Promoting Resilience Through Post-Crisis Recovery

Brussels, Belgium • June 6–8, 2017
Disclaimer: The presented papers introduce the substantive background information for the various thematic sessions. The findings of the discussions at the World Reconstruction Conference 3 (WRC) feed into the finalization of the papers as self-standing knowledge notes publications and learning modules. In addition, they will serve as background reference for the preparation of the World Reconstruction Report.

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Promoting Resilience Through Post-Crisis Recovery

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<td>Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework</td>
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<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>New Way of Working</td>
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<td>Public Employment Program</td>
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<td>RC/HC</td>
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<td>Recovery and Peace Building Assessment</td>
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<td>Sex-Disaggregated Data</td>
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<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Authority</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>UN WOMEN</td>
<td>United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<td>VR</td>
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<td>WRC3</td>
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The Third Edition of the World Reconstruction Conference (WRC3) was hosted by the European Union (EU) and jointly organized and financed by the European Commission’s (EC) Directorate General (DG) for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), the DG for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO), the World Bank’s Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP). The Conference was also co-financed by the ACP-EU Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Program, managed by GFDRR.

The WRC3 organizers would like to thank all other partners that made the event possible: the EC Joint Research Centre (JRC), the EC DG for Education and Culture (DG EAC), the European External Action Service (EEAS), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and The United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women).

Special thanks go to the session leaders named below for their efforts and time in organizing their sessions and developing the discussion papers presented in this knowledge report. The session panelists and resource teams, as well as the organizers of the European Development Days and the Young Leaders Programme, enriched the event and made it possible to share valuable knowledge.
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## WRC3 Core Team:

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Executive Summary

With the goal to identify effective and forward-looking approaches to achieve resilient post-crisis recovery in which climate and disaster risk reduction, fragility, and conflict considerations are mainstreamed, the third Edition of the World Reconstruction Conference (WRC3) focused on “Building back better in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction,” Priority 4 of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, as a central theme of the exchange. This report offers the opportunity to capture the breadth of knowledge that has been shared during the three (3) days of the conference, which was held in Brussels, Belgium, from June 6–8, 2017.

The WRC3 aimed to strengthen the discourse on recovery in a changing world, with a focus on the growing demand for strengthening recovery systems ex-ante, promoting interventions and practices leading to resilient recovery, and enhancing the global knowledge resources on recovery.

The opening ceremony brought together panelists from the European Commission, ACP country representatives, UNDP, and the World Bank. They discussed resilient recovery and emphasized the implementation of recovery strategies and resilience building, particularly in low- and middle-income countries, the importance of partnerships and cooperation, i.e., “How do we work together and how can we best work together?” and on learning lessons from the past to ensure a robust implementation of Priority 4 of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.

Two special sessions took place, with a specific focus on Nepal and an update from the 2017 Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction. The special session on Nepal provided the opportunity to learn from the early post-earthquake recovery lessons. The update on GPDRR reiterated the international commitment to the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.

The thematic sessions took deeper dives into subject matters related to resilient recovery, and exhibited the commitment of the international community to strengthen both knowledge and the practices in the field to achieve Priority 4 of the Sendai Framework. Presenters ranged from various fields and sectors, and included government representatives of developing countries, academia, recovery practitioners with field experiences, and scientists, who came together to deliver their field experience, research, and policy analysis.

A common thread through the thematic sessions was the focus on the Build Back Better (BBB) approach in various domains pertaining to financing mechanisms, sectoral approaches to recovery and preparedness, ways to leverage political consensus on the BBB approach, and the importance of paying close attention to fragile and conflict situations.

In order for resilient recovery to be optimally achieved, the policy and institutional arrangements for recovery, both on local, national, and international levels need to be addressed for better systems of coordinating and monitoring recovery processes and strengthening governments’ disaster risk management systems and create overall Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) strategies for countries. The WRC3 offered the
opportunities for government representatives to share country-level experiences in dealing with new systems and practices of recovery that have been implemented on the institutional and policy level. They also shared some of the challenges that these governments faced in terms of financing, support, and implementation, as well as share their efforts in creating frameworks for monitoring such agencies and systems for accountability, in order to achieve a people-centered approach to recovery and resilience.

Many of the discussions also emphasized the importance of developing new financial tools and mechanisms that can provide both financial and technical resources to ensure the delivery of the build back better concept. This is an important aspect of resilient recovery, particularly given that access to effective financial instruments and analytical support remains one of the biggest obstacles to recovery. For affected governments and various stakeholders to make sound financial decisions, a high quality of information and analytics is necessary, but also a broader set of innovative instruments to cater for the specific needs of countries.

The inclusion of the private sector as a key partner in preparedness, response, and recovery was also one of the strongest messages of the WRC3. The private sector can support the governments, nonprofits, and humanitarian actors in some capacities, and needs to be harnessed to the best use during the recovery period, particularly when addressing logistical issues such as transportation of assets, service delivery, telecom, etc. in which the private sector can partner with other stakeholders during crisis periods. While this partnership can raise questions and challenges, the WRC3 sessions helped better understand the role of the private sector in disaster preparedness and response activities.

Partnership was a central theme of this conference, particularly in bridging the gap between phases of recovery and the various activities led by developing partners. The WRC3 offered a venue to build on the momentum created by the Sendai Framework and the World Humanitarian Summit, to rethink ways of working together to bridge the gap between humanitarian aid and development work. Discussions also drew examples from Niger, Haiti, and Sudan, where a New Way of Working (NWoW) has been introduced, focusing on country-level behavioral changes, collective outcomes among development partners, and multiyear time frames, as well as robust analysis and program planning across the sectors and the stakeholders. The conference also built on the previous conference, which introduced the Post-Disaster Needs Assessments (PDNAs), and drew lessons from the implementation of the assessment. Suggestions were made for further improvements for the process of implementation, the coordination and collaboration among partners, and the content of the assessment in regard to its scope and results.

In addition, this year’s edition of the conference addressed the topic of Recovery and Peace Building Assessments (RPBAs) and put a stronger emphasis on conflict-disaster interface where development partners and countries have to look at structural root causes for conflict and violence as part of prevention and preparedness activities or vice versa.

Resilient recovery also means looking ahead in the future. It is, therefore, mandatory to engage early on in planning safe resilient cities as a way to prepare for disasters. The thematic sessions offered again an array of expertise in urban and systems planning. Experts discussed challenges of and solutions to building regulations and standards and their role in enhancing long-term resilience, both in cities and rural areas, through safe construction practices and land use systems strengthening, implementation of building controls, legal and administrative framework designs at regional and national levels, and codes. Resilience in the built environment, particularly in cities, requires a holistic view of the systems and their interactions within the urban context. That is why shifting the focus from urban reconstruction to an ex-ante approach that addresses underlying vulnerabilities in the city, is a crucial step for the international partners, governments, and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to take. The importance of investing in resilient cities was showcased by concrete examples such as the Accra metropolitan region, and the Quito Resilience Program.
Civil protection mechanisms were also discussed to share experiences of some countries that used this method in disaster recovery and protection to identify knowledge gaps in their use, and to identify and optimize tools for pointy designs and implementation at a wider scale.

Resilience building needs to be ensured through timely livelihood recovery, which entails a better preparedness in disaster-prone settings, and creating effective linkages between short-, medium-, and long-term needs and interventions. This affects both urban and rural contexts, and requires social protection programs to be set in place, such as cash transfers, which were used in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania, but also through building response on existing programs and structures, and strengthening preparedness, national leadership, and humanitarian development coherence.

Conflict and fragility are becoming a more pressing challenge around the world, and response to these situations is complex and requires tailoring approaches to the specific context of the conflict situation and to the possibility of engagement and dialogue. It also goes beyond physical recovery and requires addressing issues of policies and institutional reforms, but also engaging early on in peace-building exercises, which entail reconciliation and social cohesion interventions, as well as a rebuilding of national ownership and leadership.

In addition to conflict, there are migratory and demographic pressures on countries, climatic and environmental stresses, threats of violence in fragile contexts, and a flow of drugs and arms, which, if not addressed head on, can impede the resilient recovery efforts under the BBB concept. This impacts a more diversified and tailored approach toward recovery in fragile and in-conflict contexts, in terms of planning, implementation, coordination, and financing instruments.

Conflict sensitivity should form an integral part of recovery efforts: from immediate humanitarian response, through economic regeneration and structural political and governance reform, to longer term development. However, agencies working on different aspects of recovery are likely to face challenges related to integrating conflict sensitivity into action. Different types of organizations, for example, operate under very different operating principles and operating frameworks, whilst the pressures and incentives that agencies face are heavily influenced by where they sit within the reconstruction continuum. This diversity can bring significant strengths. Different organizations can offer highly complementary skills and experiences. Taken together, these can play an important role in supporting peace, for example by helping to address the multiple factors that contribute to conflict in any context.

The WRC3 also had a strong thematic emphasis on women’s rights as a critical component to achieve resilient recovery. As women face heightened vulnerabilities and poverty, as well as human rights abuses, both during and post crises and conflicts, it is pivotal that women's human rights, priorities, needs, and leadership are put at the center of recovery and peace-building processes. This entails ensuring that recovery efforts are informed by sex and age disaggregated data and gender analysis, and that women are consulted and their leadership and participation is facilitated in all steps of the recovery and reconstruction process, as well as in peace building. It furthermore entails building back better by taking advantage of the opportunities provided post-crisis to rebuild in a way that is inclusive of women, girls, boys, and men, in particular by removing barriers posed by discriminatory laws, policies, and practices.

Many thematic sessions focused on the climate change adaptation issues and sought ways to enhance climate and disaster resilience in the context of the BBB approach. This was either through discussing specific environmental issues, such as waste management landfills and toxic waste risk management in post-disaster situations, or addressing high level policies that address climate through risk management and post-crisis recovery. The main conclusion of these sessions was that synergies between disaster risk reduction, disaster recovery, climate change adaptation, and sustainable development are evident when it comes to preparedness
and prevention, and that the international partners ought to put more emphasis on environmental issues and climate change adaptation in risk reduction and preparedness.

In addition, other important issues were addressed during the 25 thematic sessions held during the WRC3. Technology was one of the topics at the heart of the debate. The use of ICT in remote assessment, particularly in conflict areas, is on the rise. Many international development partners and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have employed multiple technologies and innovations to pioneer crosscutting solutions to improve the speed, accuracy, and quality of remote assessments that better suit the needs of crisis-affected countries. However, experience shows that development partners need to develop tools and methods to actively engage in crises where access is restricted. These complex environments are forcing us to utilize science and art and tap into cutting-edge technologies. This requires development partners to forge partnerships and pool resources together to come up with evidence-based assessments to help make informed decisions, and to better respond to emerging demands and ensure that we are prepared to provide support when needed.

Large-scale housing reconstruction, often the most important thing to disaster-affected populations, poses questions regarding the best approach to adopt. The use of a model, whether state-led/contractor driven, homeowner driven, or community driven, depends on the context, existing policies, and willingness of the partners to engage. The WRC3 brought together various actors from various countries, international development partners, and academia to discuss the challenges and solutions of large-scale housing projects; as well as cultural aspects; government–CSO coordination; and communication with the general public, and the communities around the realities and time frames of reconstruction.

Empowering local actors, while a recurring point in all sessions, was discussed in depth in order to address the challenges and solutions for sharing responsibilities for disaster risk management (DRM) with local stakeholders, anchored in carefully contextualized analysis and robust financing instruments for local stakeholders. This will always work better than best practices imported from other disaster-prone settings.

Finally, the closing ceremony provided an opportunity to share varied experiences from a range of policy makers and thought leaders, highlight the challenges faced in institutionalizing recovery and discuss the ways in which governments and development partners can overcome these challenges. It also leveraged consensus on the Sendai Framework’s Priority 4, and discussed a way forward that engages national governments, UN systems, and multilateral agencies to plan in advance to implement recovery in a transformative manner that reduces risks and builds resilience in an increasingly complex world of multiple and colliding risks.
Joint Communiqué

More than 800 participants from civil society, national and local governments, academia, the private sector, and international organizations from around the world gathered in Brussels on June 6–8, 2017, for the Third Edition of the World Reconstruction Conference (WRC3). They addressed the role of post-crisis recovery and reconstruction for resilience building and disaster risk reduction, and shared experiences with a view to advance the implementation of the 2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. The conference was jointly organized by the European Commission, the World Bank’s Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP).

The WRC3 took place against the backdrop of a continuing rise in the number of people affected by disasters around the world. From 2012 to 2014, close to 1,000 disasters impacted more than 326 million people across the globe. The cost of physical damage caused by these events is also rising, from an estimated EUR 18 billion on average per year in the 1990s to about EUR 90 billion per year in the first decade of this century. Today, physical damages and economic losses together range from EUR 220 to 270 billion per year. As climate change, urbanization, and migration accelerate, the need for recovery will continue on an upward trajectory. Despite ongoing and expanding efforts to minimize hazard impacts through disaster risk reduction, the recovery function remains relevant and necessary.

The WRC3 hosted 29 sessions organized around four main themes: (1) recovery interventions; (2) recovery in conflict and fragile situations; (3) recovery preparedness; and (4) leveraging political consensus on Sendai Priority 4. It also included special sessions on Nepal and Somalia. Participants aimed to identify effective and forward-looking approaches to achieve resilient post-crisis recovery in which climate and disaster risk reduction, fragility, and conflict considerations are mainstreamed.

Key messages taken away from WRC3 are:

- **Resilient recovery is an imperative for sustainable development**
  Resilient recovery addresses setbacks caused by disasters for building back better, while offering an opportunity to stimulate political will in investing in long-term resilience. Resilient recovery involves strengthening capacities to deal with future risks, thereby supporting the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. Also, resilient recovery requires humanitarian and development actors to work together in reducing risks and vulnerabilities. At the same time, adapting to the adverse effects of climate change will require massive efforts and investments in disaster-resilient and resilient infrastructure.

- **Situations of conflict and fragility require special attention in recovery processes**
  Conflict and fragility aggravate the impact of natural disasters by increasing vulnerability and making recovery processes far more challenging. Responding to fragile and conflict situations goes far beyond dealing with the physical impact of
the conflict; it requires addressing policies and institutions, as well as the underlying causes of conflict and risks of future conflict. Policies must adapt to the context of a fractured society and institutional settings. Conflict sensitivity must be built into all recovery activities to avoid unintended negative consequences for an open or latent conflict.

- **Preparing for recovery pays off**
  In view of the increasing frequency, intensity, and cost of disasters, investments in recovery preparedness are required in the most vulnerable and least-developed communities and countries. Strong institutional arrangements, financial mechanisms, and policies support quicker and more effective recovery.

- **Better prepared communities recover faster**
  The strength of local communities in responding to and protecting against natural hazards and climate change is key. In the event of disaster, studies show that 90 percent of survivors are rescued by their own neighbors, and this level of engagement continues throughout recovery. Local communities should be considered equal partners to governments in resilient recovery. Local ownership and leadership are essential for creating lasting solutions to cope with risk and shocks.

- **Women’s participation as actors in recovery is essential for building back better**
  The marginalization and vulnerability of women living in poverty is worsened in the wake of conflicts, disasters, and complex emergencies. Understanding the underlying drivers of the differentiated impacts of crises and conflicts on women is a prerequisite for identifying ways to leverage the potential of women’s leadership for more sustainable and inclusive recovery, peace building, and community resilience.

- **Cultural heritage is a central element of resilient recovery and reconstruction**
  Cultural heritage, both tangible and intangible, have increasingly been affected by disasters and have become the direct targets of systematic and deliberate attacks in numerous conflicts. The Sendai Framework underlines the importance of addressing the resilience of this critical infrastructure. Reconstructing cultural heritage is essential for a resilient recovery as it represents both an asset to be protected and a resource to strengthen the ability of communities and their properties to resist, absorb, and recover from the effects of natural or human-made hazards.

- **The potential for partnering with the private sector should especially be pursued, particularly in the area of risk financing**
  There is a clear economic case for resilient reconstruction and recovery similar to disaster risk reduction. Building Back Better, and Disaster Risk Reduction are relevant to economic planning, and could better involve the private sector actors as well as the competent authorities. Engaging all of society is important, in particular with the private sector. Resilient recovery and risk reduction call for risk proofed and resilient investments.

Brussels, 8 June 2017
Agenda of the Conference

TUESDAY, JUNE 6, 2017 | The Square, Brussels Meeting Centre

9:00–10:30 OPENING CEREMONY: Promoting Resilience through Post-Crisis Recovery

11:00–12:30 Special Session: An Update from 2017 Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction
- Lessons and Ways Forward after a Decade of Experience with PDNAs
- Better Risk Analytics for Better Recovery Financing
- Linking Humanitarian Response and Recovery: Advancing the New Way of Working
- Building Regulations and Standards for Long-term Resilience
- Livelihood Recovery and Social Protection

14:00–15:30 PLENARY: Efforts on Post-Disaster Recovery

16:00–17:30 Special Session: Post-Earthquake Recovery in Nepal
- From Urban Reconstruction towards Resilient Cities
- Innovation in Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Monitoring
- Environment in Recovery, Focus on Waste Management
- Enhancing Climate and Disaster Resilience in the Context of Build Back Better

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 7, 2017 | The Square, Brussels Meeting Centre

9:00–10:30 PLENARY: Rethinking Reconstruction and Recovery in Conflict Settings

11:00–12:30
- Build Back Better with and for Women
- Private Sector as a Key Partner in Preparedness, Response and Recovery
- Towards Coordinated Efforts for Sustainable Solutions to Food Crises: The Role of the Global Report on Food Crises 2017
- Development Solutions for Human Mobility in Situations of Fragility
- Conflict Sensitivity in Recovery
- Civil Protection as a Pillar for Disaster Resilience

14:00–15:30 PLENARY: Preparing and Planning for Recovery—Strengthening Institutions and Capacities

16:00–17:30
- Policies and Institutional Arrangements for Recovery
- Cultural Heritage—an Engine for Social Recovery
- Large Scale Housing Reconstruction—Latest Experiences
- Recovery in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations (RPBA)
- Empowering Local Stakeholders for Resilient Recovery
- Somalia—Drought Recovery as an Opportunity for Resilience Building

THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 2017 | European Development Days, Tour & Taxi, Brussels

9:30–10:15 EDD 2017 Lab Debate: What Can We Do to Make Recovery Resilient?

14:30–16:00 CLOSING CEREMONY: Leveraging Political Consensus on Promoting Resilience through Post-Crisis Recovery
Background

Recovery is defined as “The restoring or improving of livelihoods and health, as well as economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets, systems and activities, of a disaster-affected community or society, aligning with the principles of sustainable development and “build back better,” to avoid or reduce future disaster risk.” The importance of recovery is increasing as the number of people affected by disasters around the world continues to rise. From 2012 to 2014, 994 disasters impacted more than 326 million people across the globe. The cost of physical damage caused by these events is also rising, largely due to growth of physical assets, from an estimated US$20 billion on average per year in the 1990s to about $100 billion per year in the first decade of this century. The impact on countries is further exacerbated by the fact that disasters and conflicts, or at least fragility, frequently occur together, often devastating countries that are least able to sustain them. As climate change, urbanization, and migration accelerate, the need for recovery will continue on an upward trajectory. Despite ongoing and expanding efforts to minimize hazard impacts through disaster risk reduction, the recovery function remains relevant and necessary.

Recovery in the Sendai Framework

As a result of the strong advocacy efforts undertaken by the World Bank, UNDP, the European Union, and other partners, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction includes as Priority 4 a focus on “build back better in recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction.” This priority provides an important premise for engagement of all national governments, UN system, and multilateral agencies to implement recovery in a transformative manner that reduces risks and builds resilience in an increasingly complex world of multiple and colliding risks.

There is a recognition that recovery is more than a return to pre-disaster conditions; it is about ensuring that affected communities build physical and socioeconomic resilience to disasters. Recovery is a critical opportunity to build back better and reduce future disaster risks through development measures, such as risk-informed land use planning, and improved and enforced building standards. The concept of “Build Back Better” is not only about upgrading infrastructure with disaster resilient construction technologies, but also, among others, about introducing stronger governance systems, improved basic services, diversified livelihoods for people, and better social protection mechanisms for poor and vulnerable families. Governments play a key role in ensuring that the BBB concept is applied in post-disaster recovery processes, particularly in effectively planning recovery processes, in providing technical and financial resources, and in coordinating the recovery processes. Governments must be able to develop specific institutional, policy, and legal frameworks and capacities to be able to support recovery interventions efficiently and effectively so that these efforts are sustainable.

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and reduce vulnerability to future disasters. They must do this in a context in which recovery is becoming a complex undertaking with multiple stakeholders supporting and bringing together their financial and technical resources for implementation, and meeting rising aspirations of the people. Recovery not just restores, it also connects with development in a short period of time, often a challenging task for governments and other agencies.

Resilient Recovery—The Focus of the Conference

The experience of recovery programs points to the widespread recognition that well-planned and well-resourced institutional and financial systems are necessary to support recovery. Disaster recovery is efficient if institutions, policies, laws, and financial mechanisms are set up prior to the disaster so that dedicated mechanisms, personnel, and resources are able to deliver recovery benefits to people in an effective and timely manner and in the context of a supportive policy environment. For countries experiencing complex emergencies, when conflict and disasters overlap, the recovery process is even more challenging because the social contract is broken, and existing capacities or assets might have been weakened. Several governments, particularly those who manage recovery often, are better prepared with setting up institutions and defining roles, policies, and finances for recovery. “Preparedness for recovery” has been undertaken by India, Indonesia, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, and a number of countries in Europe, Latin America, and Africa. While being a relatively new practice, preparedness for recovery is gaining significant traction—considering its benefits and the increasing frequency of recovery processes around the world.

WRC3’s Objectives

The third edition of the World Reconstruction Conference (WRC3) aimed to strengthen the discourse on recovery in a changing world, with a focus on the growing demand for strengthening recovery systems ex-ante, promoting interventions and practices leading to resilient recovery, and enhancing the global knowledge resources on recovery. The conference will also build capacity for disaster risk reduction in recovery and reconstruction, including discussion and training on tools and methodologies. WRC3 builds on the first and second World Reconstruction Conferences held in May 2011 and September 2014, which brought together over 500 experts and practitioners from governments, international organizations, NGOs, academia, and the private sector to share their best practices and lessons on recovery and explore the nexus between resilient recovery efforts and sustainable poverty reduction. The conference had a strong link with the 2017 Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (GPDRR) which was held in Cancun, Mexico, in May 2017, featured the outcomes of the GPDRR, and discussed the synergies on implementing Priority 4 of the Sendai Framework.

The overall goal of the WRC3 was to identify effective and forward-looking approaches to achieve resilient post-crisis recovery in which climate and disaster risk reduction, fragility, and conflict considerations are mainstreamed.

The conference had the following specific objectives:

- **Promoting building back better through recovery as a path to resilience and sustainable development**
  The availability of resources and a favorable policy climate following a disaster or a conflict makes it possible to introduce changes that build resilience against future shocks or crises. Recovery processes, in fact, present the opportunity for introducing change and making the right development decisions through recovery programs that “Build Back Better” (BBB) by integrating resilience into the restoration of physical infrastructure and
societal systems, and into the revitalisation of livelihoods, economies, and the environment. This translates into building safer structures by enforcing disaster-resilient construction standards; supporting vulnerable groups through insurance and social protection measures; empowering women and disadvantaged groups through joint titling of land, property, and assets; and improving and expanding basic services to build resilient communities. It is therefore essential to ensure that a BBB approach is promoted and universalized through recovery to increase the resilience of nations and communities.

- **Making recovery inclusive for greater equity and equality**
  To be effective and equal, disaster recovery must be participatory and inclusive. Recovery must also be fair and equitable, be nondiscriminatory, and address the needs of all disadvantaged groups. In order to do so, recovery programs must be based on the needs and priorities of the people affected by the disaster. It is therefore critical to engage the affected population in determining such needs and priorities and, as importantly, in the planning of recovery interventions to ensure that they truly respond to people’s needs. Through local NGOs and civil society groups, governments can create opportunities for active and meaningful participation of the communities through all phases of a recovery program.

- **Leveraging consensus on recovery as a means to implement Sendai and other global frameworks for development and resilience**
  The Sendai Framework, the Paris Climate Agreement, and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) provide an impetus for countries to graduate toward risk-informed development in order to reduce their vulnerabilities and, in so doing, the likelihood and impact that disasters have on their economies and people. SDGs are related to poverty, hunger, peace, and all the important services such as health, water and sanitation, and education. Sustainable cities and communities are critically linked to how communities recover when they are affected by disasters or conflicts. Investing in the capacity to manage and reduce climate, disaster, or conflict risk, and equally in strengthening the capacities of governments to plan and implement peace-building and recovery processes, is therefore essential for maintaining access to services and building resilient communities. As recovery provides the opportunity to implement measures and develop capacities that reduce climate disaster and conflict risk in the short, medium, and long term and build back better, it should be conceived as an important means to implement these global frameworks and become an essential part of the discourse on sustainable development.

The **overall goal** of the WRC3 was to identify effective and forward-looking approaches to achieve resilient post-crisis recovery in which climate and disaster risk reduction, fragility, and conflict considerations are mainstreamed.
Opening Ceremony

Promoting Resilience through Post-Crisis Recovery

WELCOME REMARKS
Christos Stylianides
European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management (by video)

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Cyril Muller
Vice President, World Bank, Europe and Central Asia region

OPENING REMARKS
Monique Pariat
Director General for Humanitarian Aid and Civilian Protection, European Commission

Moderator
Shada Islam
Director for Europe and Geopolitics, Friends of Europe

Panelists
Monique Pariat
Director General for Humanitarian Aid and Civilian Protection, European Commission
Cyril Muller
Vice President of the World Bank, Europe and Central Asia region
His Excellency Dr. Ambachew Mekonnen Sisay
Minister of Urban Development and Housing, The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
His Excellency Aviol Fleurant
Minister for Planning and External Cooperation, Government of Haiti
Barbara Pesce-Monteiro
Director of the UN/United Nations Development Programme Office in Brussels
Viwanou Gnassounou
Assistant Secretary General, Sustainable Economic Development and Trade, ACP Group of States
Swarnim Wagle, PhD
Member of the National Planning Commission (NPC) in the Government of Nepal
Commissioner Stylianides in his welcoming speech underlined the importance of strengthening resilience through better understanding of risks and necessity to work with the private sector. He stressed that knowledge, planning, education, and communication are central elements to anticipate the impacts of future shocks and that building back better reduces the burden and costs of reconstruction. The World Reconstruction Conference 3 should be a guide on how to better achieve resilient recovery in order to build back better and reduce the risks of future disasters.

Mr. Muller recognized that a crisis situation offers a critical opportunity to build back better and reduce future risks. Recovery efforts can ensure that communities bounce back quickly and emerge from crises stronger and more resilient to future shocks. He also stressed that the World Bank Group is committed to help countries achieve both, emphasizing the need for preparedness in recovery planning, as well as the adoption of best practices from the international community. The support given to those countries in the last 5 years is about $5.2 billion in recovery efforts for 39 countries.

**Discussion Summary**

The World Reconstruction Conference kickoff panel started with an emphasis that it is mandatory to work together to tackle issues of the twenty-first century. The importance of partnership was illustrated through the keynote addressed that showed how the tripartite partnership of the European Union, the World Bank, and the United Nations Development Group has taken up the challenges of moving toward resilient recovery through the principle of Build Back Better. The panel discussion centered on three major points: first, the implementation of recovery strategies and resilience building, particularly in low- and middle-income countries, next the importance of partnerships and cooperation, i.e., “How do we work together and how can we best work together?” and finally, learning lessons from the past to ensure a robust implementation of Priority 4 of the Sendai Framework for action.

**Implementation**

Panelists agreed that the presence of robust financial mechanisms, the mobilization of countries, and the solidarity of people and their willingness to look ahead to change their future are important to the implementation of any resilient recovery strategy. For example, the implementation of the emerging consensus on the importance of coordination, fast decision making, and flexible financing have proven to be great tools to achieve the resilience agenda.

The integration of risk in public policies, from the local level upward, is crucial to a more resilient recovery. The ownership of integrated risk includes communities and families as leaders rather than victims, particularly women, who are key drivers for promoting awareness and prevention, and for coordinating response and recovery. This requires a good governance system from the local government upward. New institutions and agencies created to put response protocols into place and to ensure stable reconstruction need to be given the chance to deliver on their mandates through appropriate stable financial mechanisms.

There is a major advance in initial response, which needs to be nurtured by both governments and development partners with adequate financing and the right institutional framework. However, the nexus between the humanitarian aid and the longer term development goals are still a challenge in implementing a resilient recovery and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.

Additionally, as the recovery phase is the most challenging, policy makers need to view disaster crisis recovery to be as important as recovery from an economic crisis. For a recovery to be resilient, upgrading outdated laws and creating laws where they do not exist for disaster management detail protocols for action in the event of a
crisis, and internalize and mainstream DRM.

Deployment of tools of digital media, rethinking organization of cities, and broadly thinking of resilience as both an international development goal and a recovery priority are necessary. Finally, recovery cannot be achieved by institutions alone. Therefore, a strong integration of the private sector is mandatory.

**Importance of Cooperation**

Resilience requires everyone to partake in the exercise. The partnership between international partners, governments, and local actors to ensure political coherence is important, particularly for representatives of the ACP countries, and for low- and middle-income countries.

Pooling and coordinating resources from partners with assets, technical expertise and tech assistance to have the most adequate assistance during a disaster still remains a challenge, due to the fact that disasters come with a complex set of problems. Panelists also came to the agreement that there needs to be a balance between an ex-ante DRM and ex-post risk.

How do you convince countries to be better prepared if they have not been affected by a disaster before? This can happen through:

- International sharing of best practices, and
- Reform of international aid architecture.

The international community also needs to assist countries, particularly low-income countries, to mobilize funds for the purpose of creating planning tools and DRM institutions within the governments. On the recovery side, more planning and coordinating of resources needs to be done, and the international community needs to work together toward those goals.

**Lessons Learned**

**From Nepal**

The overarching lesson from Nepal’s response is that whenever there is pre-agreement and prefinancing, things worked relatively smoothly. In Nepal, the initial rescue triggers worked well, because there was a functioning authority with protocols in place, which helped save lives. Social medial and the use of the Internet also helped to organize, group, and respond.

The early recovery and PDNA operations were conducted with firm government leadership and credible output.

For the reconstruction, the existing government apparatus was not able to respond flexibly because of a stifling bureaucracy. Then the government created the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA), a strong entity empowered to take fast-track procedures during the recovery and reconstruction process.

**From Haiti**

In Haiti’s case, the fact that public policies have not taken into consideration the broad list of risks to disasters, particularly those related to climate change between 2010 and 2016, exacerbated the Haitian population's vulnerability. As long as risk is integrated into the government policies, and is taken into consideration in the creation of tools of governance and planning, it does not compromise development goals.
From Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, while the Ethiopian economy has been steadily growing, poverty is the biggest problem in the country and is a root cause for most of the hazards in the country, particularly in urban centers. These urban centers are vulnerable to flooding and have been affected by landslides. The government established a DRM agency both at the national and regional levels, and is exercising pressure on the countries’ major cities to follow this lead and establish DRM units at city/town levels, in order to make an incorporated effort to integrate DRM planning throughout the policy impact levels.

Finally, recovery is not just a fad and should become part of the natural work of both international partners. This can happen through a serious effort of breaking silos, both between sectors and between humanitarian and development work, as working in an integrated manner is the way to move forward.

Although the previous World Reconstruction Conferences were successful in improving our toolboxes and our effectiveness in responding to disasters, progress needs to be made to promote resilient recovery, and to make sure that within “resilient recovery” we put people and their livelihoods first, because we are still a long way in protecting and enhancing livelihoods and people.
Welcome Remarks by Commissioner Christos Stylianides

Ladies and gentlemen,

Dear colleagues,

I have the pleasure of opening the third edition of the World Reconstruction Conference.

I sincerely regret that I cannot be here with you today.

Special thanks go to the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme and the ACP group of States. For the third time, this event is the fruit of strong cooperation between our organizations.

Today’s conference should guide us better to achieve resilient recovery in order to build back better and reduce the risks of future disasters. We need to advance this agenda in the face of complex, cascading or recurring disasters and conflicts.

We have seen this with recent earthquakes in Ecuador, Nepal and Italy; droughts and famine in the Horn of Africa, or forest fires ravaging parts of Chile and countries of southern Europe.

Our citizens, societies and economies have learnt to and will continue to bounce back from shocks. Their resilience is vital.

My messages here today echo the outcomes of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.

They follow last week’s discussions of the Global Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction in Cancun, in which I took part personally.

I would like to take three key points of relevance for this conference:

1. Strengthening resilience and reducing risks make economic sense. Building back better reduces the burden and costs of reconstruction.

2. We must better understand risks if we want to anticipate the impacts of future shocks. As well as to build back better. Knowledge, planning, education and communication are central elements.

3. Finally, we must work hand-in-hand with the private sector, from prevention to recovery and reconstruction.

We want to share our experience at the European level to support recovery, reconstruction. To name a few:

- The EU has established a Solidarity Fund to support the rehabilitation and recovery efforts of European countries affected by disasters.
- We are enhancing disaster resilience through funding research and innovation, requiring risk-informed and climate-proof investments. Through EU Structural Funds for example.
- We support disaster risk management capacities in the EU and its neighborhood.
- We aim at enhancing strategic complementarity between humanitarian and development action through resilience approaches. Our actions in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, Haiti, Nepal, or Bangladesh are good examples.
- We support the development of post-disaster needs assessment. A “Build Back Better” element is present in EU humanitarian response strategies.
The variety of subjects you will discuss here in Brussels illustrates the complexity of the reconstruction process. From cultural heritage, education and health, urban issues, to engaging with the private sector, and strengthening the humanitarian development nexus, conflict sensitivity and many more.

The sessions will be an opportunity to share experiences, lessons learnt and new ideas, on promoting resilience through post-crisis recovery.

I encourage all stakeholders to continue cooperating and coordinating their recovery and reconstruction efforts.

We must continue the dynamic set by Sendai in a coherent approach to the commitments made at the World Humanitarian Summit. And the outcomes of key international agreements on sustainable development, climate and urban development.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is by joining forces that we can build a resilient future.

I wish you a successful conference.
Keynote Address
by Cyril Muller

Good morning.

Welcome to the third edition of the World Reconstruction Conference.

On behalf of the World Bank Group, as well as our hosts, the European Union and co-organizers, the United Nations Development Programme, the European Union, and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States, I thank you for joining us for these three days here in Brussels to dive into the topic of post-crisis recovery.

Crisis seems to be an all too common word in development circles.

Today, we're facing a complex web of challenges that threaten to undermine our efforts toward social and economic progress for the world's most vulnerable populations.

We're seeing increasingly visible impacts of climate change and extreme weather; growing disaster risk in rapidly expanding urban areas; the rise of fast-moving global pandemics; protracted conflicts causing mass forced displacement; increasing food insecurity and the erosion of entire ecosystems.

It is sobering, and maybe a bit dispiriting, to consider all of these crises at once. But it is important to see the connections between them, how each can influence or exacerbate others.

While none of these forces are insurmountable by themselves, we are seeing feedback loops around the world that are pushing tens of millions back into poverty. More than 26 million people every year, in fact, are forced into poverty from extreme weather events alone.

A changing climate is also driving food insecurity, which can destabilize fragile states and lead to violent conflict. Forced displacement, driven by conflict, leaves many without access to basic services like healthcare, leading to increased risk of disease and the crowding families into poorly planned communities that are vulnerable to disaster risk. And the cycle continues, leading to unspeakable human suffering.

We desperately need innovative solutions to this Gordian knot, approaches that can cut through these different challenges and bring us closer to resilient, prosperous, and peaceable societies.

At the World Bank Group, we believe that one such approach is through well-planned and well-executed recovery.

What do we mean by this? We recognize that a crisis situation offers a critical opportunity to build back better and reduce future risks. When done well, recovery efforts can ensure that communities bounce back quickly, and emerge from crises stronger and more resilient to future shocks.

This kind of recovery requires careful and strategic planning, well before a disaster or other crisis strikes. This means having the institutions, policies, laws, and financial mechanisms in place so that recovery can begin swiftly.

It's equally important that recovery involves doing things right and doing the right things. In other words, recovery must be both efficient and effective.
At the World Bank Group, we are committed to helping countries achieve both by emphasizing the need for preparedness in recovery planning, as well as the adoption of best practices from the international community.

For example, our recently announced Global Crisis Response Platform helps governments devise sound financial planning and risk management before a disaster strikes, so they are not scrambling for funds or the necessary institutions in the wake of a crisis.

We've also closely partnered with organizations like UNDP and the EU to develop recovery guidelines to ensure developing countries are ready to respond when disaster strikes, and together have performed more than 50 post-disaster needs assessments around the globe to inform recovery programs.

In the last 5 years alone, the World Bank has supported $5.2 billion in disaster recovery efforts in 39 countries—representing our strong commitment to mainstreaming resilient recovery.

And we're beginning to see promising results. After the devastating 2004 tsunami, Indonesia enacted disaster risk management laws, created a National Disaster Management Agency, and increased its disaster risk management budget by 500 percent in just five years. This has helped reduce risk, increase resilience, and provide support to communities.

In Lao PDR, after multiple devastating flood events brought more than $1 billion in losses, we helped the government reorganize its disaster risk management agency, enabling the government to mobilize resources and coordinate across ministries during disasters.

Investments in recovery go beyond natural disaster risk alone. In 2014, the World Bank and its partners used satellite imagery, social media analytics, and other data sources to estimate about $4 billion in damages across six Syrian cities.

This assessment—based on the methodology for disaster recovery—is now helping inform the World Bank's engagement in the region. The methodology is also being used to assess other conflict situations, such as in Iraq.

We know these kinds of challenges are connected. And we know solutions can be deployed across these types of crises to better protect vulnerable populations and rebuild battered communities—solutions like strengthening governance systems, improving life-line services, diversifying livelihoods, and providing social protection mechanisms.

Over the next few days, we will explore these issues in a number of interesting and important individual sessions—more than 25, by my last count.

While you engage with these diverse topics, I urge you continually consider the intersections of the challenges we are facing today, and how to best leverage our efforts to get to the root of these issues, rather than being overwhelmed by their many branches.

I look forward to working with you all in the days to come. Thank you.
Opening Remarks
by Monique Pariat

The European Commission has just published the Action Plan for the implementation of the Sendai Framework. When it comes to the priority for enhancing preparedness for effective response on building back better, we see two drivers: first, we have to build a better risk informed approach. This means the integration of risk knowledge and risk awareness in all European Union policies. The second imperative is to work across sectors and policies, be it the humanitarian and development nexus, or the EU’s environment policy, structural funds, civil protection, research, and climate change adaptation, etc.

The Action Plan promotes the BBB concept by reinforcing the build back better element in post-disaster risk assessment, by integrating climate change adaptation into European standards for infrastructure, and by promoting the inclusion of geospatial information provided by the Copernicus Emergency Management Service. This satellite-based mapping during the recovery phase is increasingly in use, and requested by many governments, such as the U.S. government after Hurricane Matthew hit the U.S. coast. The geospatial information is one of the first things provided by the European Commission in the event of a disaster in the EU, such as the 2017 Italy earthquake.

Having the most adequate response to a disaster has to be prepared in advance. While the response phase is vital, the preparedness and the prevention phases are even more important. The better we prepare, the better we integrate risk, the more we will be able to face a disaster, to reduce casualties, and to also reduce the economic cost. The European Commission strives to have a better prevention and preparedness approach, be it within the Union Civil Protection Mechanism or through the European Commission humanitarian aid budget, part of which is dedicated to disaster prevention and preparedness.

Lastly, as Commissioner Stylianides mentioned, integration of the private sector is an important aspect of the European Commission’s goals to achieve the objectives of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. A better inclusion of the private sector can happen through the insurance sector, which can help address damages very quickly after disasters occur, or through information and communication technology (ICT) to help spread information and raise awareness during the prevention and preparedness phase.

Strengthening partnerships between the European Commission and its development partners, such as the World Bank and the UNDP, to better integrate the lessons learnt into long-term development plans, is a priority for the European Commission, and that is where “build back better” is also important to align between partners’ efforts.

The European Commission will publish a communication on resilience shortly after the conference, which will emphasize Build Back Better (BBB) from security to humanitarian aid and long-term development, to allow for the EU and its partners to be prepared and provide the right measures at the event of a disaster, and make our societies more resilient.
PLENARY SESSIONS
Efforts on Post-Disaster Recovery

“There is no silver bullet or one-size-fits-all solution to post-disaster response. When we are able we should build back better now with a view to the impacts of disasters. Post-disaster recovery should be focused on efforts to provide some degree of normalcy to those affected, to revive the ability and means for livelihoods, strengthen their resilience, but more importantly to leave no one behind.” —Hon. Siaosi ‘Ofakivahafolau Sovaleni, Deputy Prime Minister, Tonga

This plenary session was opened by the Deputy Prime Minister of Tonga, Hon. Siaosi ‘Ofakivahafolau Sovaleni who gave a short keynote speech, followed by welcoming remarks by Mr. Roberto Ridolfi (European Commission), and Mr. Sameh Wahba (World Bank).

A disaster often serves as an entry point for discussions on planning for responding to future shocks, and for strengthening systems for resilient recovery and planning. Resilient recovery focused on building back better can help countries avoid major development setbacks caused by disasters and sustain hard-earned development gains.

The increasing frequency of disasters around the world over the past twenty years has naturally translated into an increase in the number of recovery programs, providing a wealth of experiences and practices that have enriched the quality of these interventions.

With the objective of reviewing past experiences and current practices to draw lessons and suggestions for further improvements, this plenary session provided country examples on recovery.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Preparedness can significantly reduce losses and damages of natural disasters, and thus ease recovery efforts. After a powerful cyclone hit India and killed 10,000 people in 1999, steady investments in preparedness have shown subsequent effective evacuation and countless lives being saved. For instance, when in 2013 Cyclone Phailin, the fiercest storm since 1999, smashed into the coastline of Andhra Pradesh and Odisha only 15 people were reported dead despite the destruction of tens of thousands of homes. Panelists reiterated the necessity of societies being prepared for shocks through strengthened institutions, good governance, and capacities to respond.
In order to achieve resilient post-disaster recovery, panelists considered *ex-ante* investments in risk management as imperative. Building institutional arrangements, educating people, strengthening capacities, and increasing resilience of local governments and communities require, however, substantial amounts of resources that often go beyond the capabilities of many developing countries. Representatives of ACP countries were concerned about the difficulties in accessing national and regional financing mechanisms to initiate risk reduction investments. The often long list of requirements and the sometimes narrow definition of specific beneficiary groups were highlighted obstacles in this regard.

A clear partnership framework aligned to the national recovery framework was considered another crucial stepping stone in post-disaster recovery efforts. The recovery framework highlights priorities, directs investments to needs, and bridges the gap between recovery and development. A challenge for governments of developing nations is that most of the international aid that is coming into a country flows through NGOs and that some of these interventions are not aligned to the recovery framework. Developing countries require help from international partners in coordinating short- and long-term recovery approaches, otherwise international aid can become another disaster.
Rethinking Reconstruction and Recovery in Conflict Settings

Background

Fragility, conflict, and violence constitute some of the most pressing challenges in the world today, affecting the lives and development outcomes of about 2 billion people globally. Low-, middle-, and high-income countries are affected by fragility risks, some far away from where the problems originate.

Recent trends show an increase in the number of conflicts and a change in their nature. Violence is becoming more complex, shifting from civil wars to local or subnational conflicts supported by external actors, as well as instability driven by political violence. Fragility is also intertwined with global dynamics such as migratory and demographic pressures (approximately 65 million people were refugees or displaced by the end of 2015), illicit flows of drugs and arms, and climatic and environmental stresses. Not all fragile situations are violent, but the threat of violence and conflict is present in many fragile situations.

Fragility, conflict, and violence also make pro-poor growth and human development more difficult and can reverse development gains. In 2015, the economic impact of violence on the global economy was $13.6 trillion, equivalent to 13.3 percent of the world's gross domestic product (GDP) or $1,876 for every person in the world. This figure amounts to approximately 11 times the size of global foreign direct investment.

While still accounting for a small percentage of the total number of violent deaths, terrorism has grown steadily over the past decade. There are signs that terrorism is becoming more common across the globe, with almost every region having an increase in its terrorism impact score from 2008 to 2016. Violent extremists are mobilizing fighters, material support, and transnational logistics to carry out strikes in pursuit of ideological objectives rather than communal, ethnic, or local goals.

Fragility and conflict also often exacerbate gender-based violence (GBV). Sexual assault and rape are often used as a weapon of war against both females and males. Sexualized violence occurs alongside other forms of GBV such as forced marriage, intimate partner violence, physical assault, abduction, and human trafficking, as well as sexual exploitation and abuse. These tend to increase during and persist well after the conflict has subsided.

Achieving Sustainable Development Goal 16 of the new Sustainable Development Agenda will depend on a step-change in the way we think about our support to help countries and regions break cycles of conflict and instability. The commitment articulates a political consensus to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies” both as a separate goal of sustainable development and an essential crosscutting objective necessary for all other goals to be fulfilled.
Hence, recovery and peace building require addressing multiple aspects of a crisis simultaneously—such as governance, livelihoods, environment, etc.—through integrated solutions. Accordingly, the international community needs to modify its engagement and response, moving away from predominant thinking about large-scale engagement once a conflict ends, and moving toward jointly finding different ways to engage early on to build coalitions and find pockets of entry points to proactively prepare for further engagement. This approach also mainstreams the idea of joint crisis response and recovery beyond merely rebuilding what has been destroyed to sustainable peace and broader development engagement.

**Lessons Learned from Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Recovery Efforts**

Response to conflict is complex, nonlinear, and takes time. It is difficult and counterproductive to develop detailed blueprints for support, and therefore the focus of the engagement should be tailored around the specific context of the situation and the dialogue and consensus on the priorities that will sustain peace and prevent a return to violence and conflict.

Responding to fragile and conflict situations goes far beyond dealing with the physical impact of the conflict; it requires addressing policies and institutions as well as the underlying causes of conflict and risks of future conflict. The process involves rethinking existing economic, social, and institutional models, as many of those patterns may have changed due to the crises. Development policies must adapt to the context of a fractured society and polity and not necessarily pursue standard socioeconomic development policies and programs. This
provides an opportunity to build back better, to initiate important policy reforms and institutional changes that could sustain peace-building activities, and to focus on the softer interventions around reconciliation and social cohesion.

Reconstruction and recovery should work to reshape the institutional and social landscape and prepare grounds for important reforms that allow for greater inclusion and participation. Sub-regional imbalances, with both their inequity dimensions and periphery-centered dimensions; issues around access to land; rapid urbanization or fast movement of populations; high levels of corruption; and poor governance of public institutions are all important dimensions of violent conflict. Identifying viable measures for addressing issues of inequity and lack of economic and political inclusion should be an important complement to efforts to build the institutional capacities of the state. This requires a solid understanding of the political, social, and economic forces at play that influence the behavior and perceptions of different sets of local actors with a view to change the way in which decision making occurs.

National ownership and leadership are essential to the peace building process. The 2011 World Development Report on Conflict, Security, and Development emphasizes the role played by legitimate institutions—state, non-state and hybrid—in emerging from chronic instability and cycles of violence. The provision of security (of person and property, and also broader social order), justice, and jobs (the expectation of an existence with dignity and the opportunity to accumulate wealth and assets) are essential for transitions toward peace. Moreover, national ownership goes beyond government actors to include relevant groups and community members involved or potentially affected by fragile or conflict crisis. The sustainability of the reconstruction and recovery efforts will depend on the quality of leadership by national actors. An effective support for recovery would include enhancing national capacities for planning and implementation, a goal which goes beyond strengthening those of governments but also those of civil society, NGOs, and the private sector.

The new approach toward reconstruction and recovery emphasizes early preparation and engagement during active conflict to avoid delays. The timeliness of any intervention is important and highly dependent on the political and social context. Early discussions help outline a strategic direction while nurturing a sense of national ownership and leadership that could include capacity building if necessary, as well as a coherent international response. Implementation and financing options must also be considered as early as possible as an integral part of the process to ensure quick and effective implementation of the recovery and peace building priorities.

Broader partnership and shared understanding of the drivers of conflict are necessary to ensure coordinated international support to crises responses, encompassing the work of development, humanitarian, security, and political actors. A sustainable recovery can be brought only when a whole of ‘partners’ approach to recovery is pursued, starting with joint needs assessment and collective recovery planning that includes prioritization and sequencing. It requires a continuous collaboration with all relevant stakeholders including governments, the UN, international financial institutions, NGOs, and communities and relevant regional organizations. Partnerships are also critical to ensure effective recovery implementation.

Implications behind a New Approach toward Reconstruction and Recovery Planning

In planning recovery and reconstruction, the emphasis should be placed on the process over the output. The goal is to help national actors agree upon and define a vision for their own future, and from that, their priorities for recovery. In this phase, continued dialogue with all relevant national actors, particularly those that are part of the conflict or have been affected by the conflict, is imperative. It is therefore important not to insist on specific projects or the speed of completion, but the focus should be on taking stock of what is being communicated in terms of recovery needs and priorities; what is happening within the political, economic, and
social context; what are the national capacities and commitment for recovery; and how recovery activities can be implemented.

International support can be instrumental in the planning process, but national or government commitment to build national consensus and to lead the implementation and coordination is critical to success. Development is a process of transformation that is fundamentally driven by national leadership and institutions. Where it exists, the nation-state is the basis for the international legal and political order and remains the international community’s primary unit of intervention. In the cases where there is a lack of state government, governance can still be provided through a wide range of national actors, hence reinforcing why inclusive planning is so vital to the success of recovery and peace-building processes.

Planning entails defining and sequencing coherent priorities across military, political, economic, and social pillars that will sustain peace and prevent a return to violence and conflict. In order to ensure sustainability, it must be an inclusive process to build consensus on priorities over timelines, across sectors, and across target areas and groups. Violent conflict is rarely mono-causal, and successful long-term efforts to reduce the risk of conflict have been implemented through support to institutional capacity, security guarantees, and socioeconomic development, simultaneously.

Recovery processes should be grounded in a shared understanding of the drivers of conflict and stakeholder analysis. This requires understanding the political, social, and economic forces at play that influence the behavior and perceptions of different sets of local actors and the potential to affect those trajectories in positive and negative ways. An understanding of these dynamics, as well as existing peace capacities, will inform the overall approach consisting of: what to assess, where, and how; whom to consult with and how; how to present information; how to reach a final agreement; and what implementation and financing mechanisms are required, etc. Conflict sensitivity principles also importantly need to be established in the planning phase.

Implementation

Finding ways to address continuous insecurity, weak institutional capacity, lack of cohesion among international partners, and unrealistic expectations will be critical for the success of implementation activities. In the case of Yemen, the fragmentation of security, particularly outside the capital, will considerably constrain the resumption of normal service delivery and implementation of programming to support improvements.

The assumed mismatch between expectations that come with peace and the time it takes to deliver real improvements in people’s lives impose a significant risk. For example, a new peace deal would likely generate expectations of large-scale and immediate improvements, while implementation capacity may often be limited by the security situation, lack of a legitimate government, and a range of other interlinked challenges impairing the state’s service capability. As the 2011 World Development Report demonstrates, creating legitimate institutions that can prevent falling back into violence requires significant time: even the fastest transforming countries have taken between 15 and 30 years to raise their institutional performance from that of a fragile state today, for example, Haiti, to that of a functioning institutionalized state, such as Ghana.

