Cabo Verde Emergency Preparedness and Response Diagnostic & Investment Opportunities: Building a Culture of Preparedness

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report is a product of the staff of The World Bank and the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors or the governments they represent. The World Bank and GFDRR does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

Rights and Permissions

The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because the World Bank encourages dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given.
Acknowledgments

The World Bank would like to thank the Government of Cabo Verde for the partnership and strong support throughout this project. We thank the many participating interview partners for their invaluable inputs and guidance. This project is part of the World Bank Technical Assistance under the Disaster Risk Management Development Policy Financing with a Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option (Cat DDO).

This work was implemented by Prepared International (PPI) under the oversight and coordination of a World Bank team consisting of Oscar Ishizawa, Robert Reid and Elad Shenfeld, with the technical support from Rossella Della Monica and Joaquin Muñoz Díaz. Edson Medina facilitated local coordination and logistics for the Preparedness International (PPI) team’s mission in June 2019 to collect data and information for the assessment. Pietro Spigai designed the report. The team also received inputs and guidance from development partners during the technical missions and final presentation of this work.

This executive summary, the full report and associated activities were financed by the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg through the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction & Recovery (GFDRR).
This executive summary contains the results of the Diagnostic of the Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) system of Cabo Verde based on the Ready2Respond framework. The summary also covers the advised investment priorities.

The assessment took place between mid-May and the end of June 2019. The overall conclusion is that the EP&R system in Cabo Verde shows weaknesses that leave the country vulnerable to losses and damage to its development gains, and to potential loss of lives. Multiple aspects of the EP&R system should be simultaneously strengthened in order to prepare the country to better respond to crisis and disaster.
1. Introduction: Background, Methodology and General Findings

The World Bank supports the Government of Cabo Verde in a wide range of activities, recognizing that any impact caused by an adverse natural event would bring about loss and damage to recent development gains and undermine future development. As such, the World Bank, under the framework of the Disaster Risk Management Development Policy Financing with a Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option, supports the country in strengthening the EP&R procedures and capacities for the management of disaster and climate-related shocks. The Cabo Verde EP&R Diagnostic is considered as a continuation of past efforts led by the National Civil Protection Service (SNPC) aimed at assessing current status of the EP&R systems, its potential gaps, and at strengthening EP&R capacities in Cabo Verde.

The methodology builds on five core interrelated components of emergency preparedness and response:

1. Legal and Institutional Frameworks;
2. Information;
3. Facilities;
4. Equipment; and
5. Personnel.

Each component was measured by a set of criteria that address a particular aspect of a functional EP&R system for Cabo Verde. In turn, each criterion included a set of four indicators, each with five key attributes that gauge the maturity of that aspect of the preparedness and response system. In total, the Diagnostic examined 360 individual data points related to the strength of the EP&R system in Cabo Verde.

Map 1: Map of the Republic of Cabo Verde.
Source: https://earthexplorer.usgs.gov/

The infographic below shows the diagnostic results for Cabo Verde for all 18 criteria, as included in the Ready2Respond framework.

**R2R Diagnostic results for Cabo Verde**

The overall conclusion is that the EP&R system of Cabo Verde is in the primary steps of its development and that investments are needed in order to strengthen the country’s overall EP&R capacity. With many elements of the system not being in place, the scores for Cabo Verde are on the lower spectrum of the scale. The highest scoring criteria are “legislated accountability” (0.91) and “urban firefighting and technical rescue” (0.90). Two components score as low as zero, meaning that these capacities are completely absent from the EP&R system: “information management systems” and “international support coordination”.

Note: Actual scale runs from 0 to 5, results shown on a scale of 0 to 2.

**Figure 1: Diagnostic results for the EP&R system in Cabo Verde**

**Purpose of the Diagnostic:** To provide technical support to the Government of Cabo Verde in assessing and identifying systemic opportunities to develop and improve the overall EP&R system.

