

Crisis Preparedness Gap Analysis Technical Annex

August 2022

Table of Contents

Introduction	3
Assessing crisis preparedness: Overview of the CPGA methodology.....	3
Findings from the CPGA Country Assessment	5
Overview of Cross-Sectoral Challenges in Promoting Crisis Preparedness.....	5
Summary of Component-Specific Findings on Crisis Preparedness.....	7
Legal & Institutional - Aggregated score: 2.0 (Basic)	7
Legislative Frameworks and Strategic Plans and Policies for Crisis Preparedness.....	7
Institutional Framework for Crisis Preparedness	8
Understanding & Monitoring Risks – Aggregated score: 1.0 (Nascent).....	12
Financial Preparedness – Aggregated score: 1.3 (Nascent)	15
Crisis Risk Financing	15
Public Financial Management.....	20
Primary Response – Aggregated score: 1.5 (Nascent).....	24
Outbreak/Pandemic Preparedness and Response	24
Critical Infrastructure and Services	27
Civil Protection and Emergency Management Systems	27
Social & Livelihood Support – Aggregated score: 1.6 (Nascent)	31
Coverage and Scalability of Social Protection	31
Food Security and Livelihoods	33
Continued Access to Education	36
Crisis-induced Displacement	38
Appendix A: Summary of characteristics associated with each maturity level in the CPGA	44
Appendix B: CPGA data collection process.....	45
Appendix C: List of experts consulted	46

Introduction

1. **Crisis preparedness is crucial to preventing shocks from becoming crises.** Investments in ex-ante preparedness are especially relevant in countries like Uganda that face high levels of exposure and vulnerability to a range of risks.
2. **In seeking to identify opportunities to strengthen the Government of Uganda’s capacity to prepare for crisis events in an effective and timely manner, this Technical Annex presents findings from the application of the Crisis Preparedness Gap Analysis (CPGA) in the country.** It accompanies the CPGA Uganda Briefing Note, providing further details on findings and entry points across the five components of crisis preparedness. Following a brief description of the CPGA methodology, the Technical Annex presents a summary of findings from each CPGA component alongside identification of entry points and opportunities to strengthen crisis preparedness in the country.

Assessing crisis preparedness: Overview of the CPGA methodology

3. **Crisis preparedness requires a comprehensive and cross-sectoral approach to risk management with targeted interventions across a range of different sectors.** While the scope and effectiveness of preparedness activities are heavily dependent on context—including exposure to hazards and the nature of underlying drivers of vulnerability—there are some elements of preparedness that are generally considered as relevant in most country contexts.
4. **To provide a holistic assessment of preparedness, the CPGA isolates five core components of crisis preparedness.** These include: Legal and Institutional Foundations; Understanding and Monitoring Risks; Financial Preparedness; Primary Response; and Social and Livelihood Support. Components correspond to foundational elements of crisis preparedness consistent with the World Bank’s mandate, building on sector-specific frameworks, and on operational engagements in this space. Each component is further broken down into sub-components and indicators, resulting in a three-tiered system with “maturity levels” assigned to each (see Table 1). Levels of maturity range from *unmet* (essentially little-to-nothing has been done to actively promote crisis preparedness) to *advanced* (typically reflecting a regional leader in crisis preparedness, with a comprehensive and multi-sectoral approach with significant resources and capacity). The framework does not evaluate past performance or attempt to predict how a country might fare in the event of a crisis. It focuses on identifying entry points for targeted technical and financial support to strengthen crisis preparedness across its five components.
5. **The CPGA builds on and supplements a range of sector and crisis-specific diagnostic tools.** These include internal frameworks such as the Climate Risk Country Profile, the Uganda Economic Update, and the Uganda Disaster Risk Financing Diagnostic (2022), which was recently conducted in parallel to the CPGA, as well as external tools such as the Republic of Uganda’s (RoU) Social Protection Sector Review, the Global Health Security Index, and the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Joint External Evaluation/International Health Regulations framework. The CPGA does not replace or duplicate these in-depth assessments. Rather, it offers users a holistic, high-level perspective on key country systems that contribute to crisis preparedness for different types of shocks and across sectors. In particular, these sector-specific diagnostics constitute the starting point of the CPGA in countries where they exist, with inputs and guiding questions in the CPGA matched directly with those used in established sectoral framework. In countries where other diagnostic tools have yet to be deployed, the CPGA can serve as an entry point for country teams to conduct more in-depth analyses.

