Figure 6 presents a timeline of GFDRR interventions at the country level in the context of the timing of extreme events, policy processes led by the government and the World Bank's main operations in connection with the GFDRR portfolio.

Figure 6. Timeline of GFDRR Interventions in Nepal



70. **DRM institutional context:** The government institution responsible for DRM is the Disaster Management Section within the Ministry of Home Affairs, which holds overall responsibility for emergency preparedness and disaster management. The primary focus is on emergency relief and the DRM approach is still reactive rather than proactive. GFDRR has engaged with the World Bank and other partners in the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC), launched by the government and international organizations to coordinate and scale-up support for disaster risk reduction. Building on the government’s National Strategy for DRM, the NRRC has developed an action plan with five flagship areas proposed as priorities of action. The World Bank has led the coordination of Flagship 3, which is now being scaled-up to cover the entire country and is called Flood Management in Nepal. However, there is no river-basin authority or a ministry with a clear responsibility for overall flood risk management in Nepal. This role is spread across three key ministries and multiple departments.

71. In order to provide a frame of reference for the DRM context in which GFDRR has operated during the evaluation period, Table 8 shows the main DRM challenges in Nepal since 2007 and progress made (as reported in the HFA National Progress Reports).

TABLE 8. MAIN CHALLENGES AND PROGRESS IN DRM IN NEPAL

CHALLENGES	PROGRESS
2007-2009	2007-2009
Enactment of the DRM Act/policy and institutional mechanism	Inclusion of separate chapters on DRM in the 10th National Development Plan and the 3-year Interim Plan
Political will for and successful implementation through all stakeholders of risk reduction programs	Establishment of separate DRM units in key line ministries
An integrated approach to DRM at central and local levels	Implementation of risk mitigation activities at the community level through CBDRM approach
National level risk assessment	Endorsement of the Building Code by municipalities
Consistency in planning and implementation of DRM activities	
2009-2011	2009-2011
Substantiation of DRM policies and plans in annual programs and budgets	Integration of DRM and CCA at institutional level
Mechanism to assess disaster resiliency of projects and contribution towards disaster resiliency of communities	Establishment of a National Emergency Operation Center
A shift from conventional emergency response and relief approach to a more comprehensive DRM approach	Development of Risk Sensitive Land Use Planning for Kathmandu Metropolitan City
A network of Emergency Operation Centers throughout Nepal at central and local levels.	Development of Standard Operating Procedures for hospitals, security forces and local communities.

Source: HFA Country progress reports

GFDRR IN NEPAL

72. **GFDRR programming:** In the period of evaluation (2007-2012), GFDRR has implemented five programs in the country: “Hazard Risk Management Program” (2006-2011); “Agricultural Insurance feasibility Study” (2008-2010); “Disaster Risk Management Program” (2010-2013); “City to City Sharing Initiative” (2010-2013) and “Development of South Asia Regional Standard of PDNA” (2010-2013).

73. **Achievements and contributions:** GFDRR has used open source platforms to facilitate the engagement of civil society and local communities in issues relating to DRM, notably the mapping and collecting of seismic risk exposure data for public and private schools including public buildings in the Kathmandu Valley.

74. Coupled with work on hydrometeorological data, GFDRR is seeking to expand the use of open source platforms to enable citizens to feed information into risk assessments and also to receive warnings of impending hazards, thus improving early warning systems. GFDRR contributed to strengthening the institutional set-up by supporting and closely engaging with the NRRC. The Facility has also generated and disseminated information on hazards (notably glacial lakes) and opportunities for agricultural insurance mechanisms, providing a setting for future policy formulation and investments for risk reduction. To complete the assessment of GFDRR contributions at the country level, the evaluation captured further insights on perceptions from key informants on the progress in DRM performance and GFDRR’s role at the country level. By applying the evaluation scoring tool (see Chapter 1 and Annex 2), the results in Table 9 present a quantitative indication of the relevance of GFDRR contributions.

TABLE 9. PROGRESS ON DRM PERFORMANCE AND GFDRR'S ROLE IN NEPAL²⁵

GFDRR M&E PILLARS	PROGRESS ON DRM PERFORMANCE			GFDRR ROLE	
	PROGRESS LEVEL	SCORE	AT NATIONAL OR SUBNATIONAL LEVEL?	RELEVANCE	SCORE
Pillar 1. Improved identification and understanding of disaster risks	Government's understanding and awareness of the importance of issues under this Outcome has increased	 3	National and Subnational	Important	 3
Pillar 2. Avoided creation of new risks and reduced existing risks in society	Government has designed/developed/adopted guidelines/policies/ methodologies regarding issues under this Outcome	 4	Subnational	Important	 3
Pillar 3. Improved warning and management of disasters at national, subnational and community level	Government's understanding and awareness of the importance of issues under this Outcome has increased	 3	National and Subnational	Important	 3
Pillar 4. Increased financial resilience of governments and private sector	A national dialogue has started at Government level regarding this Outcome	 2	National	Partial	 2
Pillar 5. Quicker more resilient recovery	Government's understanding and awareness of the importance of issues under this Outcome has increased	 3	National	Important	 3

75. Overall, in the 2007-2012 period, Nepal appears to have made particular progress under Pillar 2 (Risk Reduction). Pillar 1 (Risk Identification), Pillar 3 (Preparedness) and Pillar 5 (Recovery), and key stakeholders at the national level perceived an important contribution from GFDRR to all these Pillars. The Facility seemed to play some initial role in enhancing financial resilience (Pillar 4), but the country progress in this dimension of DRM is still limited at this stage, although further progress is expected with World Bank support.

76. Enabling factors and obstacles: GFDRR's engagement with the NRRC coordination body has made the Facility's work better known than in other countries. Because much of its work is technical, GFDRR has avoided problems of staff turnover (technical staff are usually less likely to be transferred). It is perhaps its engagement with CSOs, however, that has most facilitated GFDRR's work in Nepal (partnerships with civil society in Kathmandu were fundamental to the mapping of seismic risk in relation to public buildings, notably schools and health facilities).

77. Work on DRM policy has been limited by overall political instability and rapid staff turnover. This also limits the spread of information from one part of government to another. Lack of capacity and limited financial resources in local governments were also obstacles to translate policy into risk mitigation actions (by enforcing building codes, for example). Weak institutional capacities and lack of coordination among relevant government authorities has limited external support. On the other hand, a lack of focus and strategic direction in the interventions promoted by GFDRR has not helped articulate DRM policies from the national level.

²⁵ The score on progress made in DRM performance is based on a scale from 1 to 5, in which (1) represents "no significant progress perceived in attitudes, perceptions or actions regarding this outcome"; (2) represents "a national dialogue has started at government level regarding this outcome"; (3) represents "the government's understanding and awareness of the importance of issues under this outcome has increased"; (4) represents "the government has designed/developed/adopted guidelines/policies/methodologies regarding issues under this outcome"; and (5) represents "an action plan and/or monitoring system/verification mechanism has been implemented by the government." The score on the relevance of the role played by GFDRR is based on a scale from 1 to 5, in which: (1) represents "marginal"; (2) represents "partial"; (3) represents "important"; (4) represents "significant"; and (5) represents "fundamental".

78. Partnership strategy: The Ministry of Home Affairs (responsible for emergency preparedness and disaster management) has been GFDRR's main government partner, while the World Bank has been the main executing partner with regard to coordination of Flagship 3 (Kosi River Basin). GFDRR is now working on a new partnership with the Nepal Red Cross through the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) (this would expand to an unusual degree GFDRR's engagement with CSOs at the country level).

79. Looking ahead: GFDRR has facilitated a wider engagement of public officials, civil society and citizens in decisions relating to disaster management, but this has yet to lead to the implementation of high level policy change. For example, building codes have been improved and at-risk buildings have been identified, but the enforcement of codes remains highly inconsistent. GFDRR has yet to draw together its activities into a coherent strategy in light of the country context and the gaps remaining in the DRM cycle.

ACTIVITIES (IN PROGRAMS)	ACHIEVEMENTS	CONTRIBUTION TO DRM PERFORMANCE	ASSUMPTIONS TEST		STAKEHOLDERS			PILLAR
			OBSTACLES	ENABLING FACTORS	GOV. MAIN PARTNER	OTHER PARTNERS	GFDRR	
(2008-2011) HAZARD RISK MANAGEMENT PROJECT								
National Hazard Risk Assessment (Study, mapping and dissemination)	Analysis of expected damage to property and livelihoods due to relevant hazards. Risk assessment for key sectors. Risk assessment maps at the district level were generated and disseminated at country level workshops Analysis of potential mitigation measures' cost/effectiveness. Provided basic information for other studies. Report disseminated in country level workshop and on MoHA website. All data and maps, available to the public in open format using Geo Node	The study has provided basic information for other studies and influenced planning processes (not followed up by GFDRR), including a better understanding of risk. Improved knowledge on the national risk profile. Improved knowledge sharing practices and lessons learned. Enhanced collaboration with dev. partners through the creation of the NRRC, which has helped to mainstream DRM issues into the dev. agenda.	GFDRR has not followed up systematically on the use or impact of the study. Consultation not wide enough (reduced involvement amongst concerned organisations) High staff turnover in the Gov. had repercussions for the continuity of dialogue and experience with MoHA		MoHA, overall responsible for emergency preparedness and disaster management	World Bank Executed. NRRC has put forward a new study with wider consultation process. The Assessment Steering Committee was formed with MoHA Secretary as chairperson.		1
Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOFs) Study	Assessment of GLOF and Mitigation Study of Potential GLOF lakes in Nepal. The study presented current risks and outlined next steps, further monitoring and interventions needed to reduce GLOF risks in the country. Report disseminated in country level workshop and on NRRC website	GLOF study increased knowledge on this particular risk and encouraged preventive action , which was taken up by UNDP. The study was important in framing climate change priorities of Gov. and donors. Improved knowledge sharing and lessons learned. Potential to minimise the risk of outburst and to reduce the vulnerability of nearby communities while securing the potential benefits of the lakes. Enhanced collaboration with dev. partners through the creation of the NRRC, which has helped to mainstream DRM issues into the dev. agenda.	Lack of in-country expertise lead to contracting of external consulting firm (ICIMOD), which delayed the process. High staff turnover in the Gov. had repercussions for the continuity of dialogue and experience with MoHA	UNDP, implemented prevention works	MoHA, guidance and monitoring of the study	World Bank Executed.	US\$ 914,000. GFDRR Focal point appointed at the end of the program (2011), sitting at WB offices.	1 2
School Seismic Safety Program and Strategy (Risk Assessment, preparedness training and school retrofitting)	Assessment of risk in Kathmandu Valley's (Lamjung and Nawalparasi districts) schools (1381 buildings). Capacity building on risk assessment. 81 Teachers and 4,600 students trained in earthquake preparedness. 60 masons trained on seismic resistant construction techniques. 120 trained on the job. Three schools retrofitted and three schools reconstructed. Report disseminated in country level workshop and on NRRC website.	Improved knowledge sharing and lessons learned. Enhanced collaboration with dev. partners mainly through the creation of the NRRC and the mainstreaming of DRM issues in dev. agenda, construction of school seismic resistant schools and hospitals in Nepal. The Assessment of risk in Kathmandu Valley's (Lamjung and Nawalparasi districts) schools has the potential to inform large scale investment in school construction and retrofitting by the Min. of Education and other dev. partners. Ultimately thi could contribute to significantly reduce risks	Lack of transparency in decision making process might affect prioritisation of schools to be retrofitted. High staff turnover in the Gov. had repercussions for the continuity of dialogue and experience with MoHA	ADB involved in large-scale work in school retrofitting	National Society for Earthquake Technology (NSET), implemented the program. Ministry of Education (in charge of further retrofitting and recipient of report). MoHA, guidance and monitoring	World Bank Executed. WB has developed the Pilot Program for Seismic School Safety in the Kathmandu Valley. PHRD (Japan) provided additional funding for school retrofitting		2 3
Procurement of emergency for preparedness equipment	GFDRR procured and deployed six motorized boats to the areas affected by devastating Kosi river floods due to breach embankment.	Emergency response was provided to areas affected by Kosi river floods.	GFDRR lacked in-house experience in this type of procurement Wider effects on preparedness will not be known as there is no reporting required after the service delivery		MoHA requested GFDRR for the provision of this grant	UNDP implemented the activity		3
(2010-2013) DRM COUNTRY PROGRAM (CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE)								
Hydrometeorological Risk Assessment in the Kosi River Basin	Probabilistic Risk Assessment flood modelling was completed for the entire Kosi River Basin. Training of staff from the hydrometeorological service on flood modelling and implementation of flood modelling. A Community Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) program is now underway.	The Kosi River Basin Assessment has increased knowledge on the works needed to reduce the flooding risks along the Kosi River Basin. Improved knowledge sharing and lessons learned. The Assessment allowed for more efficient targeting of affected and vulnerable populations.	Lack of leadership in river basin management. The role is spread into 3 ministries and across multiple departments. Delays due to long technical review and internal team miscommunication . Lack of strategy direction, diluting the impact of the engagement		Hydrometeorological service (capacity built)	WB is leading the coordination of Flagship 3 Flood management in the Kosi River Basin (umbrella of the assessment). IFRC is the implementing partner of the CBDRM.	US\$ 1,800,000. GFDRR	1 2 3
Open Data on Resilience Initiative	A mapping exercise using Open Street Mapping of two wards in Kathmandu city was produced in collaboration with a local NGO. The information generated by the OSM was developed with local scope (Kathmandu), but there is interest in expanding the methodology to other areas of the country.	The OSM exercise has created the basis for exposure mapping of schools and health facilities. The OSM IN Kathmandu has provided information to enable policy makers to identify schools at risk, allowing for an informed decision making in resources allocation. The information generated is invaluable for search and rescue services. Risk and vulnerability information will be available to the general public (once completed). The OSM tool fosters a participatory approach towards DRM that could improve government's accountability and performance . Technical information and a participatory tool has introduced transparency into policy and participation processes.	Insufficient participation/consultation at the local level limits the extent to which OpenDRI can provide access to data.	Universities' interest in the tool facilitates the expansion in the use of the tool.	Ministry of education (main user of information generated)	NGO (Kathmandu Living Labs), executing partner with involvement from University	GFDRR Focal point (appointed in 2011) is recognised to facilitate the use of studies and negotiate the best possible use of	1
Support on video production for flagship projects	Production of 5 short films (5 NRRC flagship programs) as dissemination material on risk reduction work	Increased public awareness on DRR issues and interventions. Dissemination of NRRC work and achievements is mobilizing interest and support from donor community.		Engagement of the GFDRR focal point in the NRRC has improved WB relations with other DRM actors			GFDRR funding, sitting at WB offices.	1
GeoNode installation and training	GeoNode platform was installed for better access to the National Hazard Risk Assessment produced in 2011.	Improved knowledge sharing practices. Geo Node serves as a key strategic tool to foster collaboration between various government departments working on DRM , including development partners.						1

ACTIVITIES (IN PROGRAMS)	ACHIEVEMENTS	CONTRIBUTION TO DRM PERFORMANCE	ASSUMPTIONS TEST		STAKEHOLDERS			PILLAR
			OBSTACLES	ENABLING FACTORS	GOV. MAIN PARTNER	OTHER PARTNERS	GFDRR	
<i>(FROM PREVIOUS PAGE) (2010-2013) DRM COUNTRY PROGRAM</i>								
Seismic Risk Assessment in the Kathmandu Valley	Study on exposure and vulnerability for public and private buildings was carried out (overall risk assessment to be completed by June 2014). Supported the development of a grant proposal to PHRD Japan for seismic school safety in Kathmandu Valley (7 schools retrofitted by funding leveraged)	Kathmandu city has updated its building code . Helped mobilize external resources (PHRD Japan).	Disconnection between high level policy and practice, leading to lack of enforcement of laws, e.g. building codes. The project implementation was affected by political uncertainty , as new counterparts in MoHA were appointed. Lack of strategic direction, diluting the impact of the engagement					2
CAPRA /PDNA Training	Training on CAPRA /PDNA was organized for (20 participants in each training) government officials and NRRRC members in Kathmandu.	Strengthened government capacities on Risk Assessment methodologies (CAPRA) and PDNA .	Lack of strategic direction, diluting the impact of the engagement					2
Rapid Assessment of the Kosi River flood management infrastructure	Rapid Assessment of the Kosi River flood management infrastructure was carried out to define priority areas of intervention. Findings from the Technical Assessment were shared with the Min. of Irrigation, Department of Water Induced Disaster Prevention (DWIDP), Min. of Finance and Gov. of India. Support from the Gov. of India was mobilized to fund the repairs and strengthening of the Kosi embankment on the Nepal side	Strengthened overall flood risk mitigation on the river Kosi. Facilitated dialogue and engagement between Kosi basin's infrastructure actors: Min. of Irrigation, DWIDP, Min. of Finance and Gov. of India	Separation of government departments into competing units , in the Kosi basin at least four major Gov. depts. have a stake in DRM issues. Lack of strategic direction, diluting the impact of the engagement			WB is leading the coordination of Flagship 3 Flood management in the Kosi River basin (umbrella of Kosi River Flood management)	US\$1,800,000. GFDRR Focal point (appointed in 2011) is recognised to facilitate the use of studies and negotiate the best possible use of GFDRR funding, sitting at WB offices.	2
Procurement of emergency equipment	Emergency equipment for flood and earthquake disaster search and rescue was provided .				Min. of Home Affairs prioritized the equipment list			2
Strengthening of hydrometeorological services and design of flood early warning system	Capacity of the hydromet on the design of early warning systems was built . Foreseen development of CBDRM project , lead by ICRC with an approach on linking up with local authorities.	GFDRR support to the hydrometeorological services has facilitated the data produced by this department becoming available and reaching the end users, helping to build the case to decision makers (Min. of Finance) on the usefulness of the data provided by this institution and creating added value to the current existing in-country resources by streamlining current processes and data collection equipment. Enhanced government flood management capacities in the Kosi basin.	Lack of follow up on the implementation phase of EWS.	High commitment of specialized staff leads to increased retention levels and favours sustainability of technical trainings	Hydrometeorological services (Min. of Science, Technology and Environment)	WB: the training is intended to support the development of WB's Pilot program for Climate resilience		3
(2008-2010) AGRICULTURAL INSURANCE FEASIBILITY STUDY								
Feasibility study of agricultural insurance program	The framework for the development of sustainable agricultural insurance was developed.	Agricultural Insurance Feasibility study was widely discussed and contributed to the understanding of what mechanisms to use, and helped the GoN to recognize the institutional challenges that need to be addressed. The report provided the framework for agricultural insurance policy formulation . Government included agricultural insurance as part of their 2009/2010 budget policy framework .	Technical assistance and facilitation was provided, however GFDRR recognized that sufficient budget estimates should be made for any envisaged demonstrations that might follow studies of this nature. None of the outcomes of the program were accomplished because there was lack of follow up funding on implementing the pilots.		Ministry of Agriculture and Min. of Finance (interested Gov. stakeholders)	Executed by WB technical experts.	US\$100,000. No country focal point at the time of the program.	4
(2010-2013) CITY TO CITY SHARING INITIATIVE								
City to city sharing initiative (training)	Kathmandu city officials met and exchanged land use planning practices with counterparts from Makati (Philippines) and Quito (Ecuador)	No significant outcome on building code enforcement, despite much learning and discussion on the topic	Transfer and change of officials trained .				US\$495,000. GFDRR Focal point, appointed in 2011, sitting at WB offices.	2
(2011) PDNA REGIONAL STANDARDS- BANK EXECUTED								
Regional training on PDNA (SAARC DMC led)	Regional training on PDNA methodology (25 officials, 8 countries, 5 days) was developed, but countries decided that they should first define their national standards before creating regional standards.	GFDRR helped to get this important agenda dialogue on PDNA started, <u>however further follow up</u> is needed.	Lack of institutional capacities and standards at national level delays the development of Regional level Standards. SAARC considered a good regional organization but needs further institutional strengthening .			Executed by WB technical experts. SAARC DMC, partner in implementation	US\$100,000. GFDRR Focal point, appointed in 2011, sitting at WB offices.	5

2.4 SRI LANKA

NATIONAL AND DRM CONTEXT

80. **National context:** Sri Lanka has recently emerged from a long period of civil war with a strong central government and a growing economy. DRM is not decentralized but rather entrusted to national government agents who are placed at the sub-national level. Several challenges need to be addressed in Sri Lanka in order to implement DRM effectively, challenges which the national government has recognized as priority. These include developing locally accountable governments, establishing of mechanisms that enable citizens to participate in local dialogue and involving civil society in DRM. GFDRR's work on open source data is particularly relevant to these issues.


81. **Disaster risk:** Although Sri Lanka was one of the countries hit the worst by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the probability of further tsunamis is relatively low. Localized and seasonal floods, landslides, cyclones and droughts are common, however. With predicted increases in temperatures and decreases in rainfall, climate change is expected to amplify the potential impact of disasters. The frequency and intensity of Hydrometeorological hazards has shown an increasing trend over the past two decades. Floods have been the most recurrent event with the highest number of affected people during the study period.²⁶ Sri Lanka's diversity in geography and climate, together with high population density and concentrated economic activities in flood-prone and exposed coastal areas make the country particularly vulnerable to climate variability and change. Large and recurrent economic losses resulting from extreme and cumulative events (e.g., cyclical droughts every three to four years) pose serious challenges to the country's development. Risk of loss and damage has become more prominent because of the expansion of the economy and the rapid development of infrastructure.

82. Figure 7 presents a timeline of GFDRR interventions at the country level in the context of the timing of extreme events, policy processes led by the government and the World Bank's main operations in connection to the GFDRR portfolio.