**Objectives:**

1. To advise on future programs and investments in order to enhance Cabo Verde’s EP&R system; and
2. To contribute to improving efficiency, avoiding duplication of efforts, and enhancing the benefits of collaboration among key Government, emergency relief entities, private sector, and civil society groups.
Key observations explaining the scores are the following:

**In General**

The EP&R system relies on the goodwill and motivation of emergency responders and local communities to effectively respond to crisis situations. A comprehensive and strategic system, which would enable more effective and efficient response capacities, has not yet been implemented. A first challenge is the absence of a common, country-wide interpretation of the main risks for the country, which results in a lack of focus on preparedness and response capacities.

**Legislation**

Developments to strengthen the basic law have been noted, but legislative frameworks would require further amendments. Initiatives to develop policy plans and procedures, such as Emergency Operational Procedures, Crisis Management Plans, and municipality-level Disaster Management Plans, should be finalized and endorsed as soon as possible.

**Information**

Whereas positive elements have been noted in terms of information, this component suffers from the absence of permanent and strategically integrated information and early warning systems.

**Facilities**

Basic facilities, such as an Emergency Operations Center, warehouses, and shelters, are underdeveloped, despite references in legal documents.

**Equipment**

There are neither existing norms nor legislation regarding emergency vehicles and equipment requirements. Firefighting and pre-hospital care equipment are mostly old, un-standardized and not interoperable, obsolete and, on the whole, insufficiently available. As a result, the safety of the people, visitors, and emergency responders cannot be adequately guaranteed. The National Police, however, is quite well equipped.

**Personnel**

With the exception of the police, personnel staffing and skills are insufficient. Firefighting capacity is below a bare minimum, and knowledge to handle hazardous materials, extraction of persons, and specialized search and (rope) rescue skills are lacking on many islands. Several emergency response services operate on merely 50% of the needed capacity, which results in challenges when it comes to performing primary tasks, and leaving no margin for the development of the organization and overall EP&R system.

This Diagnostic report pinpoints that some of the findings relevant to the Cabo Verdean context fell outside of the Diagnostic methodology. This context includes earthquake and volcanic eruption hazards on the islands of Fogo, Brava, and Santo Antão — as well as possible incidents with oil tankers and cargo ships at sea. Some of the additional findings include:

- There is no plan for (mass) evacuation to protect inhabitants and visiting tourists on the islands of Fogo, Brava, and Santo Antão;
- Legislation and capacity for building code inspections are insufficient; and
- Besides arrangements with oil and gas distributors, there is no response capacity to cope with incidents at sea and land, and to mitigate any resulting environmental impact.
2. Specific Findings for Each of the Components

Component 1 — Legal and Institutional Accountabilities

The basic legal framework for EP&R is in place, and important efforts have been made over the past years. However, further amendments and improvements are needed in order to strengthen the legal framework. Governmental authorities are mostly aware of these required adaptations, and many articles of the legislation already mention further operational procedures and policy plans to be established and/or implemented as extensions of the law.

This incomplete policy structure of operational plans and procedures bears important consequences because, as a result of it being incomplete, regulations declaring respective accountability are not enforced. The existing legal framework therefore provides little guidance for organizations to efficiently focus on their responsibilities, thus hindering the development of key actors who are part of a multi-sector and multidisciplinary collective of crisis prevention and management institutions.

The Diagnostic examined governmental and institutional relations and found that the lines of authority between national and municipal levels are improperly balanced in respect with EP&R, and that they lack both structure and clear accountabilities. Municipalities have decision-making power for investments in EP&R, which makes the functionality of EP&R at the municipal level subject to political willingness. Furthermore, key positions such as Regional Commander, are neither adequately anchored in legislation, nor defined by law.