Table 1. Crisis preparedness maturity levels for components and subcomponents of the CPGA in Uganda

Crisis Preparedness Gap Analysis

Uganda

Completed on

6/15/22

Completed by

Uganda CPGA Team



Component Summary			Unmet	Nascent	Basic	Good	Advanced
1. Legal & Institutional Foundations	Basic	2.0					
1.1 Legislative frameworks, strategic plans and policies	Basic	2.0					
1.2 Governance and institutions	Basic	2.0					
2. Understanding & Monitoring Risks	Nascent	1.0					
2.1 Risk assessment	Unmet	0.5					
2.2 Risk monitoring and early warnings	Nascent	1.5					
3. Financial Preparedness	Nascent	1.3					
3.1 Crisis risk financing	Unmet	0.7					
3.2 Public Financial Management	Basic	2.0					
4. Primary Response	Nascent	1.5					
4.1 Public health systems	Basic	2.0					
4.2 Critical infrastructure	Unmet	0.5					
4.3 Civil protection and Emergency Management Systems	Basic	2.0					
5. Social and Livelihood Support	Nascent	1.6					
5.1 Coverage and scalability of social protection	Basic	2.0					
5.2 Food security and livelihoods	Nascent	1.0					
5.3 Continued access to education	Basic	2.0					
5.4 Crisis induced displacement	Nascent	1.5					

Findings from the CPGA Country Assessment

6. **Findings from the CPGA shed light on barriers and opportunities for promoting crisis preparedness in Uganda.** Insights are based on information gathered from a desk review and extensive interviews with sector experts across a range of World Bank Global Practices (GPs) (see Appendix D for a list of experts consulted). Below we present technical insights from the CPGA exercise in Uganda—both with regards to cross-cutting and sector-specific issues—that complete those provided in the Uganda CPGA Briefing Note. Further details can be found in the CPGA country spreadsheet that documents all data inputs and sources used in supporting the analysis (see Appendix A). A description of steps taken in data collection can also be found in Appendix B alongside further details on the CPGA methodology.¹

Overview of Cross-Sectoral Challenges in Promoting Crisis Preparedness

7. **In addition to component-specific bottlenecks, the CPGA points to a number of overarching barriers that affect the overall enabling environment for crisis preparedness in the country.** In particular, despite strong foundations and some sectors' advancements in building crisis preparedness, the capacity to implement and adequately resource *ex-ante* interventions remains limited across key country systems. Allocations from the national budget are typically insufficient to fund the breadth of *ex-ante* measures needed, with chronic resource shortages affecting most sectors related to crisis preparedness. Further, the scope of eligible expenditures is ill-defined, making it difficult for different government entities to access any crisis related funding.

8. **Horizontal and vertical coordination (between ministries as well as between national and sub-national levels) is fragmented, hindering effective and efficient crisis response.** Roles and responsibilities related to crisis preparedness and response are not clearly defined and established, which leads to duplication or gaps in effort across sectors and ministries. For example, while the Ministry of Education has made efforts to enhance crisis preparedness at the district level, lack of clarity on responsibilities for crisis response management between the Directorate of Disaster Relief and the line ministry has resulted in difficulties accessing resources for crisis response, thereby delaying response times. Perhaps the most tangible demonstration has been the coordination of refugee issues, which is managed at the national level, with little or no input sub-nationally. As a result, there are growing disparities between refugee and host populations generally, and in access to crisis preparedness and response programs specifically.