²⁶ Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, Emergency Events Database (EM DAT): The International Disaster Database, 2014, <http://www.emdat.be/> (accessed April 25, 2014)

Figure 7. Timeline of GFDRR Interventions in Sri Lanka

SRI LANKA



(*) Sri Lanka OpenDRI : to be launched publicly in 2014

▶ National policy documents launched ▶ Hazardous events ▲ GFDRR outputs — GFDRR programs — WB Projects

83. DRM institutional setting: In the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami a Select Committee was established to assess the country's preparedness. Based on the committee's recommendations, the Sri Lanka Disaster Management Act was enacted in May 2005, raising the profile of DRM in the political agenda. The National Council for Disaster Management (NCDM) was established as the national body for DRM coordination and monitoring, with the president as Chairperson. The Ministry of Disaster Management was created to fulfill the leadership role and the Disaster Management Center (DMC) was set as the DRM executing agency. The NDMCC includes over 70 stakeholders and meets regularly. Despite formal mechanisms (such as the establishment of District Disaster Management Officials), some key informants reported that the local governments are not fully integrated into DRM structures and communities and that NGOs only play a limited role. The Disaster Management Center (DMC) is GFDRR's main partner in Sri Lanka.

84. In order to provide a frame of reference for the DRM context in which GFDRR has operated during the evaluation period, Table 11 shows the main DRM challenges in Sri Lanka since 2007 and progress made (as reported in the HFA National Progress Reports).

TABLE 11. MAIN CHALLENGES AND PROGRESS IN DRM IN SRI LANKA

CHALLENGES	PROGRESS
2007-2009	2007-2009
To improve information sharing	Increasing access to safe drinking water
To undertake awareness programs	Development of a Roadmap for DRM
To increase collaboration between Disaster Management Council and other sectors	Strengthening capacity of local governments
To increase enforcement of risk mitigation measures	Trainings for DRM awareness in schools
To increase community involvement in post disaster recovery planning	Trainings for DRM mainstreaming in urban development plans
2009-2011	2009-2011
Database for disasters information	Agreement between the DMC and technical agencies for the preparation of Hazard Maps
Formal focal point for DRM	
Improvement of stakeholder participation in the NDMCC	
Review and update of DRM plans	Training of public officials (at national and district level) and communities in the use of risk maps and data
Educational material on DRM	
Strengthening human resources for DRM	
2011-2013	2011-2013
Mechanism for DRM information sharing	Methodology for vulnerability and risk mapping
Involvement of Provincial Councils in DM activities	Completion of the final draft of the Disaster Management Act and the inclusion of DRM concerns in the Local Government Act
Mechanism to monitor and evaluate DM activities	Development of Hazard Calendars for 25 districts
Lack of trained professionals for the DM sector	Disaster Preparedness Plans for 16 districts, 77 divisions and a large number of villages

Source: HFA Country progress reports

GFDRR IN SRI LANKA

85. **GFDRR programming:** In the period of evaluation (2007-2012), GFDRR has implemented three programs in the country: “Improving Sri Lanka’s Response and Recovery (2008-2011)”, “Post Disaster Needs Assessment Technical Assistance (2010-2012)” and “Mainstreaming DRM in Sri Lanka (2011-2014)”. Activities implemented under these programs included trainings for public officials, the development of manuals and DRM tools (in particular data management packages and risk modeling) and technical assistance. Details on program activities provided in the Country Analysis Table (see Table 13).

86. **Achievements and contributions:** As a result of these activities, GFDRR has made a contribution to developing the capacities of the Disaster Management Center (DMC) and transferred information management technology (on hydrology modeling of flood risk in Colombo, in particular). The open-source approach of the tools used (e.g., Open Street Mapping, OSM, GeoNode and Central American Probabilistic Risk Assessment, CAPRA) has contributed to enhancing communications between government departments and opened opportunities for knowledge sharing. The Integrated Post Flood Assessment (using DaLA, methodology) carried out after May 2010 floods. Following this assessment, the National Council for Disaster Management passed a Council Paper, mandating the Disaster Management Center to coordinate carrying out

post disaster assessments following every major disaster (events affecting more than 50,000 people). However, the government agencies did not have sufficient capacity to carry out a post disaster assessment after floods in 2011. Although PDNA methodology was not adopted by the government, by partially applying it with World Bank technical support, GFDRR contributed to raising awareness on disaster losses and needs across government institutions, which helped build the case for risk mitigation investments and mainstreaming risk reduction across government activities. Notably, since the appointment of its national focal point, GFDRR helped create an enabling environment for political engagement and discussion of policy and regulatory frameworks for DRM (both sector-specific like social protection and of a broader scope, notably the Natural Disaster Guidelines for Safety Response and the operational manual of the disaster management fund). To complete the assessment of GFDRR contributions at the country level, the evaluation captured further insights on perceptions from key informants on progress in DRM performance and GFDRR's role at the country level. By applying the evaluation scoring tool (see Chapter 1 and Annex 2), results in Table 12 present an assessment of the relevance of GFDRR contributions.

TABLE 12. PROGRESS IN DRM PERFORMANCE AND GFDRR'S ROLE IN SRI LANKA²⁷

GFDRR M&E PILLARS	PROGRESS ON DRM PERFORMANCE			GFDRR ROLE	
	PROGRESS LEVEL	SCORE	AT NATIONAL OR SUBNATIONAL LEVEL?	RELEVANCE	SCORE
Pillar 1. Improved identification and understanding of disaster risks	Government has designed/developed/adopted guidelines/policies/ methodologies regarding issues under this Outcome	 4	Subnational (Batticaloa) and National	Significant	 4
Pillar 2. Avoided creation of new risks and reduced existing risks in society	Government has designed/developed/adopted guidelines/policies/ methodologies regarding issues under this Outcome	 4	Subnational	Significant	 4
Pillar 3. Improved warning and management of disasters at national, subnational and community level	Government's understanding and awareness of the importance of issues under this Outcome has increased	 3	Subnational	Partial	 2
Pillar 4. Increased financial resilience of governments and private sector	A national dialogue has started at Government level regarding this Outcome	 2	National	Important	 3
Pillar 5. Quicker more resilient recovery	Government's understanding and awareness of the importance of issues under this Outcome has increased	 3	National	Partial	 2

87. Overall, in the period 2007-2012, Sri Lanka appears to have made particular progress under Pillar 1 (Risk Identification) and Pillar 2 (Risk Reduction). Key stakeholders at the national level perceived a significant contribution from GFDRR in these pillars. The Facility is also perceived as playing an important role in promoting financial resilience (Pillar 4), but further progress in this dimension of DRM is still needed.

88. **Enabling factors and obstacles:** GFDRR's close engagement with the DMC helped connect different areas of intervention, particularly risk identification and risk reduction. The relationship with UN agencies (such as UNDP and UN-Habitat) has facilitated complementarities with other DRM processes at the local government level, while GFDRR focused on information technology and strengthening DRM capacities at the national level. The close partnership with World Bank, with large-scale operations in Sri Lanka, has contributed to position GFDRR at the national level. On the other hand, the government's centralized approach does not favor the decentralization of DRM resources and limits the engagement of local government and civil society (as reported by key informants). Information sharing and communication between government

²⁷ The score on progress made in DRM performance is based on a scale from 1 to 5, in which (1) represents "no significant progress perceived in attitudes, perceptions or actions regarding this outcome"; (2) represents "a national dialogue has started at government level regarding this outcome"; (3) represents "the government's understanding and awareness of the importance of issues under this outcome has increased"; (4) represents "the government has designed/developed/adopted guidelines/policies/methodologies regarding issues under this outcome"; and (5) represents "an action plan and/or monitoring system/verification mechanism has been implemented by the government." The score on the relevance of the role played by GFDRR is based on a scale from 1 to 5, in which: (1) represents "marginal"; (2) represents "partial"; (3) represents "important"; (4) represents "significant"; and (5) represents "fundamental".

levels is often poor, thus limiting the extent to which the positive effects of GFDRR contributions (made at national level) can effectively trickle down to the sub-national level. The application of PDNA methodology led to the engagement and empowerment of the Ministry of Finance in DRM, but some key informants reported a lack of ownership in PDNA developments (overliant on consultants and not sufficiently integrated in national processes). In fact, some stakeholders felt excluded from relevant DRM processes (e.g., the development of a Disaster Management Fund that does not include line Ministries).

89. **Partnership strategy:** GFDRR has been working mainly in collaboration with technical institutions (DMC, Sri Lanka Land Reclamation and Development Corporation, SLLRDC, and Survey Department), but has also sought involvement of higher levels of decision-making (National Planning Department, Ministry of Finance) through the use of PDNA methodologies. The Facility has provided significant support to a large World Bank operation (Metro Colombo Urban Development Project) by introducing flood modeling technology to inform prioritization of investments.

90. **Looking ahead:** Beyond the specific contributions linked to Pillars, according to the findings of the evaluation, GFDRR seems to also have played a role in facilitating policy processes and interactions, in particular through its national focal point. All contributions together have put the government in a better position to prioritize areas of action in DRM.

ACTIVITIES (IN PROGRAMS)	ACHIEVEMENTS	CONTRIBUTION TO DRM PERFORMANCE	ASSUMPTIONS TEST		PARTNERS			PILLAR
			OBSTACLES	ENABLING FACTORS	GOV. MAIN PARTNER	OTHER PARTNERS	GFDRR	
(2008-2011) IMPROVING SRI LANKA'S RESPONSE AND RECOVERY IN THE AFTERMATH OF NATURAL DISASTER								
Training on public institutions' mandates related to DRR	Capacity built at the DMC on public institutions' mandates related to disasters.	Potential for decentralisation of capacities on DRR, however still not formally crystallized. Increased understanding of institutional responsibilities in case of disaster.	Need of by-laws further enforcement (no clear evidence). Decentralisation would also need to be crystallized through resource decentralisation . No clear mechanism for communities to reach the district level, there is little place for advocacy in a very top-down approach.	UN agencies (UN-HABITAT and UNDP) operating at decentralised level	DMC (received training)			2
Technical assessment on social protection programs and disasters (background papers, policy recommendations, guidelines on addressing social needs of disaster affected families)	Social Protection Strategy drafted (SPS) (including disaster situations) and presented by Dept of National Planning. Natural Disaster Guidelines for Safety Net response in Sri Lanka developed. Assessment of the effectiveness of Sri Lanka main social safety net 'Samurdhi' (survey and report). Workshop on protecting the Poor in Sri Lanka developed to present and discuss design and implementation of social safety nets.	The Dept of National Planning presented a Social protection strategy (SPS) (including disaster situations) but further evidence on the implementation of an action plan was not available. Increased understanding of safety net development in the Min. of Finance and Min. of Disaster Management (discussion sessions and workshops).			GoSL officials gave support for background papers: Min. of Disaster Management, Min. of Nation Building (Samurdhi), Min. of Resettlement, Min. of Social Services and Welfare. Min. of Finance and MDM received technical advisory services.	UNDP partner as major player in this field. The activity was closely coordinated with the WB Sustainable Development Group.	US\$162,770. GFDRR Focal point (in country as of May 2010), sitting at WB Office.	4
Operational Manual for the Disaster Management Fund (DMF)	Operational Manual for the Disaster Management Fund (DMF) developed.	The manual triggered discussions on social protection issues at the government level and helped clarify responsibilities in case of disaster.	Min. of Finance ruled out any other line ministries in setting up funds and blocked the process (previously envisaged to be done under Min. of Disaster Management).		Min. of Finance and Min. of Disaster Management	UNDP partner as major player in this field. The activity was closely coordinated with the WB Sustainable Development Group.		4
(2010-2012) POST DISASTER NEEDS ASSESSMENT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE								
PDNA Technical Assistance	Capacity built on PDNA methodology, however not yet formally adopted. Knowledge exchanges were organised (South Africa and Thailand). The integrated Post Flood Assessment was successfully carried out for the first time in Sri Lanka. Mainstreaming of DRM program followed the PDNA. PDNA methodology was introduced at government level (DMC), however more training is still required but less complex and timely methods are demanded.	The National Council for Disaster Management approved the use of PDNA methodology for all natural disasters affecting more than 50000 people. PDNA methodology increased the knowledge and of the economic impact of disasters. Awareness on disaster losses and needs was raised through government institutions. PDNA methodology was introduced at government level (DMC). Government reverted to simpler DaLA methodology. PDNA is considered useful for 10 year planning / strategy to assess what resources are needed.	Process centred around consultants , capacity building insufficient at the government level (GFDRR technical assessment is required and less complex methods are requested). Costly and time consuming process. Lack of ownership of the methodology, not integrated in post disaster processes. Government (DMC) is uncertain about the PDNA approach (usefulness, complexity, replicability). Data collection phase was very complex , and it is foreseen (GFDRR staff) to evolve into a Data preparedness program to identify data needed to prepare Loss and Damage assessments as needed (more practical approach). Key lesson learned, the relevance of involvement of Min. of Finance in the PDNA process. Government staff mentioned lack of follow up from GFDRR on further implementation, so it became an ad-hoc program for a particular event (2010 floods), not used in further 2011 floods. Disagreement on the leadership / approach between institutions (DMC/ Min. Finance).	Leadership capacity of the National Planning Department (NPD), Min. of Finance , engaged with GFDRR to lead the next process on implementation of PDNA.	DMC and NPD officials were trained in the methodology, and foreseen as coordinators of next phase. NPD (Min. of Finance) envisaged as process leaders for next phase of PDNA process.	The WB took the leadership in carrying out the PDNA, mobilizing resources, coordinating donors, delivering training and promoting the PDNA. Development of WB Metro Colombo Urban Development Project was leveraged by PDNA, amongst other factors.	US\$62,519. GFDRR Focal point (in country as of May 2010), sitting at WB Office.	5

ACTIVITIES (IN PROGRAMS)	ACHIEVEMENTS	CONTRIBUTION TO DRM PERFORMANCE	ASSUMPTIONS TEST		PARTNERS			PILLAR
			OBSTACLES	ENABLING FACTORS	GOV. MAIN PARTNER	OTHER PARTNERS	GFDRR	
(2011-2014) MAINSTREAMING DRM IN SRI LANKA								
Sri Lanka Open Data for Resilience project: Training in GeoNode Technical assistance from GFDRR experts	35 people Trained in Risk Assessment (CAPRA) and 20 people in Risk data sharing (GeoNode) Three GeoNodes were installed (DMC, Survey department; Dept of Census and Statistics). Open source (powered by GeoNode) disaster risk information data sharing platform established to identify priority areas of action towards risk reduction (www. riskinfo.lk) planned to be launched publicly in 2014	GFDRR has included National Spatial Data Infrastructure (NSDI) as one of the prior actions in the Cat DDO and the Cabinet has passed a paper approving the establishment of the NSDI. . Potential to support planning to reduce disaster risk. Data platform is expected to facilitate the sharing of disaster risk information in map formats to all the stakeholders to identify priority areas of action enabling effective disaster risk management (planned to be launched publicly in 2014). Disaster Data Working group at the government level was established fostering institutionalization of data sharing. The use of open source software contributed to wider accessibility of DRR information.	Certain reluctance of Gov. departments to share information that could populate the open source platform. Strong central authority encourages competition and poor communication between departments and ministries. Lack of centre pressure to share information and unlock the technology's full potential.	-	DMC and Survey department were trained GeoNode was installed in DMC, Survey dept; Dept of Census and Statistics			1
Disaster exposure mapping with Open Street Map (training and software provision)	30 GIS professionals trained in OSM tool. Exposure mapping pilot study developed in Batticaloa. Capacity built in the Survey Department on the OSM tool. Exposure information generated to feed into the Risk Info data platform. Potential to support search and rescue operations (maps previously inaccessible) and for city planning purposes. OSM tool is generating community participation and collaboration with the university.	Open Street Mapping (OSM) envisaged as a good tool for DMC as coordination agency , allowing for collaboration. OSM software identified by Survey department as an additional tool for exposure mapping , as the pilot study in Batticaloa will allow for planning and prioritisation. Access to mapping across government departments (open source). OSM is considered relevant for administrators at the city level because <u>it will</u> allow fine scaling disaster risk assessment .	The focal point for DMC is usually the Government Agent (no direct collaboration with the municipal government). OSM is a tool that helps to capture physical vulnerability, however it is not useful for capturing non-physical vulnerability (limitation).	UNDP has performed hazard mapping in Batticaloa required for the risk assessment	DMC and Survey department was trained. Gov. officials have showed interest in expanding OSM to other exposed locations.		US\$1,430,000 GFDRR Focal point (in country as of May 2010), sitting at WB Office.	1
Development of hydrological and hydraulic model for Metro Colombo (skills training and technical assistance on modelling, LIDAR survey, review of flood mitigation designs, assessment of effectiveness of mitigation activities)	Technology has been transferred to the SLLRDC to be used independently for future modelling. Capacity has been built (6 engineers) on modelling techniques within the SLLRDC and the Colombo Municipal Council. Technical assistance lead to the development of hydrological and hydraulic flood model for Metro Colombo. Preparatory studies for Metro Colombo Urban Development project-WB developed. Flood maps have been produced as a product of the model implementation (with further calibration and validation).	Potential to help integrate flood risks across government activities. There's a Gov. commitment to demarcate water retention areas from development. Having SLLRDC has government partner with national scope , will allow for further expansion of methodology. The modelling has provided the technical information that allowed to prioritize improvement works on Colombo's canal system, allowing as well for a more efficient usage of resources (more cost-effective solutions). Government officials are very keen on the usefulness of the model and its additional uses to model other hazards (droughts). The model contributed to fund mobilization for DRM action (WB MCUDP and PHRD grant for a comprehensive risk assessment integrating exposure and vulnerability information).	High data collection requirements (time consuming/complex) could be a problem when implementing the model for other cities/regions in Sri Lanka (is the case for the other 3 local authorities of Metro Colombo). There is the risk that trained engineers tend to transfer to the private sector (reducing the capacity built of the government).	UNDP has performed a national Hazard profile that provided inputs for the Metro Colombo hydrological model This project helped leverage a PHRD grant (Japanese) to carry out a detailed flood risk assessment for Metro Colombo region (including other three local authority areas apart from Colombo)	Sri Lanka Land Reclamation & Development Corporation (SLLRDC), Min. Of Defence and Urban Development, Colombo Municipal Council and Urban Development Authority	The WB provided the consultants to help SLLRDC and CMC to develop the hydrological and hydraulic model.		2


2.5 VIETNAM

NATIONAL AND DRM CONTEXT IN WHICH GFDRR OPERATES

91. **National context:** Vietnam has a strong central government inherited from a centrally planned economy. Development processes are state-led (including DRM agendas) and the institutional setting for DRM at the local level is restrained. The country's private sector and CSOs are under development. Vietnam has recently graduated from the Lower Income Country (LIC) category and is now considered as a lower-middle-income economy. The country is now eligible for World Bank loans and operations are no longer exclusively International Development Association (IDA) grants. The national debt has become a political issue and the government is prudent in assuming financial risk with new loans.

92. **Disaster risk:** Vietnam is considered one of the most disaster prone countries in the world, especially as regards to climate change impacts (extreme weather and slow onset events). Hydrometeorological hazards (flooding and storms) and sea level rise are the most important concerns. High exposure of the population and assets, particularly in coastal areas, combined with high levels of vulnerability make disasters a common occurrence in the country, ranging from high impact/low recurrence to low impact/high recurrence events. Of particular concern are damage and loss of critical infrastructures, such as rural and main roads, irrigation systems, schools and hospitals, and loss to crops in major production areas of central and southern Vietnam. Urban risk is also increasing as a result of growing rates of urbanization and greater exposure of people and assets. Vietnam is one of the fastest growing economies in the world.

Figure 8. Timeline of GFDRR Interventions in Vietnam²⁸



²⁸ Note: According to EM-DAT, 34 floods and storms events occurred in Vietnam in the period (2007-2012). These extreme events have not been represented in the figure for the sake of clarity.

93. **DRM institutional context:** Vietnam is generally credited with good progress in relation to DRM but lacks the resources to address all the different dimensions. Among the major advances achieved in DRM over the last five years are the government's Disaster Risk Strategy for the period up to 2020 and its implementation plan. A disaster law came into effect in May 1st 2014 together with a hydromet law. The Community Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) program initiated by the government in 2009 is scheduled to continue at least up to 2020 (this works with 6,000 more disaster prone communes in the country). DRM in Vietnam has attracted substantial international funding, with the World Bank being the largest contributor by far.

94. In order to provide a frame of reference for the DRM context in which GFDRR has operated during the evaluation period, Table 14 shows the main DRM challenges in Vietnam since 2007 and progress made (as reported in the HFA National Progress Reports).

TABLE 14. MAIN CHALLENGES AND PROGRESS IN DRM IN VIETNAM

CHALLENGES	PROGRESS
2007-2009	2007-2009
Prevention, forecasting, early warning and rehabilitation not effectively and professionally implemented	Developed and promulgated relevant legal documents for natural disaster prevention, response and mitigation
Coordination system for DRM in Vietnam not comprehensive and consistent	Development and decentralization of responsibilities in DRR activities
Lack of adequate funds causing limited capacity building for staff working in DRR sector	Approved National Strategy for Natural Disaster Prevention, Response and Mitigation to 2020
Not enough attention paid to integration of DRR into post disaster recovery and rehabilitation	Almost all ministries and provincial governments developed DRR action plans
	Implemented awareness raising workshops and forums
2009-2011	2009-2011
Need for improved intersectoral coordination and more coherent, integrated and structured approach towards DRM planning	Recognition in policy documents that rural poor and vulnerable populations disproportionately affected and DRM/DRR measures prioritized for more disaster prone areas
Need for sufficient financial and human resources to implement plans	
Gaps and overlap in areas between DRR and climate change activities	
Need for addressing gaps in capacity	
Lack of legal framework for post-disaster reconstruction	
Insufficient resources for post-disaster livelihood recovery programs and lack of consultation with affected communities	Recognition of the need to include communities and particular groups in governance and decisionmaking

Source: HFA Country progress reports

GFDRR IN VIETNAM

95. **GFDRR programming:** In the period of evaluation (2007-2012), GFDRR has implemented three programs in the country: "Hazard Risk Management Institutional Development- Phase I" (2008-2010)", "DRM Capacity Building Program- Phase II" (2010-2013)" and "DRM Capacity Building Program- Phase III" (2011-2014). The details of activities within programs are provided in the Country Analysis Table (see Table 16).