Evidence from case studies points to the importance of ‘not overdoing’ implementation planning. In certain contexts, flexibility and adaptability are required as discussions and consensus with national and international stakeholders on the most appropriate arrangements for implementation evolve. In these contexts, a predetermined implementation framework could lead to unrealistic expectations and loss of momentum. Aceh and Nigeria are good examples of more flexible approaches, where implementation arrangements ‘evolved’ over time.

It is important to build on existing capacity for oversight, fiduciary, and implementation, rather than rely on the creation of parallel structures. Experiences from countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region,
including Iraq and Lebanon, highlight the importance of utilizing existing oversight bodies for procurement, implementation, and oversight, which had been significantly strengthened prior to the crisis. This would avoid undermining positive reforms that have been made and also avoid weakening rather than strengthening institutional development and governance.

**Financing**

Case studies on recovery financing point to the importance of developing a comprehensive financing strategy that is broadly inclusive of all relevant funding sources and instruments (including bilateral funds, loans, national budget, and donor programmatic funding), focusing on partnership building and facilitation of broad engagement by national and international stakeholders, and creating linkages between humanitarian and development efforts. At the same time, it is important to remain flexible, pragmatic, and adaptable with respect to the funding situation in a country as it evolves.

The role of the government can be critical in generating and maintaining momentum on financing. Close linkage of recovery financing requirements with national plans and frameworks is essential. Government leadership and the political importance it attaches to recovery funding are equally important.

Experience points to the importance of a planned financing strategy as part of the implementation process in order to (a) understand the funding/donor landscape and establish baselines on aid flows/practices; (b) assess donor appetite for funding RPBA requirements; (c) identify potential funding sources and instruments; (d) assess government financing capacity; (e) determine budget support for recurrent costs; (f) identify financial gaps; and (g) identify the elements of a possible structure for coordinating, allocating, and monitoring funding flows.

A key priority is to ensure that there is sufficient capacity to absorb and utilize in a timely manner funding that would be made available. That will entail maintaining a balance between absorption capacity and fiduciary obligations, with disbursements and expenditures on investments and recovery. Multi-donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) are useful in this regard, as they allow pooling of resources behind a joint plan and state building effort.

Stakeholder engagement, including governments, the donor community, and the leveraging role of international organizations are important considerations for recovery financing. Most cases with successful resource mobilization are underpinned by strong engagement of these stakeholders, both in mobilizing and aligning funds, but also in contributing to the policy and other discussions shaping post-assessment coordination structures and funding priorities. Also, common across most cases is the importance of the technical coordination structures (e.g., technical/sectoral working groups that can provide technical assistance and capacity building and address areas where government may not have the comparative advantage, etc.) which have often provided an important locus for coordination, joint prioritization, and funding alignment or pooling of funds.

Engaging donors early on has proven effective in encouraging programmatic and financial alignment to recovery priorities, and determining the most efficient and feasible manner for aligning different funding sources and instruments. This could also help identify the scale and scope of potential funding flows, allowing implementation and associated mechanisms to be tailored accordingly.
Coordination

International experience suggests that effective and close coordination across national actors and with international partners is required to address the many challenges of conflict-affected situations, efforts that include early policy discussions, planning, and implementation of humanitarian response, physical reconstruction, and peace building and development efforts. Overall, there is a need to ensure that the immediate relief and recovery period promotes confidence and trust between former conflict parties, allowing aid to have an assisting but also transformative impact to help break the cyclical nature of violence. The donor community will need to engage in actions for recovery, reconstruction, peace building and socioeconomic stabilization while continuing and possibly expanding humanitarian assistance. This includes a broad spectrum of activities along the path out of conflict and active coordination and collaboration between security, humanitarian, and development agendas.

Strong Leadership, whether national or international, is crucial to ensure coordinated planning and identification of needs. Leadership is also essential to improve donor coordination and alignment behind the identified objectives and priorities. Donors need to coordinate their funding, particularly as government structures are usually too weak to carry out this function.

It is suggested that a set of partnership principles and a number of related international commitments be developed and agreed upon by all national and international (and potentially regional) stakeholders as part of a new partnership or mutual commitment framework. These should reflect a joint vision on the best way to operationalize the partnership. The goal of the mutual commitment framework is to ensure that support provided by the international community to address national priorities is not only consistent and sustained in accordance with aid effectiveness principles outlined in the New Deal, but also transparent and accountable.
Preparing and Planning for Recovery: Strengthening Institutions and Capacities

Introduction

Over the last decade, the international discourse on disaster recovery has evolved, establishing recovery as a distinct practice area of disaster risk management. The inclusion of recovery as Priority 4 of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015–30) is a clear recognition of this and of the importance of recovery as an opportunity to develop capacities that reduce disaster risk in the short, medium and long term through various measures. In fact, the post-disaster context presents a short window of opportunity for making the right development decisions through better reconstruction and socioeconomic recovery programs, to promote equality and inclusiveness, to reduce vulnerabilities to future risks and thus to increase resilience.

Experience shows that for recovery processes to be effective and efficient, it is critical that strong management capacities, well-defined institutional mechanisms, and enabling policies are in place. However, the general level of preparedness and capacities in disaster recovery management remains rather limited in most regions. At the national level, recovery systems and practices are still in development. In most countries, recovery programs are set up in response to a large disaster event and, in the case of smaller events, governments tend to mostly address only the immediate needs.

As countries are increasingly becoming vulnerable to the consequences of natural hazards and climate change, there is also a growing awareness among governments of the need to enhance their capacities in recovery management. To this end, governments are placing greater emphasis on being better prepared by strengthening institutional capacity, adopting supportive policies, and securing resources for recovery prior to a disaster.

Preparedness for recovery has become an important priority for national governments. In response to this, the international and donor community is expanding its technical and financial support to this area of work. In the process, the scope of disaster risk management is also expanding to make recovery assistance predictable, effective, and efficient, and so that it can be implemented without delay to protect people’s lives and assets.
Background

The twenty-first century has been marked by an increase in the recurrence and intensity of disasters across regions with catastrophic impacts on peoples’ lives and livelihoods. Between 2000 and 2012, 2.9 billion people have been affected by disasters; 1.2 million have been killed and damages have reached $1.7 trillion. Each year economic losses from disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, cyclones, and flooding are reaching an average of $250 billion to $300 billion and 216 million people are affected by disasters.

Evidence shows that countries are increasingly becoming vulnerable to the consequences of natural hazards and climate change, a situation which is amplified by environmental degradation and overexploitation of natural resources. Estimates suggest, for example, that by 2050, 40 percent of the global population will live in river basins exposed to severe droughts or floods, mostly affecting countries in Asia and Africa.

In such context, the appropriate management of recovery is crucial to reduce the risk for future disasters and strengthen the resilience of the communities. In fact, recovery should be considered the opportunity to build back better, to transform while repairing, thus addressing those underlying risk factors that make a society vulnerable. The post-disaster recovery context presents a short window of opportunity for making the right development decisions through better reconstruction and recovery programs. The resources and favorable policy climate following a disaster makes it possible to introduce changes that build resilience against future disasters. For example, this period affords the opportunity to build safer structures by enforcing disaster resilient construction standards; to support vulnerable groups through insurance and social protection measures; to empower women and disadvantaged groups through joint titling of land, property, and assets; and to improve and expand basic services to build disaster safe communities. Hence, recovery becomes an important priority, testing governments in their capacities for planning and implementation, placing demands for accountability.

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2 UNISDR info-graphics.
5 UNISDR, 2015.
and results, and raising the issue of equity and security.

However, the general level of preparedness and capacities in disaster recovery management remains rather limited in most regions. At the national level, recovery systems and practices are still in development. Few governments are prepared to undertake sustainable and effective recovery processes as they do not have in place the necessary policy guidance and institutional, coordination, and implementation arrangements. Mechanisms for disaster recovery rely excessively on ad hoc measures, and recovery processes are often improvised and uncoordinated. Recovery processes remain highly centralized and they lack meaningful engagements with and participation of crisis-affected communities, relevant local institutions, and organizations. Recovery is usually limited to short-term public investments mainly focused on repairing or reconstructing damaged infrastructure while the socioeconomic and human development aspects needed for the full restoration of the functionality of the society are often neglected. Similarly, transitional funding targeting the planning and implementation of recovery strategies and programs is often relatively neglected, and there remains a gap between emergency and development financing.

Recovery is a clear reflection of governments’ commitment and capacities. To this end, in recent years, governments are placing greater emphasis on strengthening institutional capacity, adopting supportive policies, and securing resources for recovery. In fact, experience shows for recovery processes to be efficient and effective, it is critical that recovery institutions have strong management capacities and enabling policies are in place. Disaster recovery is efficient if institutions have strong management, coordination, and technical capacities, and if policies, laws, and financial mechanisms are set up prior to the disaster so that recovery benefits can be delivered in an efficient (‘doing things right’) and effective (‘doing right things’) manner. Preparedness for recovery helps accelerate recovery and initiate this process early, minimizing the suffering and loss of people and economy.

In response to the above, UNDP and other partners have increased their support in the pre-disaster phase for capacity building in recovery management. As a new area of work, Preparedness for Recovery aims to support disaster-prone countries to develop policies and guidelines; establish the necessary institutional and financial arrangements; assign technical resources; and strengthen their capacities for planning, coordination, and implementation of recovery.

New Preparedness for Recovery programs are being implemented, for example from UNDP in five countries in Africa, and some donors, such as Japan and Luxembourg, are supporting this line of work and are likely to expand it to ensure that countries are better prepared to plan and implement recovery.

Key Challenges

While effective management of recovery is receiving greater attention, most countries are still facing challenges in institutionalizing the practice of recovery. The main challenges are identified below:

Establishing a dedicated institutional and policy framework and capacity to manage recovery. Experience shows that crucial to undertaking a good recovery program is having established institutions with clearly defined roles and responsibilities, dedicated personnel, and resources to deliver benefits to the affected population in an effective and timely manner. A supportive policy environment is also essential. However, policy guidance, regulatory frameworks, coordination, and institutional and planning aspects of post-crisis recovery are either absent or inadequately conceived in existing governance processes in disaster-prone countries. While most governments mention recovery/reconstruction in their policies and laws, it is generally cursory. There is no established process or procedure on conceptualizing and implementing recovery. Recovery processes remain highly centralized, without clear articulation of roles between the national and local levels, and lack of delegation and accountability. The traditional development planning tools are not suitable to face recovery situations, and
countries suffer from the lack of adequate instruments able to manage the time and information constraints, lack of resources, competing priorities, and presence of multiple and uncoordinated stakeholders characterizing post-disaster recovery processes. Many governments also lack capacity in terms of skills and technical expertise to assess disaster impacts, identify recovery needs, mobilize financing, and plan and implement a recovery program, particularly at the local level.

**Ensuring sustained financing for recovery.** Recovery is an extended process and it requires a good investment of resources. However, when countries are struck by disasters, most of the international assistance they receive is used to meet humanitarian needs. There is currently no international funding window or facility that provides predictable financial and technical assistance for physical and socioeconomic recovery. The international financial institutions have instituted standby financial facilities for recovery. However, the utilization of these funds is generally linked to their larger loan portfolios. As a result, countries can be reluctant to finance recovery by borrowing money from international financial institutions. Similarly, governments generally establish reserve funds for emergencies but do not normally secure financial resources to meet the initial needs of planning and commencing recovery. Hence, financial resources to this end are generally inadequate. To ensure the full implementation of recovery, international mechanisms for more predictable financing should be established, and governments should identify national funding sources and procedures in resource mobilization. Innovative tools should also be sought. Financial protection tools, for instance, make it possible for governments to support the affected population, and they improve the transparency and predictability of the post-disaster response. Meanwhile, combined with institutional preparedness and contingent plans, they can accelerate recovery and reconstruction, reducing overall losses.

**Recovery as a collective effort and building resilience.** Recovery programs should be based on the needs and priorities of the people affected by the disaster. Therefore, it is critical to engage the affected population and create opportunities for active and meaningful participation of the communities through all phases of the recovery process. However, experience shows that recovery programs do not systematically involve the affected community and other relevant stakeholders in the planning and implementation process. As a result, vulnerable groups can be excluded by the interventions or their needs not be properly addressed. It is often the case of women, who are particularly vulnerable to disasters, and yet, recovery processes are not yet gender sensitive enough. Lacking a voice in policy dialogue and decision-making processes regarding recovery, women's participation remains generally limited with no opportunity to play as both participants and leaders in this process. On the contrary, recovery should be an opportunity to empower women and promote equity and inclusiveness. It should build resilience by addressing underlying vulnerability, whether culturally constructed, social, or economic. In fact, the resources and favorable policy climate following a disaster make it possible to introduce changes that strengthen resilience against future disasters and BBB to ensure that disaster risks are not recreated during the recovery process. Recovery means not only to upgrade damaged infrastructure with disaster-resilient technologies but also to strengthen governance systems, improve lifeline services, diversify livelihoods, and provide social protection mechanisms for the most vulnerable households and communities. Finally, recovery is also an opportunity for countries to rebuild and strengthen institutions and policies that reduce disaster risk and build stronger communities.

**Continuous generation of knowledge and understanding of recovery.** Insufficient awareness and understanding of the long-term consequences of a poorly managed recovery process underlies the lack of political commitment and resources among governments and the international community to invest in recovery as an opportunity to build resilience. In fact, while many developing countries have recurrently suffered from disasters and failed recovery experiences, few of them have acquired the knowledge and tools to do better. As well, few have had the opportunity to learn from each other's experiences and capitalize on existing knowledge. The demand for building knowledge remains high and post-disaster recovery is an emerging practice area which can be strengthened through
the development of new tools and guidance notes. There is still a very little body of knowledge documenting the importance of investing in effective recovery processes and on the high returns of doing so. Key to strengthening the practice of recovery are the development of guidelines, systematization of experiences, and lessons learnt, and establishment of formal global and regional mechanisms for sharing knowledge.

**Elements of Discussions**

This session brings together high-level representatives of selected national governments that have been engaging in strengthening their level of preparedness for recovery to share their experiences, and discuss opportunities and challenges in this area. The expected outcome of this session is to provide an overview of the progress in and benefits of being better prepared for recovery and to make recommendations to address related challenges and bottlenecks.

The discussion will be articulated around questions as follows:

- Do governments recognize that recovery needs policy, institutional, and technical resources for recovery? If so, are these part of the existing DRR system in the country?
- What are the challenges faced by countries and development partners to ensure successful recovery? How does the government address these challenges?
- How is your government securing the necessary financial, administrative, and political resources for developing and implementing recovery programs?
- How can communities and civil society be engaged as active actors in preparing for recovery? How can they strengthen the practice of recovery?
- How can preparedness for recovery help the governments and communities to enhance their resilience through the recovery process?
- How can global/regional initiatives help galvanize national efforts in preparedness for recovery and promote the principles of disaster risk reduction and resilience in recovery?
Policy and institutional environment

The discussion has reaffirmed a consensus that an enabling policy and institutional environment, with established procedures for implementing recovery, is necessary for efficient and effective recovery. Having a system in place that facilitates quick decision making in a situation where time is of the essence is critical. Evidence confirms that fast decision making and management are enabled by the establishment of regulations and procedures before a disaster strikes, when conditions allow for thoughtful considerations rather than acting in a time of pressure. Countries such as Japan have found it useful, for example, to develop a national DRR policy and strategy during a “no-disaster” time, and to revise these documents once a year to adjust them to any contextual changes and integrate lessons learnt.

The institutional arrangements must be tailored to the country’s capacity and to its disaster profile. For instance, while experience with a volcanic eruption in 2015 and floods in 2016 confirms the need for a preestablished mechanism for managing recovery, the government of Cabo Verde is also stressing the importance for such a mechanism to be light and flexible in consideration of the small sized disasters the country experiences and its limited capacity—both in terms of human and financial resources. In fact, experience offers a variety of options for institutional arrangements. Guidance on institutional arrangements at the regional level might be useful in such cases as it benefits from the variety of experiences of the countries in a region, as for example in the case of the Preparedness for Recovery Guidelines developed by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2016. Nonetheless, a general consent emerges from the discussion that formulation, coordination, standards, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) processes should be centralized, as this helps ensure coherence. Particularly, a central coordination mechanism with a clear mandate, authority, and decision-making power is essential to connect all sectors involved and act as a broker between different interests and priorities.

Technical capacity and expertise

Institutional and policy arrangements should be however complemented by adequate technical capacity and expertise of government officials. However, in many cases such capacity is deficient, and it requires considerable and targeted efforts to be strengthened, particularly in the case of local authorities being in the forefront of response and recovery. There is an overall agreement that countries are increasingly paying attention to improving their technical expertise in recovery. Although this is a long-term continuing process, some countries are already yielding results. Niger, for example, has consistently focused over the past three years on developing the capacities of national and local government officials in assessing recovery needs and plan accordingly. During the Ingall floods in 2016, the government has conducted an assessment and planned the required interventions without external support.

Local level engagement in implementation

As for the implementation of a recovery program, this should be decentralized and involve local-level stakeholders—the government, the community, and the private sector. It is important that a clear division of responsibilities are established among the different levels of government and, accordingly, capacities, as staff and procedures are put in place. The institutional framework should also be supportive of the local government by setting up arrangements that facilitate their role in recovery and reduce the strain that disasters can place with additional tasks, at a time when their capacity might be reduced if they have been affected (particularly in the case of large scale disasters). In Japan, for example, the newly approved national law on disaster response provides an “upwards” delegation of power—meaning that the national government can step in and assume responsibility in case of complex disasters too difficult for local governments to tackle. Similarly, an alternative
to boost capacities of local governments is by deploying officials from the national government and other non-affected municipalities to the affected areas as a temporary "surge" capacity. In fact, at local levels, municipalities have also established the practice of formalizing such mutual support with the signature of an agreement between the two parties that foresees both technical and material support in case of disasters.

Community’s engagement
Localizing recovery means also that recovery must be people-centered and pro-poor. Planning and implementing need to engage the affected community. Consultations with the citizens are crucial to ensure that interventions are effectively addressing their needs, particularly those of the most vulnerable. It is essential that their expectations are considered and frustrations addressed. People should not be considered only as victims but rather as active actors in recovery. From a government’s perspective, this is possibly among the most challenging aspects of recovery as they attempt to balance the choice between a more effective and inclusive process by engaging the community and a more efficient and speedy recovery by streamlining choices and decision making.

Financing for recovery
Predictable financing is certainly a key element of a recovery process and possibly among the most problematic. Ideally, a financing mechanism should be in place to secure availability of funds and reduce the pressure and need to seek financing as a disaster happens. However, governments do not generally have adequate fiscal space to manage a disaster, particularly of a larger scale. Therefore, it is important to develop a financing strategy that can evenly spread the cost between the government, development partners, the private sector, and the citizens. New effective ways to establish public-private partnership should be explored. Italy, for example, is using this approach in its post-2016 earthquake plan by creating a fiscal component to provide incentives for private citizens to construct and reconstruct with earthquake resistant standards.

Preparedness for recovery and building resilience
The above elements clearly highlight that preparedness for recovery is increasingly recognized as a much-needed investment to ensure efficient and effective recovery. As recovery becomes more efficient and effective, governments foster development and enhance resilience. Effective recovery, in fact, essentially constitutes development work and an opportunity to strengthen resilience by building back better, not only in terms of the physical aspects of reconstruction, but equally in terms of socioeconomic issues by addressing people’s vulnerabilities. The reconstruction of infrastructure and assets, reestablishment of institutions and social networks, and the rehabilitation of livelihoods lay the foundation for sustainable and resilient socioeconomic futures for affected populations. Therefore, recovery should have a development impact. To this end, responsibilities in this area should be ideally institutionalized by integrating them within a country’s development institutions, the line ministries, to have full ownership of the process.

References/Reading material
The full discussion held at this plenary is available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=5OFX99RPtjs
SPECIAL SESSIONS
An Update from 2017 Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction

Background

The Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (Global Platform), as recognized by the UN General Assembly, is the main forum at the global level for strategic advice, coordination, partnership development, and the review of progress in the implementation of international instruments on disaster risk reduction. It was established in 2006 and is now the world’s foremost gathering of stakeholders committed to reducing disaster risk and building the resilience of communities and nations.

The Global Platform (GP) holds biennial sessions. To date, there have been four, in 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013, all of them held in Geneva. The 2015 session did not take place, given that that year saw the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, which included a significant and highly appreciated multi-stakeholder dimension. The 2017 Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction was held in Cancun, Mexico on May 22–26. The Global Platform 2017 marks the first opportunity for the international community to review global progress in the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, which was adopted in Japan in 2015.

Considering that the WRC3 is organized a few weeks after the Global Platform 2017, this session is a timely opportunity to present the outcomes from the Global Platform at the WRC3 so that the links and synergy between the two forums are ensured and further contribute to aligned efforts for the implementation of the Sendai Framework, in particular recovery and reconstruction agendas (Priority 4 of the Sendai Framework).

Discussion Summary

The discussion highlighted the two outcome documents from the GP2017: (1) Cancun High-level Communiqué—a commitment to practical measures for the reduction of economic losses to disasters and the resilience of persons, communities, countries, and their assets and livelihoods with a focus on infrastructure and housing; and (2) Chair’s Summary—it summarizes key aspects to take the Sendai Framework implementation forward and includes a call on all countries’ representatives and stakeholders to represent the deliberations of the Global Platform in the preparation of the High Level Political Forum’s outcome documents.

Discussion of making an economic case for disaster risk reduction was one of the Global Platform’s main outcomes. Economic costs of disasters are...
very high, therefore, the message to foster entrepreneurship, job creation, innovation and economic growth in the context of the DRR was reiterated. It is considered important to improve economic effectiveness of investments for decision making for disaster risk reduction. The EU statement given during the Global Platform recognized the need to increase investment in disaster risk reduction, especially in the most vulnerable and least-developed communities and countries. It also stressed a necessity to work with the private sector to enhance resilience of businesses to disaster risks and to facilitate private investments in disaster risk management.

Other outcomes from the GP2017 included the prototype of the online Sendai Framework Monitor, Business for Resilience Manifesto of Private Sector organizations (ARISE), Launch of the UNISDR Risk Atlas, Sasakawa Award, and Munich Re Foundation Risk Award. The Global Platform provided space for over 175 bilateral meetings to take place, forging partnerships and strengthening cooperation on DRR. Deliberations of the Global Platform were pragmatic and key to driving the further implementation of the Sendai Framework, as well as instrumental to setting the agenda for the upcoming Regional Platforms in 2018 hosted by Colombia, Italy, Mongolia, and Tunisia and the next Global Platform, hosted by the government of Switzerland, in 2019.

The Special Session for Build Back Better at GP2017 highlighted important elements to enhance "Build Back Better," including risk-informed preparedness and recovery plans; multi-stakeholder platforms at both national and local levels for effective collaboration among national and local governments, and communities; and a policy framework and legal system for reconstruction in place in advance to facilitate the recovery process, community capacity development, and local ownership. Additionally, the Special Session for Build Back Better at GP2017 included the following seven recommendations:

1. First, it was recognized that enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to “Build Back Better” in recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction is important for achieving the global targets in Sendai Framework. In particular, the urgency of ensuring preparedness and recovery plans are risk informed by 2020 is key to achieving target. This calls for risk-informed thinking and actions in early response and in pre-disaster recovery planning.

2. Second, collaboration among national and local governments and communities is important. It was also stressed that the multi-stakeholders’ platform for policy dialogue, both at the national and local levels, be effective for this collaboration in order to share roles and responsibilities among stakeholders. This may require new structures and ways of working.

3. Third, it was emphasized that all of society engagement including women, persons with disabilities, and indigenous people be secured. Participation of all stakeholders, including citizens, in preparedness planning and the process of formulating reconstruction plans is important for smooth implementation. It was recommended to adopt an “All of Us” approach under the principle “nothing about us without us.” In order to support this, one recommendation is to work closely with actors addressing climate change to establish accessibility protocols. It was further recommended to collect disaggregated data on persons with disabilities, different function needs, and the indigenous and their needs.

4. Fourth, it was understood that preparedness for disaster recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction contributes to “Build Back Better.” The importance of preparing a policy framework and legal system for reconstruction before an event was reiterated (pre-disaster recovery planning embedded under policy framework). It was also mentioned that risk assessment of anticipated disasters and preparation for situations estimated from the assessment will help prompt recovery and reconstruction processes.
5. Fifth, importance of capacity building in communities was also noted. Citizens are often the first responders in emergency cases and have extensive knowledge on local agenda. Community activities by citizens should be a common practice, which will become vital in case of disasters.

6. Sixth, international cooperation for disaster risk reduction was pronounced. A large-scale disaster might be beyond the capacity of one country, and in many cases, damage itself goes beyond boundaries. Promotion of regional and global cooperation will be essential to prepare for and respond to such situations.

7. Lastly, it was highlighted that disaster risk reduction policies should be implemented in coherence with policies for "Sustainable Development Goals" and "Climate Change." This, too, will require new or enhanced collaboration and capacity development across sectors.

The UNISDR Private Sector Alliance for Disaster Resilient Societies, or ARISE for short, issued its seven-point plan during a business-focused preparatory meeting ahead of official opening of the Global Platform. Business for Resilience Manifesto of Private Sector organizations (ARISE) is intended to feed into discussions taking place among governments in Cancun and has the following points:

- Call for the “Build Back Better” principle to be etched into planning, development, recovery, and reconstruction—from building codes to government tenders and contracts.
- Call to create incentives for businesses to invest in risk reduction and resilience in advance of disaster. That can mean removing legal and other regulatory barriers that prevent such investment or, worse, drive continued low-resilience investment.
- Call for a more integrated approach to upgrading key infrastructure and to give local authorities more say over policy—so that money and other resources can be focused on priority areas.
- Businesses need to be involved before, during, and after disaster. The aim is to help to ensure that private resources and expertise are mobilized in support of effective disaster risk management.
- Businesses and their public sector and civil society partners should promote the benefits of resilience to consumers and extend education and professional training. The goal is to drive an increase in public awareness—without which risk reduction and pro-resilience policies will be much less effective.
- Need to harness the potential of data and technology to ensure effective implementation of resilience and risk reduction measures.

In addition to ARISE, the International Recovery Platform was also represented and functions as an international mechanism for sharing experience and lessons associated with build back better, in support to the implementation of the Sendai Framework. The International Recovery Platform (IRP) advocated for: (1) closer cooperation with development partners, regional intergovernmental organizations, regional organizations, and regional platforms for disaster risk reduction by promoting effective build back better outcomes; and (2) wider dissemination and information sharing of knowledge and experiences on build back better in recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. At the GP2017, the value addition of IRP guidance notes was demonstrated by presenting the case of Japan, and why it can build back better. At the side event, “Innovative Actions on Build Back Better: Unpacking International and Local Cooperation Experiences" was jointly organized by IRP and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) with panelists from JICA Research Institute, Guatemala, and India. The discussion highlighted the three messages: promoting local ownership of recovery, ensuring responsibility with authority, and adopting a national disaster recovery framework. It was highlighted that good governance of recovery process is essential. There is more and more emphasis on the fact that recovery begins even before a disaster, recovery is an opportunity to correct “failures” or “weaknesses,” and recovery is a continuing effort for improvement and resilience.
Post-Earthquake Recovery in Nepal

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Panel Summary
As more than two years have passed since the Nepal 2015 earthquake that caused over 8,790 casualties and 22,300 injuries, an assessment of the early phases of recovery is timely. It is estimated that the lives of eight million people, almost one-third of the population of Nepal, have been impacted by this earthquake and its aftershocks. Thirty-one of the country’s 75 districts have been affected, out of which 14 were declared ‘crisis-hit’ for prioritizing rescue and relief operations; another 17 neighboring districts were partially affected.
The destruction was widespread, covering residential and government buildings, heritage sites, schools and health posts, rural roads, bridges, water supply systems, agricultural land, trekking routes, hydropower plants, and sports facilities. In the worst hit areas, entire settlements, including popular tourist destinations, were swept away by landslides and avalanches triggered by the earthquakes. Due to the weakened, ruptured, and destabilized slopes and surfaces, the vulnerable areas have now become even more susceptible to flooding and landslides that can occur during the monsoon.

The recovery challenge is apparent as millions of people’s houses and livelihoods were either destroyed or heavily damaged, ranking housing as the most affected sector by the earthquake, with 58 percent of loss/damage, followed by the productive sectors with 25 percent of the total losses and damages. Preliminary assessment of incidence and impact suggests that the earthquakes have disproportionately affected the poorer, rural locations relative to the urban and less poor areas. Basic shelter needs were addressed, albeit not without major challenges, but the follow-on work of rebuilding has yet to come to fruition, with strong recovery frameworks and policies to guide the provision of durable solutions that would not leave affected populations no less vulnerable to a range of risks than before the disaster.

**Pre-disaster Conditions**

The government of Nepal had developed national building codes, and had launched the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management in 2009, which was a national and international effort. However, while some basic policies were in place, such as identified warehousing sites, that did not mean that the country was prepared for a disaster of such magnitude. This was apparent in the losses incurred in the country, equating one-third of the GDP. Additionally, there was a lack of institutional capacity to oversee the emergency response, recovery, and reconstruction.

Involving national stakeholders, particularly the Nepalese civil society, in the systemic preparedness would improve the clarity of the procedures in the preparedness phase, strengthen the coordination with the international partners, and create an enabling environment in which CSOs can take a leading role and support, based on their capacities and the governmental strategies put in place. UNDP and JICA echoed the government of Nepal on the importance of recovery readiness, both legally and institutionally, and recognized that the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) is a newly established institution, that had to address multiple challenges at the same time.

**Early Emergency Relief and Response**

Despite limited resources and insufficient preparedness, the government of Nepal coped well with the emergency and relief phase and quickly distributed emergency cash assistance to affected populations, many scattered in remote communities. The presence of a vibrant private sector and civil society and the need to consciously involve them in preparedness planning and recovery were important. Immediately after the earthquake, the Federal Nepalese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FNCCI) mobilized their network of members, especially Nepalese youth, spread across Nepal, and focused on distributing immediate emergency supplies to the affected population.

**Reconstruction and Recovery**

Due to changes in the political climate, the reconstruction and recovery phase did not follow the good start it had with the PDNA, and the following years saw an attempt from the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA). Nonetheless, the PDNA process was one of the most successful undertakings of the NRA, and helped pave the way toward an integrated recovery strategy.
International partners stressed community-based reconstruction as one of the solutions to solve the issue of housing reconstruction in Nepal. This can be achieved through partnerships with the government of Nepal to shift the focus from individual housing units to a community settlement perspective that strengthens the social fabrics and provides solutions for livelihoods, health care, education, Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH), and opportunities for innovation. For high risk and highly vulnerable countries like Nepal to have in the form of a trust fund pre-mobilized resources that are immediately available for humanitarian operations after a disaster would allow for a rapid start of activities. Resource mobilization based on a PDNA like in Nepal is a must, but must also consider national capacity to deliver and implement. With low absorption capacity already in a non-crisis time, providing resources on budget or trying to use and rely on weak government delivery mechanisms and procedures is (1) a serious impediment to rapid results and (2) limits the resource mobilization success of other players, such as UN Agencies, which can efficiently complement government efforts on the ground.

Key Thoughts on Ways Forward

- Empower a national reconstruction authority with a clear mandate, independence, and resources for preparedness planning, response, reconstruction, and recovery. Do this before disaster hits.
- Undertake preparedness planning pre-disaster and involve a wide array of stakeholders—the private sector, civil society, and others—to agree upon their roles in preparedness, response, and recovery.
- External partners: plan, but be flexible and responsive to changing needs and emerging challenges. This can happen through an increased reliance on national CSOs and NGOs.
- Commit to targeting the needs of the most vulnerable.
- Include women in decision-making roles and ensure that recovery responds both to the particular social and economic roles of women—and to their vulnerabilities.
- Be flexible, adaptive, and innovative.
- Devolve and localize responses, to the extent possible, through support and guidance to local NGOs and reliance on the private sector, both nationally and locally.
- Plan better for future inevitable disasters. Government should enact an integrated Disaster Management Bill and create one integrated national disaster management agency to lead coordination of relief, reconstruction, and ‘resilient recovery’ and to clarify with all national stakeholders their roles in disaster preparedness, response, and recovery.

For high risk and highly vulnerable countries like Nepal to have in the form of a trust fund pre-mobilized resources that are immediately available for humanitarian operations after a disaster would allow for a rapid start of activities.
EDD Lab Debate: What Can We Do to Make Recovery Resilient?

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This Lab Debate was conducted under the “Fragility and Resilience” theme of the European Development Day (EDD), which was also one of the key themes of the WRC3, with the following objectives:

- Getting deeper insights into the challenges involved in recovery in fragile and conflict situations
- Understanding of diverse viewpoints of developing countries and development partners on the merits and limitations in investing in recovery preparedness
- Identifying practical and tangible approaches to raise preparedness for risk-informed recovery planning and financing

There’s an increasing recognition and political will to invest in disaster risk reduction, and the positive impact of this can be observed in recent disasters such as in Mexico and India, where enhanced disaster preparedness significantly reduced the casualties.
Session Background

Rather than focusing solely on returning to pre-crisis conditions, recovery is about ensuring that affected communities build physical and socioeconomic resilience to disasters and crisis. Recovery is a critical opportunity to build back better and to reduce future risks through risk-informed development measures. For countries experiencing complex emergencies, when conflict and disasters overlap, the recovery process is even more challenging because the social contract is broken and existing capacities or assets might have been weakened. Several governments, particularly those who manage recovery often, are better prepared with setting up institutions, and defining roles, policies, and finances for recovery. However, these intuitive recommendations are not always easy to implement due to challenges ranging from political economy to financial constraints. This debate examined these issues and enhanced the understanding on the challenges involved in promoting resilience thorough effective recovery and discussed a few practical approaches to overcome these challenges.

If we want post-crisis recovery to contribute to promoting resilience, the planning and preparedness to achieve resilience recovery must begin before the crisis hits. There’s an increasing recognition and political will to invest in disaster risk reduction, and the positive impact of this can be observed in recent disasters such as in Mexico and India, where enhanced disaster preparedness significantly reduced the casualties. However, post-crisis recovery remains a challenge, where many countries’ efforts have routinely faltered and led to a protracted and inefficient recovery, with large impact on governance, development financing, and affected communities’ livelihoods. This debate among the representatives of developing countries and development partners featured diverse views on the nexus of recovery and resilience through a political economic lens.
Synopsis

Women and children, especially girls, bear a disproportionate brunt of natural disasters and the aftermath of conflicts, but are barely represented at the peace-building level, either nationally or locally.

Women and children accounted for some 90 percent of the deaths in the 1991 Bangladesh cyclone, and 70 percent of them in the 2004 Asian earthquake and tsunami, yet the lessons are only slowly being learned. Women's groups are on the frontline of coping strategies, but their voices on preparedness are hardly listened to. In Bangladesh, these groups have strong recommendations for saving lives in future floods. These recommendations should be heeded and acted upon.

As a result of conflicts, there are 5 million widows in Iraq, and 30 percent of the displaced in Yemen are female-led households. Yet, only 4 percent of peace treaties have female cosignatories.

In Iraq, the immediate priority is to address the urgent needs of the internally displaced people (IDPs) in camps in 'hot' regions, but the longer term requirement are for schools, livelihoods, ethnic reconciliation, and mine clearing.

While debate continues about the causes of current conflicts, climate change is already leading to water shortages and 'climate refugees', the stresses of which will hit states not directly affected by rising sea levels or drought. The U.S. military predicts that climate change will be a major security challenge for decades to come.

The 'build back better' mantra is a fine rule-of-thumb, but new housing for displaced persons is of little use without immediate food and water and the prospect of an economic livelihood. ‘Meaningful’ livelihoods are about more than just clearing up rubble.

Meanwhile, urbanization in Africa is occurring on a scale never seen before in human history. Yet these millions are trading 'livability' for the possibility of a livelihood, living at the margins in slums at the risk of flooding and landslides.

Although not every disaster or conflict is the same as those that preceded them, proper planning, flexible solutions and financial investment can improve recovery resilience. It is estimated that India avoided 99.6 percent of casualties in the 2014 cyclone after having invested some $250 m in shelters and evacuation planning after the 2000 cyclone.

Lessons must be drawn from previous crises, but they are not a template for every disaster or conflict. Complex emergency planning, which should include the full involvement of women, is not an optional extra, but part and parcel of a resilient recovery. The last crisis is never the same as the next one.

Insight

Crises can be opportunities for the future, but the 'build back better' model needs to incorporate more than just housing for displaced people—food and water security, nutrition, and livelihoods are essential, and will only be achieved by fully involving women in preparedness and reconstruction.
THEMATIC SESSIONS
Lessons and Ways Forward after a Decade of Experience with PDNAs
Lessons and Ways Forward after a Decade of Experience with PDNAs

Summary of the Session

The objective of the session was to review past experiences with PDNAs, to draw lessons and suggestions for further improvements. The session showcased preliminary results of the PDNA review, highlighting the relevance, impact, effectiveness, sustainability and value of the PDNA as a mechanism and tool to support national governments in developing resilient recovery plans. This was complemented by PDNA experiences of three countries, Haiti, Cape Verde, and Nepal. The three countries shared their experience in conducting the PDNAs. The discussions centered around three aspects of the assessment: the PDNA process, the comprehensiveness of the assessment, and outputs of the PDNA.

The session was organized in two parts: the first part includes a panel discussion of 30 minutes with three countries Nepal, Cape Verde, and Haiti to share their experiences in the PDNA exercise, and the second part included a 20 minute presentation based on the preliminary results of the PDNA review by the European Union (EU), UNDP, and World Bank (WB).

Introduction

The objective of the session was to draw lessons and make suggestions for further improvements in the process and application of the PDNA, based on countries’ experiences in recent assessments, and on the preliminary results of the PDNA review conducted by the tripartite partners. Furthermore, the session sought to highlight the relevance, impact, effectiveness, sustainability, and value of the PDNA as a mechanism and tool to support governments in developing recovery plans.

Background

In 2008, the European Union (EU), the United Nations Development Group (UNDG), and the World Bank (WB) signed a joint declaration to collaborate on enhancing coordination for recovery planning and harmonizing post-crisis needs assessments and recovery frameworks to better support governments and affected populations. In support of this commitment, the members developed assessment methodologies for conducting PDNAs and Conflict Needs Assessments (formerly PCNA, now RPBA).
The objective of the PDNAs is to provide "a harmonized and coordinated approach for an objective, comprehensive, and government-led assessment of post-disaster damages, losses, and recovery needs that would lead to a sustainable recovery process where risk reduction in the face of disasters is explicitly considered," allowing to move to a more resilient development.

Two sets of guidelines were developed for the PDNAs. The first, Volume A, elaborates on the PDNA process and the generic assessment methodology, and the second, Volume B, includes a set of 18 guidelines which cover sectors and thematic issues. The guidelines and the PDNA assessment methodology have been applied to least 55 countries since it was first developed. It has been used in different disasters (large and small ones) as well as different institutional and geographical contexts.

Over the years, the PDNA methodology has provided a strong integrated basis to assess disaster effects for a range of sectors of the economy, for both productive, infrastructure, and social sectors, as well as for crosscutting themes such as disaster risk reduction, gender, environment, and livelihoods, etc. The analysis from the assessment has led to quantified prioritized recovery needs as well as policy recommendations to improve disaster risk reduction systems and build resilience of all sectors of the economy against future disasters (build back better). The recovery needs identified in the PDNAs have been used by national governments and international partners to allocate resources for recovery. The use of the tool and the process for conducting the assessments has varied in different countries. To gain insight from its frequent use in many countries, a systematic evaluation is being completed on the effectiveness of the PDNA as a process and tool that supports national governments.

In March 2017, the World Bank, EU and UNDP launched a joint review of the PDNA process and its application in the last 3 years. The PDNA review aims to (a) assess the quality of coordination among international partners (UN agencies, EU, World Bank); (b) assess flexibility and timeliness of partners’ response to national government needs; (c) ascertain the national governments’ ownership of the assessment; (d) verify the application of principles of gender and disaster risk reduction, and concepts of build back better in the assessments and recovery planning; (e) verify the use of the PDNA findings for planning and implementation of recovery; and (f) list resources allocated by governments and international agencies to the implementation of the recovery strategy informed by the PDNA.

It is envisaged that such a review will improve the application of the PDNAs in countries and assist the partners in streamlining the tool and process to be more effective in supporting national governments in assessing impacts and planning recovery from disasters.

A short overview of the key issues in the PDNA review are presented below.

The PDNA review specifically focused on 14 country assessments (see the list on page 58) covering different kinds of disasters from various countries. The key issues that were analyzed in the review are as follows.

- **Purpose and output**: The objectives and purpose of the PDNA and how it has served the national governments and international partners.
Coordination and collaboration: To understand how the partners at the global and country level collaborated in planning and undertaking PDNAs and how they can improve coordination to provide a unified response to national governments. To learn about the roles of civil society organizations and other national stakeholders in the design, management, and follow-up of PDNAs.

Comprehensiveness of the assessments: To get an overview of the scope and coverage of all social and economic sectors in the assessment, including how issues of gender, disaster risk reduction, build back better, conflict sensitivity, inclusiveness, and climate change were considered within the time frame available for the PDNAs. Information on how the specific needs of the affected population were reflected in the assessments.

Factors that enable a good PDNA: To identify factors that support a good assessment, such as government leadership, technical capacities, data availability, and duration and timing of the assessment, etc., been appropriate in the PDNAs.

Linkages with Recovery: To understand how PDNAs have been used for recovery planning and supported its implementation by bringing together different government ministries and entities and nongovernment actors to implement a common recovery plan.

The expected outcome of this session was to propose recommendations for the improvement of the PDNA process and its implementation with the objective to better respond to the needs of national governments.

Questions/Challenges Discussed

The panel discussion and presentation on PDNA review focused around the following four key issues and questions:

PDNA process
- What factors facilitated or hindered the assessment? For e.g.: government leadership, availability of data, technical capacities of the assessment team members?
- How can the capacities and skills of national government officials be strengthened to undertake PDNAs and develop recovery plans?
- What are the main challenges of the PDNA process?

Comprehensiveness of the assessment
- How have the PDNAs covered the relevant issues which include the social economic impacts of the disaster on lives and livelihoods of people including its impact on households, vulnerable groups, and crosscutting issues such as environment, disaster risk reduction, gender, and livelihoods?
- How have PDNAs addressed the root causes of the disasters and preparedness for future disasters?

Outputs of the PDNA
- How effective have PDNAs been in development of recovery plans and guiding its implementation in countries?
- How have PDNAs been effective tools to leverage resources for recovery? What are the key lessons for resource mobilization from both internal and external sources for recovery?

Recommendations and way forward
- How to make PDNAs a more cost-effective and sustainable tool for use by national governments
- What are the lessons learned from PDNAs experience over the last decade?
Overview of the Country-Level Discussions from Haiti, Nepal, and Cape Verde

Haiti: H. E. Aviol Fleurant, the Hon. Minister, Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation, presented the key findings of the Haiti PDNA and commented on the strengths and limitations of the PDNA conducted in response to Hurricane Matthew. In his deliberation, the Hon. Minister presented the figures of total damages and losses that the hurricane caused in Southern departments of Haiti. In addition to causing an economic loss of USD 2.78 billion which is about 32 percent of the GDP, it also caused enormous social and economic damages to an area that was already one of the poorest in the country. Hurricane Matthew was termed as an ecological disaster because of the damage it caused to national parks and biodiversity in the region, which would take years to regenerate. The Hon. Minister mentioned that the PDNA was very valuable in highlighting the impact of the hurricane on women, on their livelihoods, and the agriculture sector, which affected women’s income. The destruction of crops had a devastating effect on women who owned 27 percent of the farms in the area. The loss in livelihoods quickly spiraled into a lack of food security, increase in debts, and forced displacement in pursuit of other income sources. Although plagued by data issues, particularly about people living with disabilities and lack of access to the affected areas, the government’s strong leadership and lessons learnt from the 2010 Haiti Earthquake PDNA led to a comprehensive assessment and a robust recovery strategy very closely aligned to the strategic plan of development for the Southern region. The challenge is to make the strategy operational with the new government and a new structure for reconstruction, which was not engaged in the assessment and therefore unsure of how to take forward the recovery plan. The government is however committed to invest in better disaster risk management systems, including early warning systems, risk mapping, and introducing insurance schemes to provide coverage to the poorest. The government is also reviewing the national housing policy to include specific provisions to include and promote awareness on cyclone resistant housing.

Nepal: The delegate from Nepal, Dr. Swarnim Wagle, member, National Planning Commission, attributed the success of the PDNA to the strong leadership of the government under the National Planning Commission, Nepal. Dr. Wagle noted that the despite the short deadline of four weeks for the assessment, the government was able to coordinate 350 members of the assessment team, representing five large international agencies and a large number of national stakeholders, to bring out a comprehensive report of the damages and losses across 31 affected districts. The government was able to mobilize over 5 billion USD toward recovery and able to follow the PDNA through with a detailed sector wise recovery framework to support the implementation. The National Reconstruction Authority appointed soon after the PDNA is now leading the recovery efforts.

Cabo Verde: The Cabo Verde delegate, Mr. Marco Inocencio, Directorate of Treasury highlighted the following points from their experience of undertaking the PDNA in response to the volcanic eruption on Fogo Island: (1) The country had prepared for conducting the PDNA by organizing a training for all the line ministries and local ministries prior to the PDNA. This training provided the basic capacities necessary to undertake the PDNA. With support of international experts, the assessment was conducted successfully and reconstruction and recovery is being undertaken by the newly designated cabinet for reconstruction of Fogo Island. The national government has decided to continue to conduct a refreshers training and establish local capacities for the PDNA and Recovery framework; (2) The PDNA was successful in bringing together all national stakeholders and international partners to deliver an assessment within a short duration. The report highlighted the need for improving urban settlement planning in the calderas, the need to diversify livelihoods, and yet to use the opportunities to grow high value cash crops in the region and continue tourism. It also emphasized the importance of installing early warning systems that allow timely evacuation of people and their assets; (3) Despite challenges in data collection and access to communities for information, the key line ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture had good data and provided support to families to restore livelihoods; and (4)
There were some challenges in translating the PDNA into a recovery plan despite being a very comprehensive assessment that addressed all crosscutting issues. A change in the government also contributed to the delay in implementation of the recommendations of the PDNA which emphasized establishing a no settlement zone around the Caldera. The government also found it difficult to mobilize national and international resources against the PDNA due to the high costs of reconstruction arising from the recommendations to “build back better,” which significantly increased the budget for reconstruction.

The Key Findings and Recommendations of the PDNA Review

The tripartite partners representing the EU, World Bank, and UNDG presented the results of the initial review of the PDNA. The findings of the review were presented by categorizing the results of the review into strengthens and opportunities, limitations and challenges, and a set of recommendations.

The key strengthens and opportunities of the PDNA were that it is highly valued, relevant, and has widespread global acceptance by national governments, donor responsiveness, and the participation of regional intergovernmental organizations. This was demonstrated by 55 PDNAs conducted globally and repeated more than once in several countries. PDNA has been recognized to have the convening power of bringing together national stakeholders and international partners to focus on one common purpose, which is to assess the impacts of the disaster and develop a recovery plan. This common purpose helps to translate the disaster event into a structured, organized process that looks beyond the damage and destruction to a systematic plan for recovery. It stimulates and develops national government capacities to review their policy on risk management and drives thinking beyond reconstruction toward resilient development. PDNA has also been able to promote data for a purpose. It stimulates improvements in data management and data sharing for a common use, and it supports upgrading national data bases and practices for data verification.

In terms of limitations and challenges, it was noted that PDNAs should be more flexible and modified to a variety of disaster scales, disaster types, and country contexts without sacrificing the integrity of the methodology. Additionally, different options for data should be available or proxies developed for reliable qualitative indicators. PDNA principals need to engage the government authorities, and planning and finance departments, as well line ministries to identify issues that impede the PDNA in resulting in positive recovery strategies. One of the challenges identified is that due to the many institutional players involved and the multiple issues following a disaster event, the accountability of the respective actors and their related resource commitments remain a challenge.

It was also noted that the means to ensure greater inclusion of the most vulnerable population and socially marginalized groups or people with special needs remain challenging for the PDNA process. Similarly, there was little explicit evidence of the engagement of the private sector in PDNA besides being a source of data. Beyond reflecting a common rationale and purpose, PDNAs have served different interests of the primary partners and the participating organizations. These can vary under country circumstances as PDNAs are initiated and planned by partners in countries. The lack of communication between the principal institutions and their country-level counterparts has led to uncertainties and some duplicated assessments. There should be a joint mechanism to establish the objectives of each PDNA through initial consultations or joint scoping missions prior to starting a PDNA.
Conclusion

PDNA has been a very useful instrument to convene all stakeholders (government, tripartite partners, and other stakeholders) under a common purpose to do an assessment of disaster impacts and needs for recovery. Thus, PDNA is now a globally accepted instrument considered the most suitable for assessing recovery needs.

Government leadership is critical to the success of the PDNA. Strong government leadership, with technical capacities of sector ministries and partners, can result in well-coordinated assessment and recovery planning. The sustainability of PDNA and its future effectiveness will be determined by the success of embedding its functions within countries’ governance, disaster, and sustainable development structures and wider national government objectives.

The recommendations to improve the PDNA are as follows:

- National government leadership is critical to the success of the PDNA. It is important that the PDNA is led by a ministry which can coordinate all the relevant national and international actors and take forward the recommendations of the assessment.
- A high-level governance mechanism should be established among the principal partners to improve communication and ensure the operational effectiveness of the PDNA.
- PDNA principals should engage the government authorities and planners to follow up the PDNA with a recovery framework/plan.
- There is a need to develop a strategy to adopt to the next generation of PDNA to address a larger context of risks and establish capacities and operational requirements and resources to implement the strategy.
- The PDNA principals need to remain sensitive to global expectations and governments’ changing needs following a disaster and other complex emergencies. At the same time, while there is a need to accommodate all government requests for a PDNA, this should be done based on agreed norms/criteria for initiating a PDNA.
- PDNAs should be flexible and adaptable to different disaster contexts, such as sudden onset disasters, as well as slow onset disasters and for large and small disasters. Furthermore, it should be adapted to the local country contexts using sectors that are relevant to the country. A “light” module of the PDNA could be developed to suit the various disaster and country context without sacrificing the integrity of the methodology. The current methodology needs to be improved to address human impacts, and integrate a conflict sensitivity and concepts of “Build Back Better” in PDNA.
- When feasible, joint scoping missions should be conducted prior to a PDNA to bring together the different parties and interests of all stakeholders for a common purpose. Furthermore, PDNA processes can be made more effective by communicating to all stakeholders at the start of the PDNA, the objective, process, responsibilities, and timelines for the assessment.
- There is a need for greater community engagement, civil society participation, and established processes for collecting localized data. The accountability to the affected population is an area that needs to be improved.
- Efforts and support to governments should be intensified and sustained to customize the PDNA in countries, and national capacities for conducting the assessment and developing recovery plans must be developed. Additionally, reliable national baseline databases for assessing disaster impacts must be improved and available at a single source to save time to facilitate more accurate assessments. Data sets disaggregated by sex, by households, and by most vulnerable population based should be developed. This work should be done before a disaster.
- PDNAs must move beyond recovery and reconstruction to address the underlying causes of the disasters and link better with the overall Sendai Framework and to the development plans of the country. PDNAs should be used to encourage research on social, economic, and risk-related issues.
References

- Specific PDNAs (most are downloadable at: https://www.gfdrr.org/post-disaster-needs-assessments)
- Report of the Joint Review of the PDNA (draft circulated prior to the session)

Selected Countries and Disasters for PDNA Review

1. Apr 2015, Nepal (Asia)—Earthquake
2. Apr 2016, Ecuador (LAC)—Earthquake
3. May 2014, Serbia (Eur)—Floods
4. May 2014, Bosnia & Herzegovina (Eur)—Floods
5. Oct 2016, Haiti (LAC)—Cyclone Matthew & Floods
6. May 2016, Sri Lanka (Asia)—Floods & Landslides
7. Feb–Mar 2016, Fiji (Pacific)—Cyclone Winston & Floods
8. Mar 2015, Vanuatu (Pacific)—Cyclone Pam & Floods
10. Apr 2016, Malawi (Africa)—Drought
11. 2016, Republic of Marshall Islands—RMI (Pacific)—Drought
12. 2014, Seychelles (Indian Ocean)—Floods
13. 2015, Georgia (ECIS)—Floods
14. 2016, Myanmar (Asia)—Floods

There should be a joint mechanism to establish the objectives of each PDNA through initial consultations or joint scoping missions prior to starting a PDNA.
Better Risk Analytics for Better Recovery Financing

**Introduction**

The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction includes as Priority 4 a focus on “build back better” in recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. The concept of “build back better” is not only about upgrading infrastructure with disaster resilient construction technologies but also about introducing stronger governance systems, improved basic services, diversified livelihoods for people, and better social protection mechanisms for poor and vulnerable families. Governments play a key role in ensuring that the “build back better” concept is applied in post-disaster recovery processes, particularly in effectively planning recovery processes, providing technical and financial resources and coordinating the recovery processes.