9. **Compounding these issues is the fact that linkages between Social Protection (SP) and Disaster Risk Management (DRM) coordination mechanisms are unclear.** While the MGLSD has a clear role within the National Policy for Disaster Preparedness and Management (NPDPM) and the Social Development Sector Plan (SDSP), there is little evidence supporting strong institutionalized links between SP and DRM agencies in practice. SP is described as a “thematic subsector” in the SDSP but it is inconsistently applied. The SDSP therefore fails to distinguish the roles of the MGLSD and other MDAs, making the definition of SP institutionally problematic. This limits the ability of the government to use shock responsive SP as a tool within a broader DRM strategy. For these programs to be effective, close coordination across different agencies is essential.

¹ For a full outline of step-by-step procedures undertaken in compiling the CPAF refer to the CPAF Overview Note.

10. **Furthermore, *ex-post* crisis response as opposed to *ex-ante* preparedness remains the primary focus of GoU interventions across all five components of the CPGA.** The reasons for this are manifold. First, political incentives strongly favor swift *ex-post* interventions as response activities attract more attention than less visible investments in crisis preparedness. When crises hit, GoU's main response has been to reallocate from the existing budget, at the expense of capital-intensive projects that can contribute to the country's economic development and poverty reduction. Secondly, development partner funding, which constitutes a significant portion of Uganda's crisis preparedness and response budget, tends to be skewed toward crisis response interventions as these are more visible and easier to mobilize resources. Furthermore, given development partners' concerns over GoU's fiduciary compliance and fiscal discipline, assistance is often delivered off-budget, leading to greater fragmentation and challenges for coordination. Limited appetite to provide budget support has hindered the GoU's ability to establish a centralized contingency fund that allows the country to prepare for future crises. As Uganda moves toward the passage of the DRM Bill, efforts are needed to support greater ownership of the preparedness agenda among key political stakeholders, to better define the division of labor among different agencies, and strengthen resourcing, capacity and mandate of agencies like OPM in order to elevate the importance of *ex-ante* crisis preparedness alongside response. At the same time, there is a strong need to strengthen the country's PFM system and ensure accountability in how crises preparedness and response funds are being utilized.

11. **Lastly, despite progress being made in certain sectors to enhance crisis preparedness, these remain fragmented and do not translate into a comprehensive crisis preparedness system.** With support from the World Bank and other development partners, the GoU has made some progress in strengthening key country systems for preparedness, including establishing the foundations of a single national registry. However, further and sustained investment is needed to solidify such progress and move towards a more developed crisis preparedness system. The OPM, which is formally in charge of overseeing crisis preparedness and response, can play an important role in this transition. However, it lacks capacity to coordinate across line ministries and sectoral agencies and should be supported with targeted capacity building, technical and financial resources to take on a leadership role in the coordination of crisis preparedness and response.

Summary of Component-Specific Findings on Crisis Preparedness

Legal & Institutional - Aggregated score: 2.0 (Basic)

Component	Subcomponent	Indicator	ML
1. LEGAL & INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS	1.1 Legislative frameworks, strategic plans and policies	1.1.1 Dedicated crisis preparedness laws and regulations are in place and well enforced, with preparedness plans mainstreamed into policy frameworks	2
	1.2 Governance and institutions	1.2.1 Governance and institutional arrangements are in place, with defined mandates, roles and responsibilities	2
		1.2.2 Preparedness activities are coordinated across sectors and levels within government and external stakeholders	2

Legislative Frameworks and Strategic Plans and Policies for Crisis Preparedness

12. **Uganda has established the foundations for a strong legal and institutional framework to guide crisis preparedness and response.** These frameworks, namely the NPDPM, establish strong leadership from the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) for the management of crisis risks and call for a number of crisis preparedness and response mechanisms to be established.