In terms of financial preparedness, Cabo Verde has few appropriate financial instruments for EP&R and early recovery, even though there is a response budget which can be made available once a state of emergency has been declared at the national level. As a matter of fact, a state of calamity has been declared twice in Cabo Verdean history: in response to the volcanic eruption on Fogo island in 2014-2015, and to the flooding in 2016. Despite the official establishment by law of the National Emergency Fund (*Fundo Nacional de Emergência - FNE*) on national level in November 2018, but at the time of writing this report, it was not fully functional yet. As such, the financial responsibilities for incident and disaster response are a subject of confusion between the national and municipality levels. Municipalities actually assume that the national budget will be made available for calamities, insofar as no respective budget lines are provided in the municipal budgets. At the end of the day, there are no emergency procurement procedures for response.

Component 2 — Information

Non-governmental organizations like the Red Cross and community-based initiatives, are well established and rooted within Cabo Verdaean communities. These organizations show significant potential for public engagement, since the cohesive communities demonstrate a high level of spontaneous resilience driven by individual initiatives, during and after recent calamities. However, community engagement to build resilience to disasters in Cabo Verde consists of multiple efforts and lacks an overall strategic and programmatic approach. The incorporation of civil society, its strong institutional memory and close contact with the communities it serves, would increase community ownership in the field of EP&R, facilitate inter-agency coordination and cooperation, and incorporate inter-generational memory in EP&R planning.
Although there is no all-hazard integrated early warning system in place, important components of such a system are operational. Insufficient information-sharing is hampering a collective development of early warning systems. The required capacity for shared analyses is very limited. With the current practice of issuing warnings via cell phone, there is little control over their timely delivery. The cell phone system is vulnerable during disasters due to the lack of an adequate back-up communication system.

With regards to Disaster Management Information Systems (DMIS), data and information are not systematically shared. This is the result of a lack of knowledge of the supportive role which a shared DMIS can play. Secondly, most organizations would not have sufficient structural capacity to contribute to an information system. The Spatial Data Infrastructure of Cabo Verde managed by the National Institute for Territorial Management (Instituto Nacional de Gestão do Território - INGT) shows much potential but is not widely used to inform decision making for disaster risk management.

**Component 3 – Facilities**

At the national level, a shared call and dispatch center for fire brigades, ambulances, and the police, was established in the National Civil Protection building. The outcomes of this initiative are however limited, as the center is not sufficiently connected to an overall plan to strengthen emergency coordination and capacity building at national, island, and municipality levels.

The assessment identified a general necessity for training facilities to accommodate trainings and exercises in the field of EP&R, which are vital in order both to train for enhanced institutional coordination in disaster response, and to maintain the basic technical skills of first responders. Lines of command cannot be practiced through exercises, and in the absence of the activation of the mechanism for real emergencies, this leads to a lack of awareness and operationality among actors. In most countries, training programs in disaster risk management are rooted in Human Resource Management and connected to multi-agency organizational capacity development. In Cabo Verde, this practice should also be implemented.

Logistical warehouses and response stations play a critical role in disaster response, but such a network of strategically located and supplied warehouses is not in place. For the time being, the country fully relies upon the logistical capabilities of the Red Cross and upon international support in case of crises. The network of Red Cross warehouses is of great added value. Fogo and Brava have the most articulated requests for warehouse facilities and should be given first consideration in building such facilities.

There are no pre-identified open spaces such as parks, vacant land, or green spaces, designated as temporary shelter for displaced people in case of an emergency. In the event of a crisis, makeshift shelters are improvised in schools or community centers, but these spaces lack the facilities to provide basic living conditions and to guarantee the safety and well-being of the displaced persons, especially of vulnerable groups. Equally, there are no protection plans in place to ensure that these improvised shelters comply with internationally defined guidelines and standards.
Component 4 — Equipment

Emergency social services in Cabo Verde were identified as weak. There is no functioning system for pre-hospital medical care with clear responsibilities and institutional accountability. Overall, the health care system operates at a basic level and is challenged by a lack of resources, equipment, and qualified personnel. The necessary equipment for pre-hospital emergency care in ambulances is mostly not in place, and when it is, it does not comply with international standards. Many ambulances are mainly used as a means of transportation to a medical center or hospital. And even so, injured persons often need to rely on private transportation or taxis and resort to the help of untrained individuals. At the time of the assessment, the island of Brava did not have a single operational ambulance. In case of an emergency with multiple persons injured, the existing medical services would immediately fall short.