In the context of “build back better,” a growing number of governments are moving toward a proactive (and more cost-effective) approach to financial planning to protect national budgets, as well as the lives and livelihoods of their citizens against the impacts of disasters. This approach complements other elements of a comprehensive disaster risk management strategy and the “build back better” concept—from investments in risk reduction to improved preparedness and resilient reconstruction. Moreover, the recent flagship report from the World Bank ‘Unbreakable’ noted that lack of access to finance after a shock can act as a severe obstacle to recovery and reconstruction (building back better), as in such situations governments tend to favor speed of reconstruction over quality.⁶

Financial protection involves planning ahead to better manage the cost of disasters, ensure predictable and timely access to much needed resources, and ultimately mitigate long-term fiscal impacts. By combining various financial instruments—such as contingency budget, contingent loans and grants, and risk transfer solutions—financial protection allows governments to manage the full range of disaster impacts and manage the liquidity constraints that can occur post-disaster. Different instruments help address different risks (ranging from recurrent to rarer events), and different funding needs (ranging from short-term emergency relief, to recovery and reconstruction). Financial planning helps map out in advance what funds are likely to be needed and when.

To make sound financial protection decisions stakeholders need to have the right information. Financial and economic analysis of risk information and quantitative evidence empowers governments to make risk-informed decisions on their financial protection against disasters. However, financial protection decisions both pre- and post-disaster are often difficult to reach due to lack of credible or adequate risk information, in addition to this information often being in a format inaccessible to the decision makers (e.g., 10,000 years of flood losses are not clearly usable).

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from a risk model does not help a financial decision maker optimize investment decisions). Additionally, where risk information is available, the tools and methodologies needed to make informed decisions on *ex ante* disaster risk financing are often lacking.

This paper discusses the importance and challenges of high quality objective analytics in increasing the capacity of governments to make informed financial protection decisions based on sound financial analysis, and ultimately increase their financial capacity to meet financial needs following disasters. Such sound financial analysis can in turn support the financial position of decision makers when looking to build back better during reconstruction.

**Background/Concepts**

Financial protection is an important component of the Disaster Risk Management and climate change adaptation agenda. It can increase the ability of national and local governments, homeowners, businesses, agricultural producers, and low-income populations to respond more quickly and resiliently to disasters by strengthening public financial management and promoting market-based disaster risk financing solutions (such as sovereign catastrophe risk transfer solutions for governments or domestic catastrophe risk insurance markets for public and private assets).

A growing number of donors, development partners and international financial institutions are supporting financial protection solutions in low- and middle-income countries. In addition, financial protection has become an increasingly important topic in high-level global policy initiatives, which bring awareness to the agenda and drive political commitment, investments and new partnerships. The World Bank is supporting many of these initiatives as a neutral advisor, bringing together stakeholders to invest in technical advice and knowledge that supports the implementation of policy reforms and financial instruments.

Without access to adequate resources, it can be challenging for governments to build back better. Research has shown that lack of resources post-disaster can lead to large negative impacts on GDP. Furthermore, in some instances, severe liquidity constraints can lead to poverty traps, leading to long-term reductions in GDP which can prevent economic development. Thus, proactive financial planning for disasters is critical to support higher quality reconstruction.

The cost of disasters to governments, households, and businesses is increasing. Population growth, concentration of assets, and climate change are increasing hazards, exposure, vulnerability, and losses. As a percentage of GDP (see Figure 1), fast growing middle-income countries suffer the most, with average annual direct loss at 2.9 percent of GDP, followed by low-income countries (1.3 percent of GDP) and high-income countries (0.8 percent of GDP). Much of this trend is due to the rapid increase of assets in developing low- and middle-income countries that do not take disaster risk into account during construction, leaving them vulnerable to natural hazards. Although average direct loss relative to GDP is less for low-income countries compared to middle-income countries, this does not consider the most important impact—the loss of lives, livelihoods, and negative effects on human capital.

Low- and middle-income countries typically lack financial protection against the impacts of disasters and rely heavily on ex-post measures (e.g., budget reallocations, donor assistance, tax increases, and post-disaster loans), with often high opportunity costs, to attempt to meet financing needs. A comprehensive financial protection strategy can secure access to post-disaster financing before an event strikes, ensuring rapid, cost-effective liquidity to finance recovery efforts.

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7 Global engagement on financial protection is an agenda of InsuResilience, G20 Germany 2017, Asia Pacific Economic Forum, ASEAN, V20.
8 MunichRe, 2013a.
Risk information and models are increasingly becoming lower cost, more readily available, and of higher quality due to improved computing capacity and technological advancements. However, such information needs to be aggregated and translated into a format which can inform financial decision makers in making policy decisions.

Governments, donors, and development partners are increasingly in need of high quality objective analytics to proactively manage the costs of disasters. Analytics increase the capacity of governments, donors, and development partners to make informed financial protection decisions based on sound financial and economic analysis. A Global Partnership between the Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance Program of the World Bank Group and the European Union is working specifically on this agenda of disaster risk finance analytics, with the overall objective to improve financial resilience of countries against natural disasters. With better analytics, governments can better:

- Understand their financial risk related to disasters;
- Employ efficient financial and economic analysis in the development of financial protection strategies;
- Improve their financial capacity to meet financial needs immediately following disasters, including through market-based risk transfer solutions;
- Identify effective delivery mechanisms for disaster support to affected populations (e.g., agriculture insurance programs and scalable safety nets); and
- Increase their capacity to monitor and evaluate disaster risk finance strategies.
**BOX 1:** Objective analytics informing financial decision making for better recovery.

The World Bank recently published a framework\(^9\) to evaluate the economic costs and benefits of disaster risk financing instruments, which can be used to inform the design of an appropriate and cost-effective approach to the financing of disaster response. The framework was then used to analyze\(^9\) different risk financing approaches to support drought response in Ethiopia through an expansion of the Productive Safety Net Program. The analysis compared three strategies, each involving different combinations of federal contingency budget, emergency budget reallocation, insurance, and humanitarian response.

In the case of Ethiopia, the analysis showed that financing disaster response costs through a combination of budget reallocation, reserves, and insurance could on average reduce the cost of response by a quarter, as compared to waiting for humanitarian aid to be mobilized.

The cost savings from including insurance as part of a disaster risk financing strategy become far greater for more severe droughts, which are expected to occur less frequently.

**Issues Related to the Topic**

Governments are not always aware of the total economic and fiscal impact of disasters. Quantifying the contingent liabilities associated with natural disasters is a critical first step to understand and reduce their fiscal impact. Natural disasters can create major explicit or implicit contingent liabilities for the government. Explicit contingent liabilities may include losses incurred on government assets and emergency response and recovery. Despite sometimes clear regulation defining the limits of government responsibility, political and social pressures often lead the government to accept additional liabilities after a major disaster, for example, for low-income housing. Natural disasters can also escalate borrowing costs, especially for already highly indebted nations. Natural disasters raise the costs of borrowing for affected governments, increasing sovereign bond spreads by 1 to 2 percent on average for up to nine months following an event.\(^11\) These implicit contingent liabilities are often the most difficult to assess and can pose major fiscal risk to the government budget.

Governments are often facing an increasing amount of disaster risk information made available from historical databases on disaster losses and catastrophe risk models. While catastrophe risk data and information lay the ground for financial protection solutions, they need to be aggregated, refined, and analyzed in order to inform financial decision making. By itself, technical disaster risk information (e.g., 10,000 years of simulated losses) is unsuitable for financial and economic analysis to either inform financial protection decision making or as the basis for transferring the risk to the market. Analysis to inform and support financial protection decision making is possible in both environments with sophisticated risk models and environments with no risk models and limited historical risk data.

Governments are increasingly solicited by private reinsurers and investment banks that offer them innovative sovereign financial solutions to protect their budget against disasters. But they often do not have the quantitative tools to evaluate (i) whether the proposed products would offer an effective financial protection

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against disasters and how it would complement their existing strategy, if any, and (ii) whether the price of the proposed product is fair compared to other financial instruments.

**Objective analytics addresses questions often raised by governments and donors, and ultimately supports decision making for better recovery**, such as:

- What are the historical fiscal costs of natural disasters?
- What are the estimated annual average costs of disasters or emergency response and the costs for realistic disaster events, e.g., small, medium, or severe events? What are the explicit and implicit contingent liabilities?
- What is the immediate financing need following a disaster, and what is the associated fiscal gap, i.e., the difference between the funds the country has, and what they need to meet immediate relief costs? [Addressing this fiscal gap is critical to supporting the build back better concept; lack of access to finance after a shock was noted in the *World Bank Unbreakable* report as acting as a severe obstacle to building back better.]
- What funding will a sovereign parametric insurance product provide, and how much will it cost?
- What is the opportunity cost of different risk financing instruments?
- What is the optimal combination of risk retention and risk transfer instruments?
- What is the cost savings to governments of implementing a financing strategy that enables rapid response? How does this support reconstruction?
- What is the fiscal cost of a subsidized insurance program; and how might this change when considering alternative coverage, product, or scheme design?
- What is the economic impact of government or donor support to a subsidized insurance program?
- What is the potential cost savings from pooling sovereign or subnational risks?
- What capital is required for the establishment and maintenance of an insurance risk pool?
- What is the fiscal cost of a scalable social protection program; and how might this change when considering alternative coverage or program design?
- What is the impact of the disaster risk finance strategy on household welfare and/or the economy? How does it protect the poorest population exposed?

**Efforts in Post-Disaster Recovery**

- Actuarial analysis and tools help governments understand and evaluate the financial implications of disaster risk finance decisions.
- User friendly interfaces, between policy makers and underlying technical models, help educate and inform decision making.
- Supports financial decision makers in leveraging financial markets based on quantitative analysis and evidence.
- Quantitative evaluation of the pros and cons of alternative instruments in order to achieve policy objectives in the most cost-effective way.
Discussion Summary

This session discussed different facets of this topic as follows:

1. **How risk information can be used to inform exposure management and financial protection decisions.** Mr. Matthew Foote is an exposure management specialist with over twenty years of experience in the insurance industry. He highlighted the need for adequate risk information and data. Depending on their exposure and risk profiles, requirements in terms of data quality will vary significantly from territory to territory, making the concept of data quality a relative one which does imply in practice a risk-based approach. Mr. Foote also noted that decision makers are placing an increased reliance on risk models as truth. He noted that decision makers need to be more informed about the uncertainty in risk data and risk models.

   - Mr. Foote explained that insurance industry decisions are dependent on risk data, and importantly analytics models to help identify and quantify potential monetary loss. Those in turn will drive and inform decisions on capital, business plans, optimization strategies, and other underwriting decisions which will contribute to the expected likely profitability of a portfolio. This is nearly always a forward-looking view.

   - He noted that in the past decade, there has been a strategic effort to be better risk informed. The importance of risk data and models has also increased due to regulation. Insurance solvency requirements and capital levels of insurers are set by financial regulators using actuarial methods embedded into company's internal models, underpinned by risk analytics.

   - Like the public sector, the insurance industry is reliant on third-party data, research, and tools to build a view of risk. While past disasters provide very valuable data due to increases in urbanization, variability in climate, and other factors, historical impacts are not always a good predictor of future disaster impacts. Insurers have been employing models and data for many decades, and the sophistication of models and quality of data has tended to improve over time, but not always consistently. While insurers are relatively experienced in the use of models and risk data, the confidence in their use for decision making is not high in all cases. This is why the industry is increasingly turning to the modeling of uncertainty, which is gradually being incorporated into business plans and portfolio management models.

2. **Risk information and analytics allow governments and the donor community to better understand the fiscal risk from natural disasters and to understand and evaluate the different risk financing instruments available and suitable for events of different severity and frequency.** For example, risk information and analytics can help governments understand their immediate financing need for emergency response post-disaster and evaluate the risk financing instruments suitable to meet the immediate liquidity need for cash post-disaster. This was discussed by Dr. Daniel Clarke, an actuary and development economist who works at the U.K. Government Actuary's Department.

   - Dr. Clarke presented how the UK Department for International Development (DFID) is using internal risk analytics to guide its decisions. He noted that DFID would like to see analytics being used more to empower developing country governments. He noted that there are many similarities in the analytics needs of donors and developing country governments and that both are needed.

   - Dr. Clarke discussed the importance of both effective communication and due diligence of risk information and risk analytics. He noted that the numbers and statistics are important, but these only form part of the financial protection discussions and decision making.

3. **How state-of-the-art technology and advances in remote sensing can be used to make risk information accessible to governments.** A joint World Bank and Columbia University study on satellite-based monitoring of flood risk in South East Asia was presented by Dr. Pietro Ceccato. Dr. Ceccato developed remote sensing products and geographic information systems to be used operationally by the Ministries of Agriculture in 21 countries in Africa and Asia. He joined the International Research Institute for Climate and Society in
2004 and his current research activities include the development and integration of environmental remote sensing products into early warning systems for human health, agriculture, pest management, and natural disasters.

- The flood index study project aims at defining a methodology for the rapid assessment of flood response costs at a national scale in South East Asia. Dr. Ceccato explained that the approach is based on the characterization of flood severity, such as depth of water or river discharge, based on the processing of satellite imagery data.
- Because of the highly volatile and difficult to model nature of flood risk, this project specifically addressed the quantification of uncertainties involved, to help understand the applicability and limitations of the results produced. The objective is both to quantify the risk of flooding per say, as well as raise awareness of the potential magnitude and severity of losses being faced.
- The project concluded with a feasibility stage design of flood indices which could serve as the basis for a risk transfer product for emergency costs following a flood event. Dr. Ceccato also detailed the practical challenges of using such indices in an operational framework, in order to provide the near real-time monitoring capability and insurance triggers needed to write a financial product.

4. The challenges in maintaining credible disaster risk information and the importance of objective analytics of such information in implementing financial protection strategies was discussed through a Pacific case study. Ms. Litea Biukoto from the Pacific Community shared her experience from the Pacific Risk Information System. Ms. Biukoto is the Sr. Hazards and Risk Manager for the Geoscience Division of the Pacific Community.

- In the Pacific region, there is a risk information system (PacRIS) that provides open access risk data, hosting national and regional risk information for 15 Pacific Island Countries. This enables easy access to risk information to inform smarter financial protection decisions.
- Ms. Biukoto explained how the risk information has been used in the development of analytics tools to inform planning, early warning, and preparedness and response and recovery activities. The analytics tools take the risk information from PacRIS and aggregate and evaluate the financial exposure from natural disasters. These tools have supported an increased understanding of disaster risk among Pacific Island countries, assisted decision makers in the selection of catastrophe risk insurance coverage, assisted decision makers in the establishment of a catastrophe risk insurance pool, and provided a new lens to evaluate other financial protection instruments.

5. The challenges in understanding catastrophe risk model data and using analytics to inform the transfer of disaster risk to the market was discussed through a Moroccan case study. The government of the Kingdom of Morocco recently passed a national catastrophe insurance law establishing a National Catastrophe Insurance Program and a Solidarity Fund to provide financial protection for the insureds as well as for uninsured households against natural disasters. Mr. Youness Lammat is an actuary working for the Supervisory Authority of Insurance and Social Welfare (known as ACAPS) in Morocco since 1997.

- He explained how risk information from a catastrophe risk model was needed to design and characterize the financial

In the Pacific region, there is a risk information system (PacRIS) that provides open access risk data, hosting national and regional risk information for 15 Pacific Island Countries. This enables easy access to risk information to inform smarter financial protection decisions.
coverage and costs associated with the national insurance program and the Solidarity Fund.

- Mr. Lammat discussed the analytics tool that is being developed to aggregate and evaluate the exposure and risk data, and to produce meaningful loss information for decision makers. The analytics tool is used to assess, illustrate, and evaluate how changes in the catastrophe insurance law parameters might change:
  - The costs associated with various categories of population and businesses under the Solidarity Fund and insurance program;
  - The average funding (levy or additional premium applied to fire insurance policies in order to include an extension of guarantee against catastrophe risk) and capital requirements;
  - The financial and fiscal risk profile of both the insurance program and Solidarity Fund; and
  - A cost-effective reinsurance program to support the financing of extreme events.

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Linking Humanitarian Response and Recovery: Advancing the New Way of Working

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Background
There is a real urgency for the international community to change their behavior and work together in new ways. It is estimated that today about 2 billion people in the world live in countries where development outcomes are affected by “fragility, conflict, and violence.” Conflicts create huge and complex humanitarian situations, which in many regions remain without durable solutions for years. This has directly contributed to an unprecedented increase in the volume, cost, and duration of humanitarian assistance provisions over the past 10 years. Interagency humanitarian appeals now last an average of seven years and have increased nearly 400 percent in the last decade. Forced displacement is an illustration of how protracted crises leave people behind, keep them...
vulnerable and inactive, and deny them development opportunities for years on end. Out of the 65 million reportedly displaced by conflict and violence today, 95 percent live in developing countries and two-thirds are internally displaced.

The international frameworks are starting to respond to the challenges. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDGs have universal Member State support. The 2030 Agenda has committed to leaving no one behind and reaching the furthest behind first, including especially those affected by humanitarian crises. Such imperatives require that the most vulnerable, including those affected by crises and forced displacement, are moved onto the path of development progress. The adoption of the SDGs thus set out a path not just to meet needs, but to reduce risk, vulnerability, and overall levels of need, providing a reference frame for humanitarian development and peace-building actors.

The World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) in 2016 created a new momentum to rethink the way the international community operates in such settings, recognizing the need for humanitarian and development actors to work closely together, especially in protracted settings. This builds on major global policy processes, such as the Sendai Framework for disaster risk reduction, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda for Financing for Development, and the Paris Agreement, which highlight the need to adapt to and manage increasing climate risk.

During the WHS, there was a commitment by the UN, endorsed by the WB and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to find a "New Way of Working" to meet people's immediate humanitarian needs while reducing risk and vulnerability. This also responds to the request from Member States for the UN development system to enhance coordination with humanitarian assistance and peace-building efforts at the national level in countries facing humanitarian emergencies and in countries in conflict and post-conflict situations.

**New Way of Working**

In brief terms, the New Way of Working can be defined as working over multiple years, based on the comparative advantage of a diverse range of actors, including those outside the UN system, toward collective outcomes. Wherever possible, those efforts should reinforce and strengthen the capacities that already exist at national and local levels.

The notion of “collective outcomes” has been placed at the center of the commitment to the New Way of Working, summarized in the Commitment to Action signed by the Secretary-General and 8 UN Principals at the World Humanitarian Summit, and endorsed by the World Bank and IOM. Transcending the humanitarian development divide by working to collective outcomes was also widely supported by crisis-affected states, donors, NGOs (international and national), and others. The New Way of Working frames the work of humanitarian and development actors, along with national and local counterparts, in support of collective outcomes that reduce risk and vulnerability and, in so doing, contribute toward achieving the SDGs.
Ending needs by reducing risks and vulnerability is now a shared vision under the SDG umbrella, that transcends this decades-old divide. The New Way of Working aims to offer a concrete path to remove unnecessary barriers to collaboration of humanitarian and development actors, governments, NGOs (international and national), and private sector actors. The changes required to make this approach work are institutionally and financially complex and will need time to operationalize. The results, however, will not only improve the lives of the most vulnerable, but the reductions in risk and vulnerability are essential to ensuring that development progress is accessible to all communities, including those affected by crises.

A collective outcome can be described as the result that development and humanitarian actors want to have achieved at the end of 3–5 years. Two examples include the reduction of cholera infections in a city commonly struck by cholera from 50,000 today to zero in 2021, or the 'legalization' of housing of an additional 100,000 long-term IDPs in a given city and their integration into municipal services by 2021.

Achieving the New Way of Working will require broader partnerships among UN agencies, international and local NGOs, the private sector, civil society actors, and governments, as well as closer alignment, where possible, between humanitarian and development processes and the way they are coordinated and financed. Exploring opportunities for improved coherence and complementarity and, where appropriate, closer alignment in four main areas will be critical:

- **Analysis:** Predictable and joint situation and problem analysis are needed to come to a shared problem statement and identify priorities based on the vast amount of reliable data that is being collected.
- **Planning and Programming:** Better joined-up planning and programming between humanitarian and development actors to enable them to agree on a set of collective outcomes and plan backwards from those envisioned three to five year results, asking what it takes to achieve them and which actors have the comparative advantage to deliver.
- **Leadership and coordination:** Leadership and coordination by an empowered UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) who facilitates joint problem statements and the identification, implementation, and financing of collective outcomes; engages with the national and local authorities; and supports connectivity between all actors and capacities available in country to contribute to such outcomes. To fulfil these functions, the RC/HC would need to be supported by adequate capacity and resources, and collective and individual accountability of actors contributing to this approach would need to be strengthened.
- **Financing:** Financing modalities that can support collective outcomes. Especially in protracted crises, financing must include a broader range of flexible and predictable multi-year programming and diversified funding tools that are aligned to enable layering of short-, medium-, and long-term programs, including by the World Bank and other multilateral development banks. Most importantly, financing should be more closely tied to the progress toward achieving collective outcomes.

The application of the New Way of Working will vary based on context, but the steps below provide a basic example of how collective outcomes can be set and met in dynamic contexts:

- **Conduct a Common Country Analysis** by drawing on the Humanitarian Needs Overview and other key risk, vulnerability, and root cause analyses that are available to achieve a more targeted understanding of vulnerability at household and community levels as well as local capacities to address them.
- **Define UNDAF, UN Humanitarian Response Plan,** or other national framework strategic priority areas for vulnerability reduction on key areas of risk and vulnerability. Where possible, link to national SDG targets.
- **Identify transformative but realistic, concrete, measurable reductions in levels of need, risk, and vulnerability that humanitarian and development actors can adopt as “collective outcomes.”**
- **Propose and support processes to align agency-specific projects and work plans to support the achievement of the collective outcomes.**
Coordinate resource mobilization for these collective outcomes (ensure short-, medium-, and long-term interventions are predictably financed with a diverse set of financing tools over a 3–5 year period).

Examples of Country-Level Implementation of the New Way of Working

Ethiopia
The government, the Development Assistance Group (DAG) and Ethiopia Humanitarian Country Team (EHCT) are looking at establishing a system, leveraging the existing country-led strategic mechanisms. Currently, under the overarching DAG, the subclassification of the development coordination structure is two-pronged: Donor-only Technical Working Groups and joint Government-Donor Sector Working Groups. On the humanitarian side, the EHCT and its emergency clusters work in close coordination with the government mechanism, including the National Disaster Risk Management Commission, as well as emergency units within the line ministries.

The Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) works closely with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other counterparts in providing support to refugees in the country. The UN Country Team, the Ethiopia Humanitarian Country Team (EHCT) and the Refugee Task Force, as well as donor, NGO, and interagency meetings at the national, field, and camp levels are the coordination mechanisms to ensure support to refugees is provided in a coherent manner to achieve sustainable results.

A small multi-stakeholder Nexus group was formed under the leadership of the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator to explore strategies on the development humanitarian sphere, which identified a potential way forward to define an integrated architecture. Specifically, the Nexus group developed and identified a “bundle+ approach.” The approach proposes to integrate humanitarian and development interventions in a selected geographical area, with the aim to reduce vulnerability and risk while providing relief to crisis-affected populations.

Uganda
Uganda has integrated refugee management and protection within the country’s own domestic mid-term planning through the second National Development Plan (NDP II). Through the NDP II, Uganda has committed to a Settlement Transformative Agenda, with the goal to assist refugees and host communities by promoting investment and socioeconomic development in refugee-hosting areas. This requires a shift in focus to bridge the gap from emergency relief to medium and longer term, sustainable, and integrated improvements in affected areas to ensure that refugees and nationals have access to adequate shelter, water and sanitation, schools, and health services. Uganda has been selected as one of the focus countries to practically inform the blueprint of a Global Compact on Refugees through practical application of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF).

Uganda’s disaster preparedness and management policy provides a global best practice to understanding, anticipating, and reducing risks, shifting the approach away from merely managing disaster events to addressing the underlying risk factor. Through district-level hazard, risk, and vulnerability profiling, the country has an evidence base to support risk-informed decision making. By better understanding climate and disaster risk, Uganda is protecting its investments and future-proofing its development.

The UN in Uganda and the World Bank, in support of the government’s Settlement Transformative Agenda, have developed the Refugee and Host Population Empowerment (ReHoPE) initiative, a multiyear joint framework for self-reliance and resilience programming for refugee and host communities. The UN, under the leadership of the Resident Coordinator (RC), is already implementing ReHoPE as part of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and ongoing refugee and host community response. These efforts are set
to inform the CRRF, the Solutions Alliance, and global blueprints for how countries can bring security and development into the response for both refugees and host communities. This is the first time UN and World Bank are jointly working to develop a displacement specific strategy in support of refugee and host communities with the involvement of government. The framework emphasizes the need to develop innovative partnerships, especially in the area of promoting sustainable livelihoods and protecting the environment, including through safe access to sustainable energy. Partnerships to such an effect are already being developed with private sector and new innovative actors.

**Yemen**

In Yemen, a review of the UN Humanitarian Response Plan, the World Bank Country Engagement Note, the EU country strategy, and the outcomes of the UN Strategic Assessment Mission identified four common strategic outcomes across the humanitarian development peace nexus. They include: (1) equitable assistance; (2) local service delivery; (3) preservation of state institutions; and (4) preparation for economic recovery and reconstruction. The strong commitment to preserve institutions for essential delivery has worked as a catalyst for important operational progress toward this collective outcome. Thus, for the first time, core IDA grants to preserve institutions and service delivery in conflict were allocated to Yemen through UN implementation, working in partnership with local institutions. The UN-WB-EU-Islamic Development Bank partners have agreed on the importance to work across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus and develop joined up response strategies through the Yemen Humanitarian-Development-Peace Platform that brings together data across the humanitarian-development-peace spectrum and contributes toward a common understanding of risks, needs, gaps, and opportunities for joint analysis, operations, and advocacy in support of common or shared outcomes.

**Sudan**

In Sudan, the aid community is implementing the New Way of Working (NWoW) by making the collective response to the protracted crisis more fit for purpose through strategic collaboration and coordination in planning, implementing, and monitoring the humanitarian response. To that end, the first-ever Multi-Year Humanitarian Strategy 2017–2019 and the new UNDAF were developed simultaneously, involving consultations with all stakeholders concerned, aiming at enhancing the programmatic linkages. In April/May, a Humanitarian Development Nexus/Coordination Review Mission (Global Clusters, Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), United Nations Development Group (UNDG)) that helped unpack the NWOW in the context of Sudan, was followed by a joint OECD-UN mission (Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)) ‘From Funding to Financing’ which fed into broader efforts to deliver an effective financing strategy for Sudan and to explore how collective outcomes could be financed, considering best practices in other contexts. Furthermore, a joint UN-WB Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) Initiative aims to provide better informed durable solutions for internally displaced persons through stronger quantitative data on their poverty characteristics. Results will inform joint strategy and planning, with recommendations for UN agencies, World Bank, the government, and development partners.
Questions and Challenges Discussed

The WHS made an explicit call for change on how the nexus between humanitarian and recovery interventions is dealt with, and the New Way of Working (NWoW) aspires to become such a change. While it is expected that the NWoW does not become just another paradigm but rather a practical way of working, there is not yet clarity on how the NWoW would function in practice in the field where different realities co-exist. To this end, it is essential that the NWoW is contextualized so that it becomes relevant to the actors at play in a specific context.

In order to explore how the NWoW is actually being viewed and applied in the field, the following key questions framed the discussion that was held during the session at the conference:

**General questions**
- How is the New Way of Working being implemented at the country level and what behavioral changes have occurred or are needed within the various modalities of engagement?
- How can joint analysis, joined up planning, and programming with multiyear time frames toward collective outcomes and innovative financing be materialized at the country level?
- What opportunities and good practices already exist at the country level, and how can evidence of these be best utilized to support implementation in other countries and by other stakeholders?
- What are the primary internal and external blockages to the implementation of the New Way of Working? How can these be overcome?

**Development agencies and organizations**
- As a development agency, what are you currently doing to adapt to the global policy shifts related to crisis settings? Can you give us concrete examples of what is being done in the field?
- What do you see as the main challenges and opportunities faced at the country level?

**Countries in humanitarian settings**
- Has the policy shift which calls for the New Way of Working (NWoW) influenced the way Niger works to address the humanitarian-development-peace nexus? Could you share concrete examples on what Niger has achieved and changes that are underway?

**Donor community**
- Given that the New Way of Working has implications to the way humanitarian and development actions are funded, what are donors doing to support planning for collective outcomes at the country level?
- What is the latest thinking in how various financing tools and instruments can contribute to this?

**Conclusion**

Note: the conclusions hereby reported are the reflection of the discussion held at this WRC3 session and do not aim to be necessarily globally shared views.

The conceptual division between humanitarian and development actors is in itself a cause of blockages to joint collaboration at the country level, as by identifying these two “worlds” as separate, it tends to perpetuate such division also in the practice. This becomes particularly evident and challenging in protracted crises contexts, where there is not necessarily a distinction between these actors as they are often all involved in both humanitarian and development interventions—as for example in the case of Sudan. In order to make the NWoW a reality and make the difference, it is necessary to join the humanitarian and development programming, and to adopt structural measures simultaneously to life saving activities. In so doing, vulnerability reduction would become the common entry point for both actors, allowing targeting the same groups of individuals and integrating risk and vulnerability reduction measures at the very outset of the humanitarian interventions.
Flexibility and sustainability in financing is also critical. Extended financing cycles for humanitarian interventions would help integrate humanitarian and longer term development interventions, and flexibility in the use of the funds would help planning as it best addresses current and evolving needs. Multiyear financing commitments would benefit programming and ensure continuity. Donors should adopt a more flexible and sustained approach to financing and reflect such an approach in their national architecture for international aid. The integration between humanitarian and development concerns should be, in fact, also sought by donor countries within their own government institutions dealing with international cooperation, as humanitarian and development interventions are in many cases managed by separate governmental offices under a single shared budget for international aid, a situation that might at times even create tensions. Structural reforms to the funding architecture in donor countries are therefore necessary to ensure that the humanitarian and development sides work together around common objectives and that the funding responds better to the needs on the ground. Italy, for example, has currently reformed its aid system to this end and ensures better synergies in provision of financial aid.

Governments’ ownership and leadership is key to the success of the NWoW and to the definition of common outcomes, yet minding the challenges of situations where government’s legitimacy and impartiality are in question. The harmonization of policies and objectives should happen within recipient governments to ensure a consensus on their priorities. To this end, it is important to establish processes that facilitate consultations and understanding of the nexus within the government. Niger, for example, is currently developing a policy to best bridge the humanitarian and development work and has established a parliamentary committee and a committee with partners to manage the link between humanitarian and development work.

References

Building Regulations and Standards for Long-Term Resilience

Introduction
In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, saving lives and providing emergency relief are the highest priorities. However, as long-term recovery and reconstruction strategies begin to take shape, critical attention must also be paid to the safe siting and construction of permanent communities. Reconstruction provides a unique opportunity for establishing and improving the capacity of institutions responsible for regulating health, safety, and welfare in the built environment. The loss experienced and the consequences of failures in the built environment provide strong motivation and common purpose to institutionalize effective building control mechanisms.

An effective and efficient building regulatory regime can provide the means to learn from disaster experiences and to remember those lessons for long-term mitigation and resilience. In order to provide adequate protection against disaster risk, building regulatory capacity must be established as a permanent component of urban and regional development. It must become institutionalized in law, in local government, and in building practice, while adequate standards and compliance must be supported and verified on a consistent long-term basis to ensure effective risk reduction.

At the core of a functioning building regulatory framework are:

1. a legal and administrative framework at the national level;
2. a building code/standards development and maintenance process; and
3. a set of implementation mechanisms at the local level.

Past experience has demonstrated that short-term emphasis on building quality during externally funded reconstruction projects does not necessarily carry over to long-term improvement of building practice. Focusing on addressing institutional and regulatory challenges for building and land use control is a key step in this context and a primary contributing factor to “building back better.” It is imperative that the experience of disaster loss be analyzed, understood, and incorporated in order to improve building practices. Only then can regulatory systems enable healthy, safe, and resilient reconstruction.
The advantages of an effective building regulatory framework include:

- Provisions for the protection of the public, particularly including the poor and disenfranchised;
- Representation of the risk perceptions and values of major components of the population, including women, minorities, children, and persons with disabilities; and
- The improvement of the general quality of life and habitation in human settlements.

Developed countries have successfully implemented effective regulatory frameworks for disaster risk reduction and improved health and safety in the built environment. Low- and middle-income countries, however, have not been able to carry out such reforms. In particular, as disasters occur, insufficient attention is paid to the opportunity to institutionalize regulatory improvements for long-term resilience. As a result, many countries experience recurring human and economic losses each time a disaster hits. It is worth recognizing, however, that there are valuable lessons from the experience of developed countries, which can be combined and adapted to local needs to help set developing countries on the path toward effective building regulatory implementation.

Why Is Building Regulation Not Effective in Reducing Disaster Risk in Developing Countries?

Recovering from a disaster requires substantial investment of energy and resources, not only to overcome immediate challenges, but also to implement measures for sustainable recovery and long-term risk reduction. However, institutional actors often fail to take advantage of the immediate aftermath as an opportunity to invest in institutional and regulatory reforms. There are several cases of post-disaster reconstruction that have attempted to implement measures to reduce risk and build back better. However, without adequate reform institutionalization and in the absence of a broad concerted effort to ensure long-term compliance on the ground, these efforts have failed to reduce vulnerability and improve resilience to disasters.

Following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, for example, many well-intended NGOs provided training for “boss masons” in the practice of confined masonry in order to transfer best practices and improve building safety on the ground. During the period of training and external funding, these improved practices were implemented. However, as soon as external supervision and funding ended, and in the absence of institutionalized building controls and inspection processes, traditional practice returned.

Similarly, following the earthquake in northern Pakistan in 2005, there was a commitment to develop safe construction based on local practice. Such an effort was successful as long as there was regular supervision from Army engineers and funding was contingent on compliance with building standards. When supervision and conditional funding stopped, the adherence to building safety standards was compromised.

After the earthquake in Central Java in 2006, an innovative effort was made to develop safe construction standards based on local construction materials and skills. Ten years later, without the institutionalization of building regulation, there remains little evidence of the impact of improved construction practices.

One must recognize that the failure of regulatory policy and implementation in low- and middle-income countries is closely linked to poverty and lack of appropriate resources to develop strong regulatory capacity. While land use and building regulatory regimes should improve access to safe and affordable housing, they have often contributed to achieving quite the opposite by fomenting informality and increasing exposure to risks. There are several factors that contribute to such failures.
Ineffective Land Use Systems
Land use planning and management systems in low- and middle-income countries are often ineffective and fail to limit settlements in hazardous areas, which have led large portions of the urban population, who cannot afford the higher prices of legal land and housing markets, to build informally. This has caused rapid expansion on hazardous territory without clear title or critically needed infrastructure. Even where provision is made to limit hazardous housing development, land use plans are often not adequately supported by effective enforcement or broader compliance mechanisms.

Inappropriate Use of Building Standards
The process of designing and adopting appropriate building standards has often been a top-down directive with insufficient consultations of stakeholders, including private sector representatives, building professionals, and local communities. This has often led to unaffordable standards, which have often set the bar at unrealistically high technical levels, especially for ordinary housing. At times, they increased the dependency of developing countries on imported manufactured building materials and stifled local innovation. However, large infrastructure and important buildings must comply with rigorous codes and construction standards in order to ensure the resilience of urban areas.

No Recognition of Prevailing Building Practices
Post-disaster reconstruction projects have highlighted the need for more contextual approaches that do not focus only on effective and efficiently built products, but that directly contribute to poverty reduction and long-term risk mitigation. People and builders in low-income settings have often integrated risk into their building practices, developing coping strategies for the enhancement of local resilience. The Dhaji Diwari and the Taq type constructions in Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh and the Assam type constructions in the Assam region, for example, are common building practices developed locally in response to devastating earthquakes and with the goal of strengthening resilience to acute shocks. Many of such practices, though widespread, are almost never recognized by formal building and land use systems, which has inevitably widened the gap between the formal and informal built environment.

Dysfunctional Regimes of Building Controls
Permitting and inspections services in developing economies are often characterized by a number of governance and system failures, such as: ineffective administration; insufficient qualification of local building officials, designers, and contractors; a limited appreciation of risk management objectives; and opaque and complex bureaucratic procedures.

High Regulatory Process Costs
The cost of the regulatory process can act as a strong deterrent to meeting legal requirements. For example, in the city of Mumbai, India, the formal cost of going through a planning and construction permitting process is equivalent to 25 percent of the construction cost. The same process costs only 0.5 percent in Japan.

As climate change, urbanization and migration intensify disaster vulnerabilities, it is increasingly important to prepare in advance for achieving resilient recovery. Strengthening recovery systems and building recovery readiness is a no-regret approach with valuable co-benefits towards managing disaster risks and building resilience.
Corruption and Regulatory Capture

Corruption in building code enforcement has been associated with extensive building failure and loss of life in disasters. Recent statistical evidence shows that 83 percent of all deaths from earthquakes in the past three decades have occurred in countries considered most corrupt by Transparency International. The related process of regulatory capture in building code implementation can considerably alter regulatory outcomes. It can lead to reducing safety standards to benefit the regulated industry or, conversely, increase safety standards to unsustainable or unaffordable levels for local owners and builders.

Bridging the Gap in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: Solutions for Effective and Efficient Building Regulatory Frameworks

In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, the challenge for governments and institutions is to focus simultaneously on providing immediate relief and recovery solutions, but also to solve a wide range of institutional and systemic issues that may hinder sustainable reconstruction. Building regulation is a key component for effective resilient recovery strategies.

A robust building regulatory system provides an opportunity to learn from the losses experienced and build the necessary institutional capacity for building control and compliance for long-term resilience. Regulatory reform does not always take place as an immediate reaction to a disaster, but it can certainly inform long-term development strategies that promote resilience-building initiatives. In India, for example, in 2001, the Bhuj earthquake killed around 14,000 people, injured 167,000 and damaged or destroyed over 1.1 million homes. The devastating losses triggered a prompt institutional reaction led by the government, which set up the Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority to hold control over the reconstruction program and promote long-term disaster mitigation. More broadly, the earthquake also led to key improvements at the national level, including a stronger focus on seismic safety in the national agenda and the introduction of new codes and improvements in building practices.

Developing the right policies at the national level, ensuring local implementation, and promoting transparency, inclusion, and compliance are at the core of an effective regulatory reform process. Furthermore, improving the quality and safety of the built environment represents a unique opportunity to achieve broader objectives for the built environment, such as improving accessibility, public health, cultural heritage protection, energy efficiency, and property value and municipal finance. Such opportunities should not be foregone.

Over the course of the past 20 years, significant advances in the natural sciences have made possible the characterization and mapping of hazardous events in terms of frequency, intensity, and location for hydro, meteorological, and geophysical hazards. Engineering research has dramatically improved the understanding of material and structural performance of buildings and infrastructure. Building and land use regulatory regimes have provided the primary channel for the effective and efficient introduction of scientific and engineering knowledge into construction practices. Japan, for example, has an extensive history of devastating earthquake disasters. Nevertheless, building codes have significantly contributed to making Japan one of the world’s most earthquake-resilient countries. Over the past century, Japan has reacted by incrementally improving building code provisions and continuously incorporating lessons learned from disaster experience. As a result, Japanese construction practices have experienced a dramatic improvement in seismic performance. When the 1995 Kobe earthquake struck, 97 percent of collapsed buildings had been built under old building codes, while those that complied with the most updated codes accounted for only 3 percent of the total number of collapsed buildings.

The road to regulatory reform in Japan, as in many other developed countries, has been a long one. Expecting low- and middle-income countries to undertake the same protracted effort to reduce disaster risk may be unrealistic. Instead, learning from the valuable experience of developed countries and selectively adapting lessons learned
to low- and middle-income countries may allow them to “leapfrog” toward appropriate regulation for resilience and risk reduction. What this approach proposes is to promote the key characteristics that generally make up an effective and efficient regulatory framework, while strongly focusing on understanding and adapting to local context and needs.

**Three Core Components of an Effective Regulatory Framework**

The following main components are at the core of a functioning building regulatory framework:

1. a legal and administrative framework at the national level that mandates the construction of safe buildings and enables the construction process to proceed efficiently;
2. a building code/standards development and maintenance process that has the capacity to develop, adapt, and update construction standards based on local needs and rapidly evolving risks; and
3. a set of implementation mechanisms at the local level that ensures that plan review, site inspection, permitting, and enforcement are carried out efficiently and effectively.

In order for national and subnational institutions to function effectively, however, they must also be adequately equipped. A coordinated effort should address the specific need for adequate funding, staffing, and execution to implement land use management and building inspection at the local level. This requires specific support for training and compensation for building officials. It also demands a parallel effort in developing building and land use–related education, financial, and insurance mechanisms for the management of risk and public understanding of the importance of safe siting and construction practice.

**Risk-Informed, Inclusive, and Affordable Building Standards**

Developed countries have successfully developed effective codes and standards that are attainable for everyone and geared toward reducing risks in the built environment. Eurocodes and the International Code Council (ICC), for example, provide common approaches and minimum standards for the design and construction of safe and resilient structures. International codes can serve as a useful reference and can help save time and resources when developing or updating national codes. However, they also require a certain degree of adaptation to local needs and conditions when applied to different contexts to avoid setting the bar too high. Where regulations are unenforceable, or excessive, they tend to be disregarded by the majority of people, especially the poor, increasing exposure to risk. Standards and implementation mechanisms should be risk-informed, affordable for all, and developed through inclusive processes that take into account the needs of disadvantaged segments of the population.

The Eurocodes, for example, enable the adaptation process by allowing each country to determine values related to regulatory safety matters at the national level. This is achieved through the Nationally Determined Parameters (NDPs), which are parameters left open for national choice and cover country differences in geographical, geological, and climatic conditions, different design and construction practices, as well as different safety levels requirements.

In selecting the appropriate standards, there should be a sound understanding of predominant building typologies and building practices in order to adequately assess and minimize risk exposure. Unlike developed countries, low- and middle-income countries face widespread informal building practices. Taking such factors into account can help establish the basic institutional capacity to develop, adapt, and update appropriate standards of construction that are aligned with local needs. In this context, incremental regulation can be introduced and promote modest initial standards of development to enable the poor to enter the legal housing market and improve their housing conditions over time. Consistent with this approach, regulation can help improve security of tenure and reduce the cost of entry to the legal land and housing market.
In 2003, the Jamaican Institute of Engineers, for example, initiated the development of the Jamaican National Building Code. The working group favored the ICC's model building code as the base code for Jamaica. Rather than transposing the ICC code, the approach consisted of drafting an application document to the ICC to present special values, parameters, and conditions for Jamaica. This approach had tangible advantages. First, it spared the reform team the high transaction cost of developing an entirely new document from scratch. Secondly, it enabled Jamaica to tap into a building code system that was adequately resourced to keep the code current with the constant changes in building technology and weather patterns. Furthermore, using the ICC model code satisfied three major directives from the government of Jamaica: (i) cover the widest possible range of building types, (ii) ensure as far as possible that no single disaster could destroy the entire building infrastructure of Jamaica, and (iii) assure that all buildings could be accessible by the disabled. An essential task of the working group assigned to the project was reviewing ICC codes and writing the appropriate application documents that provided the local calibration and necessary adjustments to national construction techniques and risk environments.

**Strengthening Quality Assurance Systems**

A sound system of quality assurance mechanisms must be in place throughout the building life cycle to ensure compliance with relevant standards and minimize risk, from planning to final inspection. During the planning phase, strong attention must be paid to land use, quality of construction materials, and means for project financing. These factors will determine the feasibility of the project and whether construction is possible. The design and construction phase must then follow applicable standards, employ qualified and certified building staff, and ensure regular and transparent supervision, testing, and inspection of the final building.

Overall, investments should be directed to support materials testing facilities and equipment, training of staff, research into safer local construction methods, and funding of programs to accredit product-testing laboratories. There must also be adequate development and dissemination of relevant regulatory documentation and delivery of educational and training programs for key actors involved in the building process. The ultimate goal is not only to minimize unexpected building losses in the event of a disaster, but also ensure that a building can be renovated or upgraded when necessary, or demolished when no longer eligible for improvements and retrofitting.

**Promoting Compliance Rather than Enforcement**

Although a rigorous enforcement function is essential, it should be complemented by positive technical assistance and support for voluntary code compliance. This is particularly true for efforts that seek to expand regulatory service delivery toward the informal sector. Understanding behavioral drivers, and the set of values upon which an effective regulatory system should be established, is crucial. In concrete terms, an effective reduction in risk requires more innovative and nontraditional regulatory approaches (such as guidance and educational effort typically deployed in reconstruction programs), which should be adopted and institutionalized in the mainstream permanent regulatory system for an effective reduction of risk.

Experience generated in the past twenty years points to the potential of leveraging private sector resources into more robust and affordable verification mechanisms. Modern compliance tools include improved information systems on risks, building practitioners’ qualification, private third-party checks, and the use of insurance mechanisms in building controls. Numerous experiences in the field also demonstrate that compliance and efficiency in planning and building regulations can be achieved by promoting greater transparency. From 2006 to 2009, the International Finance Corporation supported a reform of building inspections and construction permits in the city of Alexandria, Egypt. The reform involved the introduction of private sector engineering expertise in building controls and a sustained effort in administrative simplification. The reform resulted in a 40 percent reduction in compliance costs and a 20 percent increase in building code compliance. Reforms can be implemented through small and incremental steps. These steps can typically include measures that reduce...
excessive discretion in planning and building permit approvals and improve disclosure of information related to technical and administrative requirements.

**Limiting the Expansion of New Risks**

With building stocks expected to double in low- and middle-income countries within the next two decades and with natural disasters expected to increase in both frequency and intensity, there is a strong case to reduce the development of new risks in the built environment. Disaster resistance can be achieved in new construction at considerably less cost than in retrofitting of existing vulnerable construction. This approach should not disregard the plight of those living and working in vulnerable buildings on hazardous sites. High priority must be also placed on the inspection and assessment of existing buildings to determine the feasibility of risk reduction measures. The development of regulatory capacity for new construction will provide a foundation for the extension of regulatory practice for the improvement of existing structures.

In India, in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and Jammu and Kashmir, for example, the World Bank is currently implementing large-scale disaster recovery initiatives in response to massive floods events (in Uttarakhand and Jammu and Kashmir) and hurricanes (in Andhra Pradesh). Each of these projects contains a component focused on capacity building and technical assistance for improving disaster risk management capacity. This component is built on an assessment of regulatory capacity that aims to review local building legislation in each state, identify gaps and priorities, assess bottlenecks for effective code implementation, make targeted recommendations for local decision makers and assist in the definition of targeted reforms and training initiatives for effective code development, maintenance, and implementation. Such activities will support the reduction of disaster risk typical of the region and promote measures that will help mitigate potential impacts and losses.

**Institutionalizing Reform**

Reducing risks in the built environment and mitigating the impacts of the next disaster is possible only if actors are able to set clear goals, build accountability, and promote and share key knowledge. To enable this process, it is important to develop detailed baselines with the aim of setting targets and measuring progress in disaster risk reduction. Global leadership mechanisms should be adequately resourced to carry out this effort. While loss reduction in the built environment is the ultimate desired outcome, the approach could include measuring interim accomplishments, such as the gradual take-up of effective design and delivery of regulatory systems. Such an approach will ensure that small steps made to improve the regulatory framework become incrementally institutionalized and accepted as permanent.

**Conclusion**

Strengthening building regulatory frameworks can save lives and reduce losses in the event of the next potential disaster. It must be recognized that none of these actions will be simple and easy to implement, particularly in the aftermath of a disaster, as they will strongly interact with larger socioeconomic constraints and with more entrenched resource and governance challenges. Building on tangible progress made in engineering and construction technology in the past decades, it is possible to apply lessons learned to deliver safer buildings and save lives.

The **Building Regulation for Resilience Program**, launched by the World Bank and the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery in 2016, is an important resource in this context. By focusing on the role of building regulation in protecting lives and property from disaster events, the program aims to reduce underlying risks in order to promote long-term health and safety in the built environment. The program provides practical tools and recommendations to assist policy makers, governments, and donor entities, as well as key private sector players, in leveraging good-practice building regulation to underpin effective risk reduction. These include diagnostic and
assessment tools to identify regulatory gaps and the technical knowledge of multidisciplinary teams that can provide critical support in the development of targeted capacity building activities in the aftermath of a disaster.

Building safer and more resilient buildings can also generate additional benefits for inclusive and sustainable development. Where codes and standards are not complied with or completely absent, the quality of buildings is often compromised. Building regulation provides an opportunity to employ resources more efficiently and improve health and well-being, for example, by investing in energy efficiency to improve air and water quality. Building standards can also set important guidelines for supporting the inclusion of disadvantaged groups, such as persons with disabilities, and directly contribute to increasing productivity and promoting more inclusive societies.

Building quality can affect social, economic, and even institutional aspects of development. For example, making buildings resilient means that in the event of a disaster, health, safety, and productivity will not be compromised. From an institutional perspective, greater resilience and less disruption translates into higher revenues for municipalities and local governments, as well as lower reconstruction and retrofitting costs. Moreover, supporting regulatory frameworks that promote accountability, efficiency, and compliance with adequate building codes can improve transparency around the actual risk exposure of a building and its real value, facilitating property taxation, raising awareness around poor versus good quality buildings through more participatory processes, and even allowing the insurance sector to allocate resources and work more efficiently.

From a cultural protection perspective, heritage sites and historic buildings can suffer severe damage if not adequately protected from risks affecting the built environment. For example, the estimated damage to heritage structures and cultural institutions in Nepal following the 2015 earthquake was about $169 million. Losses in cultural heritage translate into severe costs for the reconstruction of the same structures, as well as for the tourism industry, particularly in countries relying heavily on this sector. The related impact on livelihoods in Nepal, for example, was estimated around $23 million in losses.