96. **Achievements and contributions:** GFDRR's main contribution to DRM can be divided into two types. Firstly, GFDRR has facilitated the consideration of DRM in public infrastructure investments funded by the World Bank by conducting studies to identify climate and disaster risk reduction measures. In some cases, the studies resulted in changes to the original investment plans (for example, better winterization of animals in the northern mountains). In other cases, the risk screening analysis was made available to the government to inform decision making and priority setting. The other main type of achievement arises from direct support to the government, leading to tangible improvements in the area of disaster preparedness.

97. To complete the assessment of GFDRR contributions at the country level, the evaluation captured further insights on perceptions from key informants on progress in DRM performance and GFDRR's role at the country level. By applying the evaluation scoring tool (see Chapter 1 and Annex 2), the results in Table 15 present a quantitative indication of the relevance of GFDRR contributions.

TABLE 15. PROGRESS ON DRM PERFORMANCE AND GFDRR'S ROLE IN VIETNAM²⁹

GFDRR M&E PILLARS	PROGRESS ON DRM PERFORMANCE			GFDRR ROLE	
	PROGRESS LEVEL	SCORE	AT NATIONAL OR SUBNATIONAL LEVEL?	RELEVANCE	SCORE
Pillar 1. Improved identification and understanding of disaster risks	Government's understanding and awareness of the importance of issues under this Outcome has increased	 3	Subnational	Important	 3
Pillar 2. Avoided creation of new risks and reduced existing risks in society	Government's understanding and awareness of the importance of issues under this Outcome has increased	 3	National and Subnational	Partial	 2
Pillar 3. Improved warning and management of disasters at national, subnational and community level	Government's understanding and awareness of the importance of issues under this Outcome has increased	 3	National and Subnational	Significant	 4
Pillar 4. Increased financial resilience of governments and private sector	A national dialogue has started at Government level regarding this Outcome	 2	National	Partial	 2
Pillar 5. Quicker more resilient recovery	Non Applicable		Non Applicable	Non Applicable	

98. GFDRR funded studies made significant contributions to risk screening (Pillar 1), which led to changes in some original investments (see above), to risk-proofing the design of some public infrastructures funded by the World Bank (e.g., water sanitation systems and road networks) and more recently, to the formulation of a new World Bank operation (the Ho Chi Minh City, HCMC, Flood Risk Management Project, beyond the time-scope of the evaluation). However, a number of informants from government institutions suggested that risk-proofing options and technical proposals identified by GFDRR studies would have led to further improvements in risk reduction when better tailored to the country context, that is, when less costly and less challenging to implement. The perceptions of these informants captured by the evaluation explain the relatively lower score given to Pillar 2 (Risk Reduction). The risk assessment studies often provided the Bank and the government with analysis of risks but, usually for budgetary reasons, the government adopted only a small part of the recommendations or postponed action until more funding might be available. The HCMC Environmental Sanitation Project Phase II is an exception: the design of a wastewater plant and interceptor system in district 2 has incorporated flood proofing measures from the risk screening study. In the case of disaster insurance (Pillar 4), the government welcomed the "Weathering the Storm" report (an analysis of fiscal risk profile and budgetary arrangements with proposals on sovereign cat-financing which helped trigger dialogue) but considered that the private insurance sector needed more time to develop before significant progress could be made. Risk insurance has been included in the DRM law and the policy dialogue is ongoing, with GFDRR technical support.

99. **Enabling factors and obstacles:** A number of actors from the international community have proven understanding of and commitment to the climate risk management agenda in Vietnam. This has led to opportunities for co-financing with the Korean Green Growth Institute, the UK Department for International Development's (DFID) climate change funds, the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), among others.

²⁹ The score on progress made in DRM performance is based on a scale from 1 to 5, in which (1) represents "no significant progress perceived in attitudes, perceptions or actions regarding this outcome"; (2) represents "a national dialogue has started at government level regarding this outcome"; (3) represents "the government's understanding and awareness of the importance of issues under this outcome has increased"; (4) represents "the government has designed/developed/adopted guidelines/policies/methodologies regarding issues under this outcome"; and (5) represents "an action plan and/or monitoring system/verification mechanism has been implemented by the government." The score on the relevance of the role played by GFDRR is based on a scale from 1 to 5, in which: (1) represents "marginal"; (2) represents "partial"; (3) represents "important"; (4) represents "significant"; and (5) represents "fundamental".

100. On the other hand, prioritization of resources is challenging for the government, considering the geographical scope and the extent of the different climate and disaster risks the country faces. The government is not always in a position to adopt the risk-proofing recommendations in GFDRR reports: these were considered to be either too costly or not technically adjusted to the context. Communication among government departments is sometimes an obstacle, but GFDRR maintains an open dialogue to keep the recommendations from its reports on the agenda. In the case of risk insurance, for example, regular follow up by technical staff has kept recommendations from GFDRR technical assistance alive and may lead to implementation in due course.

101. **Partnership strategy:** GFDRR has developed a strong partnership in relation to the World Bank and has supported a disaster perspective in a range of infrastructure investments. The national focal point seeks to develop a stronger integration of DRM in the World Bank portfolio and also to develop a wider dialogue with the government around risk identification and reduction. It is still GFDRR's work on disaster preparedness that is particularly welcomed by the government.

102. **Looking ahead:** Although the government is already active in relation to disaster preparedness, the key challenge for GFDRR is to find ways to ensure a consistent and effective implementation of risk-proofing and climate resilience measures into development projects, including public investments financed by the World Bank, bearing in mind the government's resource priorities and constraints. There will also be scope to support concrete action in relation to risk insurance at an appropriate time.

ACTIVITIES (IN PROGRAMS)	ACHIEVEMENTS	CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL DRM PERFORMANCE	ASSUMPTIONS TEST		PARTNERSHIPS AND ROLES			PILLAR
			OBSTACLES	ENABLING FACTORS	GOV. MAIN PARTNER	OTHER PARTNERS	GFDRR	
(2008-2010) HAZARD RISK MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT								
The CRC Primer in three cities of Ha Noi, Can Tho and Dong Hoi	Inception workshop held to launch CRC Primer. A Workbook to guide the development of LRAP for Vietnam delivered to CCFSC. Initial LRAP for the pilot cities of Ha Noi, Can Tho and Dong Hoi developed and handed over to cities.	A new national policy framework for DRM and Climate Change facilitates the implementation of DRR plans at the local level, according to GFDRR documents			CCFSC main partner. Local authorities agreed to pilot the LRAP development. MARD and MONRE also coordinated the activity.	WB executed. Synergies with the Coastal Cities Environmental Sanitation Project.		2
Assessment of potential impact of climate changes in three coastal cities of Dong Hoi, Quy Nhon and Nha Trang	Climate impact and risk assessment of the drainage system design in coastal cities of Dong Hoi, Quy Nhon and Nha Trang completed and handed over to Gov. Hydrological modelling for Cai river in Nha Trang city of Khanh Hoa province completed and handed over to Gov.	The report functioned as a climate risk screening facilitating the clearance the WB funded Coastal Cities Environmental Sanitation Project.	Climate proofing options for urban infrastructure considered too costly to be adopted. Alternative less costly options not considered. Reliance on international expertise to monitor modelling may have limited the ownership of the process by the Gov.		CCFSC	WB executed. Assessments informed the Coastal Cities Environmental Sanitation Project.		1
Risk assessment in the six Northern Mountainous provinces	Quick disaster risk assessment carried out in 6 target provinces of NMPPR II. Guidelines on DRM integration into NMPPR II sub-projects developed. The Project Appraisal Document of NMPPR II incorporating disaster mitigation activities approved. M&E system for NMPPR II including disaster risk reduction indicators designed.	The report functioned as a climate risk screening facilitating the clearance the NMPPR II project. The report informed WB team on DRM issues around the project.	Climate proofing options for urban infrastructure considered too costly to be adopted by the Government. Alternative less costly options not considered.		MPI	WB executed. It informed the NMPPR II project.	US\$ 950,000	1
Public Campaign to advocate for CBDRM approach	18-month campaign on DRR conducted targeting Vietnamese population: Video aired several times on local tv, a TV-based Panel Discussion on CBDRM, a photo contest held.	Increasing public awareness on DRM issues and Gov. agenda. DRM activity in Vietnam has increased and Gov. endorsed to the National CBDRM program. Dissemination of DRM actions at the Global DRR Platform in Geneva. Increasing policy dialogue on DRM with NGOs, donors and local authorities. Mobilization of funds for DRM (GFDRR grants)			CCFSC	World Bank executed.		2
Study on Risk Financing options: "Weathering the storm: Options for disaster risk financing in Vietnam"	Report on Sovereign Financial Protection against Natural Disasters for Vietnam produced with participation of the MoF. Report includes an analysis of fiscal risk profile and budgetary arrangements with proposals on sovereign cat-financing. Ongoing technical input from GFDRR.	Engagement of MoF in DRM dialogue and integration of risk transfer tools and options in the legislative framework (DRM Law). The report is being used as a model in other countries in the region.	Private insurance sector to be more developed before significant progress can be made		MoF, CCFSC, and the National HydroMeteorological Services also contributed to the report.	WB executed.		4
(2010-2013) DRM CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAM—PHASE II (CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE)								
Training courses in support of CBDRM. Conferences, workshops	CBDRM training materials elaborated and a series of training courses organized for both national and provincial officials.	<i>Project recently implemented, information about results not yet available.</i>			MARD		US\$ 300,000. GFDRR focal point at WB offices	3
Developing Robust Flood Defenses for HCMC	A decision making tool for flood risk management was developed. A high-tech report on risk-proofing options was produced.	The report functioned as a climate risk screening facilitating the clearance of the HCMC Environmental Sanitation Project and unblocking funds. The report has been presented in WB fora.	Limited appropriation of the report at Gov. level: proposals were considered too sophisticated and not adjusted to budgets or political preferences.	The study attracted the interest of the Korean Green Growth Institute, that provided co-financing (\$ 210,000).	HCMC Steering Center of Urban Flood Control	WB - HCMC Environmental Sanitation Project -executed.	US\$ 143,795. GFDRR focal point at WB offices	1
Riverbank Erosion Study for the Vu Gia – Thu Bon River Basin	Assessment of exposure and vulnerability to riverbank erosion, identification of critical sections and setting priority interventions, promotion of bio-engineering stabilization approaches and development of monitoring tools. Findings presented to MARD at a dissemination workshop.	Increasing understanding and engagement of relevant Gov. Agencies. The assessment facilitated the go ahead of (informed) the WB funded VN-Haz Project.			MARD	WB executed.	US\$ 143,732. GFDRR focal point at WB offices	1
Improving the Climate Resilience of Vulnerable Rural Roads in Vietnam	Technical assistance to explore Climate Resilience of Vulnerable Rural Roads. A study on climate proofing designs for Low Volume Rural Roads was developed. Training on climate resilience to rural road construction was delivered to MoT officials and 32 provinces targeted by the project. Final report widely disseminated within MoT.	Gov. capacity has been raised. Gov. recognized different road types and published ToR for updated rural roads manual. The study facilitated the go ahead of the WB funded RT3 project.	Limited buy-in at Gov. level for risk mitigation actions due to cost increase in reconstruction investments.		MoT	WB - RT3 - executed.	US\$ 83,121. GFDRR focal point at WB offices	2
Flood Control and Disaster Minimization for National Highway 1A in Central Vietnam	Highway construction manual to address risk of floods and other hazards produced.	Increasing understanding and awareness on DRM of Gov. stakeholders, risk-proofing of investments contributed to unblock funds. The study showed climate resilience implications to MoT. The project facilitated the clearance of the WB funded RAMP project.	MoT preferred low costs options to costly and highly technical specifications to mitigate risk.		MoT and Directorate of Roads in Vietnam	WB - RAMP - executed.	US\$ 149,970. GFDRR focal point at WB offices	2
Integration of Disaster Resilience into the Design of Irrigation Infrastructure	Study produced and discussed with Gov. in workshop . It assesses the types and extent of damages to irrigation systems and provides a set of recommendations for integrating disaster resilience.	Risk proofing options study facilitated the clearance of the WB funded Irrigated Agriculture Improvement Project. Awareness and policy dialogue on DRM increased, involving MARD departments, MONRE, MoC and academia.	New technical specifications were not attached to project budgets and therefore not implemented.		MARD	WB - Irrigated Agriculture Improvement Project - executed.	US\$ 100,980. GFDRR focal point at WB offices	2
Strengthening Disaster Resilience for Coastal Communities in the Mekong Delta	Review undertaken and presented. For six targeted provinces, investment packages developed with solutions for improvement of infrastructure to open escape ways to communities; provide access for emergency services and improve logistic facilities for transport of agricultural products.	<i>Project recently implemented, information about results not yet available.</i>	Options presented (such as population transfer) were considered tough by the Gov. for their political implications. Costs considered high.			WB executed.	US\$ 267,076. GFDRR focal point at WB offices	2

ACTIVITIES (IN PROGRAMS)	ACHIEVEMENTS	CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL DRM PERFORMANCE	ASSUMPTIONS TEST		PARTNERSHIPS AND ROLES			PILLAR
			OBSTACLES	ENABLING FACTORS	GOV. MAIN PARTNER	OTHER PARTNERS	GFDRR	
<i>(FROM PREVIOUS PAGE) (2010-2013) DRM CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAM—PHASE II</i>								
Development of National Public Awareness Raising Program on Disaster Risk Management in Vietnam	Study on the efficiency of ongoing and past information campaigns produced and action plan for public awareness raising in Vietnam developed.	Initial contribution to the 5-year implementation plan of CBDRM. The study facilitated the clearance of WB funded VN-Haz Project.	Program not linked with other initiatives and so low buy-in and therefore reduced effects.		MARD	WB - VN-Haz project - executed.	US\$ 91,410. GFDRR focal point (at WB offices)	3
Mobile-based disaster early warning system	Study trip to Japan for Gov. official to explore Early Warning System technical options.	Gov. capacity strengthened. The activity (software development for mobile-based early warning system) will continue in the framework of the WB funded VN-Haz project.	The best-qualified company to develop the software for the Early Warning System is a military-owned company, the project team could therefore not proceed with hiring this company in accordance with World Bank procurement rules.		CCFSC main Gov. partner. MONRE and MARD also joined the study trip. Cost covered by a Gov. trust fund.	WB - VN-Haz project executed.	GFDRR focal point placed (at WB offices)	3
Establishment of a M&E system for tracking the implementation of the Government National Strategy for DRM till 2020	A comprehensive framework including measurement indicators of the M&E system for tracking the implementation of the Government National Strategy for DRM till 2020 is finalized. Training of provinces and government departments provided to ensure M&E framework will be operated and maintained through a web-based platform at CCFSC and installed in the line ministries and provinces.	<i>Project recently implemented, information about results not yet available.</i>	Gov. institutions working in silos. The M&E being used by DMFC (at MARD) only so far.		Executed by the DMFC at MARD/ Standing Office of the CCFSC			2
Preparation of EPPs for 14 Central Provinces	EPPs for 14 Central Provinces finalized by the provincial authorities. The EPPs will be updated annually by the provinces web-based portal, connected to CCFSC's database.	Capacity improved. Work in Progress.					US\$ 750,000. GFDRR focal point (at WB offices)	3
Development of PDMCs	Study produced on the development of PDMCs: consultation process (including national and provincial gov agencies, NGOs and donors) and comprehensive review of the existing PDMC models developed by other international organizations undertaken. Pilot PDMC established and functioning in Quang Tri.	In the province of Quang Tri: Wider access to information. Improved warning time and evacuation. Networking. Better informed decision making.	Project at an early stage. Weak Gov. capacities. PDMC understaffed, lacks specialised building and equipment.					3
Supporting of National CBDRM program implementation	Production of hazards maps at commune level and CBDRM training materials.	Improved preparedness actions by the communes						3
Diagnostic review and upgrade of the hydromet master plan	Diagnostic review and upgrade of the hydromet master plan conducted under the supervision and guidance of the Hydromet Department of MONRE. Several consultation workshops were conducted.	Knowledge of situation of the sector increased. Identification of strengths and weaknesses. <i>Further information about results not yet available.</i>	Lack of communication between hydromet and early warning as a system across government. PDMC did not participate in development of DRM law. The responsibilities placed on the institution go beyond its existing capacities.		Department of Meteorology, Hydrology and Climate Change of MONRE executed the project		US\$ 450,000. GFDRR focal point (at WB offices)	3
Development of the hydromet commercial plan	Hydromet commercial plan developed.	<i>Project recently implemented, information about results not yet available.</i>	Lack of linkage between hydromet and early warning as a system across government.					3
Training for hydromet sector	Capacity development needs assessed for the hydromet sector training program developed.	<i>Project recently implemented, information about results not yet available.</i>						3
(2012-2014) DRM CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAM—PHASE III								
Review of the vulnerability of the communities' food security and livelihoods to extreme weather events	Study report developing livelihood-resilience models to be introduced in project communes under NMPP II produced.	<i>Project recently implemented, information about results not yet available.</i>	Lack of clear cooperation with NGOs and other programs in the Northern Region.		MPI	WB - NMPP II - executed.	US\$ 115,960. GFDRR focal point (at WB offices)	2
Implementation of APRT for Climate-related Actions Planning	Technical assistance and capacity building activities to guide line ministries and provinces in application of the APRT.	<i>Project recently implemented, information about results not yet available.</i>	Scarce cooperation across Gov. insitutions (keeps tool from being harmonised with relevant stakeholders, MARD and MONRE). Lack of resources to implement the tool.	Availability of funds: the project is linked to bigger DFID Trust Fund on Climate Change.	MPI		US\$ 100,000. GFDRR focal point (at WB offices)	2
Ensuring Disaster and Climate Resilience for Investments in the Wastewater and Drainage Sector in HCMC	Study on risk screening of investments in WB funded HCMC Environmental Sanitation Project.	Used mainly as basis for WB funded Project as it facilitated the go ahead of HCMC Environmental Sanitation II Project by informing its feasibility and design studies	HCMC concerns about costs and political considerations.			WB - HCMC Environmental Sanitation -II Project - executed.	US\$ 200,000. GFDRR focal point (at WB offices)	1
Flood risk management in HCMC	High-level workshop held to discuss proposals of flood risk management in HCMC among several stakeholders, MARD, MONRE and donors.	Increased dialogue with different stakeholders (SIWRP, SIWRR, SWRU, JICA and the Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology). Options study facilitated the clearance of a potential flood risk management project in HCMC.	There is a need of external funding to implement the project. Lack of internal coordination (similar studies had already been undertaken by other stakeholders).	MARD and SIWRP scaled down flood risk management plans in HCMC.	MARD and HCMC authorities	WB executed.	US\$ 245,000. GFDRR focal point (at WB offices)	2
Dissemination and knowledge sharing of GFDRR products	Production and dissemination of knowledge materials on experiences in Vietnam of mainstreaming DRM into public infrastructures design, urban planning and community resilience planning.	<i>Project recently implemented, information about results not yet available</i>				WB executed.	US\$ 120,000. GFDRR focal point (at WB offices)	2

Acronyms: APRT: Adaptation Prioritization Tool; CBDRM: Community Based Disaster Risk Management; CCFSC: Central Committee for Flood and Storm Control; CRC: Climate Resilient Cities; DFID: Department for International Development (United Kingdom); DMFC: Dyke Management and Flood Control department; DRM: Disaster Risk Management; DRR: Disaster Risk Reduction; EPP: Emergency Preparedness Plan; HCMC: Ho Chi Minh City; JICA: Japan International Cooperation Agency; LRAP: Local Resilience Action Plan; MPI: Ministry of Planning and Investment; MARD: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development; MoC: Ministry of Construction; MONRE: Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment; MoT: Ministry of Transport; NMPP: Northern Mountains Poverty Reduction Project; PDMC: Provincial Disaster Management Centre; RAMP: Road Assets Management Project; RT3: Rural Transport III; SIWRP: Southern Institute for Water Resources Planning; SIWRR: Southern Institute for Water Resources Research; SWRU: Southern Branch of Water Resources University; ToR: Terms of Reference; VN-Haz: Vietnam Managing Natural Hazards

ANALYSIS



3 ANALYSIS

103. The key findings from the country case studies have been synthesized in the Cross-country Analysis Table (see Annex 5). In this table, GFDRR's main achievements and contributions to improvements in DRM at country levels are clustered and have been analyzed (see Section 3.1), subsequently compared to the expectations included in the M&E Framework and assessed (see Section 3.2) to determine the extent to which these expectations are valid and/or should be adjusted and improved. Annex 5 also captures common obstacles and enabling factors encountered in the field. Section 3.3 presents an analysis of these findings, which were assessed to determine the extent to which the assumptions included in the M&E Framework hold true in the field and in this way, inform the theory of change. Finally, Annex 5 illustrates an analysis of the partnership strategies employed by GFDRR at the national level. This dimension is analysed in Section 3.4, which also presents lessons learned and remaining questions about GFDRR's added value. Furthermore, it serves to inform the Facility's theory of change.