Hazard-specific response equipment capacities were located with regard to wildfire emergency management, response to extreme weather events, and for evacuation in case of seismic activity. However, hazard-specific response equipment has not been adequately implemented to cope with possible volcanic activity, pandemics, and flooding landslides.

Fire departments are minimally equipped with mostly old and used vehicles of different brands, in variable condition. An adequate water supply to respond to larger fire incidents depends upon the assistance of private companies to operate water trucks, but their availability is not guaranteed due to the absences of any formal agreements in this matter. Safety equipment for firefighters is limited and mostly old. The availability of search and (specialized) rescue equipment is far below minimum standards, and equipment to handle hazardous materials is unavailable.

The ability of response personnel to attend to urban fires, as well as to carry out technical rescue, is limited due to the lack of specified skills and equipment. The growth in the tourism sector fuels greater concern, such as the extent of Cabo Verde’s capability to appropriately respond through rope rescue to potential accidents of hiking tourism.

Component 5 — Personnel

The current incident organization structures of Cabo Verde do not allow for an efficient and scalable response to emergencies. The organizational structure defined by law is not implemented, and lines of responsibility and communication among actors remain unclear, with no shared perspective on a structure for incident organization. As such, incident response is deployed based on implicit procedures that have been developed in practice over time. There is no formal assessment of response to incidents, and the EP&R system is not organized in a way that enables systemic learning and improvement for either itself or its personnel.

The assessment has found a lack in any training and simulation routine to enhance institutional coordination among key actors. Cabo Verde’s training system and knowledge-building is limited due to a lack of resources and of skilled technical staff that might facilitate trainings. As a result, training is provided ad-hoc, and mostly on a basic level. For example, experienced (but uncertified) firemen will train younger recruits. First responders are also mainly trained by Portuguese fire departments for basic first aid. Exercises and drills are also carried out on an ad-hoc basis and most take place under pressure of international regulations for airports, marine security, and private sector entities, like oil and gas importers and providers. Where emergency response plans are in place, their operational value is estimated to be low, as no simulation exercises are carried out to practice lines of responsibility and command. There are no hazard-specific response plans.

The international support coordination carried out by Cabo Verdean Civil Protection actors in past emergencies was functional. Nevertheless, international support coordination is hampered by a lack of both capacity and clarity regarding accountabilities in terms of legislation. There are no implemented functional logistical systems to receive and distribute international support. Many first response organizations generally operate below required staffing, and many organizations lack the statutes to formalize their capacity requirements.
3. Recommendations for Investment and Development

Many aspects of the EP&R system need improvements. In order to support development, the following factors and conditions should be considered:

- With the current lack of capacity combined with a lack of clear structure, a modest ambition for change is, in itself, a major undertaking which will take a long time to be implemented. Structural funding for significant capacity building at policy and coordination levels, as well as for primary processes, should be secured in the Government’s budget.

- An ambitious hands-on longer-term technical assistance program is essential. Technical assistance should focus on project implementation as much as on local capacity building, via an all-stakeholder-inclusive development and project implementation.

- High-level political ownership should lead the development of the EP&R system.

Investment opportunities to strengthen the EP&R system are arranged to create two separate tracks of development which, to some extent, can be implemented independently and at their own respective pace:

- Initiatives to strengthen the establishment of the EP&R system in order to support development and maturing over time; and

- Investments and initiatives directly aimed at strengthening response capabilities on short to middle term.