Without adequate building regulation, safety, health, and civil rights goals are more difficult to achieve. Efficient and effective regulatory frameworks can help avoid the adverse consequences of unregulated building practices and improve living conditions for all, especially the poor and disenfranchised.
Livelihoods Recovery and Social Protection

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Discussion Summary

Introduction
The humanitarian system is under unprecedented strain. In the last decades, the duration, severity and complexity of natural hazards, many turning into disasters, has increased exponentially. The severe impacts caused on the lives and livelihoods of millions of people around the world often lead to conflict, insecurity, poverty, food insecurity, and human rights violations. It's for that reason that national and local authorities, together with the international community, are being forced to find adequate mechanisms to respond to crises characterized by compounding and diverse vulnerabilities: violence, instability, acute poverty, weak governance; and exacerbated by current climate change patterns, and rapid and unplanned urbanization, to cite a few.

Humanitarian crises tend to have a disproportionate effect on the lives and livelihoods of the most vulnerable—for example, women whose mobility is restricted by cultural and social norms, or an increase in women's time for household activities and care giving after disasters, as children drop out of school, thus limiting time for economic activities. Also, disproportionately affected are people with disabilities who may require additional care and/or supports, and youth particularly affected by unemployment or underemployment. This context creates an additional challenge for the 2030 Agenda's pledge to leave no one behind.

Given this context, people with no substantial or diversified resources, or lacking human capital assets that increase their employability, are likely to be hit hardest by crises and disasters. This is particularly palpable, for those in the informal economy, as shocks can worsen their preexisting economic and social vulnerabilities, such as unemployment, underemployment, poor access to basic public services, food insecurity, marginalization, and gender barriers. Immediate humanitarian response is critical, and must go hand in hand with concerted efforts to strengthen the capacities of national and subnational governments and the affected communities to recover from disasters, linking it to long-term development policies. It is crucial not to "rebuild" those risks when designing recovery interventions, and instead, commit to increased investments in the field of risk reduction and management, and resilience building.

Therefore, humanitarian response must ultimately tackle, in a comprehensive way, socioeconomic factors as unemployment, underemployment, access to basic public services, food insecurity, marginalization, and gender barriers.
in emergency settings. Thus, economic restoration is essential to build resilience in future crises and sets in motion an equitable and sustainable development process. In addition to income generating activities and employment, the concept of livelihoods includes any reliable ways that can facilitate people's access to food, shelter, health care, education, safe water and sanitation, security, and protection. Livelihoods recovery can include immediate livelihoods restoration and income generation initiatives from the very beginning of the humanitarian intervention in order to reactivate economic activities, inject resources in the communities, and avoid dependency on the humanitarian assistance.

**Background**

There are several interventions that have the potential to build longer term resilience and sustainable development pathways—for example, support economic revitalization and sustainable/climate resilient livelihoods systems through development of small, micro, and medium enterprises; commodity value chain development; agriculture development; supporting access to finance and insurance schemes and natural resource based enterprises—to cite a few.

Among them, social protection policies are increasingly recognized as a fundamental part of successful poverty reduction strategies, as they have proved to contribute to strengthening resilient livelihoods. Evidence from Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa shows clear positive correlation on food security, nutrition, and human capital development. Social protection schemes have also been seen as enhancing the economic and productive capacity of the poorest and most marginalized communities. Beyond poverty alleviation, the blend of social and economic impacts can enhance the capacity of poor households to cope with, respond to, and withstand natural and human-induced crises.

In recovery settings, social protection systems can also play a key role for both women and men by providing at least a basic level of an income safety net and access to health and education services. By generating income, for those affected by unemployment or underemployment, or in the aftermath of severe shocks, public employment programs (PEP) contribute to the protection of the working age population as one of the guarantees of the Social Protection Floor. Consequently, access to predictable, sizeable, and regular social protection benefits can, in the short term, protect poor households from the impacts of shocks, including erosion of productive assets, and can minimize negative coping practices. In the longer term, social protection schemes can help to build capacities, smoothing consumption and encouraging investments that contribute to building people's increased resilience to future threats and crisis.

To adequately enhance this role in the contexts of fragility and natural hazards and provide an effective complementary measure to other livelihoods recovery initiatives, social protection systems need to be risk-informed and shock responsive: flexible to adequately and timely respond to crises, while at the same time effectively reach and cover households vulnerable to social, economic, as well as environmental risks.

**Issues Related to the Topic**

Participants to this session shared their experience and discussed the role of livelihoods recovery and social protection for resilience building in times of crises, with a focus on disaster recovery. The discussions went around three key dimensions:

1. Livelihoods recovery and resilience building: ensuring better preparedness in disaster-prone settings, and effective linkages between short-, medium-, and long-term interventions.

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12 Two examples of national PEPs are India's Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGA) and South Africa's Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP), a multi-sectoral program (covering infrastructure, environment, social sector, and non-state actors).
Livelihoods recovery is crucial in times of crises. It provides the much-needed source of income to meet immediate household needs; productive engagement in livelihood activities reduces psychological trauma following the loss from crisis; and promotes socioeconomic empowerment for the most vulnerable. There is a need to rightly understand the situation pre-crisis, especially with regards to preexisting development gaps, so that crisis response interventions effectively address those circumstances. In addition, there is a need to reinforce national and local preparedness systems to be able to build longer term capacities, to respond to recurrent crises.

The concept of building back better should not only be applied to infrastructure, but also to systems and societies at large, thus ensuring that societies do not ‘rebuild the risk’ that already exacerbated the impact on their economy, and livelihoods.

It is important to seek ways to involve the private sector in finding new durable solutions to crises, including funding for more predictable planning. Sustained engagement is key to building community resilience. UNDP Nepal promoted a phased approach to livelihoods recovery: (i) immediate emergency employment through cash for work; (ii) mid-term skill training, technology support, marketing, and financing linkages; and (iii) long-term value chain, product development and diversification, and market linkages.

In Niger, UNDP is providing support to income generating activities, through seeds distributions, agricultural equipment, water pipes, and livestock. The joint interventions, linking cash for work with income generating activities, have allowed the restoration of the livelihood of populations affected by the floods. It has also helped restoration of the local economy, with short-term, labor intensive emergency employment opportunities and savings schemes, while addressing food insecurity concerns in the long term.

In addition, an International Labor Organization (ILO) study in the Philippines on the informal economy in crisis showed that, after Typhoon Haiyan, the formal sector recovered after six months, and even increased operations. The informal sector, however, did not recover even one year after the calamity. It comes as no surprise that the
low levels of resilience to natural calamities are prevalent among those working in the informal economy, mostly the poor. Considering, for example, the quality of housing materials they use and type of livelihoods they are engaged in, their inability to cope with natural disasters is magnified. It is somehow contradictory that in times of widespread devastation, which needs skilled workers for repair and reconstruction, thousands of survivors are idle and are looking for jobs. The challenge is to transfer skills (in carpentry, masonry, electricity, plumbing, welding, painting, and electricity, etc.) to interested yet unskilled workers.

2. The economic and productive impact of social protection programs, including emergency employment schemes, and their role in promoting resilient livelihoods and climate smart employment—rural and urban contexts

Social Protection (SP) comprises a set of policies and programs that addresses economic, environmental, and social vulnerabilities to food insecurity and poverty by protecting and promoting livelihoods.

SP must be risk informed and can play a crucial role not only in responding to a crisis, but also as an early measure to avoid a crisis. Participants discussed the idea that social protection plays an important role in contributing to the building back better approach and at the preparedness phase, especially for the targeting of priority beneficiaries. A social protection system is considered to be risk informed and shock responsive when it is capable to expand the provision of benefits according to the variable needs of the potential beneficiaries using a mix of socioeconomic and risk exposure–related variables to inform targeting, while also supporting the enhancement of capacity for a better response to future shocks.

Participants also highlighted the need for SP to remain flexible so it can expand vertically (increasing the benefit value or duration of an existing program) or horizontally (adding new beneficiaries to an existing program).

A fundamental SP mechanism, increasingly utilized in crisis response is a cash transfer. In Burkina Faso and Niger, Mali, and Mauritania, a Cash+ pilot project helped increase households’ incomes and assets faster than input distribution or cash transfers alone for a similar amount. The Cash+ approach consists of “combining cash transfers with productive assets, activities, and inputs, and/or technical training and extension services” to boost the livelihoods and productive capacities of poor and vulnerable households, contributing to enhancing their resilience. For example, in Somalia, as part of the Famine Prevention and Drought Response Plan, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is providing unconditional cash transfers combined with emergency livelihood inputs to farming households with little to no food stocks left nor seeds to plant during the main planting season, and to marginalized rural families in riverine areas. The farming households receive unconditional cash transfers on a monthly basis (during the full duration of a planting season), along with phased agricultural input support at the beginning and end of the planting season (drought tolerant seeds to plant including cereals, pulses, and vegetable seeds, and hermetic bags to store their harvest). Households in riverine areas receive cash and fishing kits (including hooks, lines, fishing weights, knives, and solar-powered torches, coolers, and chopping boards) to help bridge the gap before the main planting season harvest.

Apart from cash transfers, innovative, less widespread insurance mechanisms, such as weather-index crop insurance or livestock insurance, can also contribute to help small-scale farmers to effectively manage shocks.

3. The components of risk-informed and shock responsive livelihoods, economic recovery, and social protection policies—including integrating risk indicators into already existing development programs, reorienting them to crises contexts.

During the discussions, experiences were shared that showed the need to reorient existing development programs, to meet the needs of crises contexts, building on existing capacities and partnerships to deliver post-crisis response programs rapidly, such as in Niger or Nepal.
In addition to the elements mentioned above, participants have agreed on the importance to offer a coordinated and needs-based response, aiming at leaving no one behind in the immediate aftermath of a crisis, and more importantly during the recovery phase. Post-crisis recovery also provides an opportunity to address deep-rooted social issues such as gender equality and social inclusion.

Development and humanitarian actors often provide robust and timely response aid to those most affected by disasters, yet they disengage too soon for them to be able to recover their lives and livelihoods in a sustainable and risk informed way.

Challenges

The challenges to assist the population affected by humanitarian crises are numerous and diverse. We have moved ahead from a linear-system approach of addressing few of the root causes that led to the humanitarian crisis, toward a more complex-system approach that offers a better understanding of many of the root causes, triggers, development gaps and socioeconomic indicators that can determine whether a natural hazard will lead to a disaster. There has also been an advance in moving from a short-term needs-based response toward a more sophisticated, longer term comprehensive risk and vulnerability informed humanitarian development response to crisis.

Among the elements highlighted during the session in the area of livelihoods recovery and social protection, let’s nail down the following three challenges. First, it is not always possible nor easy to invest in preparedness in the areas of risk and vulnerability analysis, set up social protection delivery systems, or build capacity and leadership of national counterparts. It requires dedicated human skills and financial resources that the donor community is not always ready to provide before the emergency occurs. Secondly, the effective articulation between humanitarian and development initiatives is acknowledged as a key factor of success for disaster recovery. However, the collaboration of humanitarian and development agencies (including the private sector), along with governmental authorities, is still at the beginning when it comes to concrete initiatives (e.g., leveraging shock responsive national social protection systems for crisis response through multidimensional cash transfers). Thirdly, while in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, financial and human resources channeled to humanitarian interventions are usually made available, there still remains a serious gap in terms of funding mechanisms to start the recovery phase, almost in parallel to the life-saving phase.

Conclusion

1. **Humanitarian, development, climate change nexus:** The humanitarian system is under unprecedented strain as disasters are not only more frequent but also characterized by increased complexity. The World Humanitarian Summit already emphasized last year the need of a new holistic approach to bridge the humanitarian development divide, and it should also incorporate climate smart policies.

2. **The potential of social protection:**
   - Social protection is not the only solution to restore livelihoods and build resilience, but it has an important role to play.
   - From the available evidence, climate smart and shock responsive social protection systems hold great potential to enhance the resilience and decrease the vulnerability of the poor by: (i) reducing the need for recurrent and continued humanitarian aid; (ii) facilitating an effective response; and (iii) embedding climate smart dimensions into poverty reduction strategies.
   - However, there is a continued need to generate further evidence to propose operational mechanisms, targeting methodologies and governance structure that are adapted to each context, that apply to the people most in need and which can contribute effectively to the principle of leaving no one behind.
3. **Building response on existing programs and structures**: When possible, it is interesting to use and strengthen the response capacity of existing structures and programs. Not only is it a key ingredient for sustainability, linking immediate livelihoods restoration to longer term development, but also it can contribute to improving the speed and effectiveness of the humanitarian response.

4. **Preparedness, national leadership, humanitarian development coherence**
   - Investing in national and local institutional systems and capacity building is of the utmost importance to improve preparedness, allow a quick response to crises, and build resilience into future shocks—eventually contributing to the reduction of humanitarian needs. Humanitarian agencies and donors would gain to work more with development actors on institutional preparedness as part of the humanitarian program cycle.
   - Thought leadership of the government at the national and local level, and an effective collaboration and coordination between national ministries (agriculture, economy, social protection or similar, finance, and environment) play a key role (i) in ensuring coherence between emergency, development, and climate change adaptation policies and interventions, and (ii) in linking humanitarian action and long-term programs to enhance the productive capacity of the poor.

5. **Emergency employment (cash for work/cash transfer)**: The experience in several post-crises response situations reflected that emergency employment with proper coordination and collaboration among the responders can accomplish the following:
   - Provide immediate income generating opportunities to survivors when it is most needed;
   - Facilitate transfer of practical skills to improve access to other sources of income;
   - Improve living conditions, with better access to basic public services and restored community physical and social infrastructure;
   - Revitalize the local economy with resource inflows that remain in local circulation;
   - Provide the right leverage to set up policies and programs to increase employability and longer-term jobs, diversification of livelihoods, and entrepreneurship;
   - Strengthen the local manpower pool to address the acute shortage of construction workers induced by the widespread devastation; and
   - Promote technological innovations for an efficient management of “cash for work” operations, e.g., the world’s first mobile app, an “easy-to-use debris management app” for UNDP Nepal in partnership with Microsoft.

6. **Rehabilitation of physical and social infrastructure in crises affected areas**: The direct involvement of the community in the restoration of public facilities and infrastructure develops a sense of ownership that leads to proper use and maintenance of the facilities. The results are low maintenance costs and the prolonged and useful life of the public facilities.

7. **Partnerships**: Engagement and ownership of government, local authorities, and other partners from the private sector and NGOs, ensuring sustainability and potential for scaling up post-crises sustainable livelihoods initiatives.

8. **Diversification of livelihoods as a resilience building mechanism**: With improved capacity to access other sources of income using practical skills acquired during the reconstruction and rehabilitation of public facilities and infrastructure, displaced workers have better chances for sustained income. The skills and experience gained strengthens the local manpower pool and the communities’ resilience to future calamities.
From Urban Reconstruction toward Resilient Cities

Summary of Session

While it is still important to consider robust post-disaster urban reconstruction strategies, a shift in focus toward building resilience in cities is mandatory. This session offered the opportunity to showcase examples of cities that are taking the lead in materializing this paradigm shift that was created by the rising urbanization, paired with rising numbers of disasters hitting urban centers. It also opened the discussion to multiple stakeholders to come together and debate how building resilience can be implemented, scaled up, and sustained.

One of the key examples presented during the session was the Roadmap to Resilience for the Accra Metropolitan Area (AMA) project, which implemented early warning and response to flooding in the greater AMA. It combined a targeted approach in vulnerable areas with an inclusion of upstream and neighboring municipalities. The project focused on an integrated and comprehensive development within one catchment area with a focus on vulnerable communities with targeted combinations of hard and soft interventions (such as infrastructure and road upgrading, and community awareness programs). The project is starting a next phase that will focus on setting up institutional mechanisms that will allow a smooth interjurisdictional coordination between the neighboring municipalities to allow an overall implementation of DRR projects, identify specific priority investments and areas for flood mitigation/drainage improvements, and develop risk information systems and local DRM strategies. The project is also seeking further financial support and working on fostering partnerships with various stakeholders.

Another example presented during the session was the Quito City Resilience Program in Ecuador. The city undertook a resilience building scheme with the support of the 100 Resilient Cities Program, which aimed to upgrade the critical infrastructure, planning, regulation, and legal and institutional frameworks, and to strengthen the municipal and social capacities in regards to response and recovery (see Figure 2).

However, even the most prepared countries and cities will get caught off guard. Examples include Fukushima, Japan; Christchurch, New Zealand; the Superstorm Sandy impacts in New Jersey and New York; Hurricane Katrina; or the earthquake around Istanbul. Decades of investments, governance structures, financial instruments, enforcement, and capacity building did reduce their impacts but reconstruction is still a major part of these recovery efforts.

Finally, Panelists urged the international community to get behind urban resilience, as it is a collective effort that requires collaboration and unification of actions.
Background

1. The context

The increasing frequency of disasters, coupled with growing urban populations and the concentration of wealth in cities, has forced organizations to rethink the way they prepare and respond to the needs of disaster-affected communities in urban settings, as well as how they engage in reconstruction, resilience, and development strategies.

Based on a review of the literature, there is an evolution of thinking in the urban development and disaster risk management communities about two ways cities should deal with shocks such as natural disasters. The status quo of urban reconstruction has primarily focused only on ex-post rebuilding of the city fabric along with an emphasis on building back better to reduce future risks [1]. Urban resilience stresses the importance of ex-ante risk management and resilience building which may also extend beyond the built environment or municipal administrative boundaries [2]. A comparison of these two approaches is summarized in Table 1.

Building resilient cities is key to reducing vulnerability and enhancing the capacity of individuals and businesses to manage shocks. Enhancing urban resilience helps to protect gains in economic development and poverty alleviation by reducing or avoiding the economic and human costs of disasters and other hazards. It is thus a critical element of sustainable development, particularly in dense urban areas which are often home to the majority of a country’s population and assets, or in rapidly urbanizing settings which increasingly concentrate people and wealth that are exposed to risks.

The transition from an urban reconstruction mindset to an emphasis on resilient cities should therefore be at the heart of any conversation about urban post-crisis recovery and sustainability. In so doing, urban stakeholders and development partners have the potential to strengthen cities’ capacity to respond to, adapt to, and learn from shocks related to climate change, disaster risks, and other shocks and stresses.
2. Defining urban resilience

Urban resilience has many definitions, most of which account for the ability to manage the wide range of shocks and stresses which may occur in a city. There is no standard definition of urban resilience; this paper defines resilience as the ability of a system, entity, community, or person to adapt to a variety of changing conditions and to withstand shocks while still maintaining its essential functions [3]. Notably, resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain or quickly return to a desired functionality following a disruptive event (whether natural or human induced, predictable or unpredictable). It incorporates the ability to avoid shocks and manage risks, while being able to constantly adapt to change. While not a substitute for broader approaches to sustainability, resilience contributes to long-term sustainability by ensuring current development gains are safeguarded for future generations.

In more recent years, the definition of resilience has broadened to encompass the ability to not only withstand natural hazards, but also shocks and stresses due to technological, social, economic, political, and cultural changes. Nevertheless, experiences, lessons, and solutions from climate change adaptation and disaster risk management activities may be adapted and applied to the other hazards (and vice versa) [5].

Resilience should be measured at different levels—from the individual and household levels, to the community, municipal, and national levels. At the individual and household levels, for example, resilience includes living in safe households or locations protected by risk reducing infrastructure. At the city level, resilience entails the capacity of municipal governments to enable households, communities, and enterprises to manage a stress or avoid a shock, and to maintain critical services following an adverse event. At the regional and national levels, policy reforms, investments, or financial protection strategies can enhance urban resilience in a specific city, vulnerable area, or set of cities.

Resilience must also consider cities as complex systems. Any approach to urban resilience must take into account the functional (e.g., municipal revenue generation), organizational (e.g., governance and leadership),

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### Table 1: Urban reconstruction vs. resilience building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban Reconstruction</th>
<th>Resilience Building</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reactive</td>
<td>Ex-ante as well as ex-post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often tends to function in silos</td>
<td>Considers the urban system as a whole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finishes when structures are rebuilt</td>
<td>Continuous and evolving effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depending on the type of reconstruction project, the economic impact can be limited</td>
<td>Has long-term, broad-based economic impacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has limited capacity building embedded in it</td>
<td>Brings adaptive, transformative, and absorptive capacities to the city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responds to a single disaster</td>
<td>Focus on how the entire city as responds to shocks and stresses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticipates future risks by building back better</td>
<td>Anticipates future risks through mitigation measures in systems, policies, and investments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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13 While similar to the 2009 UNISDR definition included in the Sendai Framework: “the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to, and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions,” the definition of resilience is slightly broader to address a wider subset of shocks. This includes stresses generated by natural phenomena, technological hazards, and socioeconomic risks.

14 Resilience does not, for example, provide the insights into social sustainability that are gained through the social science concepts of agency, conflict, knowledge, and power [4].
physical (e.g., infrastructure), and spatial (e.g., urban design) dimensions, which are interrelated. Urban shocks follow a disruption or breakdown of the urban system, whether economic recession, social upheaval, epidemics, or a failure of governance to deal with inefficiencies of the system. Resilience strategies and investments need to consider these underlying relationships across multiple sectors [6, 7].

The scope of urban resilience often extends beyond the administrative boundaries of a single municipality in recognition of the fact that a city’s functionality depends on external goods and services (including ecosystem services). For example, safeguarding against floods entails not only flood protection works within a city but also effective watershed management, which is often upstream of a city’s jurisdiction. In addition, a city’s resource consumption patterns have upstream consequences while its emissions of waste have downstream impacts.

3. Why is it urgent to focus on urban resilience?

Rapid urbanization
The world is rapidly urbanizing, with up to 1.4 million people per week moving into urban areas [8]. Unprecedented urbanization has transformed the planet from 30 percent urban in 1950 to over 54 percent urban today, and this will reach an estimated 66 percent by 2050. Over 60 percent of the land projected to become urban by 2030 has yet to be developed [9]. Almost one billion new housing units will need to be constructed to house the world’s growing population by 2060 [10].

Some of the fastest urban growth in the developing world will be experienced in small and medium sized cities. By some estimates, populations in these secondary cities are expected to rise by more than 32 percent between 2015 and 2030—equivalent to 469 million more residents [11]. A significant portion of developing country cities considered to be in a “very high” urban vulnerability class are small and medium sized cities growing at an annual average rate of approximately 2 percent and 2.6 percent respectively (see Figure 3). These cities have major investment, land, and planning decisions ahead of them. Here, the greatest opportunity lies in effectively addressing the interplay between risks and urban development in a manner that enables better management of current challenges while accounting for future scenarios [12].

The scale of population growth in most towns and cities has overwhelmed the capacity of many municipal governments. Larger and more densely populated cities mean not only that more people and assets are exposed to hazards but also that the characteristics of the urban ecological system or environment are changed, potentially increasing the level of disasters [13, 14].

Growing concentration of economic activity in cities
In low- and middle-income countries, rapid urbanization is generally associated with rapid economic growth. This in turns leads to a higher concentration of people, assets, and economic activity in urban environments. Cities in the developing world often account for a much greater share of GDP than of the national population (see Figure 4).

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15 Small and medium sized cities are defined as between 300,000 and 500,000 and 500,000, and 5 million respectively.
16 Globally, more than 80 percent of GDP is generated by cities [16]. The notable exception to this trend is Sub-Saharan Africa. Thirteen of the most populated cities in the world are coastal trading hubs that are vital in global supply chains, and many of them are exposed to flooding and storms. For example, the estimated exposure of economic assets is expected to increase from its 2005 level of US$8 billion to US$544 billion in Dhaka and from US$84 billion to US$3.6 trillion in Guangzhou [6].
But a city’s economic success does not necessarily lead to greater resilience. Many rapidly growing cities have neither the required infrastructure and services nor the risk-informed planning and land use management measures in place required to safeguard all their inhabitants, assets, and activities. Similarly, an economically successful city does not equate to a healthy, inclusive, or sustainable city. In many low- and middle-income countries, cities are usually characterized by unequal access to urban space, infrastructure, services, and security. This generates new patterns of risk, particularly in informal settlements, with deficient or nonexistent infrastructure and social protection, and high levels of environmental degradation.

**Increase in expected losses in urban environments**

Global average annual loss from natural disasters is predicted to reach US$415 billion by 2030 [18]. Using the 80 percent wealth concentration figure [16], urban losses could reach US$332 billion. This figure is only for disaster impacts, and underestimates the economic consequences of inadequate resilience because: (a) damages
and losses from other hazards are not included (e.g., conflict, pollution, congestion, epidemics, accidents, building collapses, and terrorism); (b) the assessment does not include economic impacts on the informal economy; and (c) welfare effects are not included.

Moreover, in an interconnected global economy, risk itself becomes globalized as both the causes and impacts are increasingly interconnected and affect other sectors. This is especially the case with foreign investments flowing into cities that offer comparative advantages (e.g., lower labor costs, closer proximity to export markets), but also higher levels of vulnerability to shocks and stresses due to lower levels of investment in risk-reducing infrastructure.\footnote{An example of this was the disruption of global supply chains for hard drives following floods in Thailand, and for automobiles after the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan.} This is especially the case with foreign investments flowing into cities that offer comparative advantages (e.g., lower labor costs, closer proximity to export markets), but also higher levels of vulnerability to shocks and stresses due to lower levels of investment in risk-reducing infrastructure.\footnote{An example of this was the disruption of global supply chains for hard drives following floods in Thailand, and for automobiles after the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan.}

However, this growth in expected losses is not inevitable. Annual investments of US$6 billion in appropriate disaster risk management strategies could generate risk reduction benefits of US$360 billion over 15 years. This is equivalent to an annual reduction of expected losses by more than 80 percent. Such an annual investment in disaster risk reduction represents only 0.1 percent of the US$6 trillion per year that will have to be invested in infrastructure over the next 15 years\footnote{Investing in climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction is thus a critical precondition for promoting sustainable development.}. But for many countries, that small additional investment could make a crucial difference in achieving the national and international goals of ending poverty, improving health and education outcomes, and ensuring sustainable and equitable growth. For example, in Ethiopia, an investment of US$10 million in improving compliance with building regulations in cities could result in a net reduction of losses of US$600 million through 2050\footnote{Public investment was calculated as an average of the annual percentage of public investment in relation to GDP from 2001 to 2011, based on data from the World Bank.}.

Increasing disaster loss and impacts, magnified by climate change, will undermine the capacity of many low- and middle-income countries to make the financial investments and social expenditures necessary to achieve the SDGs. These losses also represent a serious erosion of public investment in countries with the least capacity to invest (see Figure 5). In Madagascar, for example, the average historical annual losses from disasters since 2001 are equivalent to around 75 percent of annual average public investment in the same period.\footnote{In a recent survey conducted by the Carbon Disclosure Project, nearly 70 percent of company respondents identified concerns with business continuity risks to their supply chains and thus risks to their revenue streams due to climate change and the resulting extreme weather events \cite{carbon_disclosure_project}. More than half these risks have either already impacted these companies or are expected to do so within the next five years.} Investing in climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction is thus a critical precondition for promoting sustainable development.

Increasing resilience is good economics. A recent World Bank report\footnote{Public investment was calculated as an average of the annual percentage of public investment in relation to GDP from 2001 to 2011, based on data from the World Bank.} concludes that, if cities and countries implemented a "resilience package," global well-being losses could be reduced by US$100 billion per year in current dollars. This package would consist of better financial inclusion, development of disaster risk and health insurance, increased coverage of social protection and scalable safety nets, contingent finance and reserve funds, and universal access to early warning systems.

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4. **Increasing international focus on urban resilience**

Investing in urban resilience is critical to ending extreme poverty by 2030, and promoting shared prosperity. Poverty-focused urban resilience investments promote these goals by:

(i) Protecting development gains so that urban residents do not fall back into poverty after facing shocks and stresses;

(ii) Making poor households and communities more resilient and thus in a better position to move out of poverty; and

(iii) Strengthening urban economies that can grow with equity.

One-third of urban residents in low- and middle-income countries are classified as poor. Despite their geographic spread, the urban poor face common challenges. Addressing extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity will require solutions to these challenges—and these solutions are inextricably bound to the issue of urban resilience.

A series of recent global mandates has propelled urban resilience as a top priority amongst development practitioners—from the local to the global. The following global mandates reflect this increased importance placed on urban resilience:

- **United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs, 2016–2030).** SDG No. 11 calls on the world to “make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.” To this end, two main target action items have been identified [22].

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19 These include:
(i) limited access to income and employment;
(ii) inadequate and insecure living conditions;
(iii) poor infrastructure and services;
(iv) vulnerability to risks, particularly those associated with living in slums;
(v) spatial issues that inhibit mobility and transport; and
(vi) inequality closely linked to socioeconomic exclusion, as well as crime and violence.
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015–2030): At the Third United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (Sendai, March 14–18, 2015), a new global framework was generated, serving as the successor to the Hyogo Framework for Action. The Sendai Framework calls for efforts to reduce exposure and vulnerability in general, while identifying unplanned and rapid urbanization as key underlying drivers of disaster risk. To this end, the framework calls for integrating hazard and risk considerations in all stages of the urban development cycle, including the investments made by multilateral and bilateral development assistance programs. Within the framework, international financial institutions such as the World Bank Group committed to increasing investments in disaster risk management and resilience, while systematically working to incorporate disaster and climate risk into its operations [23].

United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP21, December 2015): During the Conference of Parties, participants emphasized the key role that urban areas play, in mitigating emissions and in adapting to climate change. This is part of the wider dialogue on climate risk serving as the main driver of losses from natural disasters; more than 75 percent of disaster losses are related to extreme weather [24]. It was concluded at COP21 that curbing climate change and efficiently funding adaptation efforts would be essential to the resilience agenda.

New Urban Agenda (Habitat III, October 2016): The New Urban Agenda adopted at the Habitat III Conference envisages cities that “adopt and implement disaster risk reduction and management, reduce vulnerability, build resilience and responsiveness to natural and man-made hazards, and foster mitigation and adaptation to climate change” [25]. One of the three pillars of the Quito Implementation Plan for the New Urban Agenda is entitled “Environmentally Sustainable and Resilient Urban Development” and calls for, inter alia, resilient urban spatial development, infrastructure and building design, reduction of vulnerability to hazards, proactive use of risk-based approaches, and climate adaptation in cities.

The prioritization reflects the growing consensus amongst national governments, civil society organizations, donors, international organizations, and the private sector on the need to ramp up efforts in strengthening urban resilience across the developing world.

Conclusion

Thinking about how cities deal with shocks such as natural disasters has evolved from an ex-post focus on rebuilding to the ex-ante perspective of resilience. Urban resilience accounts for the ability to manage a wide range of shocks and stresses in the complex urban context where causes and effects may extend from the household to the supranational level. The issue of urban resilience is one of increasing urgency for disaster recovery professionals as well as city planners due to rapid urbanization, the growing concentration of economic activity in cities, and the increase in expected losses in urban environments. Given these dynamics, investing in urban resilience is now part of a development focus on poverty alleviation and shared prosperity, and is aligned with the objectives of recent international agreements. Investment decisions taken now will have huge implications for development trajectories in the future and will prove critical in preventing cities from being locked into unsustainable development pathways, or being exposed to increasingly intense and frequent urban shocks and stresses.
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Session on Innovations in Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Monitoring.
Innovations in Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Monitoring

Framing the Challenge on Data for Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery

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Session Summary
The session aimed to allow participants and attendees to reach a common understanding on the utility of the innovative remote assessments in disaster recovery and conflict assessments, and allow technical experts to better understand the needs of client countries, enabling them to tailor tools to respond to the needs. It showcased examples of mechanisms that support and collaborate on the process and promoted a discussion on creative ideas for improvement in remote assessment tools, and the challenges faced on the field.

Presentations focused on examples of countries and stakeholders that have used remote assessments during natural disasters and conflict situations, such as Haiti, Nigeria, Yemen, and Iraq. These examples constituted a base for a discussion on the current innovations in the field of remote assessments, their utility and limitations, particularly in conflict situations, challenges in coordinating, conducting, and supporting them, and linkages and complementarities of remote assessments with on-ground assessments. The session further provided an occasion to discuss the role of collaborations in verifying and maintaining quality of data, and continuing support and updating information in ongoing crises.

Introduction
Remote assessment and monitoring methods are rapidly evolving and have expanded their scope and coverage. The remote crises assessments target areas severely affected by natural disasters or located in conflict zones where field-based assessments cannot be conducted. Various remote assessment techniques have been used to estimate damages of multiple sectors: Education, Energy, Health, Housing, Transport, Agriculture, and Water and Sanitation. Remote-based methods are also being applied in recovery monitoring to assess recovery progress in hard to reach areas.

Remote-based assessments provide an innovative way of overcoming access and limitations to reliable data collection in ongoing and post-crisis situations. With a mixture of satellite/aerial imagery, social media analytics, data mining, and modelling techniques supplemented by field reports and local government data, a series of crisis assessments have provided results on: (1) quantitative estimates of the physical damages to
key public and private assets in various sectors; (2) the impact of the crisis on associated service delivery; (3) a preliminary analysis of stabilization and recovery interventions and their respective sequencing; and (4) model-based assessments on disaster losses.

The shifting realities of crises are coupled with unprecedented advancements in technology that allow to conduct these assessments as quickly as possible. These innovations enable development partners to go the extra mile to learn in real time about the impact of the crisis on affected populations. Spatial analysis, satellite imagery, 3D modelling, remote sensing, drones, and social media are a few examples of analytical tools that enable data collection where access is limited. The innovative remote in- and post-crisis assessments and recovery monitoring greatly enhance recovery preparedness and planning capacities by providing measurable and visual information that can complement the detail ground-based assessment, and upon which programs can be implemented as soon as possible.

Evidence-Based Support for Recovery

The question is how can we produce an evidence-based support when access is difficult and usable information is scarce? This dilemma is prevalent in both conflict settings and in the wake of natural disasters. For example, earthquakes, floods, etc., coupled with capacity erosions in certain cases, can restrict access to some areas and thus make ground-based assessments extremely challenging. The World Bank and the United Nations have been exploring these technological advancements and actively utilizing remote-based sensing techniques to conduct damage and needs assessments, also known as Damage and Needs Assessment (DNAs), in crisis environments worldwide. In countries like Yemen, Iraq, Nigeria, Nepal, Haiti, and others, The World Bank has assessed damage to infrastructure and service delivery interruption to understand the recovery and reconstruction needs. We are also seeing situations in crisis and post-crisis where there is a need for rapid response. Windows of opportunity for effective recovery close quickly. Time is of the essence as recovery needs to be planned as early as possible, to mobilize resources which might be done through pledging conferences.

Recovery Monitoring

Example: Damage Estimation of school, before and after aerial photos

The European Union, the United Nations, and the World Bank have been collaborating on post-crises recovery needs and recovery planning for many years. The collaboration was formalized in a "joint declaration" in September 2008. In essence, it calls for pooling of expertise and resources to efficiently address post-crises assessments. The three institutions support government in making assessments. Haiti is an example where they used high-resolution satellite imagery almost immediately after the earthquake to provide the first glimpse of the devastation caused by the earthquake. These valuable datasets were given to the government within two months of the disaster and at the time resulted in one of the most comprehensive rapid assessments.
For example, prior to Hurricane Matthew (2014–2015), the Centre National de l’Information Géospatiale (CNIGS) carried out a complete geospatial database of all school buildings in Haiti. This survey comprised data such as the physical aspect of the school, wall types, roofing types, and spatial localization, etc. This helped to quickly determine the extent of the impact of Matthew on school infrastructure in the country. GIS analysis and models were helpful to fill the gaps in damage and loss assessment. The data derived from satellite imagery, digitized data from ortho photos, and drone imagery provided highly useful metrics for validating and calibrating GIS analysis and models.

One of the key learnings from the Hurricane Matthew assessments was that having a baseline data in an easy to use format is essential in doing rapid assessment. Many sectors lack baseline geolocated data. The recommendation is to proliferate mobile data collection to increase the geolocated data of all sectors. For recovery monitoring to be successful, innovations in technologies also require good proxy indicators, reasonable assumptions, and cross-validation to establish baselines for all sectors for cost-effective regular updates.

**Crisis Assessment**

There is an increasing demand for conducting in-conflict DNAs, and dynamic assessment models engaging in ongoing conflict situations prepare for recovery and reconstruction to support consolidation of stabilization gains. These assessments provide preliminary estimates of physical damage and quality of service delivery through satellite imagery, ICT assessments, social media analysis, and all publicly available data, as well as ground information.

The WB MENA Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience (SURR) efforts to respond to clients’ demand for assessments during and after a crisis, with limited access to the ground, prompted the use of techniques available to improve the speed, accuracy, and quality of remote assessments to better suit the needs of crisis-affected countries. Additionally, there is a growing need for quick and well-planned emergency operations. For example, the Bank conducted a DNA in Iraq in a record time of ten days using remote-based technologies to assess damages and needs, which fed into a $350 million emergency operation for reconstructing infrastructure and restoring services. Such DNAs can be entry points where more comprehensive, ground-based assessments are not possible—to assess needs related to state effectiveness, service delivery, social cohesion, and livelihood opportunities, which provide the foundation for RPBAs.

North East Nigeria, one of the poorest areas in the country, suffered over seven years of armed conflict with more than 1.8 million people forcibly displaced. The country also suffered significant damage to public and private assets, with acute humanitarian crises. The RPBA generated strong ownership by governments at all levels and provided a common vision and foundation for recovery and peace building. It identified needs of $6.7 billion spread over 18 subsectors/themes, convinced skeptical partners to join forces, and was produced in record time.

One of the main achievements of the RPBA is that it set standards for quality and produced a replicable model and tools for in-conflict situations. This allowed to set the groundwork for a sustained, long-term engagement for implementation, and formed a key basis for the development of the Buhari Plan—the National Strategy for the Recovery of the North East. As of today, the RPBA has informed over 1 billion in programming by the WB, EU, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) and others.

In Yemen, remote assessment has allowed monitoring of power outages over the period of 2 years (See Figure 6), assessing residential damages through collateral damage assessments and near infrared imagery. Satellite imagery also helps tracing active fires in Yemen, which provides insight into IDP movements and suggests mobility that closely follows conflict activity. Another example of the use of remote assessment and the use of dynamic models is in Iraq, in which social media helped assess the damage of physical structures such as bridges.
Figure 6: Power

Power Outages, Taiz, Yemen

Taiz experiences a major decrease in radiance emissions beginning in April 2015. The lower radiance emissions persist for the duration of the VIIRS survey period, with the only notable exception being in July-August 2015 with moderate distribution of lower radiance values across Taiz and modest emissions visible in June 2016.
New Technologies

In addition to DNAs, GIS analysis, analysis of social media, and satellite imagery, there are emerging technologies that are being harnessed to support crisis assessment and recovery monitoring. International organizations are taking the lead in partnering with various institutions to bring new technologies into disaster recovery and crisis monitoring and assessment. These technologies range from cloud computing capacities to graph modelling, drones, and communication devices. For example, the UNDP is cooperating with NASA to acquire useful satellite imagery for DRR and recovery. It also partnered with DJI, the largest company that produced commercial drones and prototype to use for mapping in remote islands of Maldives.

UNDP also partnered with Fujitsu Global to acquire cloud computing capacity for UNDP under the Global Center for Disaster Statistics (GCDS). The GCDS was launched during the GPDR in Sendai in 2015. When fully developed, it can have the capacity for managing a data ecosystem for DRR and recovery—including data storage, data analytics, and data visualization in a shorter time—all important to strengthen planning and decision making.

Organizations are also exploring cheaper and easily deployable technologies, such as Near Field Communications devices, that can store information about participants in recovery programs, and smooth processes of access to cash and services.

Assessment methods in recovery and reconstruction must adapt and benefit from existing and rapid development in innovation, both in digital technologies and analogue or non-digital processes. The era of “data revolution” that the digital age brought with it holds a lot of potential for narrowing information, collaboration, and participation gaps. Satellite imagery is easier to access and download, providing timely information of post-disaster impacts. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or small drones are available to the public, and on-site responders that can capture videos of physical damages and can be plotted in 3D maps.

Organizations are now seizing these innovative and technology driven opportunities as a means to achieve transformative recovery and development goals, such as Build Back Better, that is now a key component under the Sendai Framework. By being part of the data revolution, efforts for better statistics and data will help governments set baseline targets, plan and decide on strategic priorities and investment for DRR and recovery, mobilize and allocate funds, and track and report progress. However, this is not just for the government, as international agencies, CSOs, and the private sector should also be involved.

Additionally, the concept and practice of combinatorial innovation of various existing technologies allow stakeholders to receive, store, and process data at high speed. Phones are the best tools to illustrate the concept. They are not a new invention, but rather a combination of different technologies and ideas. They can transmit valuable digital data, store it, and access databases like satellite imagery. Through the penetration rate of mobile phone coverage rapidly increasing, 44 percent of the world population will own smartphones in 2017. People, particularly the millennials, are openly expressing their sentiments over policies through social media and therefore are increasingly empowered. There is now an unprecedented capacity for velocity or rapid generation and streaming of data.

Another use of innovative technologies is the retelling of compelling narratives on the effect/impact of disasters. UNDP Nepal produced a video of a family showing how incomplete recovery affects well-being long after the earthquake event. This video, titled “The Ground beneath Her” was produced in virtual reality (VR) and is now available on YouTube and other sites. The story is told from the view of the young Nepalese girl and the VR presents realistic images that stimulates watchers’ physical presence in a virtual environment, which can be a powerful tool to harness public awareness. The VR concludes with the message that the
young girl's family is not the only one still suffering from the disaster, but that millions of Nepalese are still living in the same conditions and in temporary shelters.

Other state-of-the-art technologies, such as risk models and software packages for earthquakes, and floods, etc., are being utilized and pioneered by various entities around the world to prepare for recovery and reconstruction following crisis situations. These technologies are used by a variety of entities including insurers, reinsurers, and other companies.

Challenges and Limitations

While the field of disaster recovery is witnessing major innovations, we need to acknowledge that there are limitations to these approaches and tools. Remotely conducted DNAs, for example, can provide an objective indicative picture of the damage to infrastructure, the interruptions in service delivery, and the resulting recovery needs. They are, however, broad-brush and not a replacement to ground-based assessments.

There are three fundamental challenges that need to be addressed in regard to the inclusion of innovative technologies:

1. Information Gap: Acquiring comprehensive data in the immediate aftermath of a disaster is highly iterative, or it often involves repeated actions to generate data, and decisions are made on the basis of such available data. As new assessment reports come in, decisions are built on previous actions and so forth. Any decision maker would desire that planning for post-disaster recovery is linear, where situation, and data that describe this follow a constant and/or predictable characteristic—not the case, of course, for any disaster.

2. Collaboration Gap: During Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013, over 100 responding NGOs and international organizations assisted in responding and completing about 800 assessment reports in the immediate aftermath. Thereafter, a PDNA led and conducted by the government of the Philippines and consisting of over 400 national staffs from various national and local government departments was completed, and the PDNA report was used as a basis for the government on budget planning. The issue was that harmonizing and coordinating the different assessments among organizations was difficult, and interoperability issues in the data sets came out as a problem.

3. Participation Gap: In addition to information and collaboration gaps, there is a participation gap. All too often, communities are insufficiently involved, whereas they should be considered as the most important stakeholders; frequently, data are collected “on” them, rather than “with” them. In situations where these community assessment processes were undertaken, they were paper based and aggregating them led to a loss of granularity as they were not often used for post-disaster recovery by external organizations.

The international community needs to better articulate and understand the demand for such assessments in both crisis and post-crisis environments and how the different techniques available can improve the speed, accuracy, and quality of remote assessments. Additionally, sound disaster recovery requires an understanding of both disaster and development related data. This encompasses physical science, socioeconomic vulnerabilities, community responses, and coping capacities. More so, for policy and decision makers, acquiring and using this information have to occur in an inherently chaotic and disrupted situation, and plans and decisions must be made within compressed timelines and high levels of uncertainty.
Conclusion

Many international development partners and NGOs have employed multiple technologies and innovations to pioneer crosscutting solutions to improve the speed, accuracy, and quality of remote assessments that better suit the needs of crisis-affected countries. However, experience shows that development partners need to develop tools and methods to actively engage in crises where access is restricted. These complex environments are forcing us to utilize science and art and tap into cutting-edge technologies. This requires development partners to forge partnerships and pool resources together to come up with evidence-based assessments to help make informed decisions, and to better respond to emerging demands and ensure that we are prepared to provide support when needed.

In order to do that, the international community needs to better address data fragmentation across sectors, cities, and partners; establish consistent and accurate baseline information prior to crises; and, particularly in ongoing conflict situations, work fast as the time frame for the relevance of damage data is limited. Cross functional collaboration, especially for the complex rebuilding of affected communities, is one of the most interesting opportunities for innovation to address these gaps, both through technology and analogue components of governance.

“It is indeed exciting times and even if technology froze today, we have more possible ways to configure the different applications, machines, tasks, functions and collaboration channels to create new processes and products that we could ever exhaust. Such is the exponential power of Combinatorial Innovation.” —Tech & e-Business Concepts: A Compendium of Technical Jargons, Subramanian Mohan G1202907C, May 24, 2013.
Environment in Recovery, Focus on Waste Management

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Discussion Summary

The discussion aims to introduce the importance of environmental issues in the recovery process and highlight debris management as an increasing issue in post-conflict and post-disaster recovery situations. Additionally, the session provides the opportunity to share experience from both the developed world and the developing world, as well as conflict and disaster situations.

The following questions drove the discussion:
1. How can environmental issues be best factored into the recovery process?
2. How can debris management be made into an opportunity in post-crisis situations?
3. How can countries be better prepared to deal with environmental issues in the recovery context?

Dr. Sumitra Amatya, who was the Executive Director of the Solid Waste Technical Support Center when the Nepal Earthquake happened, presented how Nepal tried to address the challenge. As the country already lacked the solid waste management facilities even during normal periods, dealing with disaster debris caused huge challenges. However, Nepal managed to tide this over by a very high recycling of the debris, thus needing only a limited amount of waste to be discussed.

Fred Stroud, from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), who has four decades of experience in dealing with disaster debris from both oil spills, as well as natural disasters, explained the federal system within the U.S. to deal with the disaster debris. Fred was deputed to China after the 2008 earthquake, and he explained how the systems differed and how disasters could be an opportunity to bring in new approaches and technology to a country.

Thorsten Kalnishkies, who had been involved in dealing with contaminated sites and disasters after the conflicts in Lebanon and Gaza, explained how post-conflict situations are different from post-disaster situations. The presence of unexploded ordnances make the management of conflict debris very troublesome. Drawing from his recent experience in the Philippines and Ecuador, Thorsten mentioned that currently there is a lack of ownership of disaster debris. It is not accounted for and financed, neither as a humanitarian issue nor as a development issue. At the same time, re-development cannot proceed till old buildings are demolished and debris cleared. This clearly has to be factored in and budgeted.

Mahesh Pradhan’s presentation also focused on the lack of clarity as to where the systemic plans for disaster debris should be anchored. Currently, dealing with disaster debris is neither in the national waste management plans or national disaster management plans. So, no effort at physical, institutional, or human resources capacity building is done prior to the disaster, making it both difficult and more expensive to deal with the issue after the event.
Introduction

Every disaster and conflict imposes a footprint on the environment. A massive earthquake may destroy mountain forests; Tsunamis often destroy coastal forests and habitats. There are also technological disasters such as oil spills and chemical pollution caused by technological reasons or triggered by natural hazards, but causing environmental crises in either case. Conflicts also exert environmental footprints. Debris, be it from conflicts or disasters, has become an integral part of every disaster. While the nature of the debris changes, there is always its presence which needs attention, both technically and financial.

However, environmental issues do not often feature in recovery efforts, whether post-conflict or post-disaster. If recovery is to be sustainable, balancing and addressing environmental issues is critical. The session will focus on the issue of disaster debris management in post-crisis situations but will also cover broader environmental issues.

Concepts

All disasters and conflict produce wastes of some kind, be it the trees which are felled by a cyclone, a house destroyed by an earthquake, a beach coated by an oil spill, or entire buildings destroyed by bombings. Post-disaster responses also produce wastes—from the human excreta of people staying in a camp, to health care waste due to humanitarian assistance in a conflict situation. The issue of management of wastes created by disasters and conflicts is becoming an increasingly important issue to be addressed in post-disaster response due to its scale, complexity, and cost. The cost of disaster waste management is crossing the billion-dollar mark in some of the major disasters, which is necessitating and prompting the emergence of a separate stream of expertise in Disaster Waste Management (DWM). In January 2011, the Joint Unit of the United Nations Environment Programme and Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) came out with Disaster Waste Management Guidelines.

While conceptually similar to conventional waste management, post-crisis waste management (disaster and conflict waste management) is different in many practical ways. The massive amount of wastes produced, the mixing up of various waste streams, the delay between production of wastes and its disposal, and the overwhelming of locally available disposal facilities, all make the waste management in such critical situations a very complex issue to address.

Key Challenges

While waste management is a well-developed area, DWM needs special attention and skills because of a number of unique challenges that have to be handled while dealing with debris in a post-disaster situation. The following section outlines these challenges.

Collapse of the existing waste system

A fully functional waste management system would have the following components:

- Skips around the city where individuals can deposit household/industrial wastes
- A number of primary collection points where materials that cannot be disposed in skips could be brought to a set of collection vehicles that collect the skips from the city to primary sorting areas or disposal centers
- Primary sorting areas where the wastes are segregated and sent to final disposal locations
• Waste management centers for both non-hazardous and hazardous waste streams
• Recycling and reprocessing facilities and networks
• Qualified staff to handle and manage each of the above

Disasters could impact one or more of the components, thus crippling the waste management system in the post-disaster situation. This could be as simple as the skips in a city being washed away by floods or as serious as the key staff in the waste management system killed or incapacitated in an earthquake.

After a disaster, it is always necessary to assess the existing system and provide reinforcement in one or more of these components.

Overloading of existing systems
Disasters often produce wastes in such overwhelming quantities that are beyond the capacity of the system at one or more of the above points. The recent tsunami in Japan, for example, produced the equivalent of three years of production of wastes within one hour. Such an enormity will invariably choke the waste management chain. Oftentimes, the collection and transport capacity will need to be augmented through involvement of military or other civilian support. Sometimes, the landfill capacity may exceed the existing facility, necessitating creation of temporary landfills, which in developed countries are a major challenge due to the legal complications that must be overcome for creating new landfills.

Absence of specialized facilities
Some disasters produce wastes that need specialized technology to handle, such as in the case of an oil spill or nuclear disasters. These facilities are not easily installed within a short time and might necessitate the storage of the waste in a temporary location till the time such facilities are locally established. The alternative is to transport the materials to another location, within the country or outside where such facilities are available. This decision is often made based on cost and environmental considerations, but the important fact is that it is made at the earliest so that waste does not remain unattended or ends up getting mixed with other waste streams.

Lack of resources
Systematic handling of all disaster wastes, while meeting best international standards practiced under normal situations, will end up being very expensive, and no country, rich or poor, will be able to afford the costs thereof. Even without adhering to the best international practices, waste management is becoming 5–10 percent of the total recovery costs, often exceeding that of health care and education. At a time when the country is going through a financial turmoil consequent to the disaster, waste management, while essential for recovery, will not seem important enough to policy makers to warrant major investments. This is all the truer when the country itself lacks any resources and much of the funds for recovery come from the international community. The international community is keener to invest in life-saving and people-friendly activities, but may not consider significant investment into disaster debris management as a priority. This will mean the wastes are managed in a substandard manner, which undermines the long-term viability of the recovery.

Health and safety issues
DWM brings with it a number of health and safety challenges that need to be factored in and addressed at an early stage. The key issues are:

• As the wastes get mixed up, the normal facilities for collection and transport may not be appropriate from a health and safety point of view
Even when the waste streams are handled by staff who normally are used to handling urban solid wastes, they may not be trained or equipped to handle the hazardous components of the mixed waste streams.