3.1 GFDRR MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

ACHIEVEMENTS

104. Based on the findings in the five selected countries GFDRR's predominant achievements in the 2007-2012 period can be grouped into the following clusters (see Annex 5):

- Improvement of the **disaster risk knowledge base in all five countries** (risk mapping, risk assessments, exposure modeling, baselines and DRM profiles, etc.)
- **Development of DRM capacities and tools** within national institutions in all five countries (knowledge exchange, training of public officials, development of risk management tools, such as modeling systems, loss and damage assessments, etc.)
- **Risk-financing options explored in all five countries** (DRM funds, insurance instruments, contingency mechanisms).

- Development of **policy products to inform decision-making and regulatory frameworks in four of five countries** (policy options analysis, revision of regulations and guidelines, risk-mitigation options and investment prioritization, risk-proofing of land use plans, etc.) Improvement of **risk knowledge dissemination** in two of five countries (access to information on vulnerability, risk communication materials, etc.) **Improvement of equipment for preparedness/response** in two of five countries (early warning systems and rescue equipment)
- **Improvement of access to DRM data in two of five countries** (technical upgrades, open source and management systems).
- It should be noted though that GFDRR programs and activities rarely cover only one pillar. Instead, **programs tend to produce achievements and make contributions across the five GFDRR Pillars**. Enabling factors and synergies with partners in the country may explain how a DRM program corresponding by design to one of the Pillars may have positive collateral effects on the country's DRM performance under another Pillar.

CONTRIBUTIONS

105. Contributions to DRM performance resulting from GFDRR achievements were examined to understand the extent to which the Facility has delivered beyond the expected outputs.

The evaluation found that GFDRR has made a contribution to broader national DRM performance in the five countries

106. Based on the findings in the five selected countries, the evaluation team could infer that GFDRR contributions to progress in DRM performance mostly took the shape of (see Annex 5):

- Increasing **understanding/engagement** of government departments relevant to DRM (all five countries);
- DRM **policy/ regulatory** frameworks being developed (including sectoral and national policies) (all five countries);
 - Increasing understanding of financial vulnerability and **risk financing mechanisms** (all five countries);
 - **Facilitation and mainstreaming of DRM in World Bank** investment projects (all five countries);
 - Increasing **in-house capacities for DRM** at the government level (four of five countries);
 - **Mainstreaming DRM in development** planning (three of five countries);
 - Increasing **mobilization of funds for risk mitigation** actions (three of five countries);
 - Increasing **public awareness of risk**, vulnerability and DRM, including at the community level (three of five countries); and
 - Increasing **availability of risk information** to end-users (three of five countries).

107. **Overall, the evaluation found that GFDRR has made a contribution to broader national DRM performance in the five countries.** With a different degree

of development in each country, the Facility has triggered policy processes at the national level, facilitated some of the necessary conditions for risk reduction, promoted government readiness and leveraged support for DRM at the country level. In other words, GFDRR has played a role in creating an enabling environment for DRM (Box 1 provides some examples).

BOX 1. EXAMPLES OF GFDRR'S CONTRIBUTION TO DRM NATIONAL PERFORMANCE

► In **Sri Lanka**, GFDRR support increased understanding among the government of safety nets and social protection, which triggered policy dialogue to develop a sectoral policy on these issues. A National Spatial Data Infrastructure will be set up to further inform decision-makers and facilitate the integration of risk mitigation measures in infrastructure investments, as was the case with the production of flood models that contributed to restricted areas for new developments in Metro Colombo, thus reducing future risks. As a result, further financial support was leveraged from the Government of Japan to expand and complement the models. ◀

► In **Nepal**, the Kosi River rapid risk assessment undertaken with GFDRR support facilitated dialogue among stakeholders relevant to the management of the river basin infrastructure. The Hazard Risk Management program and its GLOF study were reported to have influenced planning processes and encouraged to take preventive action. The risk assessment in the Kathmandu valley provided a knowledge- base used by the World Bank in the school safety program. GFDRR's support to enhance hydromet services is generally improving flood managing capacities and providing information to decision-makers. ◀


3.2 COMPARING GFDRR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE M&E FRAMEWORK

ACHIEVEMENTS VS. EXPECTED OUTPUTS

108. GFDRR achievements found at the country level correspond to a reasonable extent to the GFDRR expected outputs in the Facility's M&E Framework (see the M&E Framework, Figure 9). The correspondence is particularly apparent for outputs relevant to Pillar 1 (Risk Identification) and Pillar 2 (Risk Reduction).

Within its area of "direct accountability" in the M&E Framework, the Facility seems to be delivering as expected

The output indicators are also aligned with the type of achievements found in the field, yet some seem overly ambitious when compared to actual progress observed in the five countries (e.g., in Pillar 1, "number of countries with effective new solutions in risk assessment, open data practices, remote sensing, and institution building in place"; and in Pillar 2 "number of countries with effective new solutions in risk reduction policy, land-use planning; building standards; strategy, planning and investment in place"). Within its area of "direct accountability" in the M&E Framework, the Facility seems to be delivering as expected.



CONTRIBUTIONS VS. EXPECTED OUTCOMES

109. Beyond the achievement/output level, **GFDRR contributions observed in the five case studies could hardly be expressed in terms of the expectations and indicators at the outcome level in the M&E Framework.** Nonetheless, the contributions observed are not disconnected from the expected outcomes. For example, “increasing understanding/engagement of government departments relevant to DRM” (to which GFDRR contributed in all five countries) seems to be a necessary pre-condition to the expected outcome under Pillar 2 (“avoided creation of new risks in society”), but the corresponding outcome indicators (“number of schools and other public infrastructure made safer through retrofitting or resilient construction”; “number of countries/cities implementing new or revised policies to address disaster risk” and “amount of investment made in risk reduction measures that GFDRR has helped leverage”) either fail to capture the nature of GFDRR’s contribution to the expected outcome expected, or fail to reflect the actual extent of GFDRR’s contribution.


GFDRR is making a valuable contribution beyond the output level, despite the fact that this cannot be clearly reflected by using the M&E Framework outcome indicators

110. Some exceptions exist. In Nepal, the evaluation team found evidence of a number of schools being retrofitted in connection to GFDRR programming (this contribution could be reflected by one of the outcome level indicators for Pillar 2, on Risk Reduction). In Guatemala, a Cat DDO contingency loan was approved in connection to GFDRR enabling activities (this contribution could be reflected by one of the outcome level indicators of Pillar 4, “increased financial resilience”).

111. These two pieces of evidence suggest that the logical pathway in the M&E Framework (from GFDRR inputs to expected outputs, and from these to expected outcomes at the country level) is not misguided. As shown in Figure 10, the perceptions of key informants (reflected through the scoring tool), on the role played by GFDRR for each of the five Pillar outcomes indicate that DRM stakeholders perceive the Facility as bringing an added value (with the relevance given to GFDRR’s role varying by country and Pillar). This would support the idea that GFDRR is making a valuable contribution beyond the output level, despite the fact that this cannot be clearly reflected by using the M&E Framework outcome indicators.

Figure 10. Summary of GFDRR's Role in Contributing to DRM Performance (by Pillar Outcome and Country)

GFDRR'S ROLE



112. Stakeholders at the national level value GFDRR’s contribution to improvements in DRM performance across the Pillars, and in particular under Pillar 1 (Risk Identification) and Pillar 4 (Financial Resilience). However, this acknowledged contribution from GFDRR seems to be difficult to capture in the current M&E Framework (it goes beyond the output level but does not fulfil the outcome level). This difficulty may be explained by different, and possibly concurrent, factors:

- A The time span set for reporting has been too short to see the expected outcome delivered;
- B The formulation of the outcome indicators in the current M&E Framework limits the extent to which GFDRR’s distinct contribution can be captured;
- C The context in which GFDRR has operated at the national level was not conducive to progress and the assumptions underlying the M&E Framework did not hold true in practice. Obstacles encountered in the country may have been too prominent and/or enabling factors may not have been strong enough. In other words, assumptions made in the M&E Framework did not hold true in practice and outputs delivered could not translate into the expected outcomes.

Stakeholders at the national level value GFDRR’s contribution to improvements in DRM performance across the Pillars, and in particular under Pillar 1 (Risk Identification) and Pillar 4 (Financial Resilience)

113. Options (a) and (b) are analyzed below and option (c) in Section 3.3.

114. As indicated in Chapter 1, the five year timeframe for the evaluation (2007-2012) was likely too short to observe contributions to DRM performance resulting from GFDRR inputs and soft investments (“grants to generate knowledge, build capacity and implement DRM reforms and investment” as per the M&E Framework). **Capacity development and policy reform at the national level may, and normally do, take a longer time to produce tangible results, especially in the developing country settings where GFDRR operates.** Furthermore, even when soft investments may already be delivering results, time may be needed for these to be realized (see Box 2 for examples). ◀

BOX 2. EXAMPLES OF SHORT TIMESPAN TO CAPTURE GFDRR’S OUTCOMES

▶ In **Malawi**, PDNA trainings (and other DRM tools facilitated by GFDRR) have strengthened the capacities of technical officials, but buy-in from higher-level was slow and a government-led PDNA team is not functioning on its own yet. The new DRM law has been developed but is still awaiting approval from the President’s Cabinet. Progress has been made; GFDRR contributions are valued, but expected outcomes in DRM performance at the country level have not been realized yet. ◀

▶ In **Guatemala**, GFDRR inputs contributed to the development of building codes and reconstruction guidelines that integrate risk mitigation measures. Guatemala City is seeking to articulate the enforcement of new regulations, but until future recovery efforts are needed and future hard investments in reconstruction are completed, the impact of the new regulatory framework will not be visible. Although GFDRR has made an effective contribution to DRM at the national level, this will not yet be captured by the corresponding outcome indicator (“number of schools and other public infrastructure made safer through retrofitting and resilient reconstruction”) ◀

THE NEED FOR INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES

115. **The difficulty in capturing GFDRR contributions through the outcome indicators in the M&E Framework may also imply that some of these indicators are not appropriate to the nature of GFDRR’s work.** The current formulation of outcomes seems to be useful as “aspirational goals” shared by the DRM community in a given country (such as the expression “shared accountability” in the M&E Framework suggests), but it seems less useful in terms of portraying GFDRR’s specific contributions to improvements in DRM performance.

116. For example, in Vietnam, GFDRR funded risk screening studies for major public infrastructure investments to be financed by World Bank loans. Options for risk mitigation were identified for each of the projects, thus contributing to the clearance of the World Bank operations. Arguably, GFDRR made a contribution to avoid risk creation, and helped leverage World Bank funds. However, because the government often considered risk mitigation options in the studies too costly, they were not consistently budgeted or implemented. When assessed against the relevant outcome indicator (“amount of investment made in risk reduction measures that GFDRR has helped leverage”), GFDRR’s contribution would seem very limited (extra funds for risk-proofing measures were not always made available and infrastructure was not consistently risk-proofed). However, GFDRR delivered the expected outputs (it provided technical products to support risk identification and offered the country options to mitigate risk in new investments). These achievements led to a valuable contribution to DRM performance (increasing understanding and engagement of relevant government agencies and informing the investment plans), but these contributions are not perceived since

investors (the government and the World Bank) did not ensure that DRM measures would be consistently applied to all investments. The current formulation of outcome indicators therefore allows some GFDRR contributions in Vietnam to go unnoticed (see Box 3 for another example).

BOX 3. EXAMPLE OF INADEQUATE INDICATORS TO CAPTURE GFDRR'S CONTRIBUTIONS

► In **Guatemala**, although the land-use plans expected for 12 municipalities were not completed, the impact of the generation of hazard information, the improvements to the national information services and the upgrading of the National Geographical Institute's mapping capacities are all positive developments in DRM performance. Expected outcomes were not delivered, but GFDRR made a significant contribution to a national process. ◀

117. If GFDRR's M&E Framework incorporated "intermediate outcomes" with "process-based indicators" to measure the progress made in DRM, then specific contributions from the different stakeholders could be better captured and the pending challenges to attain final expected outcomes or "aspirational goals" could be better identified.

If GFDRR's M&E Framework incorporated "intermediate outcomes" with "process-based indicators" to measure the progress made in DRM, then specific contributions from the different stakeholders could be better captured

For example, in the case of Vietnam, an intermediate outcome indicator such as "number of countries with risk-screening tools integrated into national decision-making mechanisms" could be a new intermediate indicator useful to capture a specific contribution made by GFDRR to the ultimate expected outcomes under Pillar 1 (Risk Identification) and Pillar 2 (Risk Reduction). Box 4 provides some guidance on intermediate outcomes indicators.

BOX 4. DEVELOPING INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES AND PROGRESS-BASED INDICATORS

► Capacity building, policy reform and knowledge development are the main areas of work promoted with GFDRR inputs at the country level. These are areas for which meaningful and SMART indicators are difficult to develop. The results of soft investments (such as GFDRR's) are more difficult to capture than those of hard investments (which larger bodies like a national government or the World Bank can usually undertake). To avoid contributions from soft investments going unreported, some institutions have tried to develop capacity and policy-related indicators. ◀

► For example, to capture institutional development dimensions of DRM, UNISDR¹ includes **policy and process oriented indicators** in HFA reporting, such as: "A national multi sectoral platform for disaster risk reduction is functioning" or "National policy and legal framework for disaster risk reduction exists with decentralised responsibilities and capacities at all levels." ◀

► Within the **climate change adaptation community of practice**, similar challenges have also been addressed. The Pilot Program for Climate Resilience¹ (within the Climate Investment Funds, CIF) includes within its core indicators: "Degree of integration of climate change in national, including sector, planning", "Evidence of strengthened government capacity and coordination mechanism to mainstream climate resilience" and "Quality and extent to which climate responsive instruments/ investment models are developed and tested." ◀

► These references could inspire the development of intermediate and **progress-based indicators, which are more appropriate to the nature of GFDRR's contributions** to DRM performance at the national level. ◀

3.3 TESTING ASSUMPTIONS IN THE NATIONAL CONTEXT

118. The extent to which the assumptions included in the M&E Framework hold true was assessed by analyzing the obstacles and enabling factors encountered in the field.

ASSESSMENT OF OBSTACLES

119. Based on observations in the five selected countries (see Cross-country Analysis in Annex 5), the most common obstacles encountered by GFDRR programming at the national level seem to be:

- **Weak institutional capacities** (at the national or sub-national level) and limited technical or operational capacities (all five countries);
- **High staff turnover**, compromising internal communication and the effectiveness of trainings (three of five countries);
- **Competition of agendas** within the government, lack of coordination among agencies with DRM responsibilities (three of five countries);
- **Limited appropriateness** of Technical Assistance (TA)/DRM tools (three of five countries);
- Lack of leadership/coordination mechanisms at the government level (work in silos) (three of five countries);
- Lack of DRM resources and **unpredictable funds** (three of five countries);
- **Weak policy and regulatory frameworks** for DRM (three of five countries);
- Informality, **lack of law enforcement**, legal insecurity (three of five countries); and
- **Top-down approaches**, limited permeability of decision-making level (two of five countries).

120. Although the obstacles encountered for the implementation of GFDRR activities and for the effective delivery of expected results vary from one country to the other, some factors seemed to be recurrent (Box 5 provides some examples). Some of these are frequently common to developing country contexts and are not exclusive to the DRM agenda (weak institutions, lack of law enforcement, limited permeability of decision-making levels, etc). Others (such as lack of coordination among agencies with DRM-related responsibilities and difficulty accessing risk data) are more specific to DRM.

121. **In order for several of the assumptions in the M&E Framework (between the output and outcome level) to hold true, some of the main obstacles observed in the five countries would need to be removed.** For example:

- “Competition of agendas at government level and lack of coordination of agencies with DRM responsibilities” (obstacles observed in practice) limit the extent to which the assumptions “consensus and trust on risk information is built” (assumption included in Pillar 1 of the M&E Framework); “risk information is effectively communicated to policy makers” (assumption included in Pillar 1); and “lead technical agencies on disaster risks are able to convene and influence other line Ministries” (assumption included in Pillar 2), can actually hold true at the country level.
- “Lack of DRM resources and unpredictability of funds” (obstacle observed in practice) limits the extent to which the assumptions “national and/or city

level resources for maintenance and generation of risk information are secured” (assumption included in Pillar 1); “informed decision-making leads to an increase in, and effective use of, resources for risk reduction” (assumption included in Pillar 2); and “preparedness and early warning infrastructure is adequately maintained” (assumption included in Pillar 3) can actually hold true at the country level.

- “Top down approaches and limited permeability of decision-making level” (obstacle observed in practice) limits the extent to which “policy makers are responsive to risk information” (assumption included in Pillar 1); “conflicting market forces are surmountable with new evidence and policies on risks” (assumption included in Pillar 2); and “governments buy into and adopt recommendations and analysis presented in post-disaster assessments” (assumption included in Pillar 5) can actually hold true at the country level.

BOX 5. EXAMPLES OF CONTEXTUAL FACTORS HINDERING GFDRR'S OUTCOMES

► In **Nepal**, the lack of enforcement of building codes in Kathmandu limits the positive impact of the risk assessments developed through GFDRR support to inform planners and reduce the toll of seismic activity. Furthermore, lack of participation at the local level limits the potential for feeding open source mapping and information into decision-making processes. At the national level, different government departments are involved in the Kosi River watershed management, but competition outweighs institutional coordination. ◀

► In **Sri Lanka**, the mechanisms for consultation and participation of local communities in district planning are unclear. Lack of collaboration between municipal planners and national government institutions further contributes to top-down approaches that do not help integrate risk management in local level decision-making. ◀

► In **Vietnam**, government departments working in silos limit the extent to which GFDRR can contribute to enhanced capacities for DRM. The Adaptation Prioritization Tool promoted by GFDRR to facilitate climate-risk aware planning is being applied by the Ministry of Planning but not by the Ministry of Environment. ◀

122. Based on the existing obstacles encountered in the five countries, some of the assumptions made about the national context in which GFDRR operates could hardly hold true. On the contrary, where the M&E Framework logical pathway expects that a conducive context will be in place and will allow for outputs to translate into outcomes, the opposite seems to be occurring in practice. Obstacles exist that appear to be compromising the assumptions and seem to be limiting the effects of GFDRR contributions.

Obstacles exist that appear to be compromising the assumptions and seem to be limiting the effects of GFDRR contributions

123. For example, **Vietnam** has recently graduated from the Low Income Country (LIC) category. As a new lower-middle income country, grants and Official Development Assistance (ODA) funds are progressively less available and new, less favorable conditions apply for loans. The government now has less external resources and assumes higher risk when turning to credit. As a result, high-technology risk mitigation options presented to risk-proof infrastructure investments are seen as too costly by the government and therefore are not always integrated into investment plans. This

could explain why, despite the fact that GFDRR made an effective contribution to DRM performance (by facilitating risk identification information and feeding it into the policy analysis), the expected outcome (risk-proofing public infrastructures investments) was not necessarily delivered. It is likely that because of the “lack of DRM resources and unpredictability of funds” (obstacle observed in the field), the assumption that “informed decision making leads to an increase in, and effective use of, resources for risk reduction” (assumption included in Pillar 2) does not hold true.

ASSESSING ENABLING FACTORS

124. Testing the set of assumptions in the M&E Framework at the national level also needs to be informed by an analysis of the “enabling factors” encountered in the five selected countries (see Cross-country Analysis in Annex 5). The enabling factors identified for GFDRR programming were significantly fewer in number and most were country-specific. Still, some of these factors seemed to be especially relevant to GFDRR programming (see Box 6 for some country examples). For example:

- The emergence of the **climate change adaptation agenda** and recent extreme events help raise awareness of vulnerability and create momentum for actions that build resilience (two of five countries);
- The presence of international/regional bodies (e.g.: UNDP, MDBs, etc.) with **technical expertise** provides potential for synergies to be tapped (four of five countries).
- The presence of bilateral donors supportive of DRM (e.g.: JICA, DFID, NORAD, etc.) provides **opportunities for co-financing** and leveraging funds. (three of countries)
- The **Ministry of Finance taking a strong stance** implies potential to catalyze action on risk financing, when this actor effectively engages in DRM.
- Recognition and high level of **commitment of DRM specialized technical staff** can help engage third parties.

BOX 6. EXAMPLES OF CONTEXTUAL FACTORS ENABLING GFDRR'S OUTCOMES

► In **Malawi and Vietnam**, the increasing awareness of the consequences of climate change (including extreme events but also slow onest events, such as sea level rise, prolonged drought and salinization) have helped raise the priority given to DRM agendas. ◀

► In **Vietnam**, the Korean Green Growth Institute was attracted to the development of climate risk-screening tools and contributed extra funds; and the application of the Adaptation Prioritization Tool at the provincial level was connected to DFID climate funds. ◀

► In **Sri Lanka**, the strong stance of the Ministry of Finance and the presence of a donor community supportive of disaster risk reduction (UNDP, JICA) have been useful to promote investment in resilience. ◀

► In **Guatemala** regional bodies (ECLAC, CEPREDENAC) have provided hands-on support and World Bank facilitated technical expertise. This contributed to positive knowledge transfer with highly committed technical staff in national institutions. ◀

GFDRR appears to have promoted enabling factors in some countries, and thus, further contributed to create an environment conducive to progress in DRM performance

125. GFDRR programs have both benefited from and reinforced some enabling factors at the country level. In Vietnam, the assumption that an “increased understanding of financial risk leads to changes in mindsets among finance ministers” (assumption included in Pillar 4) holds true to some extent. Given the strong stance and leverage of the Ministry of Finance, once it engaged in the DRM agenda, its influence helped amplify the effect of GFDRR contributions and raise awareness at other government levels. In Guatemala, the assumption that “lead technical agencies on disaster risks are able to convene and influence other line ministries” (assumption included in Pillar 2) holds true to some extent. The Guatemalan Association of Structural and Seismic Engineering (AGIES, a national association of engineers and experts on seismic risk) acted as a key partner for some GFDRR activities. AGIES benefitted from GFDRR funded trainings and, in turn, contributed with its leverage to the program achievements. Although the evidence found across the five countries was limited, GFDRR appears to have promoted enabling factors in some countries, and thus, further contributed to create an environment conducive to progress in DRM performance.