Picture 2: São Filipe in Fogo, Cabo Verde
Source: iStock
3.1 DEVELOPMENT TRACK ONE: INVESTMENTS TO SUPPORT THE MATURING OF THE EP&R SYSTEM

Project 1: Emergency Operations Center and Crisis Management Plan

Investment is critical in order to address the most central caveats in Cabo Verde’s current EP&R system, best support the successful onset of the Emergency Operations Center operation, and ensure the crisis management plan is implemented successfully with clear focus put on sustaining efficiency and clarity for stakeholders holding roles and responsibilities in Cabo Verde’s EP&R.

On the short term, US$108,800 is required to hire support to assist the National Civil Protection Service in order to:

• Establish operational procedures in support of the Emergency Operations Center;
• Draft a broadly supported crisis management plan; and
• Build knowledge capacity among stakeholders in relation to the Emergency Operations Center.

On the medium to long term, US$550,000 is required for IT:

• For IT system integration in support of the Emergency Operations Center, and for the development of geographical information in general, a MoU between INGT and the National Civil Protection Service should be established, including hardware and populating databases.

Project 2: Support the Full Implementation of EP&R Legislation

Address identified requirements for the existent basis of legislation to be implemented at national and municipal levels, including policy plans and operational procedures mentioned in the law, and to create clarity on the budget for the EP&R system.

An estimated US$222,750 is required to:

• Support an all-relevant stakeholder inclusive process of revision and/or the drafting of the complete legal and institutional framework, including the policies and operational procedures mentioned in the law;
• Establish municipal Civil Protection Services and emergency response plans;
• Establish statutes on the responsibilities of Regional Operation Commanders;
• Revise legislation and procedures for the selection of firefighters and other first response personnel;
• Revise financial preparedness mechanisms;
• Advise on the centralization of the procurement processes, in order to cut costs and support standardization;
• Establish public financial management policies and procedures;
• Strengthen the legislation for building code inspection; and
• Advise on a training program with tabletop exercises to support newly adopted operational procedures and standards on all islands.
**Project 3: Capacity Building in Host Nation Support**

Capacitate EP&R stakeholders to provide host nation with relevant support, notably in terms of evacuation planning and warehouse and logistical hubs. Involve international cooperation and support to contain environmental impact as a possible result of incidents with ships at sea.

An estimated US$129,300 is required to:

- Draft a specific operation plan for mass evacuation for Fogo, Brava, and Santo Antão; and for the other islands in general;
- Draft an operation plan for logistical hubs and for the coordination of international assistance in response to, and recovery from, disaster at or nearby harbors and airports, in specific locations yet to be identified;
- Draft a host nation support\(^2\) approach that fully ties into the operation procedures and legislation established during project 2;
- The working method should be an all-stakeholder inclusive process, with a training and capacity-building mindset. Strengthened local knowledge is a deliverable of the project; and
- Advise on opportunities for cooperation with regional initiatives like ECOWAS\(^3\), Portuguese-speaking countries, and the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre.

**Project 4: Building Training Facilities**

The maintenance and development of technical skills of EP&R personnel has been assessed as limited due to a lack in training facilities. The establishment of a basic 40-people classroom for training purposes in the Civil Protection building in Praia will be a vital basis to further develop necessary training capacities.

An estimated US$46,000 is required to:

- Host trainings in a flexible way in the existing National Civil Protection building (with quite a small investment). Many trainings should be organized on the spot on the different islands; and
- Organize trainings on various islands to reduce transportation costs, and ensure that first responders in training can be deployed on the spot in case of an incident or crisis. Training facilities on the other eight inhabited islands should be arranged in existing (private) buildings. MoUs with the companies or owners of the said buildings should be established.

---

\(^2\) Host Nation Support includes preparing for: incoming international aid, humanitarian relief in case international assistance is requested; emergency support functions in close cooperation with international organizations.

\(^3\) Economic Community of Western Africa States
Required Government Commitment to the Development of Track One: Investments to Support the Maturing of the EP&R System

1. Under the leadership of the Prime Minister — or any designated minister — assisted by the National Civil Protection Service, buying in and supporting should be secured among local political leaders, as well as the management and personnel of response agencies in the framework of EP&R development programs. Regular progress reporting should help keep relevant staff and political leadership informed of any development. Regional Civil Protection commanders could be instrumental in keeping all involved personnel connected and informed. A communication and cooperation plan in support of development programs should be drafted.