Often, a large number of people are brought into the disaster management chain who have no training in waste management creating health and safety challenges even during the normal waste management process.

The health and safety precautions at the waste management facilities will not be sufficient to handle the specialty wastes.

Dealing with the challenges

Regardless whether the country has the resources or the local municipality has the capacity, the disaster waste is very much present and cannot be wished away. Also, recovery—both physical and emotional—will not be possible before the debris is cleared from the ground zero. It is therefore important that countries, rich and poor, have some plans in place to deal with disaster wastes. The following sections give a brief outline of what the key actions are to be undertaken by countries that may have to deal with disaster wastes.

Risk assessment and preparation of contingency plans

All countries, regions and, in fact, local governments, should undertake a qualitative assessment of the potential disaster risks they can face. This assessment, along with the vulnerabilities, should form the basis for their overall disaster planning. From the point of view of DWM, such an assessment should look at the vulnerability of its systems in a disaster and the capacity of various elements of waste management to efficiently deal with a major disaster. Based on this assessment, they may wish to have one or more of the following arrangements put in place:

- Create adequate excess landfill capacity while designing their routine waste management
- Pre-identify locations for staging areas or temporary landfills if a disaster were to strike
- Have an agreement with neighboring areas for supporting each other during disaster situations
- Have a standing arrangement with contractors to engage in collection, transport, and disposal of disaster debris.

Creation of emergency landfills and staging areas

The key success factor in post-disaster waste management is availability of adequate space to receive disaster debris. Whether a government plans or not, communities will start to clear debris from their own houses and backyards to start recovery and feel emotionally more comfortable. Unless the government provides them with clear guidance and options, they will not use common sense and may move the debris to any available vacant space, which could be a river valley, an old quarry, the sea, or the side of the road.

In most countries, there are strict environmental controls and public resistance to starting new landfills. If the normal process of site selection and community consultation is formed, by the time locations are found and prepared, the debris would spread around the city, necessitating costly double handling. It is therefore important that whatever be the size of the disaster, the local government comes up with rapid guidance to the community on waste segregation and notifies locations where the segregated wastes could be taken. These may be treated as temporary storage and sorting areas before a final location is found.
Employment generation in disaster waste management

Most disasters upset the normal livelihood of the communities, and the number of people who have suddenly lost their jobs could be very large. It is important to bring practical and emotional recovery among them and that these people are given some productive employment. Dealing with disaster debris is one such task that can be easily initiated. This has multiple benefits such as:

- As people are brought into work streams their self-esteem improves and emotional recovery begins;
- Reception of wages to the employed brings money to the community, which starts the money circulating in the community again;
- The clearance of the disaster debris brings appearance of progress, further wiping out emotional scars of the disaster; and
- As the community is in dire need of money, they will ensure that recovery of anything valuable from the debris is maximized, which minimizes the amount of materials which will otherwise go to the landfill.

In initiating the cash-for-work schemes for DWM, the following points should be kept in mind:

- It is best that the unskilled members of the public are given the jobs at the front end of DWM, such as clearing, collection, and sorting;
- All laborers must be given adequate training on how the waste should be handled, including thorough health and safety training;
- Laborers should be given personal protective equipment so as not be harmed during work;
- Wherever hazardous wastes are to be expected, it should be done under expert supervision and the laborers should be told about the same;
- An incentive system for recycling should be established to maximize recovery of recyclables; and
- Formation of a supply chain on recovered materials should be promoted as it increases the creation of jobs and economic opportunities.

Financing of disaster waste management

The challenges of funding DWM are already mentioned. However, it is important that at the earliest stage of post-disaster recovery, a reasonable amount of resources are directed toward DWM. Financing needs to be found for the three following concurrent activities:

- Strengthening the existing official system of waste management, and repairing and reinforcing capacities;
- Creating the supplementary system for mass employment to initiate the ground level action; and
- Creating specialized capacity to deal with hazardous waste streams.

While there will always be cases and opportunities for disaster waste recycling and re-use, it is best not to factor that in while accounting for the cost of DWM. Factoring in inflows from waste streams will result in suboptimal allocation to DWM. However, double counting in cases of employment generation and waste management could be avoided, as management of wastes will always need input of labor.

In many post-disaster situations, multiple donors and NGOs see disaster waste management as a "low hanging fruit" for employment generation and initiate small-scale projects without an overall perspective. This is often done with little or no coordination with the national authorities and understanding of the back end of the waste management infrastructure. This is not an optimal use of resources in the post-disaster setting. All post-disaster waste management should be coordinated between the agencies and the government so as to prevent double handling and mishandling of wastes.
Conclusion

Every disaster and conflict imposes a footprint on the environment. A massive earthquake may destroy mountain forests. Tsunamis often destroy coastal forests and habitats. There are also technological disasters such as oil spills and chemical pollution caused by technological reasons or triggered by natural hazards, but causing environmental crises in either case. Conflicts, also exert environmental footprints.

However, environmental issues don't often feature in the recovery efforts in most post-conflict and post-disaster situations. If recovery is to be sustainable, it has to be balanced, and addressing environmental issues is critical. Debris, be it from conflicts or disasters, has become an integral part of every disaster. While the nature of the debris changes, its presence always needs attention, both technically and financially. Dedicated a session at the conference to this topic recognizes the importance and role of debris management in recovery processes, whether from conflict or disasters, and allows to provide an overview of different experiences and lessons learnt.

Next steps proposed by the discussion:

1. Prepare a lessons learnt document from debris management in post-disaster settings, taking it as a proactive economic opportunity rather than an environmental issue to be addressed.
2. Create an advocacy document about the importance of factoring in crisis debris during post crisis financial planning
3. Create a better template for estimating disaster debris and cost estimates for recovery planning

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As climate change, urbanization and migration intensify disaster vulnerabilities, it is increasingly important to prepare in advance for achieving resilient recovery. Strengthening recovery systems and building recovery readiness is a no-regret approach with valuable co-benefits towards managing disaster risks and building resilience.
Enhancing Climate and Disaster Resilience in the Context of Build Back Better

Background

Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2015, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 emphasizes an all-of-society engagement to reduce disaster risk including local governments and the private sector. In addition, two of its four priorities for action explicitly endorse the investment in disaster risk reduction for resilience and “building back better” in recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction.

At the global level, there is widespread recognition of the benefits of linking and integrating knowledge policies and practices for addressing climate change adaptation, disaster risk reduction and management, and sustainable development. The major international frameworks, including the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the Agenda 2030, the Paris Agreement, and the New Urban Agenda, are mutually reinforcing in their goal to promote sustainable development by increasing resilience to natural disasters and reducing the vulnerability of people exposed to climate change impacts.

The overarching goal of these policy areas is to manage risks and help transform societies to make them (more) resilient. This includes building awareness, mobilizing resources, and building capacity and actions by public and private actors alike, preferably in partnership with each other. At the local level, more and more cities and local authorities from all over the world join the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy that is an example of a holistic approach combining access to affordable sustainable energy services, climate change (mitigation and adaptation), and local development governance.

The synergies between disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation, and sustainable development are evident when it comes to disaster risk prevention and preparedness. And periods of rehabilitation and reconstruction offer high-potential opportunities, as they uniquely combine high awareness to natural risks and the need for action with a large-scale construction effort when resilience solutions can be included at low cost. Building back better is about increasing resilience of nations and communities through integrating disaster risk reduction measures into the restoration of physical infrastructure and societal systems, and into the revitalization of livelihoods, economies, and the environment after the disaster.

It is therefore important to explore if and how disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation, embracing a range of complementary and crosscutting methods of managing the risks of weather and climate-related hazards, can
Contribute to better reconstruction and sustainable development in the aftermath of disasters. Understanding the extent to which integration of climate change resilience and disaster risk reduction can practically and effectively contribute to building back better is therefore crucial for the sustainability of reconstruction efforts.

Discussion Summary

At the global level, there is widespread recognition of the benefits of integrating a knowledge base, policies, and practices for addressing climate change adaptation, disaster risk reduction, and sustainable development.

At the local level, this integrated approach becomes a necessity. Building the resilience of urban settings and creating a risk-informed urban development paradigm are critical for resilient and sustainable socioeconomic development.

During the session, challenges and concrete opportunities were presented for integrating disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation in sustainable recovery by looking at government policies and governance processes (integrated across stakeholders and sectors), the role of local government, the contribution of civil society and local communities, and the opportunities offered by ecosystem-based approaches in the reconstruction.

In the context of a small country such as Belize, planning and thinking about building back better is very important. The country is prone to natural disasters such as tropical storms. To prepare well and limit the impact of disasters requires transfer of knowledge and training. It is important that the society has an understanding of the risks and consequences of climate change. Cooperation between national and local levels strongly contributes to improve disaster-risk resilience. Therefore, all stakeholders were involved in extensive consultations and at the same time investments were made to make infrastructure such as roads or bridges resilient.

In the European context, “building back better” can be perceived as a “window of opportunity” for rebuilding in a more resilient manner. Experience shows that in many cases actual reconstruction follows the pattern of “where it was and as it was.” Planning for post-disaster reconstruction does not exist in most of the countries. Time limitation is also a major constraint: immediately after a disaster people need to find their life as normal as it was before the tragedy. Therefore, quick reconstruction sounds like the best option. To build back better without previous plans would appear as a time-consuming exercise. Finally, one of the most important obstacles to build back better concerns higher costs of rebuilding in a different manner.

In Nepal after the earthquake the government launched community-based Disaster Risk Reduction actions funded by the European Union to support building back better in the earthquake-affected areas. However, recovery remains challenging.

Two years after the earthquake only 4 percent of families have completed rebuilding of their houses; 8 percent of houses are still under reconstruction out of nearly 700,000 households damaged. Nepal didn’t have reconstruction plans before the earthquake, therefore a lot of time was spent on introducing new policies, a grant disbursement mechanism, seismic resistance house design, and many other activities before reconstruction could really start. Limitation of the budget available for the building back better is another challenge: the cost of every house to be rebuilt as seismic resistant would be increased by 15–20 percent.

Another dimension of climate resilience activities in the context of building back better was brought by the city of Ghent. At the local level, mitigation of disaster risks is privileged. The local community invites citizens to share their ideas and views to address climate change consequences in a better way. It also concerns costs and fund prioritization. Citizens involved in the process are better prepared to deal with natural disasters such as floods, for example.
Conclusion

The synergies between disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation and, sustainable development are evident when it comes to disaster risk prevention and preparedness. And periods of rehabilitation and reconstruction offer high-potential opportunities, as they uniquely combine high awareness to natural risks and the need for action with a large-scale construction effort when resilience solutions can be included at low cost. Building back better is about increasing resilience of nations and communities through integrating disaster risk reduction measures into the restoration of physical infrastructure and societal systems, and into the revitalization of livelihoods, economies, and the environment after the disaster. However, many challenges still need to be addressed to benefit from building back better in reconstruction.

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In the European context, “building back better” can be perceived as a “window of opportunity” for rebuilding in a more resilient manner. Experience shows that in many cases actual reconstruction follows the pattern of “where it was and as it was.”
Build Back Better with and for Women

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Background

Sustainable Development Goal 5 ‘Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls’ recognizes that women’s rights and empowerment is a precondition for ending global challenges such as poverty, insecurity, violence, and inequality. The SDGs are universal, encompassing fragile states and countries highly prone to natural disasters or conflicts which face additional challenges for implementation of the agenda.

Impact of crises and conflicts is not gender neutral. Women, girls, boys, and men of all ages are affected differently, and their resulting needs and priorities for recovery are distinct, as are their capacities, coping strategies, access to resources, and contribution to resilience and recovery. Research shows that women and girls are most vulnerable and exposed to risk in the context of crises. Statistical analysis on 141 countries found that women were more likely to die, or die sooner, than men in disasters. Women and girls also bear the brunt of many of the harmful consequences of armed violence. In the last two decades, the use of violence against women and girls during conflicts, and especially sexual violence, has become more visible. But aside from increased sexual violence, conflict exacerbates many inequalities that can last well after a war ends. Women, in particular ones living in poverty, have different and uneven levels of resilience and capacity to recover. Understanding and addressing the gender dimensions of risk and vulnerability, as well as strengths and capabilities, are central to resilience building, recovery, and social cohesion.

In 2015, 65 million people were displaced by conflict, with 19.2 million people internally displaced due to natural disasters. And these trends are on the rise. Efforts must therefore be redoubled to ensure no one is left behind. Central to these efforts is the understanding that women are often first responders in a crisis, tending to the needs of their families and communities and coping with the adverse impact on their livelihood and possessions. Despite this, women are generally absent from the development of recovery or peace-building frameworks, and generally from decision-making processes; when present, their voices are seldom heard. For example, peace building processes remain largely dominated by mostly male elites.

There are variety of international normative commitments relating to empowerment of women and recovery from crisis. The Global Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, includes key commitments on gender equality and stresses the unique role of women and girls in resilience building, vulnerability reducing, and risk management in their respective communities.
Strengthening women’s participation in recovery from conflict is guided by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 and other supporting resolutions. However, despite the plethora of international commitments to gender sensitive risk reduction, resilience and peace building, and an increasing recognition of the importance of gender sensitive recovery, significant gaps remain in translating these commitments into action. As women face heightened vulnerabilities and poverty, both during and post natural disasters/crisis, it is pivotal that women’s rights, priorities, needs and leadership are put at the center of recovery and concrete actions are taken by national and international actors to deliver sustainable results for women and girls affected by crisis and conflicts.

**Concepts**

**Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women in Recovery and Reconstruction:** A strong focus on quantifying economic damage and loss in reconstruction have led to insufficient focus on the human dimensions. During a disaster or a conflict, as well as in their aftermath, women often endure extreme hardships, such as elevated levels of violence and insecurity, restricted mobility, and additional workloads and time used in care, domestic, and livelihoods activities. These are often deepened by structural barriers due to discriminatory legal systems, gender unaware policy design, and inadequate service provision. Disasters, conflicts, and complex emergencies can exacerbate these barriers and create new ones.

Additionally, there is a risk that international relief and recovery efforts may be guided by stereotypical assumptions related to women’s roles in different societies and cultures, as well not taking into consideration power imbalances and gender inequalities.

These interventions can therefore increase insecurity and diminish spaces and rights that women may have previously enjoyed, for example, by excluding women in decision-making processes related to reconstruction or peace building, in spite of the direct impact of such decisions on their lives, recovery, and future.

Furthermore, gender inequalities, in terms of socioeconomic status and power, capacities and knowledge, if not taken into account in the design of recovery efforts, will create barriers for women’s equitable access to resources and services allocated to affected communities. This is particularly true for groups with additional challenges to cope with a crisis such as pregnant women, female-headed households, elderly or disabled women, indigenous women, girls, and boys.

Gender mainstreaming and targeted efforts to engage women and understand their particular needs and priorities will ensure that recovery and reconstruction efforts will reduce, rather than reinforce inequalities by avoiding assumptions and stereotypes, and by taking into account gender dimensions of disaster impact and the differential ability to recover.

**Build Back Better from a Gender Perspective:** Recovery is an opportunity to influence the direction of development patterns that, prior to the crisis, may not have placed enough attention on gender equality and women’s empowerment. Crisis and their aftermaths can present opportunities for new and more equal gender roles and relationships to emerge. For example, women may assume enhanced roles in providing for their families and emerge as leaders and decision makers in their communities; girls who may not have had a chance to attend school may do so; boys may become more protected from forcible military recruitment or forced labor; and men may take on expanded roles in child care and caring for relatives. Such positive changes should be actively facilitated, supported, and promoted. It is therefore critical to include gender mainstreaming and targeted actions in every step of recovery and
reconstruction, including initial damage and loss assessments, as well as psychosocial support, in order to ensure that recovery interventions are relevant, effective, and sustainable for women and men.

The recovery process must be leveraged to improve government functions and services so they respond better to gender inequality and discrimination in public investments and programming and to create a conducive institutional environment for the meaningful political and civil participation of women in decision making. BBB is an opportunity to recognize and facilitate the actual and potential contributions and leadership roles of women in building community resilience for lasting risk reduction and stability.

**Issues Related to the Topic**

**Lack of data and gender analysis in damage and loss.** For a gender responsive assessment, planning and programming for recovery or peace building, it is necessary to systematically collect sex-disaggregated data (SADD), and conduct evidence-based gender analysis.

Almost 90 percent of the countries reporting to the Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA) did not collect SADD, making it impossible to identify the separate needs and vulnerabilities of women, girls, men, and boys, and therefore to promote gender equality. Furthermore, the lack of gender-disaggregated data and analysis means the full scope of disaster or conflict impacts is not understood in terms of damage and loss.

Considerations on how to restore, replace, and compensate for lost assets and damages can be an opportunity to decrease existing gender-based inequalities. To fully ensure recovery benefits equally to women and contribute to their empowerment, it is crucial to ensure their assets and economic contributions are recorded in damages and losses. Women's share of household wealth, savings, and credit arrangements, or ownership of assets, may not be formalized, and land tenure practices and inheritance rights may be disadvantageous to women. This includes widows, women in polygamist relationships, or female-headed households, who may not have formal ownership of their land and/or houses.

Losses in the informal sector and subsistence farming, predominated by women, are often not recorded, as is the case for losses related to reproductive activities of women, all leading to a substantial undervaluation of the impact and opportunity costs for women. Establishing best practices for sex disaggregation of losses should be a priority, despite challenges due to the fact that women and men may be contributing to different steps in the chain of production.

Learning from the few examples of recovery processes with strong attention to gender issues and specific budget allocations for gender, such as the case of Nepal following the 2015 earthquake, could therefore greatly improve recovery efforts. A review of the Post-Disaster Needs Assessments undertaken in the past five years, shows that less than 33 percent include references to gender issues and even fewer to specific budget allocations in the recovery frameworks. Supporting recovery and resilience of women's significant contributions to economies as farmers, workers, business owners, or through unpaid care work, following disasters, could accelerate not only their recovery but that of their countries.

**Lack of access of women to disaster or post-conflict compensations.** When the damage and loss to women's possessions and livelihoods are not recorded, it influences women's access to social protection, compensation and cash transfers, insurance, micro financing and credit products, and loans, etc. In addition to this, because of patriarchy social norms, women are not always entitled to compensation or face discrimination in law and practice. Women may also be suffering from the aftermaths of sexual and gender-based violence, which may often increase both in post-conflict and post-disaster situations.
Ensuring women’s legal entitlements, such as access to compensation and/or transitional justice, as well as to alternative economic and employment opportunities, will support women’s empowerment, and will be a key step to resilience and stability, as well as to gender equality.

In certain contexts, husbands are the legally designated heads of households. This means women may not be able to obtain official documents or may need approval to open a bank account. This is also relevant in cases of missing persons in conflicts, and how it affects inheritance of property and assets. Likewise, statutory inheritance laws may also differentiate between women and men limiting, e.g., access to credit.

This requires targeted actions to promote women’s participation in politics and in decision making; women’s participation in management of community assets; joint ownership or sharing of replaced productive assets; and women’s work opportunities through vocational training opportunities, tailored gender-responsive credit schemes, and financial services to recommence livelihood activities.

Recovery and reconstruction are also opportunities to revise discriminatory laws, regulations, and/or practices affecting the access of women to employment and services, etc. Opportunities may include supporting women entrepreneurs through the organization and the establishment of associations, promoting the dissemination of gender-sensitive information about available services, and providing psychosocial supports for women affected by sexual and gender-based violence. Additionally, promoting decent work and social security and services (e.g., child/elderly care) to facilitate women’s participation in the formal labor force, promoting support and preferential treatment of female contractors and enterprises in recovery efforts, and facilitating women’s participation in paid rehabilitation and reconstruction work programs are ways that allow access for women.

**Lack of women’s participation and leadership in recovery decision making, as well as in peace building.** Gender relations and women’s realities often limit women’s ability to influence policy and decision making. Women play a critical, yet largely overlooked, role in disaster and post-conflict recovery.

Women have always participated in peace negotiations and peace building, but mostly at the informal and rarely visible levels. Women have surrounded buildings to make leaders stay in the room, such as in Liberia; they have elected themselves as a third force, such as in Northern Ireland; they have demanded that justice be part of any peace process, such as the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the war widows of Guatemala; and they have rallied the country with calls for peace, like the Women in Black in Serbia.

Although many women-led recovery initiatives have actively addressed the invisible needs of women, most efforts to rebuild after crisis and conflicts are targeted at benefitting whole communities and thus fail to understand women’s diverse needs and to redress structural inequalities. But women are frequently found alongside men rebuilding houses, repairing and building physical infrastructure such as roads, and reclaiming or replanting agricultural land. Women also take on leadership and management positions, designing and implementing programs that draw on the skills, knowledge, and contributions of both men and women. In addition to their increased reproductive responsibilities, women have played a dominant role in maintaining and rehabilitating community services such as education and child care, health care, and emotional support.

Peace building in the immediate aftermath of conflict is often accompanied by political and governance reforms that are meant to address the root causes of conflict, political exclusion, impunity, and absence of the rule of law, as well as economic marginalization. This phase offers a unique window of opportunity to transform discriminatory social structures, and to promote women’s human rights, participation, and meaningful engagement.

Local and national women movements and organizations, whether operating at the community or national level, are often most knowledgeable of the specific needs and capacities of women and men in remote affected regions. Despite this, women’s organizations are generally absent from the development of recovery and
reconstruction strategies and decision-making processes and, when present, their voices are seldom heard. The fact that women are often underrepresented in politics almost globally, and in particularly at the local level, is a clear indication of their absence in the development of national priorities, including those related to recovery. When promotion of women’s leadership and meaningful participation is put at the center of recovery, it is more likely the process will identify how government functions and services can be improved so as to respond to inequalities, address imbalances in programming and investment, and eliminate biases in public policy and processes that deepen the exclusion of women.

**Lack of institutional capacity.** The absence of women in decision making, as well as the lack of attention to gender dimensions of disaster and conflict impact and recovery, often reflect the limited institutional capacity of the central recovery and reconstruction actors, including international aid organizations supporting national efforts. This is supported by the limited attention to gender inequality issues in post-disaster and post-crisis/conflict needs assessments, mentioned above. This can be rectified by ensuring that gender equality and the empowerment of women become regular elements of support to strengthening national and local capacity and systems for crisis and disaster management, as well as in training activities as part of recovery planning. Ensuring investment in gender equality and women’s empowerment in recovery strategies would also ensure the necessary resources to strengthen capacity.

Women’s participation is key to sustainable peace. The UN Women’s study on UNSCR 1325 contains research that comprehensively demonstrates that the participation of women at all levels is key to the operational effectiveness, success, and sustainability of peace processes and peace-building efforts. Mediators, facilitators, and leaders in peace operations must be proactive in including women in all aspects of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace building.

**Questions/Challenges to Be Discussed**

- Despite international commitments to gender responsive recovery, reconstruction, and peace building, significant gaps remain in translating these commitments into action. What specific actions and investments can be undertaken by the international community, as well as national stakeholders, to bridge this gap and strengthen the leadership and participation of women in recovery, reconstruction, and peace building?
- How can the international community support governments to ensure gender responsive recovery and reconstruction, as well as peace-building efforts, in particular with regards to ensuring women’s effective participation and decision making in these processes, as well as their own assessment of what needs, losses, and compensations should be addressed from an economic perspective, as well as from a perspective of justice, rights, and promotion of greater equality?

**Summary of Presentations**

Yannick Glenmarec from UN Women stressed the importance of women as guardians of the communities in times of peace and war. Women should not only be seen as victims of crisis, although it is obvious that gender
inequalities have an impact on the great vulnerability of women and girls in times of natural disasters and wars. There is a growing normative framework regarding women, peace, and security (UNSCRs 1325–2242), as well as for disaster risk reduction and recovery. However, there is a disconnect between normative commitments—which recognize the need for a gender responsive approach—and action. Women are still almost completely missing from peace negotiations. Between 1992 and 2011, 4 percent of signatories to peace agreements and less than 10 percent of peace negotiators were women. From 1990–2000, 11 percent of peace agreements included at least one reference to women. In 2015, 7 out of 10 peace agreements signed included gender specific provisions; almost 90 percent of the countries reporting to the Hyogo Framework Agreement did not collect age and sex-disaggregated data (SADD), making it impossible to identify the separate needs and vulnerabilities of women, girls, men, and boys. However, the Sendai Readiness Review identified between 57 and 66 percent of countries disaggregated by age and sex data regarding death, and the missing, injured, or ill due to disasters; 33 percent of PDNAs take gender into account. In the aftermath of natural disasters and/or humanitarian crisis, women are often financially excluded from cash transfers and have no access to bank accounts; in 2013, only 22 percent of funds from cash contributions from early recovery programs were directly disbursed to women. Women’s financial inclusion should start before any disaster strikes; women should be actively included in all economic activities from agriculture to extractive industries, from construction to engineering. House titling and land titling should also ensure women’s access to land and property. In Nepal, through the reconstruction, 50 percent of engineers involved were women. Women’s and community-based organizations’ contributions to recovery and peace building, and their leadership and central role in community resilience, are untapped assets in recovery and resilience building strategies. Addressing the gender dimensions of crisis and recovery is a rights issue and a question of effectiveness. Investing in gender equality and promoting women’s leadership will offer an outstanding return on investment.

Shyamala Gomez from Sri Lanka stressed the importance of women’s land rights and the need to support women as heads of households. After the Tsunami in Sri Lanka in 2004, there was no joint full ownership and titling of lands and properties (women/men). Heads of households were then asked to sign off on government forms, and in this way, women had to sign off their lands to husbands, or brothers, etc. It was an opportunity lost to make things right. In 2009, the war ended. Female heads of households were once again left behind, although a stronger acknowledgment came from the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Committee reports. Processes of land grabbing and militarization highlighted once again the needs for a more gender equal titling of lands. Shyamala presented two case studies of projects empowering women in promoting their land rights and human rights within the peace and reconciliation processes. Involvement of women in policy and design and implementation should happen at all levels, especially in post-disaster and post-conflict situations.

Jean Louis Ville stressed that gender equality is a fundamental value of the European Union, since the Treaty of Rome. Recently, the European Council defined gender equality and women empowerment as a “precondition” for development. The EU adopted the ‘EU Action Plan on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Development’ (GAP II 2016–2020) in October 2015. Communities and households are structured differently according to gender relations and gender-specific roles. Gender influences sensitivity to shocks, disasters, and conflicts, and how individuals will experience shocks and stresses in different ways, even within the same household or community. Donors’ responses to disasters and crisis should be, therefore, gender sensitive and gender focused. Facilitating a greater participation of women to contribute with their specific knowledge and insights to disaster and crisis management would also increase their chances to cope with them, and to participate in preventative measures. Laws that discriminate against women exist in many places and limit their participation in the economy, as well as in the processes of recovery and reconstruction. Breaking the cycle of poverty, crisis, and fragility by implementing a gendered and inclusive approach, which takes into account structural inequalities, is key to addressing the root causes of conflict and disasters, and to ensuring
effective prevention. The principle of “Leave No One Behind” in Agenda 2030, and the targets of the Sustainable Development Goal 16 in relation to promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development; access to justice for all; and effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all stages, are essential to realizing the EU’s ambition to strengthen resilience and to prevent conflicts and disasters.

Saoudata Aboubacraine stressed the importance of the role of women in resilience and conflict resolution. Saoudata belongs to the Tuareg community, which is a nomadic, pastoralist community, considered as one of the indigenous peoples in Africa under international human rights law and UN definitions. She illustrated with several case studies the importance to give voice to women, in particular to women belonging to minority groups, and the multifaceted ways to empower women to build resilience in the face of climate change and to be active contributors to conflict prevention and dialogue.

Yumiko Tanaka outlined the approach to gender mainstreaming by JICA in countries like Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Nepal, Haiti, and so on. Women’s participation is sought at all levels and at each phase of project and intervention design and implementation. There is also a promotion of a strategic use of international human rights bodies and a coherent investment which goes from financial to human to capacity building.

Hon. Nana Oye Lithur concluded with some key recommendations in relation to harnessing the learning from this session and bringing it forward through coherent approaches to building back better with women and for women, both in the wake of natural or manmade disasters, and in situations of conflict and peace building. The EU and UN can have key roles in supporting women’s empowerment, leadership, and active participation and involvement, and can actively support gender equality and the role of women as agents of change in reconstruction and recovery.

Conclusion

As women face heightened vulnerabilities and poverty, as well as human rights abuses, both during and post-crises and conflicts, it is pivotal that women’s human rights, priorities, needs, and leadership are put at the center of recovery and peacebuilding processes. This entails ensuring that recovery efforts are informed by sex and age disaggregated data and gender analysis, and that women are consulted and their leadership and participation are facilitated in all steps of the recovery and reconstruction process, as well as in peace building. It furthermore entails building back better by taking advantage of the opportunities provided post-crisis to rebuild in a way that is inclusive of women, girls, boys, and men, in particular by removing barriers posed by discriminatory laws, policies, and practices.

It also requires that the institutional capacity and governance arrangements in support of gender responsive recovery is put in place and appropriate investment and financial allocations are made to sustain these.

Finally, it requires recognizing and facilitating the immense actual and potential contributions of women to resilience-building and social cohesion, and not least to economic recovery.

This needs to be done by ensuring that women can access and benefit equally from recovery and reconstruction efforts, as well as from direct involvement in formal and informal peace-building processes, thus leading to greater gender equality and peaceful and inclusive societies.
Private Sector as a Key Partner in Preparedness, Response, and Recovery

Introduction

Most recently, the private sector has indicated its willingness to fully embrace disaster risk management, thereby assuming a more central and operational role in disaster relief, response, recovery, and reconstruction. To this end there is a growing recognition that collaboration between the development actors, humanitarian actors, and the private sector is essential for preparedness, response, and recovery.

Global agendas

In 2015 and 2016, United Nations member states took a stance on development issues by signing up for global agendas, including: the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris Climate Agreement, the New Urban Agenda, Financing for Development, and the World Humanitarian Summit (UNISDR 2015; UN 2015; UNFCC 2016; UNHABITAT 2016; ECOSOC 2015; World Humanitarian Summit 2016).

These global frameworks should have a major impact on the way development and humanitarian actions are planned, funded, coordinated, and implemented by governments of UN member states and their development partners. One of the key challenges will be to harness the knowledge, skills and expertise of multiple stakeholders to achieve the ambitious targets set out in these documents.

Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030

The lesson learnt from past disasters indicate the need to further strengthen disaster preparedness for response by taking action in anticipation of events, integrating disaster risk reduction in response preparedness, and ensuring that capacities are in place for effective response and recovery at all levels. Empowering women and persons with disabilities to publicly lead and promote gender equitable and universally accessible response, recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction approaches is key. Disasters have demonstrated that the recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction phase, which needs to be prepared ahead of a disaster, is a critical opportunity to “Build Back Better,” including through integrating disaster risk reduction into development measures, making nations and communities resilient to disasters.

The shift that has occurred from the Hyogo Framework for Action to the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction is a move from focusing on preparedness for effective disaster response and recovery to disaster
risk reduction and risk management. The emphasis is shifting away from the traditional concept of responding to disasters to reducing the risk of a disaster occurring and being better prepared to respond should an event become a disaster. In simple terms, the shift is about reducing risk and increasing preparedness for effective response and recovery operations.

Disaster preparedness for recovery and response

Priority 4 of the Sendai Framework focuses on "Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to "Build Back Better" in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction." To understand what this means, it is useful to define these terms and how they work together.

Disaster preparedness is defined as pre-disaster activities that are undertaken to minimize loss of life, injury, and property damage in a disaster, and to ensure that rescue, relief, rehabilitation, and other services can be provided following a disaster.

Disaster response can be defined as the provision of assistance or intervention during or immediately after a disaster to meet the life preservation and basic subsistence needs of those people affected.

Disaster preparedness is key for effective and efficient disaster response. Over the past decade, more than 1.5 billion people were affected by disasters, and the total economic loss was more than 1.3 trillion. The cost of disasters worldwide is now reaching an average of $250 billion to $300 billion every year, far outstripping humanitarian aid. The government and the local authorities should initiate plans for response and recovery strategies before disaster strikes.
To undertake disaster response and recovery operations in an effective manner, the international community and humanitarian coordination system has realized that the need for joint collaborative effort is vital. The foundations of the current international humanitarian coordination system were set by General Assembly resolution 46/182 in December 1991. Almost 15 years later, in 2005, a major reform of humanitarian coordination, known as the Humanitarian Reform Agenda, introduced a number of new elements to enhance predictability, accountability, and partnership. The cluster approach was one of these new elements.

Clusters are groups of humanitarian organizations, both UN and non-UN, in each of the main sectors of humanitarian action, e.g., water, health, early recovery, telecommunications, and logistics. They are designated by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and have clear responsibilities for coordination.

The role of “disaster preparedness for recovery and response” has traditionally been considered as the domain of the disaster management and the humanitarian sectors, with little or no coordination with other sectors, most notably the development and private sectors. There is now a growing recognition that preparedness and response are influenced by the activities of these sectors. In order to achieve the objectives of Priority 4 of the Sendai Framework, a siloed approach can no longer be adopted.

Sectors defined

The terms Development Sector, Humanitarian Sector and Private Sector are widely used with a multitude of formal and informal definitions. For the purposes of this discussion, the three sectors are defined as follows:

1. **Development Sector**—This is also referred to as the international development sector and focuses on alleviating poverty and improving living conditions that improve various facets of quality of life within a society, which in turn will help economically grow the country. Within this sector the actors are NGOs, UN agencies, government agencies, and donor agencies.

2. **Humanitarian Sector**—This covers operations conducted to relieve human suffering, especially in circumstances where responsible authorities in the area are unable or unwilling to provide adequate service support to civilian populations. Within this sector, there are humanitarian actors in a wide range of organizations, agencies, and inter-agency networks that all combine to enable international humanitarian assistance to be channeled to the places and people in need of it. They include UN agencies, the International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, NGOs such as Humanitarian Coalition member agencies, military institutions, government institutions, and donor agencies.

3. **Private Sector**—This sector is that part of the economy that is owned and controlled by individuals and organizations through private ownership. Within this sector there are a large number of “entities” or “actors” such as (but is not limited to) businesses, companies, cooperatives, corporations, firms, franchises, partnerships, multinational corporations, proprietorships, and sole traders.
Logistics operations are a lifesaving need in disaster response and recovery

From the definitions set out above, it is evident that to meet the requirements for effective preparedness and response, it will require the effective movement of physical items involving the integration of information flow, material handling, production, packaging, inventory, transportation, warehousing, and often security. In short it will require effective logistics to provide the services required to respond to an event.

Managing the logistics of large-scale disaster response is a complex operation. When disaster strikes, time is of the essence. Logistics operations and delivery of lifesaving necessities to the affected people becomes a bottleneck due to lack of planning and preparedness mechanisms which in many cases do not adequately predict what will be required during the response. In order to be effective, a rapid response is needed. It also has significant cost implications as 60–80 percent of costs during the response phase go to logistics.

The role of infrastructure in logistics operations in disaster response and recovery

Given that infrastructure facilitates the flows of goods and services, the ability to ensure the flows of goods and services, or logistics, is fundamental to not only the development agenda but also to effective response in humanitarian or emergency disaster situations.

When an event occurs that is described as a "disaster," it is usually because the intensity or severity of the event has exceeded the resistance capacity of the built environment (the infrastructure), resulting in damage to or destruction of infrastructure causing loss of life and livelihoods. This can have two significant impacts on the response operations:

1. The damage to infrastructure will directly affect the logistical response and determine how goods and services will be distributed in a post-disaster situation. The significant damage that usually occurs to transport infrastructure, for example, the destruction of roads and bridges, will require a logistical response dependent on air transport with associated costs.

2. The damage that occurs to infrastructure will also influence the type of response required. If, for example, the event results in a major loss of housing, the provision of shelter will become a key service that will have to be delivered by the response.

Given the reliance on infrastructure for logistics to support response operations and the impact the damage or loss of infrastructure has on the response, we can argue that any preparedness planning for effective response should consider the role of infrastructure in preparedness and response.

Challenges

The international aid agencies and the UN agencies have decades of experience on the front lines of disasters and in long-term development initiatives. They have developed expertise in various intervention strategies. Their networks, relationships, and know-how reach into the most remote parts of the world. Their values and respect support the government to solicit donor funds and operationalize activities. However, as the number of large-scale disasters increases, aid agencies struggle to keep up with burgeoning demand. Critically, because their funding mechanisms require them to devote almost all their resources to frontline assistance services, funds to develop backroom infrastructure and processes are limited. Technology is fragmented; therefore, aid agencies having multiple, incompatible information systems is not unusual.
A disaster is a crucial time that all sectors, foundations, and NGOs have to work together and bring their resources in training local communities, usage of their employees, and knowledge expertise in strengthening the local community's ability to handle the disaster response situation.

**Role of the private sector**

*Guidance Notes on Recovery: Private Sector* highlights that "logistics is also one area where the capacity of the private sector far outshines those of government, non-profit, or humanitarian actors. At present, only militaries come even close to matching the logistics capabilities of the private sector, yet only in rare cases have businesses been tapped to contribute to this function in preparedness and response" (GFDRR Recovery Hub). Private-sector companies produce and transport supplies, own transportation assets, and have the local know-how that can make a difference in the aftermath of a large disaster.

This is supported by the view that the for-profit supply delivery systems actively intersect with the nonprofit services at work in the community, daily delivering food, medical services and supplies, water, and shelter—for example, food chains donate nearly out-of-date food to food pantries every day. The new approach to recovery resource management could leverage this point of intersection and avoid reinventing a process that already works.

As noted above the private sector can play an important role in preparedness and response as:

1. Both the development and humanitarian sector rely heavily on the actors in the private sector in order to deliver the services that they provide.
2. The private sector is already on the ground and has the connections to get things done quickly. They are in most cases present before the development or humanitarian sector gets involved and will be there after they leave.
3. In many countries, the private sector owns and operates a significant portion of the infrastructure that the economy relies on, such as utility companies.
4. Not all private sector entities are only "in it for the money." While this can be true in some cases (hence why the stereotype exists) it is not always true. There are many examples of organizations working in the private sector that work toward the public good and improving people's lives—not to mention the ones that are labelled specifically as social enterprises and nonprofit businesses.

There is thus a strong common point of interest between the development sector, the humanitarian sector, and the private sector in logistics, which creates an obvious focus point for this discussion.
Toward Coordinated Efforts for Sustainable Solutions to Food Crises: The Role of the Global Report on Food Crises 2017

**Background**

Currently, the world is faced with an unprecedented call for action at a moment in which four countries (South Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and northeast Nigeria) have been identified at risk of famine. The demand for humanitarian and resilience assistance is escalating. Reducing the vulnerability of populations affected by and at risk of food insecurity requires a clear understanding of the context of food crises and a goal-oriented analysis toolkit. Food security analysis is necessary not only to understand the strength and magnitude of the shocks hindering sustainable food systems, but also to provide guidance and scale up interventions. Technical, operational, and financial partners require evidence-based information to ensure appropriate planning.
and resources to tackle the consequences of food security crises within an evolving humanitarian financing landscape. The 2016 World Humanitarian Summit has prompted a major rethink of the way that financing is delivered in crisis settings, highlighting the need for more long-term development investments to address risk, prevent crises, and build resilience. A diverse set of food security analysis modalities and methodologies is already in place, along with early warning systems. However, partial geographical coverage and a lack of comparable data within a standardized system make it difficult to get a full global picture of food crises at any given time. A joint effort is needed to ensure that findings are brought together into one global, public product.

In 2015, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission produced an annual report on food insecurity hotspots to inform decisions on food crisis allocations at the global level. In 2016, to increase the quality and transparency of the report, the European Commission invited FAO and WFP to contribute to the JRC’s publication by providing food security data and analysis. The pilot report entitled “The Global Analysis of Food and Nutrition Security Situation in Food Crisis Hotspots” was issued in March 2016. The Global Report on Food Crises 2017 scales up and expands the scope of the pilot report. The three organizations agreed to move forward, involving additional partners in the global assessment of the food crisis situation, with the aim of producing a consensus-based yearly report from early 2017. This initiative is timely as it is crucial to link it to the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) core commitments and the 2030 Agenda and the SDG indicator framework relevant for food security and nutrition, sustainable agriculture, and resilience.

The report aims at ensuring appropriate planning, and more needs-based allocations are made to tackle the consequences of food security crises within an evolving humanitarian financing landscape. Ultimately, this report aims to instigate and inform better decision making to increase resilience for the food and nutrition security of the world's most vulnerable people and "to ensure that no one is left behind" (High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, 2016). The Global Report on Food Crises 2017 is therefore the final output of a consultative process established to involve a wide range of stakeholders, including regional government institutions such as IGAD, CILSS, and SICA and technical partners such as FAO, WFP, UNICEF, JRC, and FEWS NET who have brought together credible and globally accepted findings from all major risk analysis and early warning systems. In line with the multi-partnership spirit of this initiative, it is envisaged that the preparation of the report will be undertaken in the framework of a Global Network Against Food Crises with the aim to advocate and act as a platform and ensure that the findings of the report influence key decision-making processes and facilitate coordinated response programming.

The Global Report on Food Crises 2017

The Global Report on Food Crises 2017 is a global, public product based on an accurate and comprehensive analysis of food crises for the period January–December 2016, which is complemented by trends over the last few years, where relevant, and includes forecast evolution in 2017. The report compiles the main global and regional food security analysis through a transparent, consultative, and consensus-based process. It provides food security and nutrition analyses from countries that are chronically vulnerable to food crises and have large populations in acute food insecurity. The key information sources are the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and the Cadre Harmonisé (CH), wherever these systems are in place. Complementary sources include products from WFP, FAO, European Union—Joint Research Centre, Food Security Cluster, UNICEF, and OCHA. The report provides food security population estimates for 48 countries selected according to acute food crises faced in 2016 and beyond. In addition, a detailed food security analysis (see Table 2) is presented.

Countries included in the FAO Global Information for Early Warning Systems (GIEWS) list in 2016 were automatically selected for the report, as they represent countries currently facing acute food crises. Also included were countries that have experienced at least one food crisis in the past three years, or that have had at least three food crises in the past ten years.
for crises and/or countries facing acute food insecurity conditions selected according to IPC Phase 4 Emergency or Phase 5 Catastrophe ratings.

**Global overview of food crises**

Across 48 countries around the world, 108 million people in 2016 were reported to be facing food insecurity crises (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above). This represents a drastic increase compared to 2015 when the figure was almost 80 million. In 2016, major food crises were fuelled by conflict, record-high food prices, and abnormal weather patterns caused by El Niño. Crises were widespread and severe, in some cases affecting entire national populations, and in others, causing intense damage in localized areas such as in northeast Nigeria. Moreover, shocks were not bound by national borders, and the spillover effects had a significant impact on neighboring countries (e.g., the Syrian refugees’ crisis and Lake Chad Basin crisis).

The acute and wide-reaching effects of conflicts left large numbers of people food insecure and in need of urgent assistance in Yemen (14.1 million), Syria (7.0 million), northeast Nigeria (4.7 million), and Burundi (2.3 million). In Somalia, insecurity coupled with severe drought conditions has resulted in high food insecurity levels in 2016, which were expected to increase further in early 2017. The latest analysis confirmed the worsening of food insecurity with an estimated 2.9 million classified as severely food insecure in February 2017 with risk of famine. In South Sudan, the latest IPC analysis confirmed also an upward trend estimating 4.9 million people in IPC Phase 3 and above, food insecure with famine and risk of famine in conflict affected counties of Unity state.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase Name</th>
<th>Phase description</th>
<th>Priority response objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1</td>
<td>Households (HHs) are able to meet essential food and nonfood needs without engaging in atypical, unsustainable strategies to access food and income, including any reliance on humanitarian assistance.</td>
<td>Resilience building and disaster risk reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2</td>
<td>Even with humanitarian assistance, HHs have minimally adequate food consumption but are able to afford some essential nonfood expenditures without engaging in irreversible coping strategies.</td>
<td>Disaster risk reduction, protection of livelihoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 3</td>
<td>Even with humanitarian assistance, HHs have food consumption gaps with high or higher than usual acute malnutrition; OR HHs are marginally able to meet minimum food needs only with accelerated depletion of assets that will lead to food consumption gaps.</td>
<td>Protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps and reduce acute malnutrition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 4</td>
<td>Even with humanitarian assistance, HHs have large food consumption gaps resulting in very high levels of acute malnutrition and excess mortality OR HHs have extreme loss of livelihood assets that will lead to large food consumption gaps in the short term.</td>
<td>Save lives and livelihoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 5</td>
<td>Even with humanitarian assistance, HHs have an extreme lack of food and/or basic needs even with full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, destitution, and death are evident.</td>
<td>Prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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| Table 2: IPC/CH Phase descriptions |

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21 Countries were selected according to IPC Phase 4 Emergency or Phase 5 Catastrophe ratings, or because at least 20 percent of the population was in Phase 3 Crisis. In addition, the declaration of an Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Humanitarian System-Wide Emergency Response was used to select countries.
Map 1: Population in IPC/CH Phase 3 Crisis or Higher (in millions), December 2016

Phase 3 Crisis
Even with humanitarian assistance, households have food consumption gaps with high or higher than usual acute malnutrition; OR households are marginally able to meet minimum food needs only with accelerated depletion of assets that will lead to food consumption gaps.

Phase 4 Emergency
Even with humanitarian assistance, households have large food consumption gaps resulting in very high levels of acute malnutrition and excess mortality OR households have extreme loss of livelihood assets that will lead to large food consumption gaps in the short term.

Phase 5 Famine/Catastrophe
Even with humanitarian assistance, households have an extreme lack of food or basic needs even with full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death and destitution are evident.

Map 2: Population in IPC/CH Phase 3 Crisis or Higher (in percentages), December 2016

Phase 3 Crisis
Even with humanitarian assistance, households have food consumption gaps with high or higher than usual acute malnutrition; OR households are marginally able to meet minimum food needs only with accelerated depletion of assets that will lead to food consumption gaps.

Phase 4 Emergency
Even with humanitarian assistance, households have large food consumption gaps resulting in very high levels of acute malnutrition and excess mortality OR households have extreme loss of livelihood assets that will lead to large food consumption gaps in the short term.

Phase 5 Famine/Catastrophe
Even with humanitarian assistance, households have an extreme lack of food or basic needs even with full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death and destitution are evident.
Conflict causes widespread displacement (internal and cross-border), protracting food insecurity and placing a burden on host communities. The populations worst affected by displacement are those of Syria (6.3 million internally displaced people—IDPs) and Syrian refugees in neighboring countries (4.8 million), Iraq (3.1 million), Yemen (3.2 million), South Sudan (3 million), Somalia (2.1 million), and northeast Nigeria (2.1 million). In some countries, El Niño largely manifested itself in drought conditions that damaged agricultural livelihoods, triggering food insecurity. The countries most affected are in eastern and southern Africa and include Somalia, Ethiopia, Madagascar (0.8 million in the Grand Sud), Malawi (6.7 million) and Zimbabwe (4.1 million). Projections for 2017 indicate an increase in the severity of food insecurity, particularly in southern and southeastern Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia.

**Major food crises in 2016**

**Eastern and Central Africa**

According to the number of people classified as severely food insecure (IPC Phase 3 Crisis and above), the countries most affected in the Horn of Africa are Somalia, South Sudan, and Ethiopia. In Central and Eastern Africa, food crises have also severely affected populations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, and Burundi.

In **Somalia**, between December 2016 and June 2017, 2.9 million people (25 percent of the population) are estimated to face IPC Phase 3 Crisis or Phase 4 Emergency conditions across the country. This is more than twice the number of people who were in need in August 2016. A further 3.3 million are in Phase 2 Stressed, bringing the total number of people facing acute food insecurity to over 6.2 million. Many of those affected are IDPs and about 30 percent of food insecure people are concentrated in Hiraan, Bay, and Banadir regions. The food insecure population grew by 60 percent between 2014 and 2016, as many more people were classified in IPC Phase 2 Stressed. With the current caseload being more than twice compared to the latest estimate in August and more than three times the caseload estimated one year earlier, the dramatic deterioration of the food security situation is apparent. The number of people facing IPC Phase 4 Emergency, estimated at 22,000 in February 2016, increased 20-fold over the last 12 months to 439,000 in February 2017. Consecutive seasons of poor rainfall, near total crop failures, and loss of livestock have undermined food security. In addition, population displacement, trade disruption due to insecurity, and a scarcity of employment opportunities and income combined with high food prices to erode purchasing power, especially among unskilled wage laborers. With preliminary weather forecasts pointing to below-average to near-average rainfall during the forthcoming 2017 gu (April–June) season, a further deterioration of the food security situation in some areas is very likely to occur. In a worst-case scenario, where the rainy season performs even poorer than currently forecast, household purchasing power further declines to levels observed in 2010/2011, and humanitarian assistance is unable to reach populations in need, Famine (IPC Phase 5) would be expected.

In **South Sudan**, an estimated 4.9 million people (about 42% of the population) were classified as severely food insecure (IPC Phase 3 Crisis and above) in January through April 2017. Of those, 100,000 people are facing Famine conditions (IPC Phase 5 Catastrophe) or a high likelihood of Famine at least until July 2017 if humanitarian assistance is not delivered. The affected population is concentrated in greater Unity counties, namely Leer and Mayendit. In Koch county there is a high likelihood that Famine is ongoing while Panyijiar County will likely avoid Famine if adequate humanitarian assistance is provided from February to July. Projections show a further deterioration at the height of the lean season in July 2017 with the number of severely food insecure

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22 Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit for Somalia (FSNAU) and FEWS NET Technical Release 2 February 2017.
people increasing to 5.5 million (47% of the population). The current situation shows a deterioration of the food security situation compared to the August/September 2016 IPC analyses, which estimated 4.4 million people (37% of the population) as severely food insecure and facing IPC Phase 3 Crisis and above. Food insecurity has increased dramatically since the start of the civil conflict in December 2013, and it reached record levels in 2016 and 2017. The nutrition situation is similarly alarming: in several counties, global acute malnutrition levels are near or above 30 percent—twice the WHO Critical threshold. In South Sudan, food insecurity is driven by conflict and insecurity, which have severely disrupted livelihoods, trade, and agricultural production. Moreover, the sharp devaluation of the local currency has inflated food prices, and transport costs are high because of insecurity along trade routes. Humanitarian assistance has improved food security in certain areas, but the country struggles with underlying issues, such as lack of investment in productive sectors, social services, and infrastructure.

In Ethiopia, the estimated number of food insecure was 9.7 million people—around 13 percent of the rural population in July 2016. The failure of the October–December rains has created a prolonged dry spell particularly affecting south and southeastern areas, and putting increasing numbers of people at high risk of worsening food insecurity. Malnutrition rates in spring 2016 were shocking: 2.7 million children under 5 were acutely malnourished and 400,000 were severely malnourished. Ethiopia relies heavily on agriculture, so the 2015 drought—one of the worst in 50 years—had a devastating impact. Production losses severely diminished household food security and purchasing power, forcing many to sell agricultural assets and abandon their livelihoods. Despite better harvests between October and January, millions remain at risk. Although in December 2016, the total number of food insecure people has decreased to 5.6 million, poor rainfall, small planted areas, and poor livestock health put people in southern and southeastern pastoral areas at risk of severe food insecurity in 2017.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, between June 2016 and January 2017, over 5.9 million people—8 percent of the population—were estimated to be in IPC Phase 3 Crisis or Phase 4 Emergency. Most of the food-insecure population is in four territories that are badly afflicted by civil insecurity. Global acute malnutrition is above 10 percent in most parts of the country and severe acute malnutrition above 2 percent. Food insecurity is driven by conflict among armed groups as well as instability in neighboring countries, which trigger large-scale movements of refugees. Natural disasters and animal/plant diseases also reduce food availability, pushing up prices. An average of 63 percent of household expenditure goes toward food in DRC, and agriculture remains largely at a subsistence level. Agricultural production is likely to be stable in early 2017, providing households with food until April. However, persistent insecurity and displacement will leave many territories in IPC Phase 2 or Phase 3.