13. **In 2011, the Department of Disaster Preparedness and Management (DDPM) of the OPM developed the NPDPM with the aim of saving lives, livelihoods, and the country's resources by “establishing institutions and mechanisms that will reduce vulnerability of people, livestock and wildlife to disasters.”**¹ The NPDPM was revised in 2013 with the goal to reduce vulnerability and strengthen risk mitigation, disaster prevention, and preparedness, to ensure effective response and recovery in a manner that integrates DRM with development planning and process. The updated NPDPM recognizes a broader set of crisis risks and provides policy guidance for both natural disasters (drought, flood, thunderstorms, landslides, earthquakes, human and animal epidemics, pest and infection, pandemic, famine, and food insecurity) and man-made disasters (fire, accidents, terrorism, conflict, etc.).²

14. **However, the country lacks a dedicated DRM law.** Without a law that establishes the institutions and roles and responsibilities for crisis risk management at the national and local levels of government in Uganda, the mechanisms in the NPDPM do not have legal standing. Laws have a profound effect on how we prepare for, respond to and recover from crises, especially in cases where the scale of the damage of a crisis exceeds the capacities of the national authorities.³ The lack of a robust legal and institutional framework to guide the preparation for and response to crises can result in higher physical and social costs post-crisis; for example, delivering post-crisis assistance may become more costly due to inefficiencies in coordination.

15. **Under the leadership of OPM, work has been underway since 2016 to formulate such a law and a draft has been produced.** The draft DRM Bill aims to build on international best experiences, further

strengthen the application of the existing policy and provide clarity on key aspects that are missing or weakly addressed by the NPDPM. These include the declaration of the state of disaster, mandating the development of disaster risk financing strategy and responsibilities of the Ministry of Finance in times of crisis, coordination of humanitarian assistance in the event of disasters, and training and research in crisis risk management. In the context of Uganda, it is important to provide the details differentiating a state of disaster from a state of emergency as indicated in the Constitution and to clarify measures that will be put in place to prevent a natural disaster situation from becoming a crisis.⁴

16. **There is also an increasing recognition from the Government of Uganda (GoU) on the need to strengthen frameworks for the management of crisis risks including pandemics, food insecurity, and displaced populations.** For example, the Public Health (Amendment) Bill (discussed further in the Primary Response section) would provide much needed updates to the Public Health Act of 1935. However, national frameworks, such as the NPDPM, have historically emphasized the need to prepare for and respond to natural hazard risks, especially drought. The 1995 Constitution stipulates that the state has the obligation to establish an effective mechanism to deal with any disaster resulting from natural calamities or any situation causing a general displacement of people or a serious disruption of their normal life. The constitution, therefore, assigns to the President the power of declaration of the state of emergency. The 1995 Constitution laid out a strong foundation enabling proper mainstreaming of DRM in the country's development plan and vision. Starting in 2006, when Uganda passed its refugee act, it has taken a proactive approach in the treatment of refugees. This has served as the basis of its commitments towards the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, signed in 2016. Disasters are recognized as a major threat to the achievement of the country development aspirations outlines in the Third National Development Plan (NDP III - 2020 to 2025); Uganda Vision 2040 and the realization of national targets set for SDG 2030 and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2030.⁵


17. **Additionally, Uganda has several plans and strategies outlining the country's development aspirations, which call for greater crisis risk management, especially to climate risks, in all governmental programs.** For example, Uganda Vision 2040 spearheaded the importance of strengthening the country's resilience to the impacts of climate change. The NDP III includes a dedicated program on climate change, natural resources, environment and water management with a clear objective on reducing human and economic loss from natural hazards and disasters. The National Social Protection Policy (NSPP – 2015) also underscores the importance of addressing risks and vulnerabilities that expose individuals to income insecurity and social deprivation, leading to undignified lives.⁶ More recently (September 2021) the country enacted a climate change law. This law governs all climate change interventions and provides for the establishment of a climate change fund as a special mechanism for climate change financing with some contribution from the government.⁷ To better manage health risks, the National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) 2019-2023 adopts the One Health approach, recognizing increasing human-animal-environment interactions as a major driver of zoonotic diseases. In 2021, the Kampala Disaster Risk and Climate Change Resilience Strategy was adopted to enhance the city's capacity to prepare for and respond to crises at the sub-national level.