2. While implementing the full legislative system, the capacity of policy and coordination personnel should be increased in order to take on new tasks of information sharing and analysis. During the implementation of projects 1 and 2, additional capacity needs will become more defined, but a significant increase in personnel budget should be anticipated:

   I. It is recommended to increase the capacity of the National Civil Protection Service in the coming year, by a minimum of five people who will actively contribute in bonding with other organizations in the EP&R system; and

   II. It is recommended to further increase the National Civil Protection Service within the next five years, with eight more people in order to beef up capacity, and reach out to all the inhabited islands of the Archipelago.

3. Strengthening the operational coordination capacity of the various organizations in the EP&R system to the best of island-level financial capabilities, based on advice to be delivered as an outcome of Project 2. Increasing capacity with a focus on GIS and general geographic information, including early warning system integration and information exchange.

4. The Government is advised to structurally finance the implementation of adequate equipment maintenance programs. Cooperation with experts from Portugal, for instance, could be considered.

5. Since budgets are limited, shelters should be set up, within the next ten years, in existing buildings which require minimal adjustment to be safe and accessible, in order to house people, including vulnerable groups, on a temporary basis. The Government is advised to identify suitable buildings and arrangements for future use as temporary shelters.

6. On the short-term, training facilities (classrooms) should be set up in existing buildings on all inhabited islands. Arrangements for the use of suitable existing training facilities should be implemented.
3.2 DEVELOPMENT TRACK TWO: INVESTMENTS TO SUPPORT RESPONSE CAPACITY ON THE SHORT TO MEDIUM TERM

**Project 5: Procurement of Pre-Hospital Medical Equipment and Vehicles**

Clear requirements for pre-hospital medical care equipment were identified by the R2R Diagnostic as critical investment necessity and should be addressed with highest priority.

**Short term:** the availability of ambulances should be increased within 1 year, with 2 ambulances for each municipality, provided that enough staff is trained and/or additionally hired. **Total investment in vehicles would amount to US$5,940,000 (44 x US$135,000).** Existing ambulances should be listed, and their life expectancy be assessed. With the assistance of, preferably, Portuguese Civil Protection, an adequate maintenance program should be established and budgeted for. Provisions are made in the Government budget in order to replace vehicles and equipment which have reached the end of their life span.

**Medium term:** ambulances that need to be replaced, should be replaced within the next 3 years. An inventory should help to guide and plan the said investments. 75 fixed radios should be purchased and installed, and all ambulance teams should be fitted with 1 mobile radio.

**Longer term:** within 7 years, all advised medical equipment and vehicles should be purchased to operate in compliance with international standards.

**Project 6: Procurement Firefighting and Rescue Equipment and Vehicles**

Clear requirements in firefighting and rescue equipment were identified by the R2R Diagnostic as critical investment necessity and should be addressed with highest priority. These include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 heavy fire trucks</td>
<td>US$3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 medium fire trucks</td>
<td>US$2,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 water trucks</td>
<td>US$3,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 hydraulic platforms</td>
<td>US$3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 mobile command units</td>
<td>US$850,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>450 safety equipment sets</td>
<td>US$625,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Investment</strong></td>
<td><strong>US$13,575,500</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Short term: the availability of firefighting trucks should be increased within 1 year, with 9 heavy and 9 medium trucks, provided that enough staff is trained and/or additionally hired. Total investment in vehicles would amount to US$2,250,000 in heavy trucks, and US$1,620,000 in medium trucks.

Existing vehicles should be listed, and their life expectancy should be determined. With the assistance of, preferably, Portuguese Civil Protection, an adequate maintenance program should be established and budgeted for. Provisions are made in the Government budget in order to replace vehicles and equipment which have reached the end of their life span.