In the Central African Republic, the already fragile food security situation deteriorated sharply in 2016. An IPC analysis of the period August to December estimated that over 2 million people were in Phase 3 Crisis or Phase 4 Emergency—almost 40 percent of the population. Food consumption and nutrition are worsening, with global acute malnutrition at 18 percent and severe acute malnutrition above the WHO Emergency threshold of 2 percent. Conflict and insecurity are the main drivers of food insecurity. The population is confronted by displacement, destroyed livelihoods, limited income opportunities, asset depletion and lower levels of home production. Insecurity has also hampered the delivery of humanitarian assistance. IPC Phase 3 conditions are forecast to persist at least until late May 2017 in areas affected by conflict. Displaced people, returnees, host households, and poor households will be of particular concern.

In Burundi, between May and June 2016, an estimated 2.3 million people were in IPC Phase 3 Crisis or Phase 4 Emergency in Burundi—24 percent of the population. A further 3.4 million were in Phase 2 Stressed. A second IPC assessment for July to September—the main harvest period—found better conditions, with just under 1.5 million people in Phases 3 or 4. However, multiple socioeconomic factors have combined to undermine child
nutrition: an estimated 226,000 children are acutely malnourished and 56,000 are severely malnourished. Food insecurity is fuelled by ongoing civil insecurity, which displaces the population and disrupts livelihoods. Political instability restricts trade both inside the country and across its borders, limiting the availability of food. Burundi is also vulnerable to recurrent floods, hailstorms, drought, and torrential rains. In 2017, the economic situation is not likely to improve as instability persists. Of major concern are the eastern border provinces of Muyinga, Cankuzo, and Rutana, where IPC Phase 3 conditions are forecast for late April/early May.

Lake Chad Basin regional crisis
The long-running Boko Haram–related conflict across the Lake Chad Basin reportedly left 8.2 million people destitute. With 2.6 million displaced in December 2016, food insecurity reached worrying levels: 6.3 million people in northeast Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger are facing severe food insecurity.

In North Eastern Nigeria, the Boko Haram conflict has sparked a growing humanitarian crisis, with a huge impact on agriculture and related livelihoods. A CH analysis in Nigeria in October 2016 found an estimated 4.7 million people in CH Phase 3 Crisis or higher in the states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe. In Borno alone, 3.3 million—59 percent of the population—are in Phase 3 or above, and 55,000 are facing Phase 5 Catastrophe conditions. Although territories in these areas are being liberated, food security and nutrition are worsening, especially in Borno where 3.6 million are forecast to be severely food insecure in August 2017. Around 115,700 people in Borno and 5,600 people in Yobe are expected to face Famine during the next lean season between June and September.

In Cameroon North, Far North, Adamawa, and East regions, 2.5 million people were food insecure, of whom 300,000 were severely food insecure in 2016. Boko Haram attacks have hampered access to arable land, leaving households highly dependent on markets. The closure of the border with Nigeria has severed trade routes, and poor purchasing power has left many households struggling to source food from markets. Boko Haram attacks and conflict in Nigeria have also recently triggered worsening food insecurity in Chad. Thousands have been forced from their homes and are living in precarious conditions. Insecurity and displacements look set to continue in 2017, with negative consequences for livelihoods, income opportunities, land cultivation, and market functioning.

In Niger, during the post-harvest season from October to November 2016, over 320,000 people were estimated to be in CH Phase 3 Crisis and 5,000 in Phase 4 Emergency. A further 2.5 million were in Phase 2 Stressed. The Boko Haram crisis has severely affected the Diffa region, where attacks are damaging livelihoods. Food insecurity is forecast to worsen from June to August 2017, with the number of people facing Crisis conditions rising to 748,700. The Lac region is expected to face Phase 3 Crisis conditions at least until May.

Southern Africa
The strong impact of El Niño weather patterns on agricultural production in 2016 caused severely stressed food security across southern Africa. This was compounded by an economic downturn in many countries, which lowered households’ ability to cope. The supply shortfalls in 2016 also triggered sharp food price increases, with maize prices reaching record highs in Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, and Swaziland. The effect of depreciating currencies in several countries added further upward pressure to domestic food prices and increased the cost of importing food. The combination of high food prices and poor harvests severely restricted food access and availability, increasing food assistance requirements and contributing to rising malnutrition rates, with parts of Madagascar, Malawi, and Mozambique experiencing high levels
of stunting. The El Niño–related drought hit these countries the hardest, along with Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. Food insecurity also intensified in Angola, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia, where better national capacities to respond to shocks helped avert a crisis.

In southern Madagascar, in September 2016, 840,000 people, 5 percent of the local population, were found to be in IPC Phase 3 Crisis or Phase 4 Emergency in Madagascar’s Grand Sud. A further 528,000 were in Phase 2 Stressed. Global acute malnutrition rates were classified at Serious or Alert levels in the districts of Tsihombe, Ampanihy, and Beloha. Drought caused by El Niño has been a fundamental driver of recent food insecurity. Household production was decimated and stocks were depleted much earlier than usual. Rising food prices have also exacerbated the situation, with 40 percent of households resorting to crisis-coping strategies, such as consuming seed stocks. Food insecurity is expected to remain high in southern areas. However, food assistance and the forecast average harvests will improve food availability around April and May 2017. Recovery will be slow as the recent crisis has depleted assets and reduced incomes.

In Malawi, nearly 4.1 million people were estimated to be in IPC Phase 3 Crisis or Phase 4 Emergency between May and June 2016. The figure is expected to have risen to 4.5 million—33 percent of the population—between July and September because of the sharply reduced harvest and depleted livelihood assets. Nutrition levels are deteriorating: national prevalence of global acute malnutrition was 4.1 percent in December 2016, up from 2.5 percent in May. Current food insecurity is the result of two consecutive years of below-average crop production, reflecting erratic weather. Lower production has reduced food availability and high prices have weakened purchasing power. Recurrent natural hazards undermine household resilience, which is already low because of poverty and other socioeconomic factors. Food security is expected to worsen in the first quarter of 2017, which is the peak of the lean season. After April, new supplies from the main season harvest should improve the situation. Even so, the planted area for the 2016/17 cropping season is likely to be much smaller because farmers have lost assets, income, and productive capacity.

In Mozambique, between July and September 2016, over 1.9 million people—14 percent of the population—were estimated to be in IPC Phase 3 Crisis or Phase 4 Emergency. A further 4.1 million were in Phase 2 Stressed. In August 2016, global acute malnutrition was at Alert levels in two provinces and at Critical levels in one province. El Niño drought was the main driver of food insecurity in 2016, cutting household production and triggering high food prices. The situation was exacerbated by high levels of poverty and limited resilience to natural hazards. Productivity is generally low because of a lack of technology, inadequate infrastructure, and limited access to goods and services. Those affected by the drought are expected to remain in Phase 3 or 4 in early 2017. Food security is likely to improve from April onwards, although households in conflict-affected areas may see Crisis conditions persist.

In Zimbabwe, between May and June 2016, an estimated 2.3 million people in rural Zimbabwe—17 percent of rural households—were in IPC Phase 3 Crisis or Phase 4 Emergency between May and June 2016. According to ZIMVAC, the number was expected to rise to 4.1 million between June 2016 and March 2017. Global acute malnutrition prevalence ranges from 2.6 percent to 6.7 percent, but poor food consumption levels suggest that malnutrition rates are likely to increase in the near future. Zimbabwe’s sharp economic downturn combined with severe drought increased food insecurity in
2016. Employment opportunities are scarce and household income is low, hampering food access. The drought caused a further drop in demand for workers, eroding purchasing power for households dependent on unskilled wage labor. Food insecurity is set to worsen in 2017, up until the next harvest season in March. Agricultural productivity is forecast to fall because of poor access to fertilizer and seed supplies.

**Asia**

In Asia, key drivers of food insecurity are the prolonged conflicts and insecurity that have displaced thousands, disrupted livelihoods, hampered farming activities, affected trade flows of commodities, and limited physical access to markets.

In Afghanistan, over 8.5 million people—nearly 32 percent of the population—were classified in IPC Phase 3 *Crisis* or Phase 4 *Emergency* during the preharvest season April to June 2016. A further 4.7 million were in Phase 2 *Stressed*. Food insecurity was expected to improve considerably from July to December thanks to the new harvest, with 4.3 million projected to face Phase 3 or 4 and 8.7 million to face Phase 2. Preharvest, global acute malnutrition prevalence among children under two was 21 percent, and severe acute malnutrition was 8.4 percent. These levels are likely to have deteriorated because of severe insecurity in many parts of the country. The acute food insecurity in June was the result of the peak lean season combined with a lack of food access caused by insecurity. Other underlying causes of food insecurity include widespread poverty, displacement, unemployment, depleted livelihood assets, limited market functionality, and food price fluctuations. Although markets are expected to function normally in early 2017, many poor households will have struggled to stock up for the winter and may have difficulty meeting their food needs. In conflict-affected areas, falling purchasing power and disrupted livelihoods will mean a greater need for food assistance. *Crisis* conditions are forecast for poor households in central and northeastern areas, as well as for newly displaced people and undocumented returnees.

In Iraq, food security is extremely volatile, mirroring the dynamics of the conflict. An estimated 2.4 million people are food insecure, of whom 1.5 million are severely food insecure. Assessments of malnutrition in 2016 found mostly low prevalence; a new study in 2017 across all camps will give accurate data on the nutritional status of children under five, as well as pregnant and breastfeeding women. Conflict is damaging the food security of Iraqi people in many ways. Households face loss of assets, disrupted livelihoods, and unemployment. Agricultural productivity has plummeted, fuel is scarce, markets are dysfunctional, and food prices are rising. The conflict has displaced millions from their homes, leaving them increasingly reliant on assistance. The number of those in need is predicted to rise to 12 or 13 million as the Mosul crisis continues in 2017. The worst food security conditions are likely to be faced by displaced families inside and outside camps, vulnerable residents of retaken communities, and people fleeing intense fighting.

In Syria in June 2016, 7 million people were facing food insecurity, an increase of 5 percent compared to September 2015. An August 2016 assessment recorded particularly acute conditions for over half a million people living in 18 besieged or hard-to-reach places. Food insecurity is driven by the conflict and consequent population displacement and disruption of livelihoods. Agricultural productivity has been badly hit, producers face rising transaction costs and security risks, and large areas of cropland suffered drought in 2016. More than two-thirds of the population is living in extreme poverty and unable to cover basic needs. In 2017, food security is expected to worsen as the conflict is set to continue and the main drivers of food insecurity will remain in place. Millions will continue to depend on humanitarian assistance, and in hard-to-reach areas people are at particular risk of malnutrition and disease. Millions of Syrians have escaped across borders, fleeing the war and seeking refuge in neighboring countries, mainly (in order of refugee population) in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt. The influx of refugees is having a huge impact on host communities in terms of competition over jobs, housing, and access to basic services.
In Yemen, in June 2016, 14.1 million people were classified as severely food insecure: 7.1 million were in IPC Phase 3 Crisis and 7 million were in Phase 4 Emergency conditions. The combined figure represents 51 percent of the population. An additional 8.2 million were in Phase 2 Stressed. Malnutrition is at alarming levels: 3.3 million children and pregnant or breastfeeding women are acutely malnourished, including 462,000 children under five who are suffering severe acute malnutrition. The main driver of food insecurity in Yemen is the ongoing conflict, which has devastated the economy, agriculture, infrastructure, markets, and livelihoods. Millions have been displaced, and access to food has been curtailed by dwindling employment, high inflation, and exchange rate fluctuations. Natural hazards, such as locust invasions and flooding, have also played a part. A lack of data makes it difficult to forecast food security in Yemen. Some projections indicate that the depth of hunger may increase 110 percent and the food-insecure population may reach 16.1 million. Without humanitarian assistance, Emergency conditions are highly likely to spread to many governorates between January and May 2017, with IDPs facing the worst outcomes.

**Latin America and the Caribbean**

In the Caribbean and Central America, during 2015 and early 2016, a drought exacerbated by El Niño hit Haiti and localized areas of the Dry Corridor in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In Haiti, in addition to this, the category 4 Hurricane Matthew in late 2016 directly affected the population, leaving people in high need of assistance.

In Haiti, in January 2016, 3.6 million people were food insecure, of whom 1.5 million were severely food insecure. In October, Hurricane Matthew affected 2.1 million people and left 1.4 million in need of food assistance. A nutrition study in 2016 in 20 communes found global acute malnutrition prevalence of 8.4 percent. Preliminary data indicate that malnutrition levels may be two to four times higher than normal in hurricane-affected areas. Current drivers of food insecurity are the severe drought in 2015 and Hurricane Matthew in 2016, both of which devastated agriculture and severely limited access to food. Underlying chronic drivers include poverty, high market dependency, poor infrastructure, and limited market integration. The loss of food stocks and crops caused by the hurricane means that households are likely to struggle to meet their food needs during the lean season. The food-insecure population is expected to be between 1.3 and 2.1 million.

**Main countries to watch in 2017**

Several countries will require special attention in 2017 in terms of food security and nutrition analysis and monitoring, as well as the delivery of humanitarian assistance. All major food crises reported will most likely continue in 2017. In particular, there is a high risk of famine in some areas of northeastern Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen, where food security conditions may further deteriorate because of armed conflict, drought, and macroeconomic collapse. In 2017, widespread food insecurity is likely to persist in Iraq, Syria (including among refugees in neighboring countries), Malawi, and Zimbabwe. Some countries are currently facing more localized or less acute food insecurity and/or are exposed to specific risks that may lead to worsening food security and nutrition conditions in 2017. The availability of up-to-date information in early 2017 will be crucial to confirm these projections and inform humanitarian response in order to prevent further worsening of food insecurity.
The Way Forward

This evidence-based information is required by the technical, operational, and financial partners to ensure appropriate planning and resource allocation decisions that effectively prevent, anticipate, and mitigate the consequences of food security crisis. The Global Report against Food Crises 2017 was very well received by different stakeholders, resulting in a strong interest to scale up this initiative to a global mechanism with two interlinked objectives. The first objective is to broaden the scope of this initiative from only an EU initiative to a report that is widely used as a global public good for decision support. Against this background, it will be necessary to expand the number of contributors to the report and address some of its limitations. The second objective is to ensure that the finding of the report influence key decision-making processes. To this end, it is envisaged that the preparation of the report is undertaken in the framework of a Global Network Against Food Crises. The Global Network Against Food Crisis will be a network of networks. The network is not to replace but rather build on existing initiatives by bringing a global perspective as an added value. It will have the following functions: (a) mobilize members’ efforts to avail the right level of technical expertise for the global analysis of food crises; (b) validate the overall findings of the analyses and related recommendations; (c) advocate and act as a platform to facilitate coordinated response programming; and (d) highlight the gaps in data availability and then advocate for innovative data collection tools. Membership of the network will include institutions, both at the global level and regional level, that have a stake in food crises prevention and response either as producer or user of related information and analysis.
Development Solutions for Human Mobility in Situations of Fragility

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Introduction and Background
The severe displacement crisis has gained a growing attention in the recent years. In 2015, forced displacement affected over 65 million people worldwide (compared to 59.5 million just 12 months earlier), of whom 21.3 million are refugees, more than 3 million are asylum seekers and a reported 40.8 million are internally displaced. Between 2008 and 2013, an average, 27.5 million people annually were displaced by disasters, most of them in Asia and Africa and in countries that are fragile and conflict-affected. In accordance with the Leave No-One Behind principle and SDG 10.7 to facilitate safe, orderly, and regular migration and mobility, attention to the displaced should be central to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Issues and Challenges
The root causes of displacement could be related to four main factors, which are often interlinked:

1. Poverty and lack of sustainable livelihood opportunities,
2. Protracted conflicts and violent extremism,
3. Natural hazards, man-made disasters, and climate change, and
4. Poor governance.

The challenges created by these large-scale displacements are even more acute than the interaction between disasters, conflict, and/or fragility. They create and perpetuate vulnerabilities that place communities at risk, further entrenching poverty and inequality, creating an increasing burden on host communities, and eroding the possibilities to provide successful options for the displaced.

There is a growing understanding that forced displacement should not be addressed as a stand-alone issue but instead be part of comprehensive recovery processes which contributes to two complementary objectives. On one hand, building the resilience of affected populations will contribute to limiting the number of people who will have to move, and to minimizing the negative impact for those who do and their hosts. On the other hand, the recovery and development processes will contribute to addressing root causes or triggers related to human rights violations, governance, economic opportunities, vulnerability to climate change shocks, and/or violent extremism.

Given the link to ongoing fragility, humanitarian and development actors, supporting government and in partnership with the private sector and civil society, need to work together toward collective outcomes to address displacement. Experience in responding to large-scale movements of refugees, IDPs, and forced
migration shows the need to combine short-term responses to displacement impacts with medium- to long-term development interventions, sharing responsibilities across a wider range of actors. In this sense, a resilience-based development approach could be part of a broader strategy bringing together humanitarian and development interventions in crisis and post-crisis situations, supporting host communities and displaced persons to better cope with and recover from displacement impacts, and to protect development gains. It helps ensure that affected communities not only recover from crises, but also improve their prospects for the longer term development needed to move toward lasting peace and prosperity.

Return has traditionally been seen as the ultimate solution for displacement. However, the probably of achieving this solution depends to a large degree on the initial cause of displacement. For disaster induced displacement, return tends to occur once reconstruction is under way. For those people who left due to conflict or climate change, a large proportion never return. For those fleeing conflict and fragility, return takes place in contexts marked by destruction of not only assets, but also of livelihoods opportunities, services, trust, social networks, and not least, a continued heightened risk of violence. If it is not placed within a broader framework of crisis recovery, return is likely to be unsuccessful or unsustainable, leading to renewed displacement. However, if large-scale return does happen, not including it in national/sectoral development/recovery strategies creates additional risks that can contribute to instability. Reintegration in the communities is challenged by possible tensions with those who remained behind. Recovery of housing, property, access to land, and restitution for damages suffered during a crisis need to be tackled and social cohesion preserved. Returnees might often choose not to return to areas of origin but to cities, deemed to offer livelihoods and safety.
The regional and cross-border dimension of displacement issues is another critical element that has been highlighted in recent ongoing crises, such as the current famine in the Horn of Africa, or the Lake Chad crisis where security concerns caused by the Boko Haram insurgency superpose across borders on additional livelihoods risks created by a severe drought. Consequently, in many cases, responses to displacement need to be designed, planned, and coordinated along with neighboring countries with a clear alignment of regional efforts.

The role of the municipalities is of utmost importance in the success of such interventions, including their ability to manage this demographic change. Receiving communities are faced with a large-scale population increase, creating on the one hand, competition for resources, basic services, and a potential for tension, and on the other hand, an increased demand for goods and potential for an economic boost.

A global series of events have recently taken place to build momentum around the issue of displacement and large-scale mixed movements of refugees and migrants, calling for closer cooperation and more robust responsibility sharing. Next steps at the global level will be to implement the New York Declaration, through the adoption in the coming years of two global compacts on migration and refugees and the development of a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework.

**Issues Discussed in the Session**

The session on *Development Solutions for Human Mobility in Situations of Fragility* focused on successful solutions to forced displacement, covering both internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, with a specific focus on situations of recovery from conflicts. The session provided an opportunity to share experiences, discuss good practices, identify constraints and opportunities, and formulate recommendations to improve the strategies and responses to displacement in recovery settings.

The session brought together high level representatives from two countries. There were two speakers in the session, speaking from very different contexts, one (Turkey) from the position of addressing migrants across the Mediterranean Sea to Europe and the other is cross-border migration within North Eastern Nigeria triggered by the Boko Haram insurgency. Turkey presented local/municipal level solutions to displacement and Nigeria presented an overview of the National Recovery plan that was developed through the RPBA.

**Questions/Challenges**

The panel members were requested to share their country-level experiences based on the following questions:

*Integrating return/durable solutions into broader development/recovery processes:*

- Do the current tools for recovery assessment and planning (e.g., RPBA) provide the needed analysis and right foundation to develop comprehensive interventions that effectively address displacement issues?
- How do we better integrate the cross-border nature of displacement and the regional dimension of crises?
- Can we access multiyear financing and if not, what are the implications?

*Management of displacement at the municipal/local level:*

- In urban settings, how can we work better with municipalities to increase their capacities to manage large movements of displaced persons/migrants and build resilience of the displaced persons, host communities, and communities of return?

26 Please refer to http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/declaration
How can local government ‘link the dots’ by bringing together efforts to promote local economic development with national programs for social protection and services?

How could we operationalize the 2030 Agenda and the Leave No-One Behind principle at the municipal level through displacement and resilience building interventions? How do we apply a protection lens to supporting the livelihoods of migrants and refugees?

Improving planning and preparedness on forced displacement:

- What needs to be done, and is it advisable to increase the capacity of national systems to deliver services to their hosted displaced when the length of stay is uncertain? Are there ‘no regrets’ opportunities?
- How do we improve our planning for post-crisis scenarios when returnees might not end up in the location of origin?
- Given the political/sensitive nature of conflict and conflict-induced displacement, is it realistic to expect to be able to improve preparedness in likely future refugee hosting locations?

Additionally, the issues discussed focused on the following points:

1. Strengthening the resilience of the displaced, returnee, and host communities to ensure sustainable return and successful inclusion into national systems, including support to local authorities and municipalities to implement resilience-building development approaches;

2. The operationalization of the New Way of Working and the Humanitarian-Development Nexus, based on post-WHS pilot actions, to ensure that all stakeholders from humanitarian and development sides effectively join forces along with governments to achieve collective outcomes related to displacement issues; and

3. The regional perspectives of displacement, especially as these issues are cross-border, e.g., ongoing crises: Syria crisis, the Lake Chad Basin, Horn of Africa famine, peace building in the Great Lakes, etc.
Conclusion

- Vulnerability and resilience today cannot be spoken of in static terms based on assumptions that vulnerable people live in static communities and they need to be supported. Vulnerability and resilience should consider that many people have left their ‘community’ and are now searching out opportunities elsewhere, either due to push or pull factors.

- It is problematic that the climate refugee narrative has become part of a political agenda that does not reflect the realities of mobility and displacement. Mobility has many drivers and all indications are that climate-related displacement will be overwhelming across national borders. It is part of the equation of migration across the Mediterranean, but probably a bigger part of the migration within North Eastern Nigeria.

- Experts and practitioners dealing with natural hazards are starting to learn lessons with regard to demographics, urbanization, and creeping, recognizing that climate change means greater displacement in the future.

- With regard to response, we do not need to reinvent the wheel, as there are many who have been dealing with resilience among those displaced due primarily to conflict, but also drought (in Africa), and other natural hazards elsewhere for many years. These are primarily from the humanitarian sector, but also include others.

- A range of factors create and perpetuate vulnerabilities for both migrants and host communities; and therefore, solutions may need to reflect overlapping needs and opportunities, not only through economic development but also basic services and protection for migrants and the displaced.

- Tools, such as the Recovery and Peace Building assessment, can provide an excellent analysis and the comprehensive information required to plan interventions to address issues of displacement, as has been done in Nigeria.

- Even if migration and displacement are often treated as humanitarian issues, the focus is slowly shifting more to the need to address root causes of migration and displacement and find synergies with development.

- It is important to find ways to integrate issues of migrants and the displaced into development processes. Development plans can be adapted to respond to different demographics, cultures, languages, and skills.

- The New Way of Working (NWoW) brings together actors toward common outcomes. These common outcomes should be to seek (a) solutions to protracted problems; (b) enable a shift from humanitarian to development modalities; (c) use economic development to diffuse tensions and promote recognition among host communities of the economic benefits that migrants bring to their communities; (d) seek for dignity and well being of the displaced.

- Livelihoods are central to the protection agenda, but we need to deliberately make the linkages in order to effect change. For example, cash is not just a replacement for food aid but also supports payments of rent, and provides more choice and freedom on how they spend the cash. Livelihoods programs enable avoiding child labor, exploitation of labor, unsafe shelter, and provide the resources to send children to school, etc.

- The readiness of the government of Turkey and the European Union to provide massive cash support that is an injection in local economies also allows local governments to focus on services when basic livelihoods are covered.

- Government leadership and donor commitments with multiyear financial support and interventions are necessary to provide durable solutions to migration and displacement.

- It is important to design programs that benefit both the displaced and host communities, allow markets to be more inclusive, provide access to jobs and services, and encourage investment by entrepreneurs and the diaspora.
Conflict Sensitivity in Recovery

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Session Summary
This discussion paper lays out a series of challenges, dilemmas, and opportunities associated with the integration of conflict sensitivity into post-disaster reconstruction efforts. It does not seek to offer a comprehensive review of these topics, but rather aims to raise pertinent questions and stimulate further discussion amongst policy makers and practitioners working in highly challenging, complex contexts. It considers key issues of relevance to international organizations operating across the full spectrum of reconstruction efforts in the wake of environmental or conflict-related disaster events: from immediate humanitarian response, through recovery, economic regeneration, and structural political and governance reforms. The paper was developed to inform and stimulate discussion in the run-up to the third iteration of the World Reconstruction Conference (WRC3).
It has been updated following discussion at a side event convened to discuss this topic, which was attended by experts from a range of governmental, multilateral, and non-governmental agencies.

The paper begins with a brief introduction to key concepts related to conflict sensitivity, before discussing some challenges and dilemmas agencies typically face, with a focus on humanitarian action and political and governance reform efforts. It then outlines some potential entry points for affecting change across different types of reconstruction efforts. It ends with some brief concluding thoughts.

**Background and Core Concepts**

Conflict sensitivity is an umbrella term that refers to a set of tools and approaches that seek to identify and mitigate any negative impacts, and maximize any potential positive impacts that interventions have on the social, political, and economic dynamics that contribute to destructive forms of conflict in any context. Adopting a conflict-sensitive approach involves first gaining a solid understanding of the underlying dynamics that may contribute to conflict, assessing how these dynamics are likely to interact with the planned intervention, and then identifying practical and actionable steps to avoid harm and ideally contribute to peace, within an organization’s mandate or a project’s objectives.

The concept of conflict sensitivity is premised on a number of understandings. First, conflict is a normal and important part of any society, but when it becomes violent it can have devastating impacts on people and societies. Second, all societies suffer from social tensions, and all societies have systems in place to manage those tensions. However, these systems are not always able to manage tensions peacefully. Third, physical violence is always the consequence of other, underlying issues. These can be difficult to identify, but if not addressed can contribute to increased tensions and ultimately even violence. And fourth, any intervention, irrespective of its objectives or means of implementation, can inadvertently impact on these underlying issues, either positively or negatively. This can make violent conflict either more or less likely.

The scale and seriousness of those impacts will differ according to the context. In places where institutions are weak, or where communities suffer from high levels of tension (which may or may not be overtly violent), the potential impacts can be severe. In communities recovering from violent conflicts, the need to adopt conflict-sensitive approaches is generally clear. In communities recovering from other types of shocks, such as environmental hazards, the need to adopt a conflict-sensitive approach may be less obvious, but is no less essential. Natural hazards, such as floods, earthquakes, or droughts, only become ‘natural disasters’ when the institutions, systems, and structures that a country or community has in place to manage these shocks—many of which are recurrent and predictable—are overwhelmed. Consequently, natural hazards are more likely to become ‘natural disasters’ in so-called fragile states, which are also much more likely to be conflict affected.

Under these circumstances, existing dispute resolution systems, such as the justice system, police forces, or traditional governance mechanisms, as well as other basic services such as health and education systems, are also more likely to be overwhelmed. This can result in preexisting grievances being exacerbated, for example by increasing imbalances of access to scarce resources. It can also create economic incentives for violent activities, for example by destroying livelihood opportunities, leading some people to join armed groups. The displacement that can result from disasters, meanwhile, often contributes to increased levels of violence, including sexual violence. It can further increase tensions, both within displaced populations as well as between displaced and host communities.

**Key Issues for International Agencies Engaged in Reconstruction**

It is widely recognized that international organizations can unwittingly exacerbate underlying conflict issues. Consequently, many institutions have adopted conflict sensitivity principles within operating frameworks,
developed tools to support conflict sensitivity integration into programs, or have invested in training packages or other types of capacity building in this area. Much progress has therefore been made in integrating conflict sensitivity into reconstruction efforts. However, significant challenges and issues remain.

**Humanitarian action and conflict sensitivity**

Many humanitarian organizations accept that their actions have the potential to exacerbate conflict, and many are committed to delivering aid in line with conflict sensitivity principles. Indeed, there are significant overlaps between conflict sensitivity and the core humanitarian principles. Neutrality and impartiality, for example, are fundamental aspects of conflict sensitivity, whilst the principles of operational independence and humanity dictate that aid should be driven by the needs of recipients rather than the foreign or national security objectives of the donor government. Conflict sensitivity is also largely consistent with (although rarely an explicit part of) many commonly applied humanitarian frameworks, especially those related to protection and accountability.

However, it is also largely accepted that in practice, much humanitarian assistance is delivered with insufficient attention paid to conflict dynamics. This is, at least in part, because adherence to the **humanitarian principles in complex and politically contested areas** requires difficult trade-offs and dilemmas, and in some instances, can highlight tensions between and within the humanitarian principles. The ways in which an agency manages these tensions can have important implications on the conflict sensitivity of their actions.

The principle of impartiality, for example, stipulates that aid should be provided on the basis of need alone. However, if access is denied to certain groups by a government or armed group, whilst being maintained to others who are none-the-less in need, then any assistance will inevitably impact on political (and conflict) dynamics, thereby contravening the principle of neutrality. The principles of humanity and neutrality, meanwhile, imply that agencies must be able to engage with all key groups, including conflict actors, in order to gain access to communities in need. This engagement should not benefit any group over another.

However, the very act of engaging with certain groups (e.g., some non-state armed groups) may confer upon them a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of communities and international actors. This group will inherently benefit disproportionately, since most governments are likely to already enjoy that status (at least in the eyes of international law). The legitimacy given to such a group may also give them a place at the table when negotiating peace agreements, thereby becoming a motivating factor for other groups to either take up violence and/or engage with international humanitarian groups as a way to boost their own legitimacy. This may improve access to the populations under their control, but also fuel a dynamic of violence.

In some contexts, there may also be tensions between the humanitarian principles and the practice of conflict sensitivity. Being conflict sensitive may for example require humanitarian actors to provide assistance to populations who do not strictly meet their needs-based criteria in order to avoid perceptions of partiality. This raises questions for agencies committed to a needs-based approach: are they happy to pay for assistance to less needy populations in order to avoid potentially causing harm in the longer term? As resources are finite and fall short of meeting global needs, this could mean someone potentially more in need somewhere else may have to go without.

Humanitarian agencies also face a number of **structural barriers** and challenges that can prevent them from effectively translating a desire to adopt conflict sensitivity into action. For example, relatively short funding cycles (often less than 12 months) create powerful incentives for programs to focus on short-term objectives, potentially at the expense of building long-term capacities of local stakeholders. Staff are also often under intense pressure to spend funds within allocated timeframes, potentially leading to rushed decisions, and disincentivizing staff from taking a more analytical, considered approach. Rapid turnover of staff in many humanitarian programs and frequent reliance on surge capacity meanwhile can limit the ability of staff to
develop a nuanced understanding of underlying conflict dynamics in focus countries, as well as undermining relationships with key local stakeholders. The extremely fast-moving nature of events in a post-disaster setting often means that time is not taken to develop that understanding of potential conflict triggers, leading to conflict insensitive planning.

A lack of access to many communities due to security concerns, and the continued tendency of humanitarian and development actors to operate in a 'siloed' fashion act as further barriers to more effective integration of conflict sensitivity into humanitarian programs. Equally, rigid or overly prescriptive program design and reporting templates can discourage flexibility and adaptability in programs, meaning they are not able to respond to changes in the context.

In recent years, several humanitarian actors have taken important steps aimed at better integrating conflict sensitivity into their work. The EU has invested in online and face-to-face training resources, and tailored guidance materials aimed at building capacity on conflict sensitivity for program staff, including a focus on humanitarian action. ECHO’s Resilience Marker meanwhile encourages EU-funded humanitarian programs to assess conflict risks alongside other hazards, take steps to avoid exacerbating tensions, build local capacities, and plan for long-term risk reduction. Other donors, including UK Department for International Development (DFID), Switzerland, and Canada, have also included conflict sensitivity in humanitarian partner selection processes and reporting templates, although this is not systematically applied. Swedish International Development Cooperation Authority (Sida), meanwhile, includes conflict sensitivity as a cross-cutting theme in their reporting of results across their humanitarian portfolio.

Multi-donor initiatives such as the ‘Grand Bargain’ aim to address other barriers that can inhibit conflict-sensitive humanitarian action, for example by encouraging greater local ownership of reconstruction efforts, promoting flexible implementation, and providing more predictable, longer term funds. Several INGOs have also developed light-touch or ‘good enough’ conflict analysis tools, designed to allow them to identify key conflict drivers and account for these in humanitarian programs. Others have sought to include conflict sensitivity capacity building into program designs, and to include both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in decision-making processes about where and how to target their assistance, so as to avoid inflaming tensions between groups.

**Conflict sensitivity within political and governance reform processes**

Governance reforms are often essential if reconstruction efforts are to contribute to improved disaster preparedness and resilience. Reconstruction efforts therefore often adopt a state-building focus, with a strong emphasis on supporting or reforming formal governance systems in the affected country or community. In post-conflict contexts, these efforts are both essential and extremely delicate—if managed poorly they can easily contribute to a resumption of violence. Interventions might include supporting implementation of peace processes, drafting and agreeing on a new constitution, decentralization of power, and electoral reform. Reconciliation and transitional justice mechanisms may also be important elements in such efforts.

These processes are, however, likely to be highly contested. For example, institutional reforms may be deeply resisted or captured and manipulated by elite groups in order to further their own objectives. Efforts to prosecute leaders for war crimes can easily derail peace processes. Any decision not to pursue them, however, can reinforce the grievances of victims and their communities. Furthermore, reparations and truth commissions can exacerbate perceptions of bias or feelings of victimhood amongst different groups.

If agencies are able to manage these tensions effectively, political reconstruction efforts can have a significant peace-building function. The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala for example, has helped to build confidence in anticorruption efforts and bring senior officials accused of war crimes to justice. The Gacaca courts in Rwanda meanwhile have helped to promote reconciliation and healing following the genocide
there. However, any such intervention is only likely to be effective if designed based on a detailed knowledge of underlying conflict issues, and implemented in a flexible and highly adaptive manner.

Conflict sensitivity is equally important in reconstruction efforts following a ‘natural disaster’. Governance reforms can be an important opportunity to address the underlying issues which made communities vulnerable to the impacts of those shocks in the first place (i.e., the issues that allowed a natural hazard to become a disaster). These issues are often deeply political in nature, having as much to do with how power is distributed in society (e.g., which groups control access to resources and to what ends) as with the technical capacity of institutions to manage and prepare for shocks.

There is a danger, however, that post-disaster governance reforms can be used to divert attention away from the political drivers of fragility toward a focus on primarily technical responses, such as rehabilitating infrastructure or the provision of training and materials for civil servants. Efforts may also focus excessively on working with the formal institutions of the state, whereas informal mechanisms (such as tribal councils or village elders) may enjoy significantly greater public legitimacy and support. It is important, however, to assess whether they are legitimate for all segments of the community, including women, and equally, the state institutions may be unresponsive to women’s needs. In a context in which the state is seen to be biased or in which its legitimacy is contested by certain groups, such strategies can risk reinforcing the pre-disaster status quo, thereby entrenching existing power imbalances and potentially exacerbating conflict dynamics.

For example, the Nepalese government-led and internationally supported reconstruction efforts following the 2015 earthquake have reinforced perceptions of corruption and marginalization in many of the worst-affected communities. Several vulnerable communities have reported feeling that they have been intentionally excluded from the benefits of reconstruction, thereby undermining the perceived legitimacy of the political system and the state in several areas. This is reinforcing several of the dynamics that fueled the countries’ 10-year civil war.

Of course, failure to support the rebuilding of government capacity may undermine the ability of the state to reestablish mechanisms and institutions necessary for future disaster preparedness. The challenge for international actors, therefore, is how to provide such support, whilst taking into account the potential impacts on conflict dynamics and empowering local people—from all segments of society, including women—to direct reconstruction efforts in line with their needs.

### Entry Points for Supporting More Conflict-Sensitive Reconstruction

Lessons from previous experiences of integrating conflict sensitivity into reconstruction efforts have highlighted several key entry points.

**Institutional collaboration, guided by conflict-sensitive strategies and policy objectives**

The actors and agencies involved in designing and implementing humanitarian and political reconstruction strategies typically operate under different organizational mandates, often pursue separate aims, work to different timeframes, and engage different stakeholders. Yet, they operate in the same country, and may form part of the same organizational system (such as the EU, UN, donor governments or large multi-mandated NGOs). Often, they are competing for the same funds, further undermining trust and collaboration. Coordination is therefore challenging. However, wide experience has shown that political tools and external assistance, including humanitarian support, must complement each other if they are to maximize opportunities to contribute to sustainable, peaceful change.

The EU’s comprehensive approach is one mechanism that is intended to help overcome this challenge, for example by promoting joined-up conflict analysis that draws on the perspectives of a diverse range of EU
institutions, and using this to ensure different institutions develop collaborative and mutually reinforcing strategies, and are working toward a common objective. Whilst there is still much work to be done, there are some encouraging signs that this may be contributing to more collaborative action across political, humanitarian, and development divides.

Better institutional collaboration does not, however, guarantee greater conflict sensitivity. Many donors and international organizations face strong pressures to direct international assistance toward responding to perceived threats to national security, e.g., by supporting repressive or autocratic regimes in order to prevent the flows of people, ideas, or goods from those countries from reaching donor shores. A ‘Comprehensive Approach’, different institutions from a single government or intergovernmental body working in close collaboration, may make such action more effective, but may also contribute to conflict in the focus country. In order to guard against such risks, it is essential that conflict sensitivity be seen as an overarching and guiding principle for all levels of reconstruction planning and implementation. This should include an objective setting, policy making, and strategy development, as well as project design and implementation.

**Recognizing and accepting appropriate levels of ambition**

Whilst collaboration is important, it is also important to recognize that different organizations will adopt different conceptions of conflict sensitivity. This will depend on factors such as their operational mandates and guiding principles, as well as their previous experience of, and confidence in engaging on conflict-related issues.

Humanitarian agencies are (generally speaking) more likely to adopt a 'minimalist' conception of conflict sensitivity; that is, one that emphasizes the avoidance of doing harm rather than proactively contributing to peace-building objectives. In large part, this is driven by a desire to avoid being seen to be straying into 'political' territory. Doing so may risk undermining the perceived impartiality of humanitarian actors, with potential implications for their ability to negotiate humanitarian access in highly restricted contexts. Conflict sensitivity is seen as being important to help them to achieve their primary objectives (maximizing humanitarian impact). However, any positive impacts of humanitarian actions are principally seen as 'incidental'.

Organizations with a focus on longer term political or economic reform are more likely to adopt a more 'maximalist' conception of conflict sensitivity; one in which their interventions actively seek to identify and address the underlying drivers of conflict and contribute toward conflict prevention or peace building. These organizations more readily accept that their interventions must impact upon political dynamics, and especially questions about where power lies, and how that power is exercised, if they are to contribute to sustainable, long-term change.

Recognizing and accepting that different organizations will adopt different levels of ambition in relation to their impact on conflict is therefore an important aspect of ensuring a coherent reconstruction strategy. It is also important not to place unrealistic expectation on agencies that are ill suited or unable to fully pursue a more maximalist approach to conflict sensitivity; encouraging agencies to work on conflict drivers without sufficient awareness of potential sensitivities risks exacerbating rather than easing tensions.

**Engaging and empowering local actors**

Ensuring that local people are actively empowered to take the lead in recovery and reconstruction efforts is widely accepted as being critical for ensuring efforts are sustainable over the medium to long term. However, too often internationally supported reconstruction efforts fail to adequately include local groups (including local civil society) in the design and planning of activities, preferring to see them as transactional ‘implementing partners’. Ownership and leadership of reconstruction efforts consequently remains with national governments or international actors.

This can be highly problematic from a conflict sensitivity perspective. It can reinforce perceptions that the state is either corrupt or unresponsive to the needs of local people (a common grievance in many conflict-
affected contexts), whilst strengthening narratives of exclusion and marginalization. Lack of engagement with local groups at the very earliest stages can also lead to interventions that are based on an incomplete or flawed understanding of local conflict dynamics, increasing the risk that they may either inadvertently exacerbate tensions between groups, or in some cases become more susceptible to manipulation by one party to a conflict.

It is imperative, therefore, that international action intentionally seeks to empower local people and groups to lead post-disaster reconstruction efforts if it is to avoid harm, and contributes to sustainable peace and development.

**Resilience as a possible entry point for promoting more conflict-sensitive reconstruction**

Much international action and discourse related to reconstruction is framed around the concept of ‘resilience strengthening’. Whilst there has been much criticism of this discourse, with several commentators raising concerns about whether it really brings anything new to the table, others have argued that it provides a useful entry point for breaking down silos between organizations, and can be used to encourage greater conflict sensitivity.

At the intergovernmental level, framing debates around ‘resilience’ rather than ‘fragility’ may, for example, be seen as a more acceptable entry point for discussions with governments, many of whom do not like to be considered ‘fragile’. At a more operational level, programs increasingly recognize that conflict undermines community resilience, e.g., by displacing communities, destroying assets, and undermining social cohesion. Any efforts to support community resilience therefore need to address conflict drivers in order to be effective. Framed in this way, resilience debates potentially open the door to a much greater focus on conflict prevention within international action, and consequently require conflict sensitivity as a minimum standard.

**Conclusion**

Conflict sensitivity should form an integral part of reconstruction efforts: from an immediate humanitarian response; through recovery activities, economic regeneration, and structural political and governance reform; and to longer term development. However, agencies working on different aspects of reconstruction are likely to face particular challenges related to integrating conflict sensitivity into action. Different types of organizations, for example, operate under very different operating principles and operating frameworks, whilst the pressures and incentives that agencies face are heavily influenced by where they sit within the reconstruction continuum. This diversity can bring significant strengths. Different organizations can offer highly complementary skills and experiences. Taken together, these can play an important role in supporting peace, for example by helping to address the multiple factors that contribute to conflict in any context.

However, it is also important to recognize that reconstruction efforts rarely follow a linear path—humanitarian needs must be met in parallel with governance reform processes, economic regeneration, or political reform processes. Agencies working on different aspects of reconstruction must therefore cohabit the same space, often at the same time. It is essential, therefore, that a common approach can be defined, one that maximizes synergies between different agencies, and contributes to sustainable peace over the long term, whilst recognizing and respecting the different legal frameworks and mandates that guide different types of agencies.

**Questions for Further Discussion**

In many ways, this is the fundamental challenge that international actors engaged in conflict-sensitive reconstruction activities must address. Whilst progress in this regard has been made, more is needed. Whilst there are no easy answers, some questions for agencies to consider as this debate continues may include:

- What more can we do to ensure that conflict sensitivity considerations are used to inform the political, strategic, and policy level discussions that guide overall approaches to reconstruction?
Are there fundamental tensions between the strict adherence to humanitarian principles and conflict-sensitive practice? For example, can humanitarian principles be adhered to in a conflict-sensitive manner when powerful actors are able to instrumentalize aid (e.g., by limiting access to certain communities) for their own conflict generating ends? How can these tensions be navigated?

How can local people be empowered to ensure that they are supported to genuinely lead reconstruction efforts (across the full spectrum of activities necessary)?

References

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Civil Protection as a Pillar for Disaster Resilience

OPENING REMARKS
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Background

Civil protection and disaster preparedness are core elements of the resilience of cities, communities, and nations around the world. The concept of civil protection was introduced for the first time in 1931 in the post-world war period, aiming to protect vulnerable civilian populations, historical monuments, and cultural assets. The concept has since then evolved, becoming “civil defense” or “civil security” in certain areas, and now includes the wider dimension of disaster preparedness.

In the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) 2015–2030, Priority 4 has expressed the need to further strengthen disaster preparedness for response and ensure that capacities are in place for effective response and recovery at all levels. However, the state of civil protection and disaster preparedness in the world is still characterized by difficulties that slow down the governments and other stakeholders’ performance, including: (i) the coexistence of diverse practices of civil protection based on geographic characteristics, governance structures, and levels of development; (ii) the use of different institutional mechanisms for civil protection having an (incidence) impact on the strengths or weaknesses of the civil protection structures; (iii) the lack of data, human, financial, material, and technical resources in numerous developing countries; and (iv) the marginal use of ex-ante bilateral and multilateral cooperation between governments and institutions and the lack of optimal coordination in post-disaster situations.

In this context, achieving the international commitments for civil protection and preparedness will require increased efforts from the governments and the international community.

The objective of the session was to provide an overview of the state of civil protection in a few sample countries and the relationship between preparedness and disaster resilience for incidents large and small, and to discuss the gaps to be filled in strengthening civil protection systems to enable them to fully play their roles and responsibilities in disaster resilience.

The key elements for the discussion were:

- Experience sharing of selected countries in using civil protection for disaster recovery and preparedness
- Identification of knowledge gaps to increase the understanding of the civil protection systems across the world
Civil Protection as a Pillar for Disaster Resilience.

- Evolution of the civil protection concept and consequences on the adoption of models based on countries, regions, political traditions, and governance characteristics
- Incidence of the adoption of specific institutional mechanisms on the strengths or weaknesses of civil protection structures
- Identification of sustainable remedies to address the general lack of data, human, and financial, material and technical resources in the civil protection services of developing countries (discussion from the government, donors, and private sector standpoints)
- Consequences for disaster resilience of the marginal use of bilateral and multilateral cooperation between governments and institutions in (forecasted) ex-ante events, and possible remedies
- Root causes for the lack of optimal coordination in humanitarian interventions, consequences for disaster resilience, and possible remedies
- Identification of optimal tools for policy design, implementation, coordination, and cooperation in civil protection and preparedness at the global and national levels.

**Summary of the Session**

By opening the session with a brief statement, GFDRR manager Francis Ghesquiere, stressed that after the emerging context of the concept between the two world wars, civil protection is today relevant in the world of civil conflicts and natural disasters. The typologies of civil protection systems are different from one country to another (for instance, Chile, Belgium, Mexico). He announces that to better understand the institutional diversity and the economic returns of investments in civil protection and preparedness, GFDRR will launch a global study on civil protection to analyze the different approaches, and to see how civil protection systems can be supported better by GFDRR and other partners. He invites governments, institutions, civil society, private sector, and other stakeholders to contribute to the study. The Lion Ready for Action Foundation will help to get the private sector involved.

The session began by a general presentation on the subject followed by questions addressed by the moderator/ the audience to the panelists.
The role of civil protection in disaster resilience has been analyzed in correlation with the legacy of humanity to future generations. Many scenarios about the future of humanity are being developed by scientists and non-scientists, mainly in optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. Unfortunately, the pessimistic scenarios are most prevailing due to four challenges that have a direct impact in the role and place of civil protection in disaster risk reduction and resilience:

1. demographic challenges with population growth (9.6 billion in 2050 and 19 billion in 2100);
2. economic challenges in terms of increasing competition and expansion for companies and industries, trade, and commerce;
3. environmental challenges related to availability and sustainability of resources, destruction of ecosystems; and
4. resilience challenges in terms of climate change, extreme weather events, natural and man-made disasters, sea-level rise, etc.

The conceptual evolution of civil protection since 1931 was largely commented about, with a semantic shift toward a more comprehensive concept of DRR around 1990, institutional diversification and insufficient relief, and recovery capacities in many countries. Many conferences, declarations, and action plans have been adopted and included public and private commitments. But mega disasters continue to strike indistinctively in many parts of the world, and small disasters as well, engendering many losses, damages, and impacts that are under evaluated. In this context, resilience to disasters is still hypothetical, and civil protection as the main force or capacity for disaster response is a key pillar for disaster resilience.

However, civil protection faces many gaps that negatively impact its mission on disaster resilience:

- lack of capacity to lead DRR policies
- inefficient coordination mechanisms of various stakeholders
- nonfunctionality of most of the consultative organs (platforms, commissions, committees, etc.)
- random funding mechanisms
- under-equipped and understaffed services
- lack of monitoring and information systems
- insufficient strategy for linking disaster relief to recovery and longer-term development.

The session sheds the light on key elements that need to be addressed to remove all the obstacles and fill the gaps that affect civil protection’s role as a pillar for disaster resilience:

The need for education, research, training, and awareness at national, local, and community levels which are the fundament of all problems. Learning from the past events is crucial for managing preparedness and recovery;

1. The value of coordination among actors, cooperation with the military and academies, public-private partnerships, consultation with communities, public involvement in participatory governance, updated information, and communication system that raise public trust;
2. The importance of having national standards, budget allocations to preparedness and prevention, strategies to ensure business and government continuity, and collective actions through regional approaches;

3. Everyday disaster preparedness is a building block through large-scale disaster resilience. Disaster response should be as local as possible and as international as necessary. People’s ability to respond and decide their priority for recovery need to be improved rather than their dependency on external aid; and

4. The importance of placing people at the heart of civil protection within the framework of their family, religion, culture, and nature and to build bridges between these different elements.

The Main Highlights from the panelists are the following:

**Mare Lo** has presented the general introduction to the session. He explored the state of civil protection in the world and its place in disaster resilience. While in the past civil protection was essentially focused on responses and emergency operations, nowadays the concept is much wider and is a pillar element of the value chain of disaster risk management. Building disaster resilience of communities and nations would be much easier by strengthening the intervention capacity if we accept that reducing vulnerabilities rooted in various factors is more difficult. The intervention capacity is mainly carried out by civil protection institutions which are at the heart of disaster resilience. Finally, he designed some elements of strategy to strengthen civil protection systems in the world.

**Cristian Vera** shared his country experiences of the last 10 years, fighting against an earthquake, wildfires, and floods in Chile where a substantial part of emergency personal are volunteers. In February 2010, an earthquake accompanied by a tsunami impacted the Chilean coast. It was the biggest tragedy since 1960. The system showed serious defects to manage this mega disaster. But now, after adjusting the coordination mechanisms and the volunteers’ involvement, civil protection is working right and is prepared.

**K. Harald Drager** highlighted the importance of education, information, communication, and lessons learnt that would be used for further development. He stressed that educational culture differs around the world even if we need to learn from each other. The International Emergency Management Society (TIEMS) is presently involved in a project about pandemics and epidemics, with an objective to see how to increase the public participation on governance and decision-making processes. This should be applied to civil protection to bring the individual to know how to take care of themselves and their families in times of disaster. It is important to adapt, to see how to improve educational systems, and how research can be brought back into education. He ended by sharing TIEMS’ experience in India and China in terms of cooperation with a military and academia, communication, resource mobilization, and public-private partnership.