GFDRR AS A FACILITATING ACTOR

126. Testing the assumptions regarding GFDRR work at the national level seems to indicate that in reality, there are more obstacles that compromise the assumptions included in the M&E Framework than enabling factors sustaining them. A closer look at a number of assumptions in the M&E Framework could shed some light beyond the M&E Framework design and on the definition of a theory of change for the GFDRR. Indeed, **the evaluation found that some of GFDRR’s most relevant contributions to DRM performance address a number of obstacles encountered at the national level** (see Box 7 for examples). For example:

BOX 7. EXAMPLES OF OBSTACLES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

- ▶ In **Guatemala**, GFDRR does not have a national focal point, but it has supported the establishment of a national DRM platform (*Mesa de Diálogo*) which serves to promote collaboration among different government departments. Vice-Presidential participation in the forum reinforces leadership and coordination. ◀
- ▶ In **Malawi**, GFDRR sought to overcome the lack of law enforcement by developing building guidelines for private actors (informal builders and households) instead of seeking to enact building codes. As a result, DRM measures are socialized and public awareness increased. By realizing the benefits of risk mitigation measures, DRM starts to be mainstreamed into planning. ◀

- “Increasing engagement in DRM of government departments relevant to DRM” and “increasing policy dialogue and coordination between stakeholders with DRM responsibilities” (identified as GFDRR contributions in a number of countries, see in Annex 5) are likely to remove the obstacles created by the “competition of agendas within government and lack of coordination among

agencies with DRM responsibilities”. As a result, with time, the assumptions about “consensus and trust on risk information being built” and “lead technical agencies on disaster risks being able to convene and influence other line ministries” are more likely to hold true.

- “Increasing in-house capacities for DRM in government institutions” and “increasing availability of risk information to end-users” (identified as GFDRR contributions in a number of countries, see Section 3.1), are likely to remove the obstacles resulting from “weak institutional capacities (at national or sub-national levels), scarce technical or operational capacities” and “difficult accessibility to DRM data”. As a result, with time, the assumptions about “risk information being effectively communicated to policy makers” and “national agencies being appropriately resourced and mandated to implement their improved capacity” are more likely to hold true.
- “Increasing mobilization of funds for risk mitigation actions” and “increasing understanding of financial exposure and risk financing mechanisms” (identified as GFDRR contribution to a Pillar 4 outcome in a number of countries) are likely to remove obstacles resulting from the “lack of DRM resources and unpredictability of funds”. As a result, with time, the assumptions about “national and/or city level resources for maintenance and generation of risk information being secured” and “an increased understanding of financial risk leading to changes in mindsets among finance ministers” are more likely to hold true.
- “Mainstreaming DRM in development planning” (identified as a GFDRR contribution in some countries, see Annex 5) is likely to remove obstacles resulting from “weak policy frameworks for DRM”. As a result, with time, the assumptions about “government policies not conflicting in incentivizing/preventing risky behavior, for example on land use or safety nets” are more likely to hold true.

GFDRR should seek to make its facilitating/catalytic role more apparent within the theory of change

127. Based on the analysis of dynamics in the five countries, **it would seem accurate to describe GFDRR’s contribution to DRM performance at the country level in terms of “removing obstacles”, “creating enabling environment/conditions” and “generating potential”** for the achievement of higher “aspirational goals” set for the DRM community as a whole at the outcome level. With “soft investments”, GFDRR seems to be playing a valuable role in leveraging support, channelling efforts and facilitating the work of the government and its DRM partners. Therefore, GFDRR should seek to make its facilitating/catalytic role more apparent within the theory of change.

128. Finally, it should be remembered that some of the obstacles encountered at the national level seem to go beyond the influence or power of GFDRR activities. Indeed, “informality/legal insecurity”, “top-down approaches, limited permeability of decision-making level” or “lack of continuity at high political levels” are factors determined by the political economy of each country context and encountered in a number of case studies (see Annex 5 for details). **The different governance issues that are likely to play out in the developing country contexts in which GFDRR operates should be taken into account to adjust the theory of change accordingly** and inform the country-specific GFDRR strategies.

129. Governance issues identified at the country level should also inform the choice of implementing partners who are likely to influence the effectiveness of GFDRR and the delivery of results. Hence, the evaluation team also explored GFDRR partnership strategies in the five selected countries.

3.4 EXPLORING GFDRR PARTNERSHIP STRATEGIES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

130. Observations made in a number of case studies have revealed that some of the obstacles faced by GFDRR at the national level are of a governance and political economy nature. The cross-country analysis seems to concur with the conclusions of the World Development Report,³⁰ which highlights the relevance of power relations and political economy considerations among the challenges to DRM performance. In a similar vein, the Views from the Front-Line report³¹ concludes that DRM progress may depend on how power and authority is dispersed horizontally and vertically across government.

131. In this context, exploring GFDRR's partnership strategy (government and main executing partners) at the country level seemed a relevant exercise to inform the theory of change. The extent to which GFDRR is playing a catalytic role for DRM improvement may well be related to the actor with which GFDRR is interacting.

132. As reflected in the Cross-country Analysis (see Annex 5), the following are findings from the five countries:

- GFDRR's main executing partner at national level has been the World Bank (involved in all five countries), with limited involvement of national NGOs, sub-national authorities and regional expert bodies (in three of five countries). The World Bank also implemented GFDRR activities directly in some countries.
- GFDRR's partners at the government level have been technical agencies/ departments in line Ministries (in all five countries), sub-national authorities (in three of five countries), line-Ministries (in two of five countries) and Ministries of Planning/Finance (in three of five countries).
- GFDRR's most significant inputs to its partnerships at the national level have been: seed funds (in all five countries); technical tools (in four of five countries) and channelling of DRM efforts through GFDRR focal points (in four of five countries).

133. According to its Partnership Charter,³² GFDRR was not conceived as a direct implementer, but its grants could be channeled through different streams: "The recipients of Track II funds include country governments, United Nations agencies, IFIs, regional intergovernmental organizations or research organizations." Findings in the selection of five countries would suggest that, in practice, **GFDRR tends to prioritize the relationship with the World Bank as an executing partner for programs at the national level.**

³⁰ World Bank, *World Development Report 2014*

³¹ Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction, *Views from the Frontline*

³² GFDRR, Partnership Charter, GFDRR, May 2010, (accessed April 26, 2014)

SYNERGIES WITH THE WORLD BANK

134. Most of the interviewees at the country level have highlighted the relevance of the GFDRR focal point for negotiation, facilitation and effectiveness of operations. In some countries, the professional background of the person appointed seemed to be a relevant factor in terms of GFDRR positioning at the national level (see Box 8 for examples). The institution hosting the GFDRR focal point position may also be relevant in terms of the formulation and implementation of programs. In four of the five countries that had a national focal point, the post was integrated in World Bank offices (the position was, in some cases, co-financed by World Bank operational structures).

Most of the interviewees at the country level have highlighted the relevance of the GFDRR focal point for negotiation, facilitation and effectiveness of operations

BOX 8. EXAMPLE OF THE RELEVANCE OF GFDRR FOCAL POINTS' BACKGROUNDS

► In **Malawi**, the GFDRR focal point is a technical expert in hydrology. He gave saliency and presence to the hydromet and water planning components of the program, which are so important to the country. ◀

► In **Vietnam**, the GFDRR focal point had previously worked for the Government and for MDBs. Synergies between these two stakeholders were promoted. ◀

135. **Observations point to valuable synergies in the partnership between GFDRR and the World Bank.** The Bank acting as administrative agent and trustee of GFDRR funds may reduce transaction costs and speed up implementation if GFDRR streamlined with the Bank's operations at national level. On the other hand, GFDRR funds have delivered knowledge products or facilitated DRM tools that contributed to risk-screening thus, clearing large infrastructure operations from the World Bank. The potential for synergies and win-win situations is high and practice seems to prove GFDRR's capacity to leverage World Bank funds (see Table 17). GFDRR's privileged partnership with the World Bank may also have contributed to the engagement of the Ministries of Finance in GFDRR programs which, in turn, provided expertise on fiscal vulnerability reduction and financial resilience. (N.B: GFDRR's expertise and role in promoting tools for financial resilience is widely acknowledged by national stakeholders, as reflected in case studies and in Figure 10. The analysis in Chapter 2 also showed limited progress in this dimension of DRM in the five countries, but this was usually attributed to lack of readiness at the national level rather than to limitations of GFDRR inputs.)

TABLE 17: FINANCIAL LEVERAGE BETWEEN GFDRR AND WORLD BANK

GFDRR PROGRAMMING (2007-2013)	SRI LANKA	NEPAL	MALAWI	GUATEMALA	VIETNAM
GFDRR financial execution (US\$ Million)	1.7	3.5	2.0	1.5	4.2
Share of GFDRR funds executed by World Bank	100%	100%	100%	87%	64%
Share of GFDRR funds linked to clearance of World Bank loans	28%	11%	78%	53%	32%
World Bank loans leveraged by GFDRR ³³ (US\$ Million)	213.0	32.5	18.0	85.0	1764.3

Source: GFDRR Focal points, GFDRR program documents, update reports

136. Table 17 provides data on the partnership between GFDRR and World Bank through the lens of financial execution. In all five countries, World Bank is the main executor of GFDRR funds (and the sole executing partner in three of five countries). Although other national partners may have been involved in the implementation of activities, the financial execution of GFDRR programs at the country level remains with the World Bank. The table also suggests that **GFDRR has significant capacity to leverage World Bank funds**. For example, in Vietnam US\$1.3 million of GFDRR's investment served to clear US\$1.8 billion of World Bank loans. In Sri Lanka US\$ 0.4 million of GFDRR investment served to clear US\$213.9 billion of World Bank funds.

137. The table also indicates that a significant share of GFDRR funds at the country level (from 28 percent in Sri Lanka to up to 78 percent in Malawi) have been invested in activities linked to the fulfillment of requirements for the clearance on World Bank loans. In other words, **World Bank also seems to have a significant influence on the use of GFDRR grants at the country level**. This raises some questions (see Box 9) about the GFDRR/World Bank partnership that maybe relevant for further discussions on the theory of change.

BOX 9. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ON GFDRR AND WORLD BANK RELATIONSHIP

- Are activities that seek to fulfill requirements for World Bank loan clearance the best possible investment in DRM performance at the country level? To the extent that these activities can ensure the risk-proofing of large public infrastructure developed through World Bank operations, the investment decision would seem appropriate. The case study of Vietnam suggests this is not guaranteed in practice, but further research is needed to respond to this question. ◀

- When operating in disaster-prone countries, it seems within reason to expect that risk-proofing of investments would be common practice of the World Bank. For the same reason that environmental and cultural safeguards are streamlined in World Bank procedures and triggered in vulnerable contexts, it seems sensible to mainstream risk-screening and integration of risk mitigation measures in World Bank operations in disaster prone countries. If risk management is effectively streamlined in World Bank operations, what would be GFDRR's added-value in relation to World Bank loans? Could other potential executing partners (national governments, CSOs, regional bodies, UN agencies, etc.) bring different comparative advantages that may contribute to GFDRR goals in a more effective or sustainable way? Further research is needed to answer these questions ◀

³³ The calculations include operations for which GFDRR's activities facilitated clearance (as found by the evaluation team). These include the Cat DDO in Guatemala; one of the components of the Shire River Basin Management Plan in Malawi; the Building Resilience to Climate Related Hazards project and the Pilot Project for Seismic School Safety in Nepal; the Metro Colombo Urban Development Project in Sri Lanka; and for Vietnam, and a number of World Bank funded projects (Ho Chi Minh City Environmental Sanitation Project, with additional financing phase and a Phase II operation, Third Rural Transport project with a additional financing phase, the Coastal Cities Environmental Sanitation Project, the Second Northern Mountains Poverty Reduction Project, the Managing Natural Hazards Project, the Irrigated Agriculture Improvement Project and the Road Asset Management Project).

138. Findings suggest potential drawbacks for national governments in the execution of GFDRR funds by World Bank. All grant agreements under World Bank-administered trust funds follow World Bank procurement guidelines. In Vietnam and Nepal, it was reported that GFDRR implementation was delayed due to difficulties in complying with the procurement rules. In Sri Lanka, Nepal and Guatemala, the World Bank promoting PDNA methodology for loss and damage assessment has proved challenging for national stakeholders, with ensuing ownership and sustainability issues.

139. In a number of case studies (Malawi, Vietnam and Guatemala) triangulation through interviews showed that **third parties could hardly distinguish between GFDRR and World Bank contributions to DRM performance at the country level.** Beyond the issue of visibility of GFDRR support (which may or may not be relevant to its effectiveness), the “perceived identification” of GFDRR with the World Bank could eventually have implications in terms of the potential for broader and more diverse engagement strategies. The partnership with the World Bank appears to have a particular potential for the achievement of some GFDRR goals (such as retrofitting of public infrastructure or establishing contingency mechanisms for financial protection, for example).

OTHER PARTNERS

140. Partners other than the World Bank may also have a unique added value in pursuing different GFDRR goals. For example, CSOs may be best placed to contribute to increasing accuracy and timeliness of early warning systems or improving the management of disasters at local and community levels (as the Nepal case study seems to suggest). Selecting government institutions as implementing partners may provide a higher sense of ownership and appropriation in key program areas, such as the reform of policy and regulatory frameworks or incentive schemes relevant to DRM performance (in Guatemala, the Ministry of Agriculture seems to have played a role in promoting buy-in for the development of insurance markets, including from the private sector).

141. Each stakeholder and potential implementing partner may bring different comparative advantages to GFDRR interventions. Therefore partnership strategies and implementation arrangements in GFDRR programs may be more effective when informed by an ex-ante DRM diagnostic of the country, including a power analysis. This way, GFDRR strategy and priority setting could be better tailored to the country's challenges and opportunities.

Each stakeholder and potential implementing partner may bring different comparative advantages to GFDRR interventions

142. Indeed, the diversification of executing partners at the country level would respond to GFDRR's Partnership Charter:³⁴ “To the maximum extent feasible, complementarities and collaborations will be sought with other programs of participating donor partners, country governments, IFIs, UN agencies, research and academic institutions,

³⁴ GFDRR. *Partnership Charter*

intergovernmental organizations, CSOs, and the private sector, regional development banks, regional intergovernmental organizations, and other low- and middle-income country governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).”

143. Across the five countries studied, partners other than the World Bank were present and active in building resilience at the national level (from national government themselves to research institutions, private actors, UN agencies, local NGOs and regional bodies). **Further research would be necessary to analyze the comparative advantage of each of these potential partners and to draw recommendations on the most suitable partnership strategies and implementation arrangements to attain GFDRR goals in a given country.**

144. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to expect that GFDRR’s selection of partners at the national level can play a role in the DRM power relations. In turn, these relations will influence the extent to which the theory of change is applicable to a particular country. Indeed, some assumptions included in the theory of change (e.g., “GFDRR is able to positively leverage and collaborate with other agencies” and “GFDRR has the influential power to lead DRM policy in country”³⁵) may or may not hold true depending on the selection of GFDRR partners at the national level. In Nepal, GFDRR chose to partner with CSOs operating at the local level; the strategy delivered positive results, but it limited the extent of policy impacts at the national level. In Malawi, GFDRR committed 78 percent of its programming funds to leveraging World Bank funds, which may have limited its financial margin of manouvre to positively leverage and further collaborate with other partners, such as CSOs like the Red Cross) or UN agencies like UN Habitat and UNDP. Box 10 provides some insight about how other facilities have addressed similar challenges. Chapter 4 draws some emerging recommendations on possible ways to address these matters.

BOX 10. DEVELOPING PARTNERSHIPS AND IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

- ▶ Other trust funds that have faced challenges selecting partners and establishing implementation arrangements in contexts similar to the ones where GFDRR operates have developed partnership strategies that may be interesting for the GFDRR Secretariat to explore. ◀
- ▶ The Adaptation Fund finances projects and programs to help developing countries adapt to the negative effects of climate change. Parties seeking financial resources from the Adaptation Fund must submit their project and program proposals directly through National, Regional or Multilateral Implementing Entities. These entities can range from government departments to research institutions, CSOs, IFIs, UN Agencies or regional bodies and need to be accredited by the Adaptation Fund Secretariat. To ensure diversity of partners and retain the capacity to benefit from comparative advantages from each of them, the Fund establishes caps per type of implementing entity. ◀
- ▶ The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) is also open to a range of implementation arrangements and a diversity of executing partners. To favor alignment with national priorities and appropriation of funds by national governments, GEF focal points are designated within government departments. The focal points play a critical coordination role regarding GEF matters at the country level, as well as serving as the liaison with the GEF Secretariat and implementing agencies. ◀

³⁵ Paula Villanueva, *Promoting Evidence-based DRM Investments. A GFDRR Theory of Change*, Internal Communication, November 5, 2013. Work in progress.

LESSONS LEARNED AND EMERGING RECOMMENDATIONS



4 LESSONS LEARNED AND EMERGING RECOMMENDATIONS

145. The findings from the five case studies and the cross-country analysis have identified the extent to which GFDRR is delivering the expected outputs and the ways in which the Facility is contributing to progress in DRM performance at the country level. The assumptions made in the M&E Framework, and the theory of change inferred from it, have been tested against the obstacles and enabling factors observed at the field level. Considerations about GFDRR's role and added value within its partnership strategies were also explored. Chapter 4 builds on the findings and analysis undertaken to draw lessons learned about GFDRR and offer emerging recommendations that seek to enrich its M&E Framework and inform its theory of change. Some suggestions on possible improvements to the program design and evaluation are also provided.

4.1 LESSONS LEARNED ON GFDRR'S CONTRIBUTIONS AND M&E FRAMEWORK

146. Findings in the five selected countries show that **GFDRR has delivered substantial achievements over a relatively short period of time (2007-2012)**. To a reasonable extent, these correspond to the expected **outputs in the GFDRR M&E Framework, particularly under Pillar 1 (Risk Identification) and Pillar 2 (Risk Reduction)**. Although the expectation set by some of the indicators seems high at times, the formulation of outputs in the M&E Framework captures the achievements that can already be observed at the country level to a large extent.

147. In most cases, the evaluation confirmed that the effects from the program investments went beyond the expected output level. Based on findings in the five countries, **GFDRR contributions to progress in DRM performance were perceived as valuable by national stakeholders, particularly under Pillars 1, 2 and 4 (Financial Resilience)**. Beyond the acknowledged contributions by Pillar, overall, GFDRR seems to have triggered policy processes, facilitated some of the conditions for risk reduction, promoted government readiness and leveraged support for DRM. **There is evidence in the field of the catalytic role played by GFDRR.**

148. However, the contributions to progress in DRM performance at the national level could rarely be captured through the outcome indicators formulated in the M&E Framework. **The Framework provides result-based outcome indicators, but contributions observed in the field are more process-oriented.** GFDRR provides grants to generate knowledge, build capacity and implement reforms; that is, GFDRR seeks to positively influence processes. Therefore, the **effects of GFDRR programs are better captured in relative (progress made) rather than absolute terms** (final outcome indicators). Indeed, outcomes are an area of "shared accountability" in the current M&E Framework and GFDRR cannot deliver on the expected outcomes alone.

149. GFDRR programs and activities can hardly be classified as being relevant to “only” one pillar. Findings in the five countries show that GFDRR programs usually deliver achievements and make contributions across the five GFDRR Pillars. **Interconnections and cross-fertilization among Pillars can go beyond what is conceived in the M&E Framework**, which “only” reflects connections between Pillar 1 and the other four Pillars. These knock-on effects and potential for synergies seem to be country specific and related to enabling factors and partnerships at the national level. This finding seems to support the **vision of GFDRR as a facilitating actor within the theory of change**.

4.2 LESSONS LEARNED ON GFDRR’S THEORY OF CHANGE AND PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY

150. Based on the findings in the five selected countries, the context in which GFDRR operates offers a limited number of enabling factors and a relatively large number of obstacles for program implementation. Where assumptions were made at the national level (between outputs and outcomes in the M&E Framework) for conducive conditions in countries, the opposite seemed to be true across the five case studies. In reality, a limited number of assumptions appeared to hold true. While enabling factors seemed to be mostly country-specific, obstacles and dynamics unfavorable to GFDRR end-goals were identified across the countries. These included: weak institutional frameworks; limited capacities and high staff turnover in national institutions; poor coordination of DRM and competing agendas within government and relevant stakeholders; limited appropriation of TA and DRM tools; inadequate resources and unpredictability of DRM funds; weak regulatory frameworks for DRM and poor policy/law enforcement; informality/legal insecurity; limited permeability of decision-making level and persistent difficulties in accessing DRM data. With few exceptions, the **obstacles encountered in the country setting seemed to compromise the assumptions made and obstruct the expected pathway from outputs to the expected outcomes at the national level**.

151. The parallel analysis of obstacles found at the country level and the most common contributions made by GFDRR suggests an interesting conclusion about the GFDRR’s theory of change. In a number of cases,

GFDRR programs seemed to contribute to the removal (or reduction) of the obstacles encountered at the country level to attain DRM performance goals.

That is, rather than enabling factors (assumed to exist at the country level), enabling actions (resulting from GFDRR inputs) contributed to create an enabling environment for improvements in DRM to take place. By assuming that a conducive setting exists at the country level, the theory of change bears the risk of making GFDRR’s contributions invisible to its stakeholders in the DRM community.