Medium term: 17 water trucks and 450 sets of safety equipment should be purchased within 3 years. Total investment would amount to US$4,025,500.

Longer term: all remaining equipment should be purchased within 7 years. Total investment would amount to US$5,680,000.

Project 7: Establishment of Preparedness for a First Response Training Program

The R2R Diagnostic identified the urgent need to target and support emergency response personnel in developing technical skills, with special attention to medical and firefighting personnel. The training program will follow a tailored two-track design.

An estimated US$188,200 is required to:

- Implement standard basic training for medical and firefighting personnel in all 22 municipalities of the nine islands — both volunteers and professionals. Use the opportunity of this first training to both refresh and streamline knowledge and skills, and to assess current skills;
- Based on the outcome of the first deliverable, design a training program and calculate the costs required to reach the international standards response capacity of all first responders, prioritizing medical and firefighting teams; and
- Design a program and estimate the costs of the training of a selection of local professionals to become certified trainers.

Project 8: Establishment of a Community Resilience-Building Program

Investing in civil society actors with the aim of capacitating them in the field of EP&R, will tap into their strong community outreach and proximity to vulnerable groups, and coordinate their efforts to ease their active involvement in mobilizing communities when struck by disaster.

An estimated US$104,500 is required to:

- Set up municipal-level Community Resilience Support Groups under the guidance of volunteer Community Resilience Officers, which oversee simulation exercises and disaster risk awareness campaigns — this plan entails specific attention being paid to the needs of all vulnerable groups;
- Draft a multiple non-governmental organizations’ implementation proposal to build community resilience; and
- Guide and facilitate the implementation process during 3 years.

US$250,000 should be earmarked for community resilience building initiatives by non-governmental organizations on all 9 islands.
Required Government Commitment to Supporting the System’s Short to Medium Term Capacity Building

1. The Government should budget the costs for structural training programming, including the training of first responders and coordinators. A yearly budget of US$500,000 should be earmarked.

2. Most volunteer firefighters do not take leave from work to attend trainings. A solution to this problem would be to hire professional staff and/or find compensatory arrangements for employers whose personnel is required.

3. Volunteering is an alternative to professional firefighting. The capacity of medical and professional firefighting response personnel should urgently be brought up to minimal standards. A higher structural staffing budget for operational personnel is a prerequisite to saving lives and preventing damage and casualties in infrastructures. In terms of equipment, the acquisition of additional vehicles is recommended. Well-trained professional ambulance and firefighting teams, available 24/7, should be considered a prerequisite prior to purchasing vehicles:
   - An ambulance requires 2 people, working 3 shifts. The workload is normally spread over a 6 times 6 roster. It takes 36 trained staff members to operate 1 ambulance 24/7; and
   - A fire truck requires a team of 6 responders, working 3 shifts. One team of 6 is typically on standby at the fire department for 24 hours, followed by 48 hours off. One fire truck requires 18 trained staff members to operate 24/7.

In case of a limited availability of funds, an EP&R development program with a US$5-million budget should focus on the following seven investment opportunities, deriving from the two aforementioned development tracks:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Name and Output</th>
<th>Investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Emergency Operations Center and the implementation of Crisis Management Plans: consultancy and ICT infrastructure</td>
<td>US$658,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completion of legal framework</td>
<td>US$222,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuation planning, as well as warehouse and logistical hubs in the context of Host Nation Support</td>
<td>US$129,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement of 10 ambulances</td>
<td>US$1,350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement of 11 medium firetrucks</td>
<td>US$1,980,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First response training program</td>
<td>US$188,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community resilience building</td>
<td>US$354,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Investment</strong></td>
<td><strong>US$4,883,550</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The establishment of a Center of Excellence for Disaster Management and Disaster Risk Reduction should be considered. It is still lacking in the West African Region and would provide for the three key points that the further development of the EP&R system of Cabo Verde requires: political support, capacity building, and long-term funding support.