**Johannes Luchner** stated that the notion of civil protection as civil defense is becoming stronger again. EU Framework makes it easier. In Europe, there is a greater variety of civil protection systems and definitions. For instance, there is civil protection mostly consisting of volunteers in many countries, and in others, there is protection mostly made up by the military. There can be competition between the civil protection and foreign affairs in terms of cooperation. Depending on the status of federal states or unitary states, the civil protection capacity is at the regional level for the first and at the central level for the second. In face of this diversity, EU promotes patience and consultations to talk to each other. EU budget allocates more than 50 percent on preparedness and prevention. The response is important but is much more expensive. Furthermore, within the regional approach, it is no longer embarrassing for a country to manage a disaster alone if the process becomes collective. EU has modules and equipment that can be used from diverse member states and many states have changed their national law in that perspective. This shows that integration is a slow process, but disasters are good opportunities to accelerate integration. And nowadays, unfortunately, terrorism has also made countries realize that they won’t be able to cope alone in the long term.
Stephen Schwartz mentions that 7 years ago, a customer returned 3,000 sets of gears after using them for several years. They did not want them to go to waste. They decided to give them to communities that needed them, in Latin America and Eastern Europe, among others. The question is not only about the equipment but also about the training. Responding to everyday disasters by having a strong local emergency service contributes to economic growth. For instance, a fire in Borneo affected a commercial center which led to losses for small businesses at the local level. There is not enough data on this subject, and therefore the private sector would be happy to be a collaborator on a GFDRR global study on civil protection. The Lion Ready for Action Foundation will help bring data to the study on these issues, along with other private sector collaborators.

Laura Olson illustrated that we are professionalizing more and more civil protection in the international community. But in each institution, it is important to take charge not only of the organization’s recovery mission, but also the culture of the people on the ground. When we forget to take agencies and culture into consideration, we build recovery projects that fail. She gave the example of Lions Village in Thailand, abandoned because the recovery project did not take into consideration culture. Another successful example is in Afghanistan on drought, in which the communities talked about the design of the program and were asked what they expected. They would not accept charity, had pride in their own agricultural knowledge, and understood who was vulnerable and in need on their community. It gave them ownership and self-sufficiency. Technical support was not required, it was offered. This shows the importance of bottom-up strategies, and issues of voices, cultural inclusion, and participation.

Zdravko Maksimović described the civil protection system in Serbia from the national level that handles emergency situations to the local level responsible for local affairs, especially for the city of Kraljevo. The experience in Kraljevo began in 2010 after an earthquake. The key of their success is hidden in the approach, which follows the steps of identification of key factors such as reducing risks of natural disasters, climate change, infrastructure, and human factors. Human factors residing into ignorance and lack of training are the major problem. To manage this problem, cities and municipalities in the basin region for the first time signed a protocol of cooperation. NGOs also signed a protocol, and they hope the private sector will sign a protocol as well. They worked with local communities, private companies, preschools, and schools. They organized trainings, exams, and exercises. Civil protection needs knowledge and skills, awareness, and the conscience of communities.

Mark Cox emphasized that it’s only with longer term development that emergency services can be part of a larger emergency framework for disaster response. Today, the most advanced firefighters are provided with a wider range of skills and equipment. A simplistic approach to civil protection is that the provision of equipment solves the issue, but that is not the case. The civil protection capacity of a country is hugely dependent on the system to support it. Lack of a system to maintain the equipment, and a simplistic and uncoordinated approach by donor agencies undermine the capacities. In many countries, the civil protection services are almost revered by the populations they serve; this is the case in France. The development of the relationship between effective civil protection services coupled with support from the public they serve can have a direct bearing on the resilience of the communities.

Discussions
Responding to the questions raised by the moderator and the audience, the panelist clarified that:

- Civil protection is not focused on lives only but also on assets (cultural heritage, public infrastructure), and can do what humanitarians cannot do (for instance in Haiti). Also, industrial accidents are outside humanitarian domain;
- For institutional arrangements, in many countries in and Africa, civil protection is a unique agency responsible for all the phases of disaster risk management attached to the cabinet of the prime minister.
This approach has been recommended in Sendai Framework for DRR.

- Regarding the use of social networks in case of disasters, many examples have been shared by panelists, especially the development of an application in France during the terrorist attack. In Germany, the government developed an application borrowed by Austria. These tools serve to raise population awareness. In the United States, there is an application to mobilize the volunteers to act quickly. In South Korea, the use of technologies, social networks, and high tech is very developed in early warning systems and information sharing between communities and civil protection agency. In the United Kingdom, over the last ten years, fire is reduced by 40 percent using social media. But the importance is to put more research into how we can digest the messages and use them in a constructive way.

- About the involvement of emergency response groups in risk reduction promotion, in Nepal, the response team is never involved in risk reduction, but in UK the civil protection is a fundamental part of DRR. Fire stations are now called “community fire stations.” They are now open to the public.

- Relative to international aid, the misunderstanding between needs of the country and aid delivery results from the fact that often assistance is sent before the assessment of the needs on the ground is done. But sometimes, the situation of the market destroyed and the fund available to buy the equipment needed can explain this mismatch. However, the stronger the community infrastructures are, the stronger the assessment and aid received can be.

- In terms of bilateral and multilateral cooperation, in many countries, civil protection is organized as a military service, part of state sovereignty, and many donors do not like to intervene in this field.

- But with GFDRR involvement, we may have new mechanisms to leverage funding from diverse partners. However, we need to have more economic evidence that a civil protection type of intervention is effective. Perhaps the study that the Bank will be launching soon could be an opportunity to convince donors to add money to civil protection.

- Regarding the protection of civilians in the process of reconstruction and resilience in CAR, we can apply civil protection principles in this context using humanitarian organizations or UN agencies present in the field. On their own initiative, communities can be organized in associations and networks to develop preparedness and civil protection principles in case of post-conflict and reconstruction situations. The European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) has a budget line on small projects for DRR in any country to help communities at the local level to build this type of system.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, it is possible to reverse the pessimistic scenarios of the legacy of humanity by ensuring better protection of communities and assets, and prevention of disasters and conflicts, climate change, environmental degradation, and demographic explosion. By exploring more comprehensively the civil protection systems, finding the gaps and strengthening the mechanisms, we will contribute to better guarantee the place and role of civil protection in disaster resilience. The GFDRR global study will better inform the policies, strategies, and investments in civil protection around the world.

The wide variety of civil protection typologies in the world is the combined result of the conceptual evolution to DRR; the increase of disasters in nature, frequency, and intensity; and the history, tradition, and governance styles of countries and regions. This variety is a richness that would feed the design of a worldwide standard model of institutional arrangement that each country could tailor and adapt to its context.

The development of cooperation, participation, partnership, communication, and investment in civil protection and preparedness is crucial for disaster resilience. The capitalization of lessons learnt and best international practices from appropriate countries with strong or perfect civil protection organizations would help to inform and strengthen the civil protection systems in the world where the mechanisms are still weak, inefficient, or unorganized.
Policies and Institutional Arrangements for Recovery

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Session Summary
The session on *Policies and Institutional Arrangements for Recovery* brought together high-level representatives of four national governments to deliberate on the options for institutional arrangements, policies, and systems for coordination and monitoring recovery processes. The government representatives shared their experiences in setting up institutions, defining the mandate and role of the institution in managing recovery. The session also elaborated on policies or directives that supported the institution and guided the recovery process. The discussions in the session were informed by institutions and policies for recovery based on best practices and lessons from several countries.
Questions/Challenges Discussed in the Session

The panel members were requested to share their country-level experiences based on the following questions:

- How have the institutional arrangements for recovery been developed in countries? What are the systems and practices related to recovery and how did they help in making the recovery process more effective?
- What are the policies and directives drafted to support the functioning of the institution and implementation of recovery? What are the key elements of these policies and directives?
- How are the governments providing financial support for implementing recovery programs? What are the other sources of financial support for recovery?
- How is recovery being pursued within the government; how is it planned and implemented? How do they relate to the DRR system of the country?
- How do we see more preparedness for recovery in terms of capacities, systems, and financial mechanisms?

Background

Between 2005–2015, disasters left approximately 23 million people homeless with an economic loss of US$1.7 trillion. The trend in economic losses is predicated to rise as more and more people choose to move to cities living in shoddily constructed houses and civic amenities that do not serve the growing population. As disasters strike countries repeatedly, they destroy houses, disrupt basic services, and cause loss of livelihoods. Millions of dollars are spent in recovery and reconstruction. This draws attention to the quality of recovery and reconstruction undertaken, as well the systems and processes set up to ensure that the recovery process does not recreate risks, but rather builds back better. The inclusion of recovery as Priority 4 of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015–30) is a clear recognition of the importance of recovery as an opportunity to Build Back Better through safer infrastructure, resilient livelihoods, stronger governance systems, better early warnings and improved preparedness of the governments and communities to manage disaster risks.

Lessons from large-scale recovery programs show that recovery would be implemented more successfully when institutions, policies, personnel, and finance are already a part of the Disaster Risk Reduction systems in the country or are set up soon after the disaster to lead recovery processes. However, at present, the general level of preparedness and capacities for recovery remains rather limited in most countries. Governments generally set up institutions and policies for recovery in response to a large disaster event and use existing institutions to respond to smaller events. Some of the institutions are dismantled after the recovery program is completed while some others take on a larger role of strengthening disaster risk reduction systems in the country.

As countries experience disasters frequently and people are more aware of their rights to recovery, greater demand has been placed on the governments to enhance their capacities to manage recovery. In response to this demand, governments are placing greater emphasis on being better prepared by strengthening institutional capacity, adopting supportive policies, and securing resources for recovery. The imperative for the government to establish an institution following a large-scale disaster is to take responsibility and provide leadership for recovery taking place within its geographical boundaries. Recovery can generally take over 5–10 years depending on the scale of the disaster. Recovery is implemented by multiple actors and will require strong coordination to ensure there is equity in providing assistance and no duplication of efforts. An institution with the mandate of recovery can bring together the competing agendas of multiple actors engaged in recovery and can pursue a coherent agenda in a timely manner. Therefore, in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, governments determine the institutional set up and its mandate, and select credible leaders to steer the recovery process.

Overview of institutional arrangements on recovery: Post-disaster experience reveal a range of institutional options to lead recovery. The decisions on the most suitable option and institution for a specific country context is usually based on the scale of the disaster; current government structure and political priorities; capacities of institutions to manage recovery processes; and the scale of recovery operations and funds available for recovery.

Institutional options for recovery: There are three major options for institutional arrangements for recovery. The first option is to strengthen existing institutions and structures within the government to lead the recovery. This arrangement relies on sector and line ministries to plan and implement their own recovery process with reconstruction funds flowing through their normal budgetary process. The line ministry through its staff at the subnational level implements recovery and reconstruction for its own sector and reports back to the national government. An example of use of this option was the post-tsunami recovery in the Tamil Nadu state of India which devolved authority through the State Revenue Commissioner to the district authorities to carry out recovery and reconstruction activities. The critical considerations for the success of this option were the prior experience of the district authorities in management of large scale operations, management and coordination skills, technical expertise in post-disaster reconstruction processes, and capacity to cope with additional demands of work for extended periods of time. In the case of Tamil Nadu, several temporary but additional staff were provided to support the district authorities in implementing recovery and flexibility in decision making, procurement, etc., which facilitated a timely and effective recovery.

The second option is to create a new agency for recovery and reconstruction. In countries where local government offices and its assets were destroyed and its officials were affected by the disaster, the national governments may make a decision to set up a new institution to lead the recovery. This institution has the legal mandate of authority to plan, coordinate the implementation, and monitor the overall recovery efforts. An institution with a specific mandate has several advantages. The first is that it has a single focus with a clear mission, and second it has dedicated capacities and a budget to do its job. With the legal mandate comes the authority to coordinate not only all national stakeholders but also all international stakeholders. This institution becomes one central point of coordination and oversight for the recovery and therefore reduces the transaction costs. The accountability for the recovery work lies with one institution. The disadvantages of a dedicated and new institution are the lack of ownership by the line ministries and lack of recognition for its mandate and authority, unless the institution has the full political backing of the highest elected office in the country. Additionally, such an institution, unless it has a designated end date, could over time take over functions from existing ministries and departments and thus weaken existing structures.

There are several examples of special institutions established for recovery. The Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR) in Indonesia, set up following the 2004 tsunami is one such institution which was internationally recognized as a best practice. The Wolfensohn Center for Development in the 2008 report on post-tsunami aid effectiveness in Aceh says “the creation of a single agency, in the form of BRR, to coordinate the Government's response, together with the pooling of funds by donors into a Multi Donor fund, had direct and significantly positive effects on coordination.” BRR had a four-year mandate and at the end of this duration it handed over responsibility to local governments and line ministries. BRR, over the four years of its mandate, implemented a recovery program of the value of USD 6.7 billion and coordinated the efforts of 900
organizations. A similar institution was the Task Force to Rebuild the Nation (TAFREN) in Sri Lanka, which was set up after the tsunami and later dismantled. The work was taken over by the newly established National Disaster Management agency. Odisha and Gujarat states in India set up State Disaster Mitigation Authorities following the super cyclone in 1999 and the earthquake in 2001. These two institutions continue today with a larger role in disaster management. Similarly, after the 2005 earthquake, Pakistan set up the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) with a mandate to undertake all reconstruction activities. All these agencies brought about greater coherence at the level of policy and programs, channeled available funds, and provided oversight for implementation.

The third option is to establish a hybrid institutional model. Under such institutional arrangements, existing government structures are strengthened through the creation of temporary agencies or units to support the recovery process. These units, referred to as Project Management Units (PMUs), draw on existing staff from various line ministries and departments, and once the recovery is completed, they go back to their original institutions. Project management units or project implementation units are set up within an existing ministry with the task of implementing recovery. These units have the necessary technical expertise to budget, plan, implement, and monitor recovery. Such institutions have the advantage of benefiting from established systems and mechanisms, and work with higher capacities to deliver on the mandate of recovery. A drawback of the PMU is that, as the unit is disbanded, the capacities, experience, and knowledge gained is lost.

Factors that contribute to an effective recovery institution: There are several factors that contribute to the successful recovery institution. Some of these are elaborated below.

- **The recovery agency must have a clear mandate and adequate powers** to implement its mandate. The institution must be set up by government regulation, ratified by law, and endorsed by the highest political office in the government. Legislation should clearly codify functions and authorities of the implementing institution(s), clarify funding mechanisms and the duration of the institution. A strong legal foundation gives the institution the legitimacy to engage with ministries and departments, as well as with international donors, private sector partners, local NGOs, and the civil society. It is also critical that the structure of the institutions is well thought through and provides the necessary managerial, financial, procurement, and technical capacities to plan and implement recovery. The credibility of the institution lies in its ability to deliver on its mandate, and therefore it is necessary to create the right structure and positions within to deliver on its mandate.

- **Leadership plays a crucial role in defining the organizational culture of the institution. A recovery institution is empowered through an experienced and strong leadership.** This is particularly important for a newly established institution which is seeking to find its place among the other more experienced government ministries. The leadership of a recovery institution must be able to raise the profile of the institution and assert its role and function in the reconstruction process. The leader should overcome institutional barriers and embrace partnerships. S/he should be able to resolve organizational conflicts, mediate between competing interests, and guide different stakeholders toward one common objective. For a person to be able to do this, s/he should be impartial, have a sense of integrity, and have a reputation of being honest. The leader should have skills to lead an inclusive recovery process that brings together the institutions, authorities, and affected people. The leader should be able to mobilize resources and have the reputation of being able to deliver results on programs of very high financial value while maintaining accountability and transparency.

- **Recovery institutions must have the best technical staff and attract skills with competitive compensation.** For a post-disaster recovery operation, it is necessary to ensure that human resources policy allows to
hire the most capable professional for the job. Hiring of staff should be done based on capacities and not on seniority. One option is to draw officials with right skills and expertise from line ministries. Another option is to source technical experts from international agencies, private sectors, academia, and civil society. The recovery institution can benefit significantly from recruiting experts from the private sector, from international agencies, and from the academia. These “external” experts can bring good practices into the institution. In most large recovery efforts, the teams have been staffed with an equal or more number of staff from external institutions. However, it is necessary in these cases to establish reporting lines to the lead agency so that they are accountable to the host institution.

- **Recovery institutions require a wide range of technical expertise and skills to plan, implement, and monitor recovery.** Given the huge volume of reconstruction of infrastructure done following a disaster, the most obvious technical skills required are those of engineers. These engineering skills could range from civil engineers, to structural engineers for earthquake recovery, or hydrological engineers for flood recovery. The engineering skills will depend on the type of disaster. A second set of technical experts are architects, and urban and rural planners. In areas affected by landslides, experts in geology and volcanologists for mapping risks of a volcanic eruption are needed. In addition, these highly skilled technical experts, social scientists, environment experts, disaster risk management experts, community organizers, coordination and information management specialists, communication specialists, experts in conducting assessments, and GIS experts should be part of the recovery institution. A recovery institution’s function will also include managers of programs and managers of finance. The organigram of a typical recovery institution will have an engineering unit, a management and planning unit, coordination and communication units, and an operations unit providing support with finance and human resources.

- **The recovery institution should be decentralized with flexibility in decision making and functioning devolved to the local levels.** Being closer to the disaster site enables the institution to be more responsive to the needs of the affected communities. The central-level agency may be responsible for policy making, resource mobilization, and coordination at the national level; it is at the local level where decisions should be taken on implementation. Thus, while establishing institutions at the national level, it is important that functions of implementation, coordination, finance, procurement, and delivery are also mirrored at the local level. However, while devolving these functions to the local level, some safeguards to ensure that due diligence has been met should be retained.

- **Recovery institutions should maintain a strong sense of urgency through the entire reconstruction effort.** Recovery is not business as usual; the recovery institution and its partners must adapt their processes and functioning to a “crisis mode” so that they deliver quickly. To ensure speedy delivery, some procurement processes may be modified, and routine project approval processes may be modified. This will accelerate implementation of recovery programs. An emphasis on speed and quick decision making with a flexible approach to internal procedures enables quicker execution, which is an essential element of successful recovery.

- Recovery is an inclusive process and is implemented jointly with many partners. A single government institution cannot implement recovery. The civil society, NGOs, the private sector, international agencies, professional associations, and the local community groups contribute to the recovery process. **An effective recovery institution is one that can coordinate the multiple actors and drive the agenda for recovery.** Each agency brings with them skills, expertise, and resources which can be harnessed for recovery. Civil society and nongovernmental organizations have often very strong links with communities and can play a role in encouraging community participation in implementing recovery. Local community groups and affected communities have the local knowledge and expertise and can provide local solutions to problems. The coordination mechanism established by the recovery institution should promote an interface between the affected communities and the decision makers to facilitate quick redressal of
grievances, and incorporate local knowledge and practices into recovery and accountability to the
affected communities. International agencies and professional associations provide technical expertise
and resources which can be channeled toward planning reconstruction and recovery programs.

Policy for recovery: One of the first steps of a government while embarking on a recovery is the development of
a policy that clearly states the government’s intent and commitment for recovery. The recovery policy generally
provides information on provisions and standards for recovery and therefore, in many ways, provides a guideline
implementing recovery. Recovery policies lay down the guiding principles, priorities, approaches to sectoral
recovery, and implementation modalities for recovery and reconstruction programs. They are a statement of
intent and establish the scope of government assistance for recovery. Recovery policies are generally developed
after a disaster, as was done by Indonesia for tsunami recovery; Gujarat in India after the earthquake in 2001;
and Nepal following the earthquake in 2015. Each of the policies mentioned here has its unique features and
does not necessarily follow a common structure; however, there are certain common elements in all the recovery
policies and they are elaborated below.

Recovery vision and principles: Several recovery policy documents begin with a vision statement which communicates
the result of the recovery process. The vision is often an articulation of the aspiration of the government and people
and often aims high to achieve the well-being of people through the process of recovery and reconstruction.
For example, the recovery vision in the Indonesia master plan for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction for Aceh
is to "realize an Acehnese community that is advanced, fair, peaceful and prosperous." In addition to the vision,
recovery policies establish the broad principles for recovery. These principles strive to emphasize the core values
that will be upheld in the recovery and reconstruction process. The most common principles in recovery policies
underscore inclusiveness, nondiscrimination in selection of beneficiaries, people's participation, addressing the
needs of the most vulnerable, designing reconstruction of houses aligned to local culture and designs, promotion
and use of local materials and local knowledge, and the application of principle of Build Back Better for risk
reduction in reconstruction.

Objectives of recovery: Recovery policies state the objectives of recovery which generally cover four broad areas:
the reconstruction of all public infrastructure and houses, the restoration of economy including the livelihoods
of households, the restoration of socio-cultural practices and community services, and the strengthening of
disaster risk reduction systems in the country.

Sector recovery strategies: The sector recovery strategies in a policy are less detailed but the approach to the
key sectors of recovery is outlined. Housing reconstruction is treated as an important sector, and therefore
the recovery policy provides the overall approach to housing reconstruction, which covers issues such as
the eligibility for receiving housing assistance, the financial and technical support given to beneficiaries, and
modalities for construction of housing. Similar guidelines for reconstruction of all public infrastructure are
provided. Other important elements of the sector recovery strategy include addressing cross-cutting issues of
environment, gender and social inclusion; land use plans; and disaster risk reduction.

Implementation strategies: Although less detailed, the recovery policy touches upon key elements of the
implementation which defines the roles of various stakeholders in recovery. The implementation strategy
lays out the process for implementation and the principles of participation for all stakeholders engaged in the
process. It speaks clearly to the role of the government, the private sector, NGOs, the international community
including the diaspora, the media, and the affected communities. The recovery policy also expresses the intent
to establish mechanisms for grievance redressal, measures to ensure an accountable and transparent process in
use of finance, and reporting and monitoring mechanisms.
Conclusion

Government capacities in large disasters are stretched due to the numerous demands placed on them. In many cases, the existing laws and policies and institutional set-up are not adequate to address the complex issues that come up in recovery processes. Issues such as relocation and resettlement of communities, the assistance to communities, the processes for procurement, the management of donor funds, and contributions made by the civil society are often not reflected within existing policies. Furthermore, national and local governments may not have the capacities, and therefore are often not prepared nor authorized to undertake the huge task of recovery and reconstruction affected by the disaster.

The post-disaster context provides the incentive and opportunity for the government to review the existing disaster risk management system, and revise it to address the gaps in policies and institutions.

Recovery is an expensive undertaking, which uses high financial and human resources. It is a long process and requires deliberate planning and expertise. Given the context of increased risks and limited financial resources, it is important that recovery is planned ahead with institutional arrangements and policies which are developed prior to the disaster rather than after the disaster while simultaneously implementing recovery. As countries face disasters, they should be able to make improvements in the disaster management systems incrementally and be better prepared for the next large recovery process.

The mandate of the recovery agency should be established through a legal basis and be specific with well-defined roles and responsibilities. It is critical that the lead agency for recovery enjoys autonomy, has full administrative and financial powers, and is empowered power to make quick decisions without necessarily going back to the government. It should have the full confidence of the highest authorities in the government. Funds approval and disbursal through the recovery agency will ensure that the agency commands authority over all implementing ministries.

The leadership of the recovery agency should be officials selected based on their reputation for honesty and ability to deliver on their mandates. If necessary, staff may be brought in from the private sector as was done in Serbia to ensure efficiency and quick delivery. The recovery agency should be given the flexibility to hire staff and consultants, and bring technical expertise when required from external agencies.

Finally, the institutional arrangements for recovery should be supported with a policy which stipulates the assistance that affected people can expect from the government. The policy should provide the guidelines and standards for recovery and reconstruction of sectors. Additionally, the recovery policy must be able to provide the framework for accountability, monitoring, and commitment to a people-centered recovery process that would lead to building the capacities of communities and prepare them better for future disasters.

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Cultural Heritage—an Engine for Social Recovery

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Session Summary
This session shed light on the impact of armed conflicts and disasters on culture and on ways in which this affects the resilience of the concerned communities. It also discussed the benefits of including a concern for culture, in both its physical and intangible manifestations, in recovery efforts through relevant examples, touching as well on the potential of new technologies. Moreover, the session highlighted the importance of protecting cultural heritage, as critical infrastructure closely associated with people's identities and a major driver of local sustainable development. It showcased how the integration of cultural heritage in reconstruction efforts is essential to strengthen the ability of communities and their properties to resist, absorb, and recover from the effects of natural or human-made hazards, and to promote inclusive and cohesive societies in the aftermath of conflicts. In doing so, the objective was to create an enhanced understanding, among the audience, of the value of culture in strengthening resilience and facilitating recovery, notably when embedded in physical reconstruction processes and urban planning.

Main Highlights

- **Sameh Wahba** stressed the fundamental role of culture and heritage for sustainable development. He underlined that when planning for post-conflict reconstruction, cities need to be understood not only as urban fabric but living space, whose populations need to be considered. Drawing on examples such as Seoul and Istanbul, Mr. Wahba showed how urban planning strategies for reconstruction or regeneration that take cultural heritage into account create more livable cities that support economic and social development.

- **Amra Hadzimuhamedovic** highlighted how the destruction of cultural heritage affects not only the urban landscapes of a country but also represents a loss for the affected populations. She added that, as such, the physical recovery of heritage can support the reconciliation of communities and sustainable peace. According to Ms. Hadzimuhamedovic this was the case in Mostar, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, where the reintegration of communities was a priority in reconstruction.

- **Glafkos Costantinides** and **Mr. Ali Tuncay** illustrated the case of the Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage in Cyprus, which uses cultural heritage as a tool to rebuild confidence and trust between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, by jointly addressing the challenges affecting their
common heritage. They also explained how joint projects at the local community level in Cyprus have had an impact on economic development at the national level, by identifying appropriate and sustainable uses for neglected historic buildings, increasing tourist activities, and generating income.

- **El-Boukhari Ben Essayouti** described the importance of artisanship and the resulting income for Timbuktu, Mali. Following the city’s occupation by extremist groups in 2012 and their destruction of shrines and manuscripts, local communities were highly involved in the reconstruction of the destroyed monuments, and Mr. Ben Essayouti underlined how this supported the creation of a dialogue between religions at the city level.

- **Brigadier General Fabrizio Parrulli** presented the experience of the recently established Italian Task Force for the safeguarding of cultural heritage in emergencies. He shared his personal impressions of rescuing cultural heritage assets following the 2016 earthquake in Italy, emphasizing in particular the measures adopted to address the concerns of local communities, for which these assets where highly symbolic.

- **Rohit Jigyasu** emphasized the impact of the earthquake in Nepal in 2015 on the country’s economy and on the local communities impacted by the destruction of their cultural heritage. He highlighted, in particular, the role of traditional knowledge in reconstruction as well as the opportunities provided by reconstruction to revive traditional knowledge. In this context, he stressed the need for enhanced preparedness to disasters as well as better coordination between heritage professionals and organizations specializing in post-disaster relief as part of Disaster Risk Management policies and practices.

- **Yves Ubelman** underlined the potential of new technologies in supporting the recovery of cultural heritage in emergency situations through the work he had recently undertaken in Syria and Iraq. He also showed how new technologies can be used to support the social recovery of people affected by conflict or disaster, notably by providing alternative means of accessing their cultural heritage and thereby enjoying their cultural rights.

**Introduction**

Cultural heritage and cultural expressions have increasingly become the direct targets of systematic and deliberate attacks in numerous conflicts around the world. Culture is particularly vulnerable to collateral damage, looting, and intentional destruction, which is often paired with the persecution of individuals based on their cultural, ethnic, or religious affiliation, the violation of their cultural rights, and the denial of their identities. Out of 81 World Heritage Properties in the Arab States Region, 21 are listed as in danger, 17 of which are due to conflict.

In countries such as Iraq, Mali, and Syria, extremist groups are applying a deliberate strategy aimed at eradicating cultural diversity. This involves the persecution of peoples and groups on the basis of their cultural and religious identity, including by intentionally targeting their material cultural references—such as shrines, monuments, sites, museums and their artifacts, libraries and archives. Also targeted were schools and other places of knowledge, and even teachers, intellectuals, and religious leaders. It also includes preventing people from practicing their intangible cultural heritage, including religious rituals, and from exercising their cultural rights. Such strategies has been termed ‘cultural cleansing’ by UNESCO’s Director-General Irina Bokova.

Cultural heritage, both tangible and intangible, is also increasingly affected by disasters around the world, triggered by both natural and human-induced hazards. As the number of disasters is growing, with more exposure and vulnerabilities caused by urban and demographic expansion, so is the impact on cultural landmarks, sites, and museums. Since 2014, UNESCO has supported eight Post-Disaster Needs Assessments (PDNA) in the culture sector in response to earthquakes, cyclones, flooding, and other hazards, in the framework of joint EU/UN/World Bank exercises.
similar integration of culture within post-conflict RPBA exercises is equally necessary. The loss of cultural heritage following a disaster severely increases the vulnerability of communities by undermining their collective resilience and potential for sustainable recovery, including in terms of economic development. It is becoming increasingly evident that heritage represents both an asset to be protected and a resource to strengthen the ability of communities and their properties to resist, absorb, and recover from the effects of natural or human-made hazards.

In this regard, the appropriate conservation of the historic and natural environment, including cultural landscapes, and the safeguarding of relevant traditional knowledge, values, and practices, in synergy with other scientific knowledge, enhances the resilience of communities to disasters, including by fostering their social cohesion, self-esteem, and confidence in the future.

In the context of ongoing and future recovery efforts in Aleppo, Mosul, Timbuktu, Kathmandu, and other cities affected by armed conflict and/or disasters, the question of the role of culture, and particularly heritage, in the larger reconstruction process has increasingly become the subject of debate. It is argued, in this respect, that integrating the consideration of the cultural context in the planning of and actual recovery, particularly in areas of significant ethnic and religious diversity, is essential to strengthen resilience, foster stability, and lay the conditions for sustainable peace and social cohesion.

The technical session entitled “Cultural Heritage—An Engine for Social Recovery” will thus shed light on the impact of armed conflicts and disasters on culture and on ways in which this affects the resilience of the concerned communities. It will also discuss the benefits of including a concern for culture and in both its physical and intangible manifestations and in recovery efforts through relevant examples, touching as well on the potential of new technologies.

The role of cultural heritage for social recovery and the actions undertaken by the international community

The safeguarding of culture strengthens resilience and fosters social cohesion for a more sustainable recovery. Culture and heritage, as expressions of peoples’ identity and repositories of memory and traditional knowledge, are essential components of a community's identity and social capital. Promoting respect for cultural diversity is fundamental to preventing violent extremism, generating positive dialogue and inclusion, and fostering lasting peace.

The significance of culture in the lives of communities and individuals makes its continuity a powerful tool for building resilience, serving as a basis for sustainable recovery. Likewise, the rehabilitation of heritage can contribute toward healing the scars of war and disasters by allowing communities to recover a sense of hope, dignity, and empowerment. Whether as part of local or large-scale public efforts, culture plays a central role in overcoming trauma and in rebuilding communities. This can include the creation of memorials or commemorations but also includes the physical reconstruction of the heritage that has been lost.

The ultimate objective of protecting cultural heritage is to safeguard the living culture of humanity and preserve human rights and dignity, and the rights of past and future generations. It is thus essential to help rebuild communities following disasters, as well as to recognize the intentional destruction and violation of cultural rights as aggravating factors in armed conflict, representing major obstacles to dialogue, future peace, and reconciliation.

Building on its more than 70 years of experience, UNESCO, with the support of its partners, intends to concretely reinforce its primary mission, that is “building the defenses of peace in the minds of men and women” through culture, and thus demonstrate its extraordinary potential to contribute to peace and security. In doing so, and in particular by linking the protection of cultural heritage to cultural rights, such as access to culture and the enjoyment of culture, UNESCO supports the affected communities’ resilience and facilitates their recovery.
In the wake of the earthquake on January 12, 2010, the Haitian city of Jacmel, designated UNESCO Creative City in 2014, has invested in its renewal by promoting its culture, traditions, art, and crafts. The Carnival of Jacmel, known for its creativity and exceptional originality, was the starting point for the creative development of the city—its painting, sculpture and giant papier-mâché masks anchored in local traditions are a source of meaning and belonging—and also provide concrete job opportunities and improves livelihoods for the entire community. Every year the carnival brings together craft artists in collaboration with many professional crafts and folk-art associations. In an effort to facilitate the population’s access to culture following the earthquake, UNESCO also supported theatre activities in camps for internally displaced persons throughout Haiti that made reference to local traditions.

In Timbuktu, Mali, UNESCO, with the financial support of Switzerland, the EU, Norway, the Netherlands, and MINUSMA, collaborated with the government and local communities to complete the reconstruction of 14 of the 16 mausoleums inscribed on the World Heritage List, which were deliberately destroyed by violent extremist groups in 2012. A consecration ceremony was held in February 2016 to celebrate the revival of the city’s invaluable heritage. The rehabilitation of Timbuktu’s destroyed heritage served to ensure the continuity of the city’s ancient cultural traditions as well as to commemorate and overcome, as a community, the traumatic experience of its loss.
UNESCO’s planned construction of the Bamiyan Cultural Centre in Afghanistan will promote cross-cultural understanding and cultural diversity, serving as a public space for civil society and the general public to engage in the cultural life of the valley, support the work of local artists, and enjoy handicraft training and shops, thereby creating jobs and generating income. With the restoration of historic sites in Bamiyan, the communities are once again able to enjoy their cultural rights and build on the Cultural Centre’s support of artistic and cultural processes, with the institution serving as a platform to connect the public with Afghan cultural past traditions and contemporary practices. As a city recovering from the disastrous effects of conflict, Bamiyan thrives on its cultural resources: the city is a member of the UNESCO Creative Cities Network and organizes annual cultural festivals such as Silk Road, Buzkahshi, and Food Festival. It also attracts the highest number of national tourists in Afghanistan.

Amongst others, the EU is supporting a comprehensive UNESCO project for the “Emergency Safeguarding of the Syrian Cultural Heritage” that aims at contributing to “restoring social cohesion, stability and sustainable development.” Other examples of EU interventions aimed at rehabilitating sites and promoting tolerance and respect, as well as building the capacity of local communities to promote, monitor, and protect heritage sites can be found in the Western Balkans and Cyprus.

Equally, the World Bank is working and collaborating with UNESCO and the EU in cultural heritage reconstruction in post-conflict situations, such as in the case of Timbuktu in Mali, and in post-disaster settings in the aftermath of natural hazards, such as the post-earthquake reconstruction of Bagan, in Myanmar, as well as in many other interventions to protect and enhance heritage. Culture is a key element to promote sustainable development, and it is taken into account in World Bank projects through a focus on community participation and empowerment for better development impact as well as through safeguarding policies. The World Bank’s new Environmental and Social Framework broadens the definition and treatment of cultural heritage to tangible and, for the first time, intangible expressions. Culture is also fundamental to develop and implement the World Bank’s urban strategy, which focuses on creating sustainable, inclusive, resilient, and competitive cities. Projects in the cities of Fez in Morocco, Lahore in Pakistan, and Gjirokastra in Albania all illustrate well the role of culture in the World Bank urban development agenda.

Finally, in the past years, technological innovations have greatly facilitated UNESCO’s and its partners’ activities in emergency contexts. In cooperation with UNOSAT, ICONEM, and other partners, UNESCO assesses damage to cultural heritage via aerial photography or satellite imagery, allowing remote access to otherwise inaccessible areas. This helps to assess the situation on the ground, to deploy cultural first aid wherever it is most needed, and to plan for future recovery, all of which are based on a comprehensive record of historic features and the involvement of local communities and their understanding of the consequences of destruction.

**Drawing on cultural heritage for urban reconstruction**

Recent conflicts and disasters have had a major impact on historic cities, and more generally on historic urban landscapes, raising the question of how these are going to be reconstructed. The issue is of course not new as major urban reconstruction plans were implemented in the past, for example in the aftermath of World War II. With particular reference to cities having a significant heritage dimension, however, recent developments have highlighted the need to address a policy gap in current approaches with consideration of recovery and development needs. Within a wide range of nuanced positions and operational practices, two main approaches—at the opposite ends of the spectrum—appear to confront each other at present, reflecting different conceptual frameworks, visions, and practices.

On one hand, an approach strictly adherent to existing doctrinal texts in the heritage conservation field appears to fall short of recognizing the broader social, humanitarian, and developmental dimension of reconstruction post-trauma. This tends to focus mainly on the physical fabric of cultural heritage, valued mainly for its
historical/aesthetic attributes, and is concerned by the preservation of its authenticity. To this perspective, the very word ‘reconstruction’ is contentious. Conversely, a mainstream reconstruction approach, as promoted by developmental actors, private sectors, and often local authorities, frequently appears to neglect the importance of the cultural dimension of cities, as expressed both by tangible and intangible heritage, in their diversity, as well as creative expressions. This vision can be argued to having led in the past to the loss of the cultural identity of cities and resulted in soulless urban environments, thus compromising the quality of life of their inhabitants and overall sustainability.

There is clearly a need to articulate a more balanced and comprehensive approach, which could guide both national authorities and international development actors in addressing this challenge. The aim of such an approach would be to promote reconstruction aimed at preserving the cultural significance of historic urban landscapes and drawing on the potential of cultural and natural heritage as a catalyst for a rapid social and economic recovery.

How should cultural heritage be restored or reconstructed in a post-conflict situation?

In recent post-conflict or post-disaster situations, the question of the restoration or outright reconstruction of affected cultural heritage has often been the subject of debate. How soon should this be undertaken, and what approach should be adopted? In a situation of armed conflict or transition, when the affected population remains at risk and there is a possibility of a relapse into conflict, an incremental approach regarding interventions on cultural heritage is often the best option. Such an approach would be limited, in first stages, to damage assessment, documentation, and—to the extent possible—urgent safeguarding measures aimed at mitigating risks of further loss. Then, once stability has returned, and with it the conditions for proper reflection and consultation with all concerned stakeholders, would actual restoration become a possibility.

Indeed, the restoration of monuments and sites destroyed during a conflict involves a number of complex questions that should be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the specific social, historic, cultural, and economic background and needs in question. Many factors can play a significant role in determining the appropriate solution for each specific situation, such as views of the stakeholders, including local communities in their diversity, owners, and experts; degree of damage; damage type (collateral or intentional); type and function of the building/site; available documentation on original state; availability of skilled labor, appropriate materials or funding; and finally, the intended cultural meaning and use of the restored structure (same as before the conflict, turned into a “monument,” a “memorial” of the destruction, etc.).

Any solution should follow a very thorough process of consultation with all segments of the society, including—when relevant—the displaced and the diaspora. It should also take into account, and be integrated within, a larger strategy for the social, economic, and cultural reconstruction of the society, which includes measures to address basic humanitarian needs, violations of human rights and the persecution of war crimes. The people affected by the conflict should continue to be the first consideration when discussing strategies for the rehabilitation of their cultural heritage.

At the practical level, it is important to clarify that conservation and restoration may involve a number of techniques and approaches, which range from minimal intervention (conserving the ruins as they are) to the reassembling of the original materials, all the way to full reconstruction of all or parts of the building/site. Each of them may be legitimate in particular circumstances, depending on the above-mentioned considerations. The restoration of sites such as Palmyra or Nimrud will require many years of research, reflection, studies, and careful work. The fact that many of these places have been intentionally destroyed will have to be taken into account in determining a future vision for these sites, which the affected communities might wish to see
restored to reaffirm their identity, dignity, and resilience in the face of the deliberate attempts to erase their cultural heritage. In this context, the final decision will have to result from a broad and inclusive debate within the concerned groups, including—but not exclusively—cultural heritage experts.

The use of technology/3D initiatives related to cultural heritage in the context of recovery

Modern technologies, such as digital documentation, smartphone applications, and social media platforms, have a great potential to assist in the protection and promotion of culture and cultural diversity. On one hand, they have greatly increased the effectiveness and rapidity of incredibly accurate data collection. On the other hand, they enable the active participation of a large number of civil society players who were traditionally excluded from this area of work, such as youth, particularly through crowdsourcing. In the context of post-conflict or post-disaster recovery, and notably reconstruction and the related planning processes, the use of modern technologies applied to cultural heritage will prove critical.

A rapid and reliable assessment of the state of conservation of cultural heritage in areas of difficult access can inform immediate safeguarding measures and support the fight against illicit trade of looted antiquities, as well as guide recovery planning.

The use of virtual representations of damaged or at-risk cultural heritage—including through online platforms, virtual museums, etc.—for educational and awareness-raising purposes, can play a significant role in mobilizing public support for their protection but also around reconstruction or rehabilitation processes. Innovative technology can also be used as a tool to support people affected or displaced by humanitarian emergencies, who are temporarily prevented from accessing their cultural heritage and from practicing their cultural expressions, as an alternative means to securing their cultural rights. This can be done, for example, through social media and other platforms that facilitate the sharing of information within a community. This way, the continuity of cultural practices can be supported, and thereby the resilience, and eventual social recovery, of affected communities enhanced.

Another important matter concerns the use of digital technologies for the restoration of destroyed cultural heritage, notably in relation to the proposed mechanical reconstruction of monuments based on their 3D models. This is a debate that has considerable ethical and social dimensions, raising questions of authenticity, ownership (linked to the rights of the affected community to determine their cultural identity), and even security, when these reconstructions are intended as acts of defiance of violent extremist groups. UNESCO considers this as an area that needs further reflection, in light of the unprecedented possibilities offered by the new technologies available today.

Conclusion

Damage to and destruction of culture and heritage during armed conflicts and as the consequence of the increased occurrence of natural disasters have called for new and more effective approaches to address these challenges.

Therefore, at its 38th General Conference in November 2015, UNESCO adopted a Strategy for the reinforcement of the organization’s actions for the protection of culture and the promotion of cultural pluralism in the event of armed conflict. It builds on the six culture conventions administered by UNESCO by strengthening their synergy and operational capacity to achieve the following dual objectives:

30 http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002351/235186e.pdf
to strengthen Member States’ ability to prevent, mitigate, and recover the loss of cultural heritage and diversity as a result of conflict; and

■ to incorporate the protection of culture into humanitarian action, security strategies, and peace-building processes.

In this context, over the past years, the international community has demonstrated a growing awareness for the importance of integrating culture in the framework of humanitarian, security, peacekeeping and human rights policies and operations. In this context, since 2015, the UN Security Council has adopted three Resolutions that considered cultural heritage. While Resolutions 2199, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and 2253 recognized the illicit trafficking of cultural objects as a source of financing of terrorism and banned the trade in cultural artefacts from Iraq and Syria, Resolution 2347 is dedicated exclusively to cultural heritage, condemns its unlawful destruction, and makes concrete recommendations for action to UN Member States.

Regarding disasters, following the 2015 Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (WCDRR), the UN General Assembly endorsed the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, which clearly recognizes the essential relationship between different aspects of culture, resilience, and DRR. This new international framework, which is guided by four Priority Areas, calls for “the substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries.” In particular, it calls for the following priorities for action specifically linked to cultural heritage.

■ “Systematically evaluate, record, share and publicly account for disaster losses and understand the economic, social, health, education, environmental and cultural heritage impacts, as appropriate, in the context of event-specific hazard-exposure and vulnerability information.”

■ “Protect or support the protection of cultural and collecting institutions and other sites of historical, cultural heritage and religious interest.”

At the core of achieving these actions lies the need to:

a) Mainstream a concern for culture and heritage in DRR, and at the same time include DRR strategies in the management of cultural heritage. Hence, enhanced coordination is required between cultural and heritage authorities, and those in charge of DRR; and

b) Foster greater awareness and actions mobilized by national and local governments to reduce risk and build resilience. The challenge is to implement this policy at national and local levels, which requires considerable building of capacities at these levels and the setting up of the necessary institutional mechanisms, complemented by data collection and monitoring.

In the Joint Communication “Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations”31 the EU Commission and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy have affirmed their commitment to strengthening cooperation on cultural heritage because the latter is an important manifestation of cultural diversity that needs to be protected. Enhanced cooperation with partner countries is a priority in this respect.

The European Year of Cultural heritage in 2018 will soon be an opportunity to further promote the protection and valorization of the world’s cultural heritage, as stressed by the Ministers of Culture of the G7 and the European Commissioner responsible for culture in their joint declaration, on the occasion of the ‘Culture as an Instrument for Dialogue among Peoples’ meeting that took place in Florence, Italy, on March 30, 2017.

Despite these important advances, however, a gap remains to be filled for the full integration of culture into humanitarian, security, and peacekeeping policies. Events such as the World Reconstruction Conference, in this regard, represent critical opportunities to further sensitize international stakeholders, including at the technical level, which is often driving concrete initiatives on the ground.

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G7

Joint Declaration of the Ministers of Culture of G7 on the occasion of the meeting ‘Culture as an Instrument for Dialogue among Peoples’ http://www.g7italy.it/sites/default/files/documents/1490881204940DECLARATION-Dichiarazione.pdf

Regarding disasters, following the 2015 Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (WCDRR), the UN General Assembly endorsed the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, which clearly recognizes the essential relationship between different aspects of culture, resilience, and DRR.
Large-Scale Housing Reconstruction—Latest Experiences

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Session Summary

An array of large-scale housing reconstruction cases was presented during the discussion, ranging from single family housing, all the way to high density projects, from rural settings, to suburban settings to urban settings, both in developed and developing countries. Four elements were discussed in this session: reconstruction policy, balancing structural and nonstructural interventions, linkages to user community participation and culture, and finally, how large-scale reconstruction can adopt principles of Build Back Better.

The issue of large-scale housing reconstruction poses questions regarding the best approach to adopt. The use of a model, state-led/contractor driven, homeowner driven, or community driven, depends on the context, existing policies, and the willingness of the partners to engage. According to research led in more than six countries, the difference between homeowner driven reconstruction and contractor driven reconstruction, in terms of user satisfaction, depends on how involved the communities and the homeowners are involved in the process. To ensure safe construction practices, homeowner driven reconstruction requires support for homeowners to understand construction quality, and to learn what to look for in a contractor/mason. On the other hand, contractor driven reconstruction, if it is not paired with communities and individuals’ participation, can lead to dissatisfaction regarding the housing design, quality, etc.

The spread of the damage was on one of the largest in Chile’s history. More than 150 cities and towns in Chile were subject to a reconstruction strategy and recovery master plan after the earthquake of 2010. Problems of land ownership, particularly private land, were in many examples, a problem facing contact-based large-scale housing reconstruction. This invited innovative approaches to deal with decentralization of reconstruction, such as the promotion of use of up-to-standards prefabricated homes, community mobilization to create enough demand for the private sector to respond in remote areas and smaller towns, as well as fostering competition in the private sector to respond to the demands of communities. This allowed communities to avoid relocation and gentrification, particularly in coastal fisher-people areas.

In the case of Odisha state, India, the 2013 cyclone proved to be a challenge to the disaster recovery program put in place prior. In response, the Odisha DRM Authority created a new housing policy that gave primacy to the community, whereby the process, from the selection of beneficiaries, to the assessment of damages and the verification of the construction, was entirely driven by the communities. The government supported NGOs and communities to train masons, both men and women, and provided cash subsidies as the construction of houses was progressing. Despite the challenges linked to relocation of some households, and land acquisition issues,
strong leadership in the community, as well as continuous communication and support from the government, are allowing the Odisha state to advance as per the schedule to rebuild the housing stock needed.

Similarly, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 2013 floods cost the country 15 percent of its GDP. The government realized that a one model fit for all approach was not possible and the involvement of local communities was crucial to the success of the recovery master plan of the country. However, many regions were faced with the necessity of relocation due to the high risk of hazards, and a history of migration that prevented the government from adopting a buyout option, which would push more people to choose to settle abroad. This led to a hybrid model of state-led, community supported housing reconstruction strategy.

The government of Ecuador was in charge of the reconstruction after the earthquake of 2016. It passed a solidarity law that increased value-added tax (VAT) by 2.5 percent to allow for the reconstruction of homes. The strategy offered three options for victims of the earthquake: relocation, buyout, and repair. One year after the earthquake, all shelters were closed and the only part of the strategy that is still in progress is the repair option. Another important element was that as there was a major need for resettlement, there was a need to include, as an incentive, services, such as schools, health facilities, parks, sports centers to allow for a smooth transition in the new environment.

Implementation throughout local governments is a challenge for a coordinated large-scale reconstruction. Even in the most advanced areas, disasters can put pressure on municipalities due to challenges of loss of human capital, lack of communication with other municipalities and central government, and failure of protocols in place. CSOs and NGOs are important to support in building the capacities and supporting government and communities at the local level.
Cultural aspects, loss of large housing schemes, political controversies beyond the technical aspects of housing reconstruction, land tenure and rental issues, and high costs due to the high demands of construction materials are also recurring issues for large-scale housing reconstruction strategies. A strong communication, particularly around timeframes, of the complexity of housing reconstruction undertakings on a large scale, to the communities as well as to the individuals, is key to the success of any large-scale housing reconstruction strategy. Issues of the whole landscape, i.e., schools and community centers building location in relation to the housing projects, are also an intrinsic part of strategies.

Background

The increasing occurrence of disasters in urban or highly populated areas triggers larger scale housing reconstruction needs, as it is often the sector with the highest damages and losses, especially when hit by earthquakes, hurricanes, or floods. However, housing reconstruction suffers from delays in implementation, causing institutional, financial, and social strains, as well as infrastructure, land tenure, and services stresses. The accumulation of these stresses often risks reproducing existing vulnerabilities and inequalities among the targeted populations, or creating new ones. In addition, a lack of trained professionals and sound reconstruction practices, which enable the implementation of housing recovery, do not help countries in guiding large-scale reconstruction processes.

While challenges for housing reconstruction strategies include affordability and technical feasibility, as well as social and cultural considerations, their success also depends upon institutional and financial mechanisms (subsidies, housing finance, etc.), infrastructure and access to property rights, and land tenure. Some of the dichotomies such as the difference between urban and rural approaches to housing reconstruction, and community-based versus state-led reconstruction, or the incorporation of the private sector in these schemes add more complexity to the field. For example, when policies are detached from the reality on the ground, their application leads to more social and economic fragmentation.

Dealing with such challenges, while keeping in mind notions of resilience and building back better, can strengthen the engineering skills and community outreach and education, and stress regulations and good planning, which leads to high quality results (in terms of quality of construction, social and community relationships, and economic prosperity). A successful housing reconstruction reduces disaster vulnerability, strengthens resilience, and promotes overall well-being.

Over the past 10 years, the estimated loss and destruction of the housing stock due to natural disaster or conflicts has reached unprecedented numbers. The built environment in general, and housing, are key components in both casualties and economic losses—their failures are associated with loss of life and they make up, in infrastructure and real estate, most of the assets which get destroyed.

Additionally, the world is rapidly urbanizing, with up to 1.4 million people per week moving into urban areas—World Organization Prospects, the 2014 Revision (UN DESA 2014). Unprecedented urbanization has transformed the planet from 30 percent urban in 1950 to over 54 percent urban today, and this will reach an estimated 66 percent by 2050. Over 60 percent of the land projected to become urban by 2030 has yet to be developed (Elmqvist T. 2013). And nearly 1 billion new housing units will need to be constructed to house the world’s growing population by 2060 (Bilham 2009). Currently, the majority of the world’s 3.9 billion urban dwellers reside in developing countries, where most future urban growth is also expected (UN DESA 2014). Large-scale housing reconstruction is one of the biggest issues that the international community, and local governments, have to deal with in the wake of a disaster.
This session enabled the conversation around post-disaster housing reconstruction in order to better understand the relationships between context, management strategies, and outcomes. Ultimately, it is intended to provide practitioners with a decision support platform of knowledge for selecting appropriate large-scale housing reconstruction strategies.

**Issues related to large-scale housing reconstruction**

Over the course of the past three decades, there have been multiple attempts to streamline large-scale housing strategies and to document experiences, best practices, and lessons learned. The current issues surrounding post-disaster housing reconstruction often circle around questions of community versus state-based design and implementation of housing projects, the involvement of the private sector (particularly in relation to resources management, project management and housing finance, and insurance), and housing reconstruction in fragile states.