Institutional Framework for Crisis Preparedness

18. **The NPDPM establishes the institutional network responsible for implementing the Policy and managing crisis risks at national and sub-national levels with support from the development partners, the private sector (see Figure 1).** However, in reality crisis preparedness and response tends to be implemented exclusively by OPM with limited collaboration with other government ministries at the national and local levels.⁸ Under the Policy, the DDPM within OPM, headed by the commissioner and the

assistant commissioner, is the main agency coordinating disaster preparedness, management, coordination, disaster risk reduction, prevention, and response with all stakeholders at the national level. The NPDPM also instructs the Ministerial Policy Committee (MPC) to set measures ensuring that sectorial ministries identify and allocate resources for disaster preparedness and management in their sector.

Figure 1: Uganda's Institutional DRM Structure



Source: Directorate of Relief, Disaster Preparedness and Refugees 2010

19. **The NPDPM assigns several key functions for crisis preparedness.** For example, the NPDPM entrusts DDPM with the administration of a disaster preparedness and management fund as well as the establishment of mechanisms and procedures to access the fund. The NPDPM also instructs the MPC to set measures ensuring that sectorial ministries identify and allocate resources for disaster preparedness and management in their sector.⁹ Additionally, the NPDPM establishes the National Emergency Coordination and Operations Center (NECOC) to act as the central body in charge of early warning and coordination of emergency and crisis response, available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. NECOC aims to improve Uganda's preparedness and response capabilities by establishing and endowing

institutions at national and local levels, promoting research and the use of technology for disaster risk reduction, disseminating early warning information, and establishing effective coordination and emergency response mechanisms at national, local, and municipal levels, with the ultimate goal of reducing the vulnerability of the people and the natural environment. Uganda's Disaster Risk Information Centre is part of NECOC.¹⁰ The institutional structure and various bodies responsible for disaster preparedness and management are set out in the national policy and include the following:

- National Disaster Risk
- Reduction Platform City Disaster Policy Committees (CDPCs)
- City Disaster Management Technical Committees (CDMTCs)
- District Disaster Policy Committees (DDPCs)
- District Disaster Management Technical Committees (DRMTCs)
- District Emergency Coordination and Operations Centres (DECOCs, based at district police stations)¹¹
- Municipal/Town Disaster Policy Committees (M/TDPCs)
- Municipal/Town Disaster
- Management Technical Committees (M/TDMTCs)
- Subcounty Disaster Management Committees (SDMCs)
- Village Disaster Management Committees (VDMCs)

20. **However, NECOC does not have a law establishing it nor its budget or the aforementioned institutional structures described in the national policy.** Passage of the DRM Bill will reaffirm the legal mandate of these structures and other functions outlined in the NPDPM, including the annual allocation of a minimum of 1.5 percent of the annual approved budget to the National Disaster Preparedness and Management Fund, which will be used for Disaster Preparedness and Management in the country. Therefore, based on the institutional arrangements that are currently in place, when a disaster occurs, the District Disaster Management Committees with support from sectorial ministries would conduct a needs assessment and response interventions as well as activate the District Emergency Coordination and Operations Center (DECOC) as well and alert the NECOC. Currently, the district local government lacks resources (technical capacities and financial resources) for disaster preparedness or mitigation and has limited linkage with NECOC. However, when NECOC receives an alert, according to the NPDPM, the Inter-Agency Technical Committee is convened to organize and coordinate responses from both national institutions and development partners. The proposed response plan is then submitted for approval to the Ministerial Policy Committee (MPC) which is a standing Cabinet committee and present to the President in charge of declaring a state of emergency. This instructs the Minister of Finance to mobilize the various financial mechanisms of the country (supplementary budget, budgetary reallocations, Contingency Funds, deviation from objectives of the Charter for Fiscal Responsibility, etc.).¹²