152. Findings from the five case studies suggest that **GFDRR is perceived by its stakeholders at the national level as playing a facilitating role for progress in DRM performance and as a catalyzer of others' activities** (mostly the World Bank, and indirectly the national governments and CSOs). The program's main inputs at the national level were identified as: (i) seed funds (adequate for soft investments but less so for hard investments); (ii) tools for DRM (mostly by facilitating TA and providing software to national institutions); and (iii) the establishment of a focal point at the national level who was reported to play a valuable role in fostering DRM action and leveraging institutional, technical and financial support. GFDRR's partnership strategy at the national level gains relevance within the theory of change when viewing GFDRR from the perspective of a catalyzing actor that helps create an enabling environment and facilitates the effectiveness of DRM investments and the activities of others.

153. Findings from the five countries seem to indicate that the World Bank is the predominant executing partner for GFDRR at the national level. This preference may be explained by a combination of strategic and operational factors: the Bank funds large infrastructure investments and GFDRR seeks to tap its potential to risk-proof these operations; the Bank administers GFDRR at the global level and partnering at the national level may be convenient to reduce transaction costs and gain access to the Bank's high technical capacities. In most countries, **the synergy between World Bank and GFDRR has delivered results, especially in the areas of risk reduction and financial protection.**

154. This intimate partnership has benefitted GFDRR by raising its stance at the government level and providing access to Ministries of Finance and of Planning. In other cases, national stakeholders reported that GFDRR programs were perceived as being part of World Bank operations. The close alignment with the World Bank may be confusing to national partners and limit the leverage of GFDRR over the government or third parties. The implications of GFDRR's partnership strategy at the country level need to be further researched to better inform the theory of change.

155. Based on findings from the five countries, **executing partners other than the World Bank appear to be less explored by GFDRR.** Experience with national CSOs in Nepal seemed to indicate that they are particularly well placed to reach community levels in a more direct and effective way (when seeking to produce results in terms of impact indicators at the national level, as in the M&E Framework, this may be a more effective way forward for GFDRR). Each potential executing partner is likely to have a specific comparative advantage and further research is needed to explore this aspect of GFDRR programming.

4.3 EMERGING RECOMMENDATIONS

156. GFDRR constituencies need to better understand and further acknowledge GFDRR's valuable role as a facilitator/catalyzer of progress in DRM performance at the country level. GFDRR performance at the country level should not be measured against shared and "aspirational" goals at the outcome level. GFDRR would be held accountable more fairly by **assessing its performance in terms of its specific added value (progress made in creating an enabling environment for DRM performance) rather than in terms of achieving the ultimate outcomes.** To this aim, **intermediate outcomes with process-based indicators should be included in the M&E framework.**

157. Considering the nature of GFDRR contributions (mostly enabling actions, generating knowledge, developing institutional capacities, promoting policy frameworks, etc.) **reporting on GFDRR results may need to be based on mid- to long- term scenarios,** rather than short timeframes. Expecting visible outcomes in the two or three year period of program duration, or even the five year period (covered by this evaluation) may be overly ambitious, particularly in developing country contexts.

158. GFDRR's current M&E Framework assumes that sufficient and timely financial support will be made available for DRM. **Donors need to fulfil their commitments.**

159. **The facilitation role that GFDRR plays at the country level should be integrated in the theory of change and acknowledged in the M&E Framework.** The generic assumptions made at the country level should be revisited. An assessment of initial obstacles and enabling factors should inform the design of a GFDRR strategy at the national level. This way, soft investments and interventions could be tailored to the national challenges and GFDRR could be more effective in creating an enabling environment and further contributing to progress in DRM performance.

160. **The implications of GFDRR's partnership strategy should be further explored and used to inform the theory of change and to select executing partners based on their comparative advantages and the country context.** In the meantime, maintaining an open and diversified approach to implementation arrangements and partnership at the national level may be the best way to tap into the potential and comparative advantages of each stakeholder and executing partner.

161. Beyond the overarching theory of change for the Facility, **country-specific strategies should be further developed to increase the effectiveness of national programs.** These should include:

- An ex-ante assessment of the country's DRM performance, challenges and opportunities; a roadmap/timeline to sequence activities in a way that promotes complementarities and synergies; a map of DRM stakeholders to clarify their roles and priority actions and to help identify GFDRR's niche and priorities at national level; and the establishment of a baseline and targets for GFDRR intermediate indicators according to each country's timeframe for intervention.
- Considering the extent to which governance factors can either facilitate or hinder progress on DRM performance, the country strategy should also be informed by an **analysis of political economy at the country level.** This analysis would help identify obstacles (to be avoided) and enabling factors (to be incorporated).

ANNEXES



ANNEXES

ANNEX 1 TERMS OF REFERENCE

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR A RETROSPECTIVE EVALUATION OF THE GFDRR PROGRAM IN A SAMPLE OF DISASTER-PRONE COUNTRIES


A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND RATIONALE

- 1 The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) supports national and local efforts to build resilient societies who can manage and adapt to emerging disaster risks, in order to reduce the human and economic impacts of disasters. The World Bank, the UN and bilateral donors launched GFDRR in 2006 to deepen international technical and financial cooperation to build resilience in vulnerable countries. This is in line with global commitments on this issue made at the time and set out in the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005 - 15.
- 2 GFDRR is a grant-making facility – not a direct implementer – and as such works through partners to stimulate policy reform and public investment that can better protect people from the natural hazard risks they face. An overview of the logic of the GFDRR program is presented in Figure 1.
- 3 GFDRR is responsible for allocating funds entrusted to it in line with geographic and thematic priorities set by its donors and partners. Since 2006, GFDRR has supported over 50 countries, with the most significant engagement in 31 prioritized countries. These include 20 countries financed through a multi-donor trust fund, and 11 countries targeted by individual donors.¹ This evaluation will look at a sample of these countries. In addition, GFDRR also manages special initiatives that focus on particular region or topics, including a EUR 54 million initiative of the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States financed by the European Union.
- 4 GFDRR grants are awarded to national and local government agencies, World Bank teams working with those agencies or other development partners, and are typically one to three years in duration. Grant-making has increased from \$6.4 million in FY2007 to \$46.7 million in FY2012.
- 5 A secretariat of 41 staff manages the allocation of resources and monitoring of implementation. The secretariat also acts as the knowledge and capacity development hub for a decentralized network of DRM specialists in priority countries. These specialists are embedded in World Bank country offices, and play a leading role in implementing GFDRR grants and in developing relationships with partners at country level. More details of how GFDRR works are contained in the new strategy: *A Global Partnership for a More Resilient World*. The strategy provides the overarching strategic vision and operational framework for GFDRR's work.

¹ See <https://www.gfdr.org/node/156> for a current list of countries

- 6 GFDRR is governed by a Consultative Group (CG) made up of donors and non-contributing partners. In May 2013, the CG members endorsed a work plan for the period 2014 to 2016. This work plan is the result of a collaborative effort between GFDRR and partners to define how resources can be best allocated and progress measured in the countries GFDRR seeks to support, and is the first document of its kind for the program. Its production signals the transition from GFDRR as a ‘start-up’ initiative to a maturing program that has greater foresight on how resources can best be allocated to achieve desired outcomes.
- 7 As part of this, the work plan envisages an increasingly structured global program of support, and also an increased focus on monitoring and evaluation. This consultancy and the evaluation it will conduct is a key component of this effort, in recognition of the need to better understand the difference the program is making in the countries it supports, and moreover to better define how empirical evidence of changes in resilience can be captured.

FIGURE 1: AN OVERVIEW OF THE GFDRR PROGRAM



- 8 The work plan includes a new monitoring and evaluation framework (see Annex 1, also in annex in the GFDRR Work Plan 2014-16), which presents the results chain of the program. This is not the first such framework for the program: during the last strategic period (2009 – 12), GFDRR developed a results framework, although this was not used for evaluation at a country level. The current framework – and the program theory model that underpins it – is one in which GFDRR intends to continue to invest, including through this evaluation. The concepts and indicators contained therein are therefore open to future development and refinement.
- 9 The current M&E framework presents the logic that the ultimate success of the GFDRR program – as with any investment in the better management of disaster risks – is averted loss of life or economic activity. In the absence of these events actually happening, GFDRR seeks to demonstrate intermediate results, independently of trends in losses, through considering changes in performance in risk management. Good DRM involves a range of incremental activities that help move human, economic and ecological systems along a path from vulnerability to resilience. This is the underlying principle of the five desired program outcomes set out in the M&E framework:
- Improved identification and understanding of disaster risks
 - Avoided creation of new risks and reduced existing risks in society
 - Improved warning and management of disasters at national, local and community level
 - Increased financial resilience of governments and private sector
 - Quicker, more resilient recovery
- 10 These outcomes are well aligned with the historic focus of the program, and to broader DRM frameworks in use by disaster-prone countries and their development partners. GFDRR and its stakeholders have an interest both in gathering evidence of the likely contribution of the program to these outcomes, and moreover to identify ways to benchmark incremental improvements in each area.
- 11 A number of global programs have made their own efforts to evaluate DRM, notably those working from the perspective of adaptation to climate change.² The field of DRM has few examples of good practice in evaluating impact, as any literature on the subject emphasises (see reference material in section K). Evaluation of DRM programs has tended to focus on institutional and policy aspects; few have considered the risk management action that follows.
- 12 GFDRR is already making advances in defining and measuring the change the program seeks. One key effort is a project, co-funded by DFID, which aims to test and evaluate the uptake of innovation in risk identification and risk financing in low-income and fragile states. A similar project to evaluate evidence in the field of disaster risk financing was also approved by DFID in June 2013. Drawing from this work, GFDRR is also working to develop a deeper articulation of its program theory model. This will be a separate conceptual piece of work outside the scope of these terms of reference, but will nonetheless inform (and be informed by) the evaluation process.

² See for example the January 2013 revised Results Framework for the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience: https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/monitoring_and_evaluation%20

- 13 Although not impact focussed, it is important to note that a number of independent evaluations of the program have already taken place through the six-year life of the GFDRR program (see Table 1). In addition, some current donors intend to conduct evaluations at the end of their current funding cycle. For example, the World Bank's Development Grant Facility (DGF), which has provided financing primarily for GFDRR's partnership with the UN Office for Disaster Reduction, is currently planning a specific evaluation of this aspect of the program (separate TOR available). This evaluation will review and assess the activities financed by the DGF grants and the impact of the partnership between GFDRR and UNISDR on the achievement of the mission and objectives of the GFDRR Program.

TABLE 1: PREVIOUS EVALUATIONS/REVIEWS OF GFDRR

TITLE	DATE	METHODS
Evaluation of the World Bank GFDRR – Volume 1: Final Evaluation Report; Volume 2: Annexes	2010	Questions structured in an evaluation matrix based on three OECD DAC criteria. Data collected through sampling of 55 projects; document review; interviews; on-site field missions (in Haiti, Indonesia, Madagascar and Nepal) and virtual field missions (in Djibouti, Ghana and Malawi).
DFID Multilateral Aid Review	2011	Value for money ranked based on two criteria – organisational strengths and contribution to UK development objectives. 2013 update pending.
Australian Multilateral Assessment	2012	Assessed on seven criteria – delivering results; alignment with Australia's interests; contribution to multilateral system; strategic management and performance; cost and value consciousness; partnership behaviour; and transparency and accountability
Global Program Review of GFDRR conducted by IEG	2012	Main methods were document review and interviews with key informants (see Annex I). Structured broadly around OECD DAC criteria.

- 14 The evaluation outlined in these Terms of Reference should be considered as the first step in a longer term effort to move towards better defining and measuring the impact of the program. GFDRR recognizes that this is not an 'impact evaluation' in the traditional sense. Rather, it is a retrospective evaluation that will help estimate program causes and effects, test the validity of the current M & E framework and provide inputs to an evolving program theory model. GFDRR plans to work to define aspects of its program that may be most appropriate for experimental impact assessment, for example on the uptake of catastrophe risk insurance, but this is outside the scope of this evaluation.
- 15 This will be a timely piece of work in the context of the development arc of the program. Moreover, it will also come as the international development community attempts to define more specific goals and targets in post-2015 development frameworks on the theme of disaster and climate resilience, and as the World Bank itself takes 'risk management' as a lens through which to think about and deliver development (notably through the forthcoming World Development Report 2014).

B. EVALUATION OBJECTIVES

- 16 The objectives of the evaluation are:
- a. to identify if program outputs are contributing to expected (and unexpected) improvements in DRM performance in a sample of disaster prone countries participating in the GFDRR program;
 - b. to test whether the assumptions made in defining expected program effects hold true;
 - c. to draw out lessons learned and make recommendations on:
 - i. The M&E framework, including whether (and how) to adjust indicators for improved program design and evaluation;
 - ii. The development of the program theory model.

C. AUDIENCE

- 17 The main recipients of the evaluation are the GFDRR secretariat and its funders and country partners. UN organizations and civil society organizations and the broader DRM community are also an important audience.

D. KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS

- 18 The following are the key questions that GFDRR seeks to answer through this retrospective evaluation of its program:
- a. What is the nature and level of contribution that program activities have made to outputs, outcomes and impacts consistent with the M&E framework and (b) any additional program effects not captured through this framework?
 - b. In particular, what evidence exists of the catalytic role of GFDRR activities in leveraging policy commitments and investment in disaster risk management by governments and/or their development partners (including the World Bank)? What is the observed or forecasted impact of these investments?
 - c. Where program effects are observed, what enabling factors are most important? How did GFDRR cultivate these?
 - d. Where program effects are not observed or minimal, what obstacles are most apparent? How did GFDRR mitigate these?
-

E. SCOPE OF THE WORK

- 19 The time period covered by this evaluation is 2007 – 2012, that is, from the inception of the program to the end of the last strategy period.
- 20 The geographic scope of the evaluation is 3 – 5 countries. The countries to be evaluated will be selected from GFDRR priority countries, assuring diversity across three criteria: geographic region; political and socio-economic context; and scale and duration of GFDRR support. Based on these criteria, a provisional proposal is to evaluate work in Haiti, Togo, Djibouti, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. Final country selection would take place during a virtual inception meeting.
- 21 There are some aspects of the GFDRR program that will be outside of the scope of this evaluation. The evaluation will focus on GFDRR's primary role of influencing governments, and this will be the emphasis of the studies. This is not to say that private/non-profit spheres are not important, but rather that the focus of the program has been based on a government-led approach and this offers the most fertile ground for evaluation. The GFDRR-UNISDR partnership will also be outside of the scope of this evaluation, due to the parallel evaluation planned on this specific aspect of the program (see above). Finally, a number of global efforts are underway to come up with new ways to track trends in losses, as part of global commitments to building resilience to disasters.³ This highest level of impact is outside the scope of this evaluation.

F. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

- 22 GFDRR's expectation is that the evaluation focusses on assessing likelihood of causality between outputs delivered and outcomes observed, and the assumptions the program has made at this level. It is likely that the contractor would use mixed methods to identify plausible linkages here. In this way, it is useful to think of the GFDRR program as one that sets out one amongst many possible pathways to disaster resilience. The job of the GFDRR evaluator, therefore, will be to look for evidence of the validity and effectiveness of this 'pathway', by seeking to link program activities to program effects. In this way, the evaluation is in part seeking to account for investments made by donors, and in part seeking to test the program's theory model, using the 3 – 5 countries as a policy 'laboratory'.
- 23 Evaluators should focus on gathering qualitative data/evidence to (a) estimate the extent of change experienced by the country during the time period; and (b) determine the type, nature and level of contribution program outputs have had on this observed change. 'Change' should be defined according to the outcome indicators presented in the M&E framework, but not be limited to this. This is consistent with the third objective of the evaluation, i.e to make recommendations on the future development of the framework itself. This evaluation should test the validity and feasibility of outcome indicators, and to propose revisions where there is scope to make them more 'SMART'. One inherent challenge arising is

³ See for example Mitchel, T et al (2013) DRM in Post-2015 Development Goals, ODI at: <http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8354.pdf>

whether measuring the direction of travel in a given country is preferable to defining absolute outcomes (for example, of thresholds to be passed). Evaluators may make recommendations on this.

- 24 GFDRR will provide evaluators with programmatic and financial data on activities implemented and outputs generated during the relevant time period, which will form the basis for contribution analysis. Such an analysis should set out the cause-effect issue to be addressed, assessing the logic of the links and the plausibility of the assumptions, and identify evidence needed to substantiate the contribution. Qualitative methods of particular relevance will include key informant interviews and participatory group techniques such as participatory rapid assessment. Secondary data from public agencies should also be sought. Based on evidence collected through these methods, a contribution 'story' can be generated and tested under future evaluations.
- 25 A key element of the inception phase will involve agreeing with GFDRR and the TAG how country-level outcomes will be estimated. This is likely to involve some qualitative methods, e.g. using recall methods to collect relevant qualitative data. GFDRR expects bidders to outline in their tenders how they would propose to approach this element of the evaluation. Details of this will be finalised with the selected contractor during inception.
- 26 It is expected that understanding contextual factors will be a key characteristic of the evaluation, for example to identify factors of success or failure of the program theory. Contextual factors are important to understand in two different ways – first as factors influencing the effectiveness of GFDRR activities and second as independent factors producing outcomes directly.
- 27 In order to address the second evaluation question in particular (see paragraph 18.b), evaluators should consider the World Bank's investment portfolio (active and pipeline) and compare trends in DRM in the World Bank's country portfolio and strategies prior to the start of GFDRR and after. In so doing, evaluators may attempt to establish ways to estimate population coverage by this investment and, where possible, the disaggregation of this data. Specificity in the geographic or demographic focus of new DRM policies, other institutional reforms or investment programs will help in this effort.
- 28 Given the focus of the GFDRR program on national and sub-national processes of government, meetings and consultations with counterparts in national and city government agencies are likely to be a critical part of the evaluation methodology. It will also be important to triangulate reports from government officials with those from other development partners.
- 29 Beneficiary surveys with disaster affected or disaster prone people on the ground are an important part of judging impact of DRM interventions. While it will not be possible to conduct extensive 'on-the-ground' beneficiary surveys within the scope of this evaluation – given the stated focus on national level outcomes - it is important that the evaluation triangulate findings with those of community-based assessments. The largest effort in this area to date has been the 'Views from the Frontline' survey conducted by the Global CSO Network for Disaster Reduction.

Where gaps in beneficiary survey data exist in the context of the evaluation questions set, targeted key informant interviews at local levels may be beneficial.

- 30 Initial comparative analysis across countries should be possible across the sample of countries. A country visit protocol will be established by the evaluators to ensure comparability. Wherever possible, evaluators should analyse why some countries have made better progress towards desired outcomes than others and what GFDRR has done/could do to (better) facilitate such progress. The evaluators should make recommendations on how GFDRR might facilitate future comparative analysis through its data collection.
- 31 GFDRR invites clear and specific ideas for approaches and methods that would enhance the results of the evaluation from bidders in their proposals. The selected contractor will provide an inception report, based on details set out in their proposal, setting this out in more detail following initial consultation with the GFDRR Secretariat and its Technical Advisory Group on Evaluation (see paragraph 38).
- 32 GFDRR collects primary data on its activities and outputs through an online 'results-based management system'. This data will be made freely available to the evaluation contractor. In addition, the contractor may provide advice and make suggestions to GFDRR as to the type of monitoring data needed for the evaluation, both during the evaluation's inception phase and throughout implementation.
- 33 GFDRR expects this evaluation to play an important role in contributing to broader understanding about how DRM interventions can make a difference to how disaster-prone countries experience natural hazards through the communication of analysis of evidence. It is therefore important that the final evaluation have a compelling communication style, which helps bring the analysis to life, including through illustrative examples and photography. GFDRR is open to suggestions on how best to achieve a compelling communication style in the report, which could involve embedding a communications expert in the team, or providing additional capacity within the Secretariat.
- 34 Evaluators must be able to undertake objective, unbiased evaluation. Therefore, each bidder must fully divulge any activities or connections that might lead to potential or perceived conflicts of interest, a self-assessment of whether such conflicts exist, and if so, how the firm proposes to manage these. This applies at both the corporate and individual levels. Failure to disclose such conflicts would constitute grounds for disqualification. Given that the pool of consulting firms from which to draw evaluators with the required skills, knowledge, and experience may be limited, it is understood that some potential conflicts of interest may have to be managed transparently rather than avoided completely. Any such occurrences will be reported in the final evaluation report. The consulting firm will be expected neither to engage in nor to seek any other GFDRR-funded work during the course of this consultancy.

G. DELIVERABLES AND TIMEFRAME

#	DELIVERABLE	DUE	REQUIREMENTS
1	Inception Report	September 15, 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Proposed analytical framework based on evaluation questions set and informed by the background documents provided. Proposal of a detailed field work methodology, including a country visit protocol (approach for selection of interview candidates, data sources, selection of activities for analysis etc.). The expected length of each country visit is 7 to 14 days
2	Workshop at the 15th Consultative Group meeting in Washington DC	November 13 – 14, 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Design and facilitate a workshop with the GFDRR Secretariat and members of its Consultative Group on evaluation of impact Presentation of approach, methodology and preliminary findings from the field (majority of field work should be completed before this date)
3	Draft evaluation report	December 15, 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An Executive Summary A synthesis of findings, including any comparative analysis A main section detailing country-specific findings and appropriate justification, presented as a series of country visit reports A concluding section which draw together any comparative analysis, lessons and recommendations Relevant annexes (e.g. quantitative data, interviews transcripts)
4	Final evaluation report	January 31, 2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incorporation of comments and feedback by the GFDRR Secretariat and the TAG Revised Executive Summary and Evaluation Report Revised annexes Final report should be presented in Word, and be no more than 35 pages, excluding annexes
5	Completion of assignment	February 28, 2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Edited final evaluation report, including supporting data sets, graphics and images. Potential workshop / presentation to stakeholders.