**Community driven housing reconstruction and state-led housing reconstruction**

Community involvement in housing reconstruction has proven to be important, as it re-empowers communities that have sustained major shocks, builds local capacity, and serves as an effective way of targeting beneficiaries and lowering the cost of reconstruction because of knowledge of local resources. It is an efficient way to deal with governance issues, particularly in highly centralized states. Community-led housing reconstruction also poses some specific challenges, such as the lack of infrastructure and human resources to assist with transferring knowledge, the lack of engagement of women, and lack of the inclusion of marginalized groups. However, these challenges can be solved through sound project design, and addressing ahead the lag in start time through awareness campaigns, for example.

Community engagement should not only be seen as opposing a government-led large-scale housing reconstruction operation, but can also be a drive toward the establishment of a wider array of housing options that offer a tailored response to communities’ needs of resilient housing, economic capital, as well as social and cultural capital.
State-led housing reconstruction strategies can range from a scaling up and support of local and community practices that are proven to be successful and efficient, to creating policies and frameworks of actions to mainstream disaster risk reduction (DRR) in housing construction practices. Government-backed reconstruction strategies can significantly affect the housing outcomes, particularly in dense and urban areas. Housing reconstruction is often politically sensitive, as it is a meeting point of geopolitics, social relationships, and identity politics. Therefore, the relationship between the state and the citizens is extremely important during post-conflict housing reconstruction. The lack of local government capacity in designing and implementing housing reconstruction can lead to disorganized reconstruction.

Private sector engagement in large-scale post-disaster housing reconstruction

There has been a rise in efforts of including various stakeholders in the early stages of design of reconstruction strategies, due to the rising awareness, particularly in urban areas, of the important role that the private sector plays. Insurance companies; construction companies; and architecture, urban planning and landscape firms bring knowledge of the local markets that can be tapped into during the design phases of a reconstruction project. For example, following a major disaster, the majority of local production facilities and supply systems in manufacturing industries are likely to be damaged, and the construction market tends to be in disorder, contested, and highly adversarial. Five factors influence the availability of resources for reconstruction, including the prioritization of works, the ability to pool resources, the lead time of procurement, existing contractual relationships, and transportation into and around the disaster zone.

One of the cons of the inclusion of private sectors contracting companies is the need for added quality management plans and quality assurance mechanisms, including measures such as materials testing and specifications checks, workmanship quality control, adequate inspection, and supervision by supervisory personnel that should be provided. These need to be implemented by the governing agencies, or by the international community, to ensure high standards of service provision in the construction material, management, design, and schedules, which can be an added stress to a struggling governing body.

Successes and best practices of large-scale housing reconstruction

Successes and best practices of large-scale housing reconstruction after Yogyakarta

On May 27, 2006, an earthquake measuring 6.3 on the Richter scale hit Yogyakarta, Indonesia, killing nearly 6,000 people, damaging or destroying some 628,000 homes, and leaving 1.5 million people homeless. The strong and functioning local government structure and capacity, both at the local and national level, were important factors that facilitated an effective reconstruction of the housing stock in the region. The local authorities insisted on a no-relocation policy as well as reliance on a community’s self-help and coping mechanisms. A small number of households without clear formal land title were displaced, including squatters, renters, and families living on state owned ‘sultan’s land’. Other communities who lived in highly risky areas that are prone
to landslides were displaced and sheltered in climatically and culturally inappropriate concrete dome houses. Adverse effects of these displacements continue to this day. Families who opted to stay on their own land or in their own neighborhoods were able to avoid land tenure issues and clearly recovered much faster than those that were displaced.\textsuperscript{32}

Nearly a quarter of a million destroyed houses were rebuilt within eighteen months. This is due to multiple factors, but importantly, the early engagement of development actors coupled with relatively early funding for permanent reconstruction played a significant role in speeding the recovery process.

A community-based housing recovery program (REKOMPAK) also supported new housing on site (when it is not risk) or resettlement area with close to 3,000 houses built on-site. Intensive resident participation in the planning process from the early stage to site planning and construction, with expert support, was crucial to the success of this endeavor.

**Post-Yolanda housing reconstruction in Tacloban**

In November 2013, Typhoon Yolanda caused devastation across the Philippines and Tacloban City was especially hard hit. With almost 30,000 houses destroyed, the majority from informal coastal communities, Tacloban City’s housing reconstruction focused on the provision of new housing in resettlement sites in the northern part of the city. As of 2016, the city-coordinated plan included more than 13,000 housing units to be built by the National Housing Authority (NHA) and another 2,500 houses to be built NGOs on land coordinated by the city. Independent from the city, two other resettlement sites are planned by NGO/donors.

The city-coordinated housing recovery process includes various combinations of different support to provide safer housing to the city’s most vulnerable residents; the vast majority of houses are built by the National Housing Authority (NHA). At 22.5 square meters NHA houses are row houses built of reinforced Concrete Masonry Unit (CMU) blocks, and are constructed by developers, according to the NHAs established methods to provide socialized housing. At the scale of the house, the design is standard, without many options for modifications by residents. Whereas the residents’ voices were not included in the planning process to designing houses or settlement planning, coordination from the Tacloban City Dept. of Housing and Community Development attempted to facilitate community building within the process of relocation. The City Dept. of Housing and Community Development office has attempted to move residents together as groups from temporary to permanent housing, and support this transitional process through staff support and promotion of community leadership.\textsuperscript{33}

In contrast to the standardized housing units provided through the NHA, there are also examples of resettlement sites organized by nonprofit organizations. Including members of Development and Peace and Urban Poor Associates, the FRANCISCO consortium has started construction of 500 houses as part of a model community that includes livelihood and farming. Along with local partners, the international NGO Catholic Relief Services (CRS) is also planning a resettlement area for 900 families. Urban Poor Associates (UPA) and CRS are each supporting the construction of a housing resettlements site on land they have acquired. Using community facilitation, these projects include the future residents in the planning for the site; residents are also involved in the building construction. Limited by scale, future residents of these projects represent only a small fraction of all post-Yolanda housing beneficiaries in Tacloban, but these projects provide a meaningful demonstration of how people-centered housing recovery can be done in this context.


\textsuperscript{33} Recovery and Reconstruction Planning In the Aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), Summary of knowledge briefs, October 2014, 49 pp.
Challenges in the Haiti housing reconstruction strategies
Large-scale housing reconstruction in conflict situations

Housing reconstruction can potentially be a driver toward solving/preventing conflicts. For example, a study finds that reconstruction has created new forms of conflicts and tensions for the people who came to live in the newly constructed houses. The hostile relations that existed among different ethnic groups during the conflict were continued, and to some extent, exacerbated by the reconstruction undertaken after the war. Houses are connecting the communities socially, rather than standing in isolation to one another. They can cause as much conflict as they can resolve. If one group is favored in terms of housing, it can be an indicator of dominance of a certain group in society over another, particularly after a period of division and discrimination. Housing reconstruction is often politically sensitive, as it is a meeting point of geopolitics and identity politics. Therefore, the relationship between the state and the citizens becomes extremely important during post-conflict housing reconstruction. The present practice of housing reconstruction often recreates and even exasperates the existing vulnerabilities in terms of disaster, poverty and gender. Assistance provided for housing often benefits the wealthier or better off communities (Barakat and Zyck, 2011).

Conclusion

Across both urban and rural areas, gaps and challenges remain for housing reconstruction experts in terms of strategic choices, fundamental time considerations, and markets dynamics. Large-scale permanent housing reconstruction programs are typically initiated to cushion the effects of disasters on housing and to facilitate the recovery of affected communities. However, particularly in developing countries, the implementation of housing interventions has often been ineffective and their intended outcomes have not been achieved. In earlier research, the ineffectiveness and failures of housing interventions have been linked to certain management issues that arise in the context of post-disaster reconstruction.

- What improvements can be made to address the inherent resource constraints under each of the aforementioned approaches?
- How do we reconcile between the immediacy of housing reconstruction on a large scale and the time limitations and urgency on one hand, and the resilience discussion that the international community is currently having?
- How do we better define “building back better,” which inherently addresses housing and settlement reconstruction, to clearly reflect best practices on all scales of the housing reconstruction (institution vs. household level)?

Unprecedented urbanization has transformed the planet from 30 percent urban in 1950 to over 54 percent urban today, and this will reach an estimated 66 percent by 2050.
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Recovery in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations (RPBA)

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Introduction
As part of the 2008 Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning, the World Bank Group (WBG), the United Nations (UN), and the European Union (EU) have committed to providing joint support for assessing, planning, and mobilizing efforts geared toward recovery, reconstruction, and development in countries affected by crises. This tripartite agreement is executed via the mechanism of joint RPBA. The agreement represents a commitment on the part of the three organizations to work together in support of national ownership of the recovery and peace-building process, and to coordinate the broader international response to crises. Between 2008 and 2016, approximately 12 joint assessments of this nature have been conducted.

An RPBA is a joint, structured approach to assess and address recovery and peace-building requirements in a country experiencing conflict or in transition from a conflict-related crisis; it therefore helps gain a deep understanding of both needs and priorities. It has three primary purposes:

- To help governments and their international partners to identify, prioritize, and sequence recovery and peace-building needs, priorities, and related activities;
- To provide an inclusive process to support dialogue and participation of stakeholders in the identification of recovery and peace-building priorities, and resource mobilization; and
- To coordinate international support through joint assessment and planning processes.

An RPBA fits within a broader and long-term process to support countries in conflict or emerging from a conflict-related crisis, and should therefore be grounded in a shared understanding of the impact and underlying causes of the conflict. The strategic value of the RPBA process is threefold: it provides an evidence-based assessment of recovery and peacebuilding requirements; a platform for consensus-building and prioritization; and a mechanism for identifying the implementation and financing arrangements required to deliver on these priorities. An RPBA should not be seen as a one-off data collection exercise or a sectoral needs assessment, but an ongoing process of gathering and analysing information that can inform the response. Consultation, consensus, and partnership building are just as valuable in the RPBA process as the assessment itself.

34 The 2008 Joint Declaration is also executed through the three organizations via Post Disaster Needs Assessments in response to natural disasters.
Background

In 2015, a review of conflict-related joint assessments, known then as Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs), was conducted to gain insights on ways to improve the relevance and flexibility of these efforts; to take stock of the changes in context, operational, and institutional environments; and to gather lessons learned. The review highlighted the need to:

- Clarify the strategic role of joint assessments and strengthen partnership framework and institutional arrangements underpinning the process.
- Ensure effective and flexible design and management mechanisms, including through different typologies, the clarification of management arrangements, enhanced synergies with other in-country processes, and a simplified methodology and framework for conducting such exercises.
- Ensure focus on implementation and financing modalities throughout the process.
- Promote inclusive national ownership and leadership.

Based on the recommendations from the 2015 review and subsequent discussions with key partners and practitioners, the methodology has been revised to allow assessments to remain light and flexible and to put more emphasis on the pre-assessment phase. It was also decided to change the name from PCNA to RPBA for a more accurate reflection of the nature of the assessment.

Rationale

RPBAs address conflict-affected situations that present several immediate, medium-, and long-term needs across the humanitarian, security, political, peace-building, and socioeconomic development spectrum. Short-, medium- and long-term requirements for recovery and peace building could, therefore, include a range of areas, such as:

- The political process: what is needed to foster and sustain a political settlement/dialogue and prevent a relapse into violent conflict?
- Security: what is needed to establish effective and accountable security sector institutions and reform processes, and to strengthen people's security?
- Justice: what is needed to address injustices and increase people's access to justice?
- Economic foundations: what is needed to revitalize the economy and generate employment and livelihood opportunities?
- Services: what is needed to build the capacities for accountable and equitable service delivery, and enhanced access to basic services?
- Trust and social cohesion: what is needed to (re)-build trust in institutions and cohesion across communities?
- Displacement: what is needed to address the needs of displaced populations and facilitate their dignified return and reintegration?
- Physical reconstruction: what are the main reconstruction and construction needs?
- Gender equality and women's empowerment: what is needed to address structural gender inequalities and to empower women to engage fully and equally in the recovery and peace-building processes?
- Youth empowerment and participation:

An RPBA should not be seen as a one-off data collection exercise or a sectoral needs assessment, but an ongoing process of gathering and analysing information that can inform the response.
What opportunities and resources exist for fostering youth employment, participation in peace-building processes and civic education?

- Technical and other capacities of institutions responsible for the implementation, financing and oversight of recovery and peace-building efforts.

Other potential areas to address could include: violent extremism; illicit financial flows; and the linkages between conflict and environmental/natural resources-related stressors. Crosscutting issues that warrant attention are gender, youth, human rights, the environment, and addressing the underlying causes of humanitarian needs.

**Elements of an RPBA**

Whilst the scope of an RPBA will vary depending on the context, an RPBA will, at a minimum, focus on: the conflict and security situation; the host government position and capacities; institutional interests; and available resources. The RPBA approach selected for each country will be informed by a thorough understanding of the causes and dynamics of the conflict, including its impact on different sectors (political, economic, and social) and population groups (e.g., women, youth, elderly, and disabled). It will also provide a clear picture of key recovery and peace-building needs and priorities across different sectors, as well as the strategies and resources required to address them. Generally, the RPBA process (see Table 3) will comprise of three phases:

The first element, pre-assessment, is designed to provide some initial guidance on the process in order to decide whether an RPBA is necessary, and to provide inputs on the scope, objectives, and institutional arrangements; this stage of the process may also provide an initial indication of the recovery and peace-building issues to consider if the assessment goes ahead.

The second element, assessment, prioritization, and planning includes the assessment of recovery and peace-building needs and their prioritization in the context of a strategic recovery and peacebuilding plan, and is accompanied by a results matrix. It also presents options for implementation (including coordination and monitoring arrangements), and financing-related issues.

The third element, validation and finalization, focuses on ensuring that the plan is agreed upon, and that the necessary arrangements to begin the implementation and financing are in place.

**Implementation and Financing**

An assessment of needs is the starting point for coordinated action to address peace-building and recovery. To ensure that the assessment leads swiftly to a coordinated response, the RPBA needs to be firmly linked to implementation and financing mechanisms. The unique environment of each RPBA should inform the design of these mechanisms, making sure they are realistic and actionable.

**Project Examples and Results**

Between 2008 and 2016, about 12 joint assessments were conducted, including assessments in Ukraine, northern Mali, northeast Nigeria and the Central African Republic, as well as a currently ongoing assessment in Cameroon. Brief descriptions of each case are listed below.

**Ukraine (2014–2015)**

In mid-2014, the government requested technical assistance and financial support from the international community to assess and plan priority recovery and peace-building efforts in the conflict-affected regions of eastern Ukraine. Following a joint EU, UN, and WBG scoping mission to Ukraine that took place between September 29 and October 3, 2014, the three institutions agreed to organize an assessment of recovery and
peace-building needs. The Eastern Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RPA) was launched in October 2014 as a two-stage process. In light of the continuing conflict, it was decided that an initial rapid assessment should be undertaken that covered areas under government control. The rapid assessment would provide an analytical and programmatic baseline for recovery efforts; identify urgent interventions; and provide a basis for scaling up the responses as needs evolved on the ground. As a result of the RPA, a specialized government agency was established to implement identified priorities that evolved in 2016 into the Ministry of Temporary Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons of Ukraine.

**Northern Mali (2015)**
The RPBA for northern Mali was requested during the Peace Accord. It was conducted by various development partners, including the World Bank, the United Nations, the Islamic Development Bank, and the African Development Bank. It was undertaken in three months and finalized with a donors’ conference. The implementation of the assessment has not been possible due to security reasons.

**North East Nigeria (2015–2016)**
An RPBA for North East Nigeria was undertaken in response to the request made by President Muhammadu Buhari. As such, under the leadership of the government of Nigeria, the WBG, UN, and EU carried out an RPBA for the northeast during a period of five months, between the scoping mission and launch of the assessment. The RPBA focused on identifying and prioritizing short- and medium-term responses to the needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs), host communities, and conflict-affected populations, and articulated the related recovery and peace-building needs for northeast Nigeria, including infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction and service delivery restoration and improvement needs.

### Table 3: Main elements of an RPBA

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<th>Element</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Product</th>
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| I–Pre-assessment | 1. Early discussions to establish the potential need for an RPBA.  
2. Pre-assessment mapping and scoping mission.  
3. Formal agreement whether to conduct an RPBA. | Background paper with findings from desk mapping that will inform the scoping mission.  
Scoping mission concept note with recommendations on whether to conduct an RPBA, its scope and objectives, and how it should be conducted.  
Formal agreement to proceed with an RPBA (or not) and, if so, elaboration of a ToR signed off by senior officials in consultation with the government. |
| II–Assessment, prioritization, and planning | 4. Assessment of recovery and peacebuilding needs.  
5. Prioritize and present the priorities in a strategic, implementable recovery and peacebuilding plan and results matrix.  
6. Outline implementation (including coordination, monitoring, and evaluation arrangements), and financing options. | Assessment findings (presentation may vary).  
Final assessment report and recovery and peacebuilding plan and results matrix with recovery and peacebuilding priorities.  
Options for implementation and financing included in the final report. |
| III–Validation and finalization | 7. Format validation of the recovery and peacebuilding plan and results matrix.  
8. Agreement on implementation and financing agreements.  
9. Lessons learning. | Formal agreement on the recovery and peacebuilding plan and results matrix, implementation and financing arrangements, and launch of the implementation phase.  
Lessons learned on the RPBA process. |
Central Africa Republic (2016)
The CAR government in May 2016 requested support from the three partners for an RPBA following the presidential election and the reinstitution of constitutional order after nearly three years of political transition and violent conflict. The RPBA defined the country's priorities over the short and medium term, in a consultative manner and in close collaboration with all international and regional partners. The resulting report was approved by the government in October 2016 and adopted as the National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan (RCPCA), which informed the international donor conference for CAR that took place on November 17, 2016, in Brussels, Belgium.

Cameroon (ongoing)
The urgency of the Boko Haram crisis in the region and its effects on the Far North of Cameroon prompted the government, through the Ministry of Economy, Planning and Territorial Administration (MINEPAT), to request assistance from the EU, UN, and WBG to carry out a RPBA. In response to this request, a scoping mission took place in late 2016. The RPBA launched in January 2017 and is still ongoing. The assessment will produce a strategy describing the overall challenges and priorities for recovery and peace and outline the five programs that will form the nucleus for joint actions over the next three years. The strategy will also include overall cost estimates, implementation and financing arrangements, a transitional results matrix, and the information and monitoring system to be used to track impact.

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Empowering Local Stakeholders for Resilient Recovery

Discussion summary

Empowering local actors for preparing and planning for resilient recovery requires a multidimensional approach considering legal mandates, institutional arrangements, funding flows, organizational and human capacities, and social capital, applying to all steps of the DRM cycle. Considering the challenges identified in the previous section, the following key questions were discussed during the session:

1. What is the most appropriate division of responsibilities between different governance levels for disaster risk management, considering existing political, social, and institutional contexts?

2. What can be done to make sure that the decentralization of DRM does not work at a cross-purpose with the need for efficient risk reduction and recovery preparedness and a timely disaster response at the local level?

3. Which approaches work best in decentralizing disaster recovery functions in least developed and/or fragile countries?

4. What are viable and effective means to increase financial capacities of local governments for post-disaster recovery preparedness?

5. What can be done to increase the share of external aid directly reaching local actors in post-disaster situations?

6. What are effective mechanisms to bridge gaps in local technical capacities for DRM without comprising the need for locally driven recovery processes?

7. Which systems and capacities are needed to increase the share of DRR spending in local budgets?

8. How can existing community capacities be better harnessed in disaster recovery preparedness?

9. What are the prerequisites for an effective application of social accountability approaches over the DRM cycle, from risk identification to recovery?

10. What measures are useful to take when building disaster recovery frameworks to prevent the marginalization of women and other vulnerable groups in post-disaster situations?
Background

Note: Unless stated differently, “local” here refers indistinctly to any subnational governance level, whether regional, provincial, district, municipal, or village level. Distinction between these different levels is brought into the discussion as needed.

There is widespread support in international policy frameworks for disaster risk management (DRM) toward the notion that the responsibility for preventing and reducing hazard exposure and vulnerability to disaster, increasing preparedness for response and recovery, and thus strengthening disaster resilience, cannot be the sole responsibility of central government agencies. This responsibility needs to be shared with local stakeholders, and in particular local governments, civil society, and communities themselves. The Sendai Framework adopts as a guiding principle that “while the enabling, guiding and coordinating role of national and federal State Governments remain essential, it is necessary to empower local authorities and local communities to reduce disaster risk, including through resources, incentives and decision-making responsibilities, as appropriate” and establishes the increase of local disaster risk reduction strategies by 2020 as a global target.

Pleading for a greater role of local stakeholders in DRM, and in particular in building preparedness for resilient recovery, is of course a reflection of the combined rise in the twenty-first century of decentralization as a core organizing principle of the modern state and of urbanization as the most common form of human settlement. But it is also a reflection of lessons learnt from recent disaster recovery processes, which show that achieving effective and resilient recovery is closely linked to strengthening demand-driven recovery policies, resources, and mechanisms. Some of the most threatening drivers of disaster risk, such as inappropriate land use and physical planning, can also only be effectively tackled if localized risk reduction strategies are adopted and local capacities to enforce them are built. Ultimately, communities need to be at the center of the decision-making process affecting their capacity to prevent and recover quickly from disasters to minimize negative impacts on their development pathways. Local governments and civil society are usually seen as legitimate representatives of community members and promoters of the common good, and with the greatest community mobilization potential, and hence require special attention in terms of institutional, financial, and capacity frameworks in the process of localizing disaster recovery frameworks. Communities remain the main engines of recovery and are key to building resilience against disaster risk.

Yet, empowered local-level actors for disaster recovery preparedness are far from being a global reality, especially in fragile and conflict-affected countries, but also in large sprawling cities. Recent disaster cases show that local-level actors also face important legal, capacity, financial, and political challenges to be able to take decisive action in anticipation of disaster events, integrate disaster risk reduction in their plans and policies, and reach a level of accountability and inclusiveness in the management of disaster recovery processes that can truly support community resilience.

Conceptual Framework

In 2015, 3 percent of the recorded 376 disasters caused 66 percent of disaster victims (killed and affected) worldwide and 42 percent of damages. These are mega events that affect large portions of a country (e.g., drought) or localized events of enormous magnitude (e.g., Nepal’s earthquake). In both cases, the institutional, financial and human capacities to be mobilized for recovery go far beyond what local stakeholders can provide. But the great majority of disasters (or 97 percent of recorded events in 2015) are more limited in scope, either of a low-impact and/or small geographical scale. Logically, in such events, local capacities are expected to be mobilized in priority for responding to immediate and longer term recovery needs. This is particularly true in cities across the world, where the frequency and magnitude of disasters are increasing and where, at the same time, the concentration of political, social, and economic powers is happening. In all cases, regardless
of the level of impact and location of a disaster, whether urban or rural, achieving demand-driven recovery and decentralized implementation speeds up recovery and is more likely to correspond to actual needs of the affected communities—hence contributing to achieving greater resilience.

Integrating disaster recovery preparedness into local governance systems and empowering local actors in leading recovery processes requires advancing the objectives listed below.

■ A clear division of roles and responsibilities and shared goals, backed by enabling legal and regulatory frameworks, between national and local level actors for the different phases of the recovery cycle.

■ Effective coordination mechanisms, aligned with the adopted division of responsibilities, between local and national actors and particularly between local DRM agents and national technical sector agents, and between public, civil society, and private actors at the local level.

■ Predictable and sufficient funding, combining local, national and international (if needed) sources, dedicated to supporting local-level policy making and implementation responsibilities.

■ Prioritizing DRR investments, beyond the early recovery period, into local development planning.

■ Commitments and mechanisms to ensure community-led reconstruction and recovery models, meaningful participation of affected communities in recovery decision making, and strong social accountability of all recovery activities.

■ Strengthened local technical capacities in areas critical for effective DRM, including risk analysis, risk reduction planning, PDNAs, devising build-back-better solutions, social impact analysis, multi-stakeholder coordination, and accountable financial management of recovery funds.

■ Empowered local civil society capable of facilitating community-led models, raising awareness on risk prevention, advocating for greater DRR investments, implementing local recovery plans, exerting social accountability over DRM agents, and promoting inclusiveness (especially for women, youth, senior citizens, migrants, indigenous, and disabled persons) in all aspects of the recovery process.

More broadly, engaging local governments and civil society in resilient recovery means achieving a better balance of capacities, whether legal, human, or financial, between national and local levels. This must be accomplished while not losing sight of the need to: (i) reduce risks for all; (ii) achieve fast transition from the emergency relief phase to longer term recovery; (iii) make an efficient use of resources available; (iv) improve the links between readiness, recovery, and development; and (v) build back better. Localizing recovery preparedness and management should maximize, and not compromise, progress on the above goals.

Key Challenges

Recent disaster cases show that local governments and civil society remain often not equipped technically or financially to play an influential part in recovery. Only a few countries, and even less developing countries, have local governments that set aside 1 to 2 percent of their budgets for DRR, as an internationally accepted ratio, and recovery budgets are still overwhelmingly originating from central sources, which may go against the concept of local empowerment. Many cities are also lagging on their resilience building agenda as exposed during the recent HABITAT-III Conference. And repeatedly, after-action reviews of disaster responses show that aid effectiveness has been lowered by insufficient participation and leadership of disaster-affected communities.

“Empowering” local stakeholders in resilient recovery, rather than just promoting greater “engagement,” remains therefore a policy priority. The very understanding of the concept of "empowerment" can be different. Depending on the viewpoint, for central governments, it is often understood as decentralizing the implementation of recovery frameworks and policies set at their level. For local actors, “empowerment” would rather mean giving them the leadership in priority setting and implementation, with sufficient resources allotted by the central state. Likewise, community participation achieved in recovery processes can often be more instrumental than
transformative: a few rounds of community consultations in a post-disaster needs assessment do not bring long-term empowerment. Involving communities in all stages of the recovery process, starting from building risk reduction strategies upon local knowledge and skills, and giving citizens the power to hold accountable their local and national governments, as well as other aid providers on their DRM policies and efforts, is what community empowerment effectively means. This needs strong political will from decision makers as well as investments in building community and civil society capacities.

The main challenges in empowering local governments, civil society, and communities for resilient recovery are presented below.

- **Finding the right legal and institutional frameworks:** Evidence from a few countries with a decentralized local governance system shows the risks of relying solely on existing decentralization laws and mechanisms for organizing the division of responsibilities between levels of government in disaster risk management. On the other hand, certain centralized countries have also experienced the limits of such systems for DRM after major disasters and have had to reconsider their local governance systems. Indeed, disasters open periods where decisions based on sound technical evidence need to be made swiftly and high levels of coordination achieved between national and local institutions across sectors to guarantee the most effective use of available resources. Often, the inadequacy of the existing legal and institutional frameworks for identifying and reducing risks and for a swift and effective post-disaster response has led to temporary recentralization in decision making. This inadequacy may then be responsible for undermining local self-governance and potentially introducing delays in recovery, and for transitioning back to development. Many countries, following a major disaster, have issued new laws reorganizing the division of responsibilities for DRM between levels of government. This is in particular the case of Chile after the 2009 earthquake, in Concepcion, Serbia, after the 2014 floods, as well as in Indonesia following a series of disasters in the 2000s.

- **Increasing readiness, flexibility, and efficiency in funding for local disaster risk management:** Local governments can face important challenges in accessing and allocating development funding to disaster risk reduction and recovery preparedness. In many developing countries, especially the least advanced and fragile ones, local budgets often barely cover the delivery of basic services and the costs of local administrations; it is therefore politically difficult in such contexts for decision makers to prioritize spending on risks and if they do so, it may not provide them with political credit—until a disaster hits. When local governments depend almost entirely on central state transfers for their development expenditures, their capacity to prioritize DRM is also contingent on national policies in this regard. In the Philippines, for example, while the law obligates local governments to allocate 5 percent of their development budget on DRM, it also specifies that a maximum of 30 percent of this amount should be allocated to risk reduction measures—something that local governments see as too little given that better prevention means also lesser damage and a lower recovery price tag after a disaster. Setting aside local contingency funds, as is done in the Philippines, and also in the Lao PDR and many other countries, helps complement national resources for disaster response and gives greater flexibility for local leadership in the early recovery phase. But local contingency funds are also difficult to set up in countries with limited fiscal decentralization. Reducing dependency on external aid for recovery contributes to strengthening resilience and can be achieved through a variety of means, including insurance schemes for public and private assets, community cost-sharing contracts, or mobilizing the corporate social responsibility of the private sector. Where donor funding cannot be dispensed with, increasing aid effectiveness in supporting local recovery can never be too much emphasized. In Myanmar for example, studies show that, overall, the least affected and most accessible villages received the lion’s share of post-cyclone Nargis aid receipts. Multi-donor trust funds need to cover risk reduction and not just the recovery phase. Donor funding also
needs to be accessible more easily and directly by local governments, civil society, and the private sector, rather than entirely disbursed through national institutions and programs. Finally, a major obstacle to increasing funding to local actors for disaster recovery preparedness in many countries remains the real (or perceived) high level of fiduciary risks involved with local budget execution. Concomitant efforts to improve public financial management and accountability at the local level remain, therefore, essential to see more fiscal resources devolved to local stakeholders.

- **Fast-tracking capacity-building of local actors to reduce the risks of decentralizing DRM:** Countries that have taken important legal steps to transfer DRM functions to the local level are often facing challenges in fast-tracking the building of local capacities for key elements of an integrated DRM approach. Included in the challenge are risk mapping and early warning, developing local disaster recovery frameworks, identifying risk reduction investments, building recovery preparedness, and conducting post-disaster needs assessment, as well as for general functional skills such as multi-stakeholder coordination, community engagement, strategic communications, and operational readiness. Following the passage of legal frameworks empowering local actors for DRM, capacity building strategies need to be devised and implemented swiftly. In Serbia, following the 2014 floods and given the total inadequacy of most municipal risk reduction plans with the scale of the flooding, the government realized the urgency to shift to a rapid training and certification approach for municipal staff on risk assessments for complex hazards. In Pakistan, the national disaster management agency has seconded technical staff from its central and regional offices to newly established district-level agencies managed by local governments until homegrown capacities are in place. In Niger, the government is setting up local observatories on disaster vulnerability to build capacities of communities and local governments in collecting and analyzing timely and effectively risk-related data. Measures also need to be taken to reduce staff turnover in DRM departments of local governments and develop partnerships with other local actors to bridge their capacity gaps. Finally, capacity building for DRM at the local level cannot be restricted to institutions: the best way to reduce the vulnerability of a decentralized DRM system is to invest in educating community members around resilient recovery, and in particular, risk identification and reduction as well as first response to disaster events. In this regard, more and more countries understand the value of building strong civil protection capacities among the general population and at the most grassroots level.

- **Mainstreaming a people-centered approach throughout the DRM cycle:** Post-disaster periods often see tensions between the necessity to act fast and decisively and the necessity to ensure that early and long-term recovery efforts are demand driven, inclusive and transparent, even if at the cost of rapidity. The risks of unfair access to recovery assistance, marginalization of vulnerable groups (e.g., women, youth, minorities, or disabled) and misuse of recovery funds in post-disaster situations is also heightened. Without a prior strong commitment by national and local actors to a people-centered approach in DRM, underpinned by relevant legal provisions, and methodological tools and effective capacities in public institutions, civil society, and communities, it is difficult to implement a people-centered approach in the heat of the action. Organized communities bring their own expertise to the recovery process and contribute to improving risk monitoring, such as through mobile phone solutions as in Niger. Needs assessment, priority setting and process implementation and their involvement better shape the recovery response to their expectations. More broadly, accountability, transparency, inclusive participation, and informed decision making need to infuse all aspects of disaster risk management. Post-disaster periods also heighten public expectations for efficient and inclusive use of recovery resources; if these are not met, the impact on the local social contract can be devastating and induce conflict in fragile settings. Civil society can play a lead role in promoting strong social accountability over the DRM cycle, from checking that the state tackles risk drivers (such as harmful land use and improper construction) to making sure that no one is left behind in rebuilding their lives. For this, civil society needs a conducive legal framework
that respect its independence, its right to information, as well as access to capacity-building support and
dedicated financial resources, which is still not the case in many disaster-prone countries. Finally, citizen
participation in DRM needs to be transformative rather than instrumental. The latter needs more than
a few community-based assessments or community working groups during the early recovery phase; it
needs strong political will among decision makers to understand local needs and aspirations in all their
complexity and constant evolution.

Furthermore, it is important to understand the unequal starting point between countries affected by disaster
risks in addressing the above challenges. Countries with years of decentralization behind them, a professionalized
local administration, and active civil society are less challenged in engaging local government and civil society in
resilient recovery. This compares to least developed and/or fragile and conflict-affected countries, where local
institutions can usually only count on scant support from the central government for anything, let alone for
building disaster response preparedness.

Conclusion

Major catastrophes can easily overwhelm local institutions by the impact and subsequent demands placed on
them and uncover organizational flaws and fractures and expose serious gaps in national and local disaster
recovery frameworks, including lack of capacities in local governments and civil society and insufficient
participation of affected communities. Limitations in balancing the roles and means of national and local actors
to build effective and demand-driven recovery preparedness often need rapid focused responses, especially
given the higher frequency of natural disasters linked to climate change. These limitations are also closely
related to the lack of empowerment of local stakeholders in achieving better local development results. More
effective DRM through empowerment of local stakeholders is inseparable from a broader reform effort at
strengthening core systems of local governance and local development.

Post-disaster periods provide strong incentives and opportunities to reform or restructure legal and institutional
aspects of local governance and DRM. Countries that have taken important steps toward accelerating the
decentralization of DRM functions have prioritized the following: (i) empowering local authorities with expanded
mandates for civilian protection; (ii) mainstreaming the use of integrated and risk-informed local development
planning; (iii) improving local governments’ democratic accountability and transparency; and (iii) making local
governance systems more participatory and inclusive. However, there are also important political economy
considerations surrounding the decentralization of disaster risk management, and every country has its own set
of unique parameters. In that regard, decentralizing too fast and wide a function that is so critical for a country's
stability and economy to local stakeholders that are not sufficiently prepared can be disastrous. Therefore,
solutions for sharing responsibilities for DRM with local stakeholders, anchored in carefully contextualized
analysis, will always work better than best practices imported from other disaster-prone settings.

Above all, these countries have made a strong commitment to the principle of community-led recovery (and
not just community-based needs assessment) which, in the longer term, is the best guarantee of resilience to
disaster risk. Indeed, people should be at the center of the recovery processes. Recovery must be inclusive,
fair and equitable, nondiscriminatory, and address the needs of all disadvantaged groups. It should be built
on the needs of the affected people, driven by their development goals and ambitions, and informed by their
knowledge and experiences. In particular, women should have a special space in recovery as both participants
and leaders in this process.
Finally, **government and donors need to increase financing made available directly to local stakeholders for recovery.** Combined with recovery policies and institutional arrangements, sufficient and predictable decentralized funding can accelerate recovery and reconstruction. Governments must identify funding sources (national and external) for supporting recovery preparedness needs of local actors, and also enable them to mobilize their own resources to ensure adequate and sustained financial availability to implement their recovery priorities. At the same time, local stakeholders must also build their capacities and commit to allocate their regular development resources toward DRM and adhere to accountable and transparent financial management; both commitments will create the necessary confidence with central governments and donors to spend more through local channels.

**References**


Somalia: Drought Recovery as an Opportunity for Resilience Building

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“I cannot stress more that the Somali people and the Somali government want to take ownership of the challenges of their country—the path to self-reliance starts with building the capacities and the institutions in the country. Support from the international community is encouraged to strengthen the government’s capacity.” —H. E. Dr. Ali Said Faqi, Ambassador to Benelux and Head of the Mission to the European Union, Federal Government of Somalia

**Somalia Context**

Somalia has made progress in recent years toward peace, stability, and prosperity. However, challenges such as a protracted conflict and cycles of drought and floods have severely affected the country’s development. The current 2016–17 drought has brought Somalia on the brink of famine. An estimated 6.7 million people are acutely food insecure and in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. As the situation continues to deteriorate, increasing numbers of people from rural areas will move to urban centers and join settlements for the internally displaced. The government has little capacity to absorb this shock as institutions and revenue mobilization are weak, presence of non-state belligerents remains, and public spending still depends on multilateral and bilateral donor inflows.

In this context, timely and flexible support from various humanitarian, recovery, and development partners is needed to make a significant dent in the US$1.5 billion humanitarian appeal and response to support a more cohesive, integrated, multi-sector, and programmatic approach that facilitates a gradual transition from immediate drought response to medium-term recovery and resilience building.

During the session, panelists presented and discussed preliminary ideas on developing and operationalizing a roadmap for Somalia’s future transition from immediate drought response to more sustainable medium-term drought recovery and resilience building, thereby preparing grounds for fuller scale developmental efforts to be launched at a future stage. The session raised awareness on ongoing initiatives by the government and various humanitarian/development partners on the ongoing drought response, and also presented upcoming proposals on transitioning from immediate recovery to resilience building. It also provided a quick assessment of the impact of the drought and conflict on people and key sectors of the economy and highlighted linkages with the massive current displacement to, and impact on, urban areas.
Key Initiatives for Recovery and Resilience Building in Somalia

Since the start of the drought in November 2016, Somalia has experienced losses estimated at around 26–30 percent of its livestock and 76 percent of crop during the 2016 "Deyr" season, in addition to 680,000 drought-displaced people and 41,000 cases of AWD/cholera.

As part of the humanitarian appeal, development partners, humanitarian organizations, and the Somali government have urgently taken steps to ensure that the immediate effects of the drought are mitigated. During the session, panelists discussed ongoing and future plans to ensure that recovery efforts lead toward a path of resilience building. Among them were:

- The World Bank's US$50 million "Somalia Emergency Drought Response and Recovery Project" (SEDRP) to address the immediate needs of the drought-affected people within the territory of the Federal Republic of Somalia, and support resilient recovery through the provision of livelihood opportunities and the restoration of agricultural and pastoral production. The project is extending multi-sector support to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and FAO’s current drought response efforts, and will be achieved through (a) a surge of high-impact, immediate interventions while humanitarian operations continue in tandem, and (b) activities that transition toward medium-term recovery via the reconstitution of productive assets.

- A proposed programmatic resilient recovery framework which aims to seek the strategic partnership, technical collaboration, and financial support of key bilateral and multilateral donors and development partners to the World Bank. The framework would be for setting up a trust fund for Somalia "to support its transition from the ongoing humanitarian and early drought recovery phase of interventions toward longer term resilience building aimed at reducing and mitigating negative impacts created by years of protracted conflict and recurring natural disasters." Such a ‘Recovery Framework’ will include efforts to break the cycle of recurring disasters in an environment of protracted conflict through transition from humanitarian efforts to long-term resilience building through five core analytical activities: (1) a prioritization and sequencing of recovery; (2) an institutional framework and implementation strategy; (3) a recovery financing strategy; (4) policy development for recovery and resilience; and (5) a program oversight, monitoring, and evaluation, and coordination plan. In a broader sense, this work will also inform dialogue between national governments, humanitarian and development partners on effective methods.
of operationalizing the multi-sectoral needs assessment and the programmatic recovery framework. This proposed initiative will also build upon and potentially utilize the platform of the ongoing WB partnership with the UN through the UN/WB Trust Fund on the humanitarian-development nexus in Somalia.

- DFID’s multiyear investment in Somalia and a shift to a four-year disaster response program to create a need for an incremental approach to resilience building for the country. This will also be supported by the DFID’s investment into more information and analytics for new early warning signs to support prevention and resilience.
- The government’s continued efforts to ensure proper institutional mechanisms are instituted to support resilience building, and encourage stronger cooperation and knowledge sharing between the ministries.

Panelists identified several key recommendations going forward:

- It is imperative to bridge development and humanitarian efforts to ensure that a strategy for recovery and resilience building is in place that makes Somalia more resilient to the next disaster, and to help the people of Somalia bounce back from the impacts of the drought and future disasters of this kind.
- We must aim to support a more cohesive, integrated, multi-sector, and programmatic approach that facilitates a gradual transition from immediate drought response to medium-term recovery and resilience building. This transition will ensure that Somalia has the necessary institutional capacity and resources to endure forthcoming natural disasters.
- It is essential to support and build the capacity of governments to conduct post-disaster needs assessments and identify recovery priorities that will contribute to long-term sustainable development.
- We must reinforce cross-border development investment and stronger cooperation regionally and internationally. The Horn of Africa has constantly been affected by issues such as conflict, natural disasters, and terrorism. Countries need to come together by sharing knowledge, avoiding being confronted by the same challenges, and using this as an opportunity to build on the experiences of the region.
- The role of the Somali diaspora needs to be leveraged to ensure that Somalia gets the needed support from its overseas population, and that remittances become an important contributor to consider when financing the government’s resilience building capabilities.

**Key Recommendations for Recovery and Resilience Building in Somalia**

Recurring climatic disasters around the world, and specifically in the case of Somalia, have emphasized a growing need and an opportunity to bring the process of long-term disaster recovery and resilience to the attention of the international community, with an emphasis on early recovery that begins while immediate and humanitarian assistance is still under way.

Recovery must begin as soon as possible, without waiting for humanitarian assistance to end. State institutions, NGOs, and multilateral organizations must adapt to support the longer term recovery process in the midst of humanitarian work. If recovery does not take place early, the process will become characterized by a vicious cycle of delays, inefficiency, and inadequate resources.

“Now is an opportune time to bring development and humanitarian resources together to ensure resilience building.”

—Gustavo González, Director, South-South and Resource Mobilization Division, FAO
CLOSING CEREMONY
Keynote Speech
EU Commissioner Neven Mimica, International Cooperation and Development

Ladies and Gentlemen,
Distinguished Guests,

I am very pleased to be with you today at the closing ceremony of the Third Edition of the World Reconstruction Conference.

Let me start by thanking our distinguished panelists, the 79 African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries, the World Bank/Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, the United Nations Development Programme and my own colleagues at the European Commission for bringing this important event together with the European Development Days.

I also warmly welcome the 800 experts and practitioners from all over the world who attended this Conference. I am confident that over the last two days you have had some very fruitful exchanges about recovery and reconstruction. I am grateful for the incredible work you do to promote resilience and reduce the risks and impacts of crises.

From the Commission’s perspective, this is a perfect opportunity to discuss how we can make recovery more resilient. We have just finalized our proposals on how to develop and implement—together with our Member States and international partners—a Strategic Approach to Resilience in our external action.

Building on our own experiences and lessons learned, we are now expanding the scope of the EU’s approach to resilience—by putting emphasis on an enhanced state and societal resilience to cope with different types of risks and pressures.
Strengthening resilience is intended to make EU external action more coherent, more responsive, and more flexible, and therefore, more efficient.

We want to break the silos and ensure that EU political, diplomatic, development, and humanitarian actors work more closely together when assessing and implementing resilience measures in partner countries.

We want to ensure that our political and operational responses to impending crises are more timely and integrated, by better monitoring and analyzing external pressures.

And we want to work more closely with our partner countries and local actors, to increase their own resilience and ultimately their ability to protect the most vulnerable.

For example, we are looking specifically at strengthening resilience in rapidly growing urban areas, where a lack of planning or investment in climate change mitigation and other geophysical risks can expose people to huge risks when significant damage occurs.

Addressing the underlying risk factors upfront—through a more informed public and better designed private and public investments—is proving more cost-effective than post-disaster responses.

Finally, we are also looking to increase our policy and practical cooperation with international partners on research and, where possible, to share data and alerts, and align our approaches.

We hope this will result in more efficient actions on the ground, because the impacts of future disasters are likely to be even more devastating given the additional complications of climate change, urbanization, food price fluctuations, financial shocks, and other stresses.
When it comes to natural disasters, we cannot prevent drought in Ethiopia or earthquakes in Nepal or Italy. But we can work more effectively together to help states and communities to adapt, minimize, and eventually to recover from these types of disasters.

We have to accept that risk is a very real possibility in many of the contexts in which we work. This should be factored in upfront, rather than being seen as an unexpected exception after the event. Some good examples of this are the Global Network Against Food Crises and the discussion you had on resilient cities.

When it comes to conflicts, we need a different approach. This should include early action in response to early warning, closer coordination to support regional and country-led plans, new policy and program guidance, and better collaboration between humanitarian and development actors—not only in managing the crisis, but to build resilience from the onset.

Last but not least, we must ensure better coordination between the European Union, World Bank, United Nations, and other major players, based on shared analyses, such as the Reconstruction and Peacebuilding Assessments or the Post Natural Disasters Assessments. The example of Nepal is a good case in point.

Because ultimately, our resilience efforts are about protecting the most vulnerable people in the most vulnerable of circumstances.

We owe it to all of them to do whatever we can to build more effective approaches and responses, which improve lives and livelihoods, and avoid human sufferance.

Thank you.
Panel Discussion Summary

Following the keynote speech, moderator **Nigel Fisher** introduced a short video that captured the key moments of the conference and the reaction of the participants. The moderator then invited the panel members to present their views on the most important topics that stemmed out of the conference.

**Zainab S. Ahmed** reminded the challenges that Nigeria faces to ensure successful post-crisis recovery. Those include the need to create consensus to prioritize, plan and monitor together; the coordination of the various actors in the field; and the need to create a sustainable peace for a stable future.

**Wade Warren** expressed his believes that the promotion of resilience is critical to the future of USAID development efforts and that programs can have long-term impacts when they are country-owned and country-led. For this, there is the need to promote countries own efforts to strengthen resilience and to manage risks. Investing not only on humanitarian relief but also on resilient recovery leads to development outcomes and is a good return on investment.

**Robert Glasser** insisted on a huge progress made in the direction of the Sendai Framework for DRR, but reminded of the challenges that continue to arise, such as Hurricane Patricia in Mexico, and recurring storms and cyclones in Bangladesh. The progress is seen via the work of these countries to increase early warning systems, for instance. The real challenge is the increasing number of hazards such as climate change, combined with massive economic growth and investment. There is the need to ensure that the investment in new infrastructure that goes along with economic growth is risk informed, if not, the rising costs of disasters will continue.

**Viwanou Gnassounou** presented the diversity of the challenges faced by ACP-EU members States, ranging from big to small countries, and facing different types of disasters. The approach of ACP-EU is to work to avoid the duplication of efforts by building national capacity and information sharing.
Suman Kumar shared his first-hand experience as a victim of the Nepal earthquake and his efforts to help rebuild his country. With the help of an American friend, both initiated the building of 100 shelters. The initiative received later the support of 130 organizations, which led to the construction of shelters which housed over 23,000 victims. Mr. Suman Kumar insisted on the need to trust the youth and include them in the efforts for resilient recovery. Another recommendation included the need to strengthen public-private partnership.

Barbara Pesce-Monteiro expressed the importance of working not only on the humanitarian relief phase but also on the recovery phase. For that, there is the need to strengthen partnerships and ensure a common understanding of what recovery is. Mrs. Pesce-Monteiro highlighted the importance of securing predictable and flexible funding to enable the recovery efforts following the conduct of assessments such as the Post-Disaster Needs Assessments (PDNAs).

Sameh Wahba closed the panel discussion by reminding the audience of the interlinkages of the financial challenges linked to urbanization, conflict and disasters. In addition to the mechanisms existing for risk finance, donors can work with national governments to increase the mobilization of local revenues. Donors need to work in supporting the local governments which are in the front line for resilient recovery to improve their credit worthiness and better manage their assets. The strengthening of public private partnerships is also key to address these challenges.

Barbara Pesce-Monteiro shared the highlights of the joint Conference Communiqué: 1) Resilient recovery is an imperative for sustainable development. 2) The situation of conflict and fragility requires specific attention in recovery processes. 3) Conflict sensitivity should be built in in all recovery situations. 4) Preparing for recovery pays off. 5) Better prepared communities recover faster. 6) Women participation as actors of recovery is essential for recovery and to build back better. 7) Cultural heritage is an essential element in resilient recovery and reconstruction. 8) Potential for partnership with the private sector should be pursued and we should be looking at the risk financing.
ACP-EU Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Program
Focus Day on Post-Disaster Response and Recovery Frameworks: Overview, Lessons Learned, and Intra-ACP Knowledge Exchange

On June 9, 2017, more than 100 participants, including ministers, permanent secretaries, ambassadors, disaster risk management (DRM) coordinators, recovery advisors, and policy officers from African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries attended a “Focus Day” on lessons learned from post-disaster response in ACP countries in the frame of the ACP-EU Natural Disaster Risk Reduction (NDRR) Program. The Focus Day, organized by the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) and hosted by the ACP Secretariat in Brussels, took place in conjunction with the third edition of the World Reconstruction Conference (WRC3). Welcome remarks were made by Ambassador Léonard-Emile Ognimba, Assistant Secretary General Political Affairs & Human Development Department-ACP Secretariat and Mr. Felice Zaccheo, Head of Unit, Sustainable Energy and Climate Change, European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development.

The core objective of this one-day workshop was to bring together officials from ACP countries, the ACP Secretariat, European Union (EU), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and GFDRR/World Bank, to strengthen the discourse on post-disaster response activities in ACP countries since the ACP-EU NDRR...
Program inception in 2011. The Focus Day also aimed at promoting intra-ACP knowledge exchange of best practices and lessons learned on post-disaster response.

“The raison d’être of this event is to create interaction between political actors and actors that are on the ground and to therefore find useful synergies to better tackle disasters.”
—Ambassador Léonard-Emile Ognimba, ACP Assistant Secretary General—Political Affairs and Human Development, ACP Group of States

The workshop introduced the background and institutional framework surrounding PDNAs, which are key to the mobilization of resources and international development assistance after a disaster.

“The Focus Day is important to share experiences and lessons learned from countries that were affected by disasters. It is also a chance to take stock of how the ACP-EU NDRR Program has provided support, especially on post-disaster response.”
—Mr. Felice Zaccheo, Head of Unit, Sustainable Energy and Climate Change, European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development

The sharing of country experiences and lessons learned from the three regions triggered intensive discussions. From the viewpoint of ACP countries, disasters create a window of opportunity for mainstreaming disaster risk reduction and climate resilience into recovery and development policies. ACP delegates underscored that recovery and reconstruction efforts need to adopt a holistic, multi-stakeholder and resilience-based approach to risk-informed development. Integrating sectoral recommendations in recovery plans was considered key in this regard.

“Case studies help to clear up some of the misunderstanding that encapsulate frameworks and guidelines. The views from bigger African countries as well as smaller Pacific countries, from landlocked countries as well as island countries, help the discussion and in getting the buy-in from colleagues who yet have to be more familiar with this framework.”
—Hon. Mr. Siaosi Sovaleni, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of MEIDECC, Tonga

From the ACP-EU NDRR Program’s perspective, the Focus Day confirmed that the vast majority of country delegates appreciate the support received so far. The Program has had an impact by contributing to building capacities at country and regional levels, and leveraging additional financing from other sources. Looking forward, the Focus Day has reminded everybody of the importance to have regular intra-ACP knowledge exchange mechanisms and highlighted the need for organizing more South-South and regional cooperation activities.

“Today was a great opportunity to listen to first-hand country experiences and lessons learned. We will continue cooperating with the ACP Secretariat and the European Union on best ways to exchange knowledge such as in today’s event.”
—Manuela Chiapparino, Team Leader, ACP-EU Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Program, GFDRR
Conference Evaluation

Gender Participation

Overall, How Would You Rate the Third World Reconstruction Conference?

How Would You Rate the Conference for . . .
How Would You Rate the Conference for

How would you rate the conference’s success in identifying effective and forward-looking approaches to achieve resilient post-crisis recovery in which climate and disaster risk reduction, fragility, and conflict considerations are mainstreamed?

How likely are you to attend a similar event again in the future?