- 35 Bidders would be expected to present a more detailed timeline of activities in their tenders. It is expected that this would be finalized between GFDRR and the selected contractor during inception. Bidders should present their proposal for team composition, including balance between international and local consultants.

H. PAYMENT SCHEDULE

- 36 The consultant will be remunerated for the deliverables specified in Section H as follows:
- 10% upon contract signature
 - 10% upon delivery of Inception Report
 - 30% upon delivery of Draft Evaluation Report
 - 40% upon delivery of Final Evaluation Report
 - 10% upon delivery of Edited Final Evaluation Report

I. OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT

- 37 The consultancy firm will report directly to the Head of the GFDRR Secretariat (or a designated task manager in the team) who will manage all aspects of the contractual relationship. In addition, the Secretariat will facilitate the work of the evaluation consultants by providing all necessary data and documentation to the consultants; review deliverables for factual accuracy; communicate findings to CG and other stakeholders.
- 38 A Technical Advisory Group of 4 – 6 expert members, nominated by the chair and co-chair of the GFDRR Consultative Group, will provide independent technical oversight of the evaluation, and act as a vehicle for stakeholder participation and collaboration. The primary function of the TAG is to assure the quality of evaluation outputs and to facilitate broad participation in the evaluation process. The consultants will report to the nominated chair of the group on a routine basis. The terms of reference for this group are available separately. Specifically, the group will:
- a. Ensure the satisfactory framing and design of the evaluation;
 - b. Provide guidance to the evaluation team on matters relating to evaluation standards and expectations;
 - c. Review evaluation outputs (inception report, plus various drafts of the final report);
 - d. Avail data, contacts and other inputs as necessary to the evaluation team;
 - e. Be available for technical consultation on specific or general issues, as required by the evaluation team via telephone or email;
 - f. Design and conduct a workshop-style session at the 15th meeting of the CG, in collaboration with the evaluation consultants, the GFDRR Secretariat and the CG Co-chair.

J. MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS OF THE CONSULTANTS

- 39 GFDRR welcomes bids from consulting firms or teams that demonstrate the following:
- a. Knowledge and experience with complex quantitative and qualitative evaluations;
 - b. Demonstrated track record and knowledge of trust fund programs;
 - c. In-depth knowledge of issues related to DRM policies and operations;
 - d. Previous experience of theory-based approaches to evaluation;
 - e. Previous experience with the evaluation and/or operation of multi-donor programs or global partnerships (preferred).
 - f. Excellent written and verbal communication skills, and track record in developing human interest stories
-

K. LIST OF REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

EVALUATION RESOURCES

Villanueva, P., 2012, *Learning to Adapt: monitoring and evaluation approaches in climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction – challenges, gaps and ways forward*, Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, UK.

IEG/DAC, 2007, *Sourcebook for Evaluating Global and Regional Partnership Programs: Indicative Principles and Standards*

Major Evaluation Criteria and Suggested Evaluation Questions for GRPP Evaluations," Annex G in IEG, 2011, *The World Bank's Involvement in Global and Regional Partnership Programs: An Independent Assessment*

IEG, 2012, *Global Program Review of the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery*

Evaluation of the World Bank Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) - Volume I – Final Evaluation Report & Volume II - Annexes

Australian Multilateral Assessment of GFDRR, 2012

DFID Multilateral Aid Review of GFDRR, 2011

Global Network of CSOs for Disaster Reduction, 'Views from the Frontline' Reports (2009, 2011, 2013).

Carter, R. (2012), 'Theory-based evaluation approach (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report)', Birmingham, UK: Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, University of Birmingham.

Vogel, I. (2012) *Review of the Use of 'Theory of Change' in International Development: Review Report*

Mitchel, T. et al (2013) *DRM in Post-2015 Development Goals*, Overseas Development Institute, London, UK.

GFDRR RESOURCES

GFDRR Partnership Charter

GFDRR Partnership Strategy 2009-2012: Reducing Disaster Risks for Sustainable Development

Managing Disaster Risks for Resilient Future – GFDRR Strategy 2013-2015

GFDRR Work Plan 2014 - 16

The Sendai Report: Managing Disaster Risks for a Resilient Future

GFDRR Annual Reports 2007-2012

GFDRR-supported Post-Disaster Assessments 2007-12 (notably the section on risk reduction in each report)

Minutes of the 13th and 14th meetings of the GFDRR Consultative Group

ANNEX 2 METHODOLOGY

This annex explains the methodological approach and tools used throughout the evaluation in order to assess the outputs and outcomes achieved by GFDRR in a sample of countries. Initially, the evaluation team re-defined the scope and objectives of the study by reconsidering the country selection proposed in the ToR and the time period in which achievements were to be analyzed. It developed an Analytical Framework that guided the process of assessing the outcomes of the GFDRR and testing the assumptions and validity of the M&E Framework. The evaluation unpacked the evaluation objectives and evaluation questions, incorporating them in the evaluation matrix and identifying sources that would help address them.

The annex also includes the tools that were used to collect and interpret data and represent findings. These tools are the Interview Guide used in the semi-structured interviews and two scoring tools created to qualitatively assess both national progress in DRM and the contribution of the role played by GFDRR to this progress.

FOCUSING THE EVALUATION: COUNTRY SELECTION AND PERIOD COVERED

As the title of the evaluation indicates, a sample of case study countries was selected. The sample was chosen to ensure that countries were as diverse as possible in terms of **region**,⁴⁴ **political and socio-economic context**, **type of disasters** (slow onset, flood, earthquake, etc.) and phase (pre-disaster and recovery) and **scale and scope** of GFDRR program activity (assessed in terms of total budget and number of projects). **Data availability** was also taken into consideration in the sample design. The team chose countries for which there were as many published editions as possible of Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) and Views from the Front Line (VFL) reports (see Table 2).

In order to ensure the best fit with these criteria, the evaluation team analyzed 31 countries: 20 GFDRR core countries financed through a multi-donor trust fund and 11 GFDRR non-core countries funded by individual donors (see Table 1). Following this analysis, **Guatemala, Malawi, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Vietnam** were selected for the final sample. These five countries are located in four different GFDRR regions and represent US\$12,057,273 of GFDRR funding, or 19 percent of GFDRR's total budget. They comprise 48 active and 49 completed GFDRR projects, which account for approximately 14 percent of the total GFDRR activity in terms of both types of projects.

Although the formal focus of the exercise was on the period between **2007-2012**, exceptionally, when assessing programs that cover a period beyond 2012, the evaluation also sought to understand achievements in 2013 that could be the result of activities programmed during previous years.

⁴⁴ GFDRR works in six regions: Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, East Asia and Pacific, and Europe and Central Asia, the latter representing the lowest level of GFDRR activity. While there is also considerable activity at the global level, this was not a priority for the current evaluation.

TABLE 2: ANALYSIS OF CORE AND NON-CORE GFDRR COUNTRIES

COUNTRIES	REGION	CORE/ NON- CORE	LDC	INCOME GROUP	LENDING CATEGORY	RESOURCES AWARDED (US\$)	% TRANSFERRED	% DISBURSED	NUM. OF ACTIVE PROJECTS	NUM. OF COMPLETED PROJECTS	YEAR OF START OF GFDRR SUPPORT
BANGLADESH	SAR	Non-core	Yes	Low	IDA	5,261,767	91%	74%	2	6	2008
BURKINA FASO	AFR	Core	Yes	Low	IDA	1,586,147	100%	17%	1	2	2008
COLOMBIA	LAC	Non-core		Lower middle	IBRD	1,490,323	71%	57%	4	2	2010
COSTA RICA	LAC	Non-core		Upper middle	IBRD	724,000	66%	84%	2	0	2009
DJIBOUTI	MNA	Core	Yes	Lower middle	IDA	1,394,000	91%	33%	3	2	2007
ECUADOR	LAC	Non-core		Upper middle	IBRD	953,000	62%	84%	1	0	2008
ETHIOPIA	AFR	Core	Yes	Low	IDA	2,847,738	83%	40%	2	3	2008
GHANA	AFR	Core		Lower middle	IDA	1,025,000	100%	75%	1	1	2008
GUATEMALA	LAC	Non-core		Lower middle	IBRD	1,229,538	76%	70%	1	2	2008
HAITI	LAC	Core	Yes	Low	IDA	8,661,304	83%	73%	6	3	2008
INDONESIA	EAP	Core		Lower middle	IBRD	4,061,392	78%	61%	1	3	2007
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC	ECA	Core		Low	IDA	1,782,119	92%	9%	2	1	2008
LAO PDR	EAP	Non-core	Yes	Lower middle	IDA	1,655,000	66%	65%	2	3	2009
MADAGASCAR	AFR	Core	Yes	Low	IDA	1,408,234	100%	67%	1	1	2008
MALAWI	AFR	Core	Yes	Low	IDA	1,946,522	100%	91%	1	1	2008
MALI	AFR	Core	Yes	Low	IDA	1,400,000	95%	2%	1	0	2012
MOZAMBIQUE	AFR	Core	Yes	Low	IDA	2,686,448	99%	43%	2	1	2006
NEPAL	SAR	Core	Yes	Low	IDA	2,873,400	77%	44%	2	2	2007
PAKISTAN	SAR	Non-core		Lower middle	Blend	1,260,000	37%	35%	2	5	2006
PANAMA	LAC	Core		Upper middle	IBRD	500,000	100%	57%	1	0	2010
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	EAP	Core		Lower middle	Blend	1,873,200	95%	1%	2	0	-
PHILIPPINES	EAP	Non-core		Lower middle	IBRD	5,500,000	33%	27%	2	2	2009
SENEGAL	AFR	Core	Yes	Lower middle	IDA	1,897,849	96%	48%	1	2	2009
SOLOMON ISLANDS	EAP	Core	Yes	Lower middle	IDA	-	-	-	0	0	2008
SRI LANKA	SAR	Non-core		Lower middle	Blend	1,654,087	64%	16%	1	1	2010
TOGO	AFR	Core	Yes	Low	IDA	1,807,640	100%	12%	1	2	2010
VANUATU	EAP	Non-core	Yes	Lower middle	IDA	-	-	-	0	0	2010
VIETNAM	EAP	Core		Lower middle	Blend	4,353,726	84%	32%	2	1	2008
YEMEN	MNA	Core	Yes	Lower middle	IDA	1,568,944	100%	99%	1	3	2008
GRAND TOTAL						63,401,378	81%	50%	48	49	

Source: 2012 Updated Country Profiles. GFDRR. Note: Activity in the Marshall Islands and Mongolia is very limited to date and not yet included in GFDRR data

TABLE 3: DATA AVAILABILITY FOR THE SELECTED COUNTRIES

COUNTRIES	VIEWS FROM THE FRONTLINE				HYOGO FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION
	VFL 2013	VFL 2011	VFL 2009	VFL NATIONAL PROGRESS REPORTS AVAILABLE	HFA PROGRESS REPORTS
VIETNAM	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (2011 and 2013)	2007-2009; 2009-2011
GUATEMALA	Yes	Yes	No	Yes (2013)	2007; 2009-2011; 2011-2013
SRI LANKA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (2011 and 2013)	2007-2009; 2009-2011; 2011-2013
NEPAL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (2013)	2007-2009; 2009-2011
MALAWI	Yes	Yes	No	Yes (2011)	2007-2009; 2009-2011; 2011-2013

Source: Compilation made by DARA

REFINING THE OBJECTIVES: EVALUATION MATRIX

During the inception phase, specific questions were added to the evaluation matrix in order to further explore the evaluation objectives and evaluation questions in the ToR (see Table 3). Sources of verification and evaluation methods were identified for each specific question in order to guide the evaluation team's work in a systematic way in the five countries. The main sources include:

- A selection of HFA core indicators relevant to the measurement of GFDRR's five expected outcomes (one per Pillar, according to the 2013 M&E Framework); the national self-assessment of DRM progress undertaken by country governments (HFA Monitor);
- Primary data at the country level (existing evidence and interviewee perceptions)
- GFDRR program documents and GFDRR, WB, Views from the Front Line and external reports; and
- The evaluation team's expert judgment.

TABLE 4: EVALUATION MATRIX

EVALUATION OBJECTIVE (TOR)	EVALUATION QUESTIONS (TOR)	SPECIFIC QUESTIONS	SOURCES/METHODS
1 To identify if program outputs are contributing to expected (and unexpected) improvements in DRM performance in the sample	<p>What is the nature and level of contribution that program activities have made to outputs, outcomes and impacts consistent with the M&E framework and any additional program effects not captured through the framework?</p> <p>In particular, what evidence exists of leveraging policy commitments and investment in disaster risk management by governments and/or development partners (including the World Bank)?</p> <p>What is the observed or forecasted impact of these investments?</p>	<p>Have the intended outputs been achieved?</p> <p>What effects beyond direct outputs can be observed? (Divide these into direct outcomes and indirect outcomes in the form of synergy or leveraging).</p> <p>To what extent are all these effects captured in the M&E Framework?⁴⁵</p> <p>Can any impacts (specific effects on people) be verified?</p> <p>What is the actual or expected contribution of GFDRR to DRM (in the sample country)?</p> <p>What are the trends in WB DRM portfolio and strategy from 2005?</p> <p>Are there any links between these trends and GFDRR's work?</p>	<p>Triangulation of plans, reports and interviews</p> <p>Results Analysis conducted on the basis of case studies (see below)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> HFA, VFL reports Program documents Semi-structured interviews and group discussions with key stakeholders (GFDRR, Gvt, INGOs, UN Agencies, Academics, communities and local authorities) Estimation of GFDRR effects relating to the above
2 To test whether the assumptions made in defining expected and unexpected program effects hold true	<p>Where program effects are observed, what enabling factors are most important? How did GFDRR cultivate these?</p> <p>Where program effects are not observed or minimal, what obstacles are apparent?</p> <p>How did GFDRR mitigate these?</p>	<p>Do the assumptions in the M&E Framework appear to be valid?</p> <p>What enabling factors can be observed and verified? How were obstacles addressed?</p> <p>What was GFDRR's role in relation to the above?</p>	<p>Triangulation of program design/M&E framework assumptions and interviews with key stakeholders:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Semi-structured interviews and group discussions with key stakeholders (GFDRR, Gvt, INGOs, UN Agencies, Academics, communities and local authorities) Program design assumptions and M&E Framework assumptions Background documents
3 To draw lessons learned and recommendations on the M&E Framework	N/A	<p>Does the M&E Framework provide useful indicators linking outputs to outcomes?</p> <p>Does the M&E framework lead to an adequate representation of GFDRR achievements?⁴⁶</p>	<p>Identification of most useful indicators (see point 4.3) Comparison with indicators from M&E Framework.</p> <p>Score the result per indicator</p>
4 To draw lessons learned and recommend on the program theory model	N/A	<p>What theory model does the M&E Framework represent?</p> <p>Has this proved valid in the sample country?</p> <p>How does it vary across the sample countries studied?⁴⁷</p> <p>What are the implications for the existing program theory model?</p>	<p>Identification of most useful indicators (see point 4.3)</p> <p>Compare existing Assumptions in M&E Framework and underlying program theory/ other unforeseen enabling and hindering factors</p>

¹ In the Evaluation Report this is addressed under Evaluation Question 3

² In the Evaluation Report this is modified to- How can the M&E Framework be adjusted to lead towards improved program design and evaluation?

³ This question is considered in Chapter 3 of the Evaluation Report


ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The analytical process followed by the evaluation team has two main components, namely, (1) analysis per case study (see Chapter 2) and (2) cross country analysis and “reality check” to test the appropriateness of GFDRR’s assumptions and M&E Framework (see Chapter 3). Figure 1 shows the Analytical Framework that was used in the evaluation:

⁴⁴ This is addressed under evaluation question three.

⁴⁶ This has been modified to: “How can the M&E Framework be adjusted to lead towards improved program design and evaluation?”

⁴⁷ This question is considered in Chapter 3 of the evaluation report



This Analytical Framework shows the logical process used to assess GFDRR's performance at the country level (see Chapter 2). As shown in Figure 3, the evaluation began by verifying the activities executed and the achievements resulting from them. The evaluation explored (i) the extent to which achievements correspond to the expected outputs (GFDRR area of accountability in the M&E Framework); (ii) the extent to which these achievements led to the expected outcomes and effectively contribute to improvements in DRM performance across the five Pillars of GFDRR (area of shared accountability in the M&E Framework); (iii) the extent to which the obstacles and enabling factors observed at the field level are actually contributing to the assumptions in the M&E Framework holding true; and finally, (iv) the evaluation explores dynamics regarding partnership strategies and the added value that GFDRR brings to the field.

For each GFDRR program at the country level the team analyzed:

- Activities implemented with GFDRR inputs by executing partners at the national level;
- Deliverables and achievements generated by the program;
- Contributions to DRM performance at the national level associated with the inputs and outputs generated by GFDRR programs;
- Obstacles that impeded or restricted the generation of further achievements or further contributions;
- Enabling factors that enhanced program achievements and/or expanded the extent of contributions.
- GFDRR partnerships strategy at the country level that facilitated the implementation of activities and/or provided opportunities to tap the potential for synergies at the national level.

In order to assess GFDRR's contribution to DRM at the national level, the evaluation team began by exploring the level of progress in DRM at the national level and the challenges to this progress during the evaluation period. In the absence of a baseline study informing GFDRR program formulation at the country level, the HFA National Progress reports⁴⁸ were taken as a frame of reference to contextualise GFDRR contributions to DRM progress at the national level. The Table 4 below shows the alignment of the GFDRR Pillars with the HFA Core Indicators:

⁴⁸ UNISDR has developed an evaluation tool to assist national governments in assessing their progress in building resilience to disaster, based on the principles of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), which is the world's universally-accepted guide for reducing disaster risk. HFA National Self-assessments capture key trends and areas of progress and challenges at all levels with regard to achieving the strategic goals of the HFA.

TABLE 5. ALIGNMENT OF HFA CORE INDICATORS TO GFDRR PILLARS

GFDRR PILLARS	HFA INDICATORS
PILLAR 1	National and local risk assessments based on hazard data and vulnerability information are available and include risk assessments for key sectors
	Systems are in place to monitor, archive and disseminate data on key hazards and vulnerabilities
	Relevant information on disasters is available and accessible at all levels, to all stakeholders (through networks, development of information sharing systems, etc)
	Research methods and tools for multi-risk assessments and cost benefit analysis are developed and strengthened
PILLAR 2	National policy and legal framework for disaster risk reduction exists with decentralised responsibilities and capacities at all levels
	Dedicated and adequate resources are available to implement disaster risk reduction plans and activities at all administrative levels
	A national multi-sectoral platform for disaster risk reduction is functioning
	Disaster risk reduction is an integral objective of environment related policies and plans, including for land use, natural resource management and adaptation to climate change
	Social development policies and plans are being implemented to reduce the vulnerability of populations most at risk
	Economic and productive sectoral policies and plans have been implemented to reduce the vulnerability of economic activities
	Planning and management of human settlements incorporate disaster risk reduction elements, including enforcement of building codes
	Procedures are in place to assess the disaster risk impacts of major development projects, especially infrastructure
PILLAR 3	Early warning systems are in place for all major hazards, with outreach to communities
	Strong policy, technical and institutional capacities and mechanisms for disaster risk management, with a disaster risk reduction perspective are in place
	Disaster preparedness plans and contingency plans are in place at all administrative levels, and regular training drills and rehearsals are held to test and develop disaster response programs
	Procedures are in place to exchange relevant information during hazard events and disasters, and to undertake post-event reviews
PILLAR 4	Financial reserves and contingency mechanisms are in place to support effective response and recovery when required
PILLAR 5	Disaster risk reduction measures are integrated into post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation processes

Finally, the evaluation team captured perceptions of key informants regarding the relevance of the role played by GFDRR in enhancing DRM performance at national level. These perceptions were represented numerically through a scoring tool (see “Tools” section below). The progress made on DRM performance at the national level and the perceptions of the contributions made by GFDRR are presented in the tables called “Progress on DRM Performance and GFDRR’s Role” in each case study.

MAIN TOOLS

INTERVIEW GUIDE

The Interview Guide (see Table 7 below) was based on the specific questions formulated in the evaluation matrix. It served to structure interviews with stakeholders from national and subnational governments, World Bank staff, UN agencies, local and international NGOs, the donor community, academia, consultants and representatives of affected communities. The way in which questions were posed and the focus of the interview were adapted to the stakeholder interviewed, as each interviewee's level of familiarity with GFDRR's terminology and GFDRR's work in the country varied.

TABLE 6: INTERVIEW GUIDE

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Was the basic objective (Output) of GFDRR activity achieved? 2. What was the quality of the Output? 3. What was the most important direct result (Outcome) of the activity? 4. Were there any obstacles or problems? How were these addressed? 5. Did GFDRR provide any further enabling help such as technical support? 6. Were there any other direct effects of the activity? 7. What is the likelihood that further effects may be achieved in the future? 8. Were there effects that could be described as synergy with other activities or facilitation of other investment? In relation to the above would you describe the effect as 'leverage'? 9. Would you be able to specify any impacts on the lives of people? To what extent could these be attributed to GFDRR?
SPECIFIC QUESTIONS FOR GFDRR AND WB STAFF
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 10. Was the Output consistent with plans? 11. Were obstacles and risks recognised in planning the activity? 12. How were such obstacles overcome? 13. What was the most important single effect (Outcome) from the activity? 14. What was the relationship of the GFDRR activity to other WB activity? 15. What are the trends in WB DRM portfolio over the last 5 years? 16. What changes would you attribute to GFDRR? 17. What other factors contributed to change? 18. Overall how would you describe GFDRR's contribution to national achievement in relation to DRM?
SPECIFIC QUESTIONS TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 19. How does the activity relate to similar activities in the same and different parts of government? 20. Did the input address a specific priority for government? 21. Were the enabling efforts of GFDRR adequate? 22. What do you expect to be the long-term effects of the activity?
SPECIFIC QUESTIONS TO OTHER ACTORS
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 23. Can you verify that GFDRR undertook the (specified) activity? 24. How would you describe the way in which it was planned and managed? 25. Did GFDRR achieve the maximum effect through enabling action such as cooperation and communication with other actors? 26. Do you know of any indirect effects?

A list of interviewees held by country is available in Table 6:

TABLE 7: SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS HELD BY COUNTRY

CASE STUDY COUNTRY	LEVEL	CATEGORY	NUMBER OF INTERVIEWEES
VIETNAM	National Level	World Bank	11
		Government Departments	19
		Donors	3
		UN	2
		INGO/NGO	5
		Academia	1
	Sub-Total		41
	Sub-national Level	District Departments	4
		Affected community people	10
	Sub-Total		14
GUATEMALA	National Level	World Bank	5
		Government Departments	17
		Donors	2
		UN/IDB	2
		INGO/NGO	2
		Academia/consultants	7
	Sub-Total		35
	Sub-national Level	District Departments	4
	Sub-Total		4
	MALAWI	National Level	World Bank
Government Departments			15
Donors			1
UN			4
INGO/NGO			4
Academia			4
Sub-Total			30
Sub-national Level		District Departments	1
		Community representatives members of the Village Civil Protection Committees	About 35
Sub-Total			36
NEPAL	National	World Bank	2
		Government Departments	1
		Donors	1
		UN	1
		INGO/NGO	2
		Academia/consultants	1
Sub-Total		8	
SRI LANKA	National	World Bank	2
		Government Departments	7
		Donors	1
		UN	3
		INGO/NGO	2
Sub-Total		15	
TOTAL INTERVIEWED			183

SCORING TOOLS

Two scoring tools were used in order to: (i) assess progress in DRM performance in each country; and (ii) assess the perceptions of key informants regarding the relevance of GFDRR's role in enhancing DRM performance at the national level.

- i. The evaluation confirmed, nuanced or adjusted the reported HFA progress, following perceptions of key informants. To capture key informants' perceptions on the level of progress on DRM at country level a scoring scale of 1 to 5 was generated by the evaluation in which (1) represents "no significant progress perceived in attitudes, perceptions or actions regarding this outcome"; (2) represents "a national dialogue has started at government level regarding this outcome"; (3) represents "the government's understanding and awareness of the importance of issues under this outcome has increased"; (4) represents "the government has designed/developed/adopted guidelines/policies/methodologies regarding issues under this outcome"; and (5) represents "an action plan and/or monitoring system/verification mechanism has been implemented by the government."
- ii. In order to measure the relevance of the role played by GFDRR, perceptions of national stakeholders/ key informants and expert judgment were used to produce a second score, reflecting answers to the following interview questions:
 17. *What was the most important direct result (outcome) of the GFDRR activity?*
 18. *Were there any obstacles or problems? Were these addressed?*
 19. *Did GFDRR provide any further enabling help such as technical support?*
 20. *Were there any other direct effects of the activity?*
 21. *What is the likelihood that further effects may be achieved in the future?*
 22. *Were there effects that could be described as synergy with other activities or facilitation of other investment?*
 23. *In relation to the above would you describe the effect as "leverage"?*

The score given to the relevance of the role played by GFDRR in contributing to the national performance on DRM is based on a scale from 1 to 5 in which (1) represents "marginal"; (2) represents "partial"; (3) represents "important"; (4) represents "significant"; and (5) represents "fundamental".

Both the progress made on DRM performance at the national level and the perceptions of the contributions made by GFDRR are presented in the tables called "Progress on DRM Performance and GFDRR's Role" in each case study (Chapter 2).

Existing evidence and interviewee perceptions collected through interviews, along with team expert judgment, were highly relevant to the process of assigning scores, as they could be adapted to the purpose of the evaluation. Therefore, following triangulation, expert analysis and judgment, interviewee perceptions on GFDRR performance form the primary basis from which scores are built.

It is important to note that although the team was committed to a policy of triangulating evidence, there were many cases in which GFDRR (or World Bank) staff were the primary source of information and could only be corroborated with government officials who also had a stake in the program's activities and results. It was difficult to identify independent third parties. When they were identified, they often had limited awareness of GFDRR activities and a hazy understanding of the distinction between GFDRR and the World Bank. In general, there was a lack of critical but informed voices in the five countries visited. Therefore, the assessment of GFDRR contributions had to rely more heavily on primary data (perceptions of the interviewees) and expert judgment than initially anticipated.

ANNEX 3 REFERENCES

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ANNEX 4 LIST OF INTERVIEWEES PER COUNTRY CASE STUDY

TABLE 8. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES IN GUATEMALA

CATEGORY	INSTITUTION	INTERVIEWEE	POSITION
WORLD BANK	GFDRR	Osmar Velasco	Focal Point
	World Bank	Jean Roch Lebeau	Advisor
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS	Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources	José David Díaz	Environmental Information Systems Unit Coordinator
	Ministry of Education	Abraham Velasquez	Subdirector de Infraestructura
	Ministry of Finance	Guillermo Escobar	Head of Climate Change Department
	National Geographic Institute	Marcos Sutuc	Secretary and National Member of the Cartographic Commission
	National Geographic Institute	Carolina Herrera	Alternate National Member
	SEGEPLAN	Carlos Barillas (and Technical Team)	Director of Territorial Planning
		Hugo Gomez	Subsecretary of Territorial Planning
	SE-CEPREDENAC	Noel Barillas	Executive Secretary
	SE-CONRED	Angela Leal	Director
	Municipality of SANTA LUCÍA DE COTZUMALGUAPA	Main Team	
UN	UNDP	Julio Martinez	
NGO	AGIES	Main Team	
	OXFAM	Ivan Aguilar	Program manager
	Inter-American Development Bank	Omar Samayoa	Climate Change Specialist
DONOR	AECID	Belén Revelles	Deputy Coordinator
	USAID	Pedro Carrillo	Food for Peace Officer and Mission Disaster Relief Officer
OTHER	Independent Consultant in Territorial Planning	Rodolfo Azpurú	
	Independent consultant in Hydrology	Carlos Cobos	
	Former staff in GFDRR's communication's department	Ana Julia Solis	

TABLE 9. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES IN MALAWI

CATEGORY	INSTITUTION	INTERVIEWEE	POSITION
WORLD BANK	World Bank	Francis Nkoka	DRM/Climate Change Adaptation Specialist
		Pieter Waalewijn	Senior Water Resources Management Specialist
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS	Department of Disaster Management Affairs (DoDMA)	Jeffrey Kanyinji	Commissioner
		James Chiusiwa	Director
		Dyce Nkhoma	Chief Relief and Rehabilitation Officer
		Stern Kita	PMO
	Department of Surveys	Felix Mangani	Surveyor General
		Alice Gwedeza	LA/GIS Specialist
		Gumbi Gumbi	GIS Specialist
	Ministry of Water	William Chipeta	Project Coordinator - SRBMP
		Sydney Kamtukule	
	Department of Climate Change and Meteorological Services (DCCMS)	Charles Vanya	Principal Meteorologist, Blantyre
		Adams Chavula	Principal Meteorologist, Blantyre
		Stanely Chabvunguma	
	Department of Housing	Esau Mwambira	Acting Chief Housing Officer
Ministry of Agriculture	Kauma Chinamale	Principal Agriculture Officer	
Department Economic Planning and Development	Peter Mwale	Economist	
DONOR	DFID	Dr. Donald Reuben Kamdonyo	Climate Change Adviser
UN	UNDP	Jan Rijpma	Assistant Resident Representative
		Noud Leenders	DRM Advisor
	UN Habitat	John Chome	Program Manager
	UNRCO	Atupele Kapile	Humanitarian Affairs Officer
INGO/NGO	Christian Aid	James Chilima	Program Officer
	Evangelical Association of Malawi	Bryer Mlowoka	Program Director
	Red Cross	Joseph Moyo	
	Concern Universal	Sernard Mwale	
ACADEMIA	The Polytechnic	Dr Geoffrey Chavula	Lecturer, Blantyre
		Dr Ignasio Ngoma	Lecture, Blantyre
	Lilongwe University of Agriculture and Natural Resources (LUANAR)	Dr. MAR Phiri	Lecturer
		Wilson Nandolo	Lecture
		Dr Patson Nalivata	Lecture

TABLE 10. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES IN NEPAL

CATEGORY	INSTITUTION	INTERVIEWEE	POSITION
WORLD BANK	World Bank/GFDRR	Mr. Anil Pokhrel	DRM Specialist
	World Bank	Ms. Stephanie Borsboom, World Bank	Operations Officer
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS	Ministry of Education	Mr. Jhapper Singh Vishokarma	Senior Divisional Engineer Department of Education
		Mr. Youb Raj Paudel	Civil Engineer, Department of Education
UN	UNDP	Mr. Vijaya Singh	Environment Focal point, Energy, Environment, Climate and Disaster Risk management Unit
		Mr. Avani Dixit	Disaster Program Analyst, Energy, Environment, Climate and Disaster Risk management Unit, UNDP
NGO	Kathmandu Living Labs	Dr. Nama Raj Budathoki	Open Data for Resilience Initiative (OpenDRI) Nepal, World Bank Consultant
INGO	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies	Ms. Ritva Lahti	Country Representative, Nepal
NATIONAL PLATFORM	Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium	Ms. Moira Reddick	Coordinator
DONOR	DFID	Mr. Sam Rose	Disaster Resilience Adviser

TABLE 11. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES IN SRI LANKA

CATEGORY	INSTITUTION	INTERVIEWEE	POSITION
WORLD BANK	World Bank	Mark Forni	Senior Disaster Risk Management Specialist, South Asia
		Samantha Wijesundera	Water and Sanitation Specialist, Team leader for Component 1, MCUDP
		World Bank/GFDRR	Suranga Sooriya Kumara Kahandawa
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS	Disaster Management Center	Mr. Srimal Samansiri	Assistant Director - Research and development
	Sri Lanka Land Reclamation and Development Corporation (SLLRDC)	Eng. A.H. Thushari	Assistant General Manager
	Ministry of Disaster Management	Mrs. S. M. Mohamed	Secretary
	Survey Department	Ms. Shyamalie Chitrakala Perera	Deputy Surveyor General
	Disaster Management Center	Mr. U. W. L. Chandradasa	Consultant to the Ministry of Disaster Management, Former Director, DMC
		Ms. Anoja Seneviratne	Acting Director, Mitigation and Technology Division
UN	UNDP	Dr. Ananda Mallawatantri	Assistant Country Director and Team Leader: Environment Sustainability and Disaster Resilience
		UN-OCHA	Mark Prasopa-Plazier
	UN-OCHA	Watsala Jayamanna	National Coordination & Donor Relations Officer
	UN HABITAT	Planer. I.S. Weerasoori	Project Manager
	NGO	Oxfam	Paul Joicey
Kamane Hapugalle			Senior Program Manager
Sri Lanka Red Cross		S.B. Madugalle	Deputy Director General
DONOR	JICA	Ms. Kishani Tennakoon	Project Specialist
		Toshiyuki Shimano	Representative

TABLE 12. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES IN VIETNAM

CATEGORY	INSTITUTION	INTERVIEWEE	POSITION
WORLD BANK	GFDRR-World Bank	Dzung Huy Nguyen	Disaster Risk Management Specialist, EAP DRM Team, EASVS
	World Bank	Jennifer Sara	Sector Manager, EASVS
		Cuong Hung Pham	Sr. Water Resources Specialist, EASVS
		Anjali Acharya	Senior Environmental Specialist, EASVS
		Madhu Raghunath	Senior Urban Specialist, EASVS
		Paul Vallely	Sr. Transport Specialist, Transport Country Sector Coordinator, EASVS
		Võ Thanh Sơn	Senior Rural Development Specialist, EASVS
		Nguyễn Thị Thu Lan	Natural Resources Economist, EASVS
		Tran Thi Minh Phuong	Sr. Transport specialist, EASVS
		Zuzana Stanton-Geddes	Operations Analyst, Transport, Urban and Disaster Risk Management, East Asia and Pacific, EASIN
	Consultant of WB	Jasper Cook	Geotechnical and Road Engineering Specialist
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS	Ministry of Construction	Tran Thi Lan Anh	Deputy Director Urban Development Agency
		Nguyen Kim Cuc	Official Urban Development Agency Planning and general office
		Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Disaster Manager Center	Mr. Nguyen Huu Phuc
	Mr. Dang Quang Minh		Deputy Director
	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Water Resources and Rural Water Supply Management	Mr. Hoang Anh Tuan	Deputy Director
	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment	Mr. Nguyen Tran Linh	Director, Economic Policy and Legislation Division
		Ms. Nguyen Binh Minh	Hydromet and Climate Change Department and Project Director
	Ministry of Finance	Ms. Yen or Ms. Thao	
		Tran Anh Duong	Deputy General Director. Environmental department
		Cao Van Hung	Deputy General Director. PMUG
		Le Dinre Quang	Head of PID num 1. PMUG
		Nguyen Trung Thanh	Official. Environment Dept
		Do Hung	Official. International Cooperation Dept
	Ministry of Planning and Investment	Nguyen Tuan Anh	CCA expert , MPI office
		Ms Tam	
	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Department of Dyke Management and Flood, Storm Control	Mr. Vu Van Tu	Acting director. Head of standing office
		Mr. Nguyen Hiep	Vice head
		Mr. Tran Thanh Tung	Project manager. Expert
		Mrs. Tam Thi Hoa	Expert
	Dept of Agriculture and Rural Development of Quang Tri	Mr Tran Duo Nhu	Vice director
	Dept of Irrigation and Flood Storm Control of Quang Tri	Le Da Sin	Director
	Disaster Management Center of Quang Tri	Le Chi Cong	Director
		Tran Minh Hanh	Official
UN	UNDP	Mr Koos Neefjes	Policy Advisor Climate Change
		Bui Viet Hien	
INGO	American Red Cross	Wilderspin, Ian	DRR advisor
	CARE	Eric Debert	Disaster Risk Management. Program Manager DIPECHO program
	CARE	Ms. Nguyen Thi Yen	Disaster Risk reduction and Climate Change Manager
	OXFAM GB	Provash Mondal	Humanitarian Program Co-ordinator
	Challenge to Change	Hanh	Behaviour Change Group
DONORS	Ausaid	Wendy Conway Lamb	Climate Change Manager
	Ausaid	Phuong Nga	DRR/CCA expert
	DFID	Nguyen Van Kien	Climate and Environment Adviser
ACADEMIA	Water Resources University	Dr Hoc	Professor

TRENDS AND PATTERNS IDENTIFIED ACROSS THE FIVE CASE STUDIES			S.	L	N	M	G	V	BALANCE	
PREDOMINANT ACHIEVEMENTS OF GFDRR	Disaster risk knowledge base (risk mapping, studies exposure/vulnerability, risk assessments, econ. loss assessment, baselines, DRM profiles, etc.)		●	●	●	●	●	●	5/5	
	DRM tools development (e.g.: manuals for DRM mainstreaming, methodologies, data management software, PDNA, etc.)		●	●	●	●	●	●	5/5	
	Public officials/ Technical staff trained (data management, community-based DRM, preparedness)		●	●	●	●	●	●	5/5	
	Risk finance instruments explored (e.g.: DRM fund manual, contingency mechanisms, agricultural insurance market)		●	●	●	●	●	●	5/5	
	Knowledge exchange (e.g.: S/S collaboration facilitated, technology transferred- modelling tools, etc.)		●	●	●	●	●	●	4/5	
	Policy/ decision-oriented products (e.g: risk mitigation options an investment prioritization, cost effectiveness studies, revision of regulation, etc.)		●	●	●	●	●	●	4/5	
	Knowledge dissemination (sensitization and communication material, public workshops)		●	●	●	●	●	●	2/5	
	DRM data/info access improved (tech. upgrade, open source management system)		●	●	●	●	●	●	2/5	
	Equipment for preparedness/ response improved (rescue boats, early warning systems designed)		●	●	●	●	●	●	2/5	
PREDOMINANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO DRM PERFORMANCE	Increasing understanding/awareness of DRM within relevant Gov. departments (incl. sub-national level)		●	●	●	●	●	●	5/5	
	DRM policy/strategy is being developed (e.g.: sector, national, regulatory frameworks)		●	●	●	●	●	●	5/5	
	Increasing understanding of financial risk vulnerability and risk financial mechanisms (risk transfer tools, engagement of Min.Fin in DRM)		●	●	●	●	●	●	5/5	
	Facilitation of clearance to WB infrastructure investment projects		●	●	●	●	●	●	5/5	
	Increasing in-house DRM capacities at Gov level (technical staff, DRM tools, EWS and preparedness to response equipment)		●	●	●	●	●	●	4/5	
	Increasing mobilization of funds for risk mitigation actions (incl. infrastructure retrofitting)		●	●	●	●	●	●	3/5	
	Improving access to DRM data/info (hydromet/climate data, incl. for end-users, incl. at sub-national level)		●	●	●	●	●	●	3/5	
	DRM mainstreaming in dev. planning		●	●	●	●	●	●	3/5	
	Enhanced engagement of different Gov institutions and policy dialogue with donor community		●	●	●	●	●	●	2/5	
	Increasing public awareness on DRM		●	●	●	●	●	●	2/5	
ASSUMPTIONS TEST	OBSTACLES	Developing DRM capacities at community level		●	●	●	●	●	1/5	
		Weak institutional capacity (admin/fin, skilled staff, IT-issues)		●	●	●	●	●	●	5/5
		Limited appropriation of TA and DRM tools at Gov level		●	●	●	●	●	●	3/5
		High staff turnover at Gov. level limits impact of training		●	●	●	●	●	●	3/5
		Lack of leadership/coordination mechanisms/ internal communication at Gov level (work in silos)		●	●	●	●	●	●	3/5
		Lack of DRM policy/regulatory framework		●	●	●	●	●	●	3/5
		Poor law enforcement		●	●	●	●	●	●	2/5
		Economic informality in key economic sectors (construction)/ legal insecurity (land tenure)		●	●	●	●	●	●	2/5
		Competition between Gov institutions (e.g.: technical agencies, Min. Fin).		●	●	●	●	●	●	2/5
		Unpredictability of DRM funds (incl. GFDRR) limits up-scaling/impact		●	●	●	●	●	●	2/5
		Delays resulting from equipment procurement		●	●	●	●	●	●	2/5
		Limited permeability of decision-makers at Government level (incl. to grass-root/ community levels)		●	●	●	●	●	●	2/5
		Weakness of DRM institutional framework (no DRM coordination platform/no leading focal point)		●	●	●	●	●	●	1/5
		Lack of resources for DRM at local level		●	●	●	●	●	●	1/5
		Emphasis of recovery over risk reduction in Gov. approach		●	●	●	●	●	●	1/5
		Political instability compromises continuity of engagement at HL		●	●	●	●	●	●	1/5
	Lack of DRM data for dev. of parametric insurance		●	●	●	●	●	●	1/5	
	Gov reluctant to embrace risk proofing of large infrastructures considered costly and financially risky		●	●	●	●	●	●	1/5	
	ENABLING FACTORS	Presence of international actors providing support (e.g.: financial, technical)		●	●	●	●	●	●	4/5
		Past extreme events have increased awareness on DRM		●	●	●	●	●	●	2/5
		Synergies with the climate change adaptation agenda		●	●	●	●	●	●	2/5
		Engagement of sub-national authorities		●	●	●	●	●	●	1/5
		Expert support from regional institutions		●	●	●	●	●	●	1/5
		Strong stance of Min. of Finance		●	●	●	●	●	●	1/5
		Presence and interest of private sector in risk insurance		●	●	●	●	●	●	1/5
		Commitment of highly-qualified technical staff		●	●	●	●	●	●	1/5
		PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY	GOV. PARTNER	Technical Departments at national level (or departments in line-Ministries)		●	●	●	●	●
HL Min of Fin. and Planning, Vice- Presidency				●	●	●	●	●	3/5	
Sub-national institutions				●	●	●	●	●	3/5	
EX. PARTNERS	WB (Executing Partner)		●	●	●	●	●	5/5		
	NGOs		●	●	●	●	●	1/5		
GFDRR INPUT	Seed funds		●	●	●	●	●	5/5		
	Technical tools;		●	●	●	●	●	4/5		
	Articulation (Focal Point)		●	●	●	●	●	4/5		
	Procurement of equipments		●	●	●	●	●	1/5		

EVALUATION
REPORT
APRIL 2014

RETROSPECTIVE
EVALUATION
OF THE GFDRR
PROGRAM
IN A SAMPLE
OF DISASTER-PRONE
COUNTRIES



Despite overall awareness of the need to invest efforts in increasing Disaster Risk Management (DRM) among vulnerable country governments and the international aid community, there is a gap between high level commitments and actual achievements on the ground.

The Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) commissioned DARA, a research and evaluation organization, the independent evaluation of its DRM efforts in five vulnerable countries. This evaluation report presents evidence of GFDRR's performance in Guatemala, Malawi, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Vietnam.

The evaluation found that in the five countries studied, GFDRR delivered beyond the expected outputs, making a valuable contribution to broader DRM performance at the national level. GFDRR triggered policy processes, facilitated some of the necessary conditions for risk reduction, promoted government readiness, and leveraged support for DRM at the country level.