21. **While the NPDPM describes various structures that should be in place for crisis preparedness, further investment and action are required to operationalize the structures, especially at the local level.** The Kampala Disaster Risk and Climate Change Resilience Strategy (2021) sets out to provide a framework to help operationalize disaster preparedness and management at the city level and below across 6 pillars including: 1) Institutional and Governance Strengthening, 2) Understanding Risk, 3) Investment in Disaster Risk Reduction for Resilience, 4) Preparedness, Response, and Resilient Recovery, 5) Climate Mitigation and Resilience, and 5) Health Resilience and Prevention. Under the Kampala Disaster Risk and Climate Change Resilience Strategy, Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) seeks to provide the city—its leaders, stakeholders, and residents— with a better understanding of the risks associated with climate change and the measures and investments that will enable it to manage and reduce those risks and achieve resilience.

The Strategy aims to provide an integrated approach to: 1) avoiding the creation of risks, 2) reduce existing risks, 3) respond more efficiently to disasters, and 4) mitigate climate change and building climate resilience. The Strategy provides a framework for translating national level ambitions towards climate risk management down to the local level that could be replicated in other sub-national contexts in Uganda. While the Strategy has been adopted by the KCCA, it has not yet been implemented. The implementation of the Strategy will support improved capacity for managing crisis risks in Kampala and provide a roadmap for other sub-national structures to learn from.¹³

22. To conclude, the passage of the DRM Bill provides a number of opportunities for strengthening the legal framework for managing crises in Uganda. For example, the DRM Bill would give legal mandate to the coordination mechanisms at the national and sub-national levels, which are articulated in the NPDPM. Additionally, the DRM bill would provide details differentiating a state of disaster from a state of emergency as well as help to clarify measures to prevent a natural disaster situation from becoming a crisis. The distinction between a state of disaster and a state of emergency is important to facilitate access to innovative risk financing mechanisms such as contingency credit. In this vein, the DRM Bill also presents an opportunity to include provisions for disaster risk finance and clarity on the roles and responsibilities of the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED). Currently, the role of the MoFPED in responding to disaster risks is limited and formal coordination between OPM and other government entities responsible for financial planning, assessment of contingent liabilities and fiscal risk arising from disasters is limited.

ENTRY POINTS FOR LEGAL & INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR CRISIS PREPAREDNESS

<p>1. Support the passage of the DRM Bill in order to strengthen the legal, regulatory and policy framework for crises. (Short-term)</p> <p>For example, the passage of the DRM Bill offers opportunities to clarify aspects of the NPDPM that are currently unclear, namely: a) the declaration of a state of disaster, which is needed to facilitate access to disaster risk finance instruments, such as contingent credit, b) the provision of clear mandates and defined roles and responsibilities for all relevant stakeholders across the DRM cycle, c) providing a legal framework to enable the appropriate crisis response systems, and d) establishing the organizational framework for the coordination of humanitarian assistance in the event of a declared disaster.</p>
<p>2. Strengthen sub-national institutional capacity to manage crises by implementing Districts Disaster Policy and Technical Committees (DDPC and DDTC) according with the NPDPM. (Medium-term)</p> <p>Budgetary support may be needed for this. Furthermore, prioritizing the implementation of the Kampala Disaster and Climate Change Resilience Strategy will support the use this framework as a template to develop climate and disaster-informed integrated neighborhood plans (e.g., in Nakamiro Channel) in a concrete way.</p>
<p>3. Improve inter-institutional coordination for crisis risk management at the national and sub-national levels by developing and implementing standard operating</p>

procedures (SOP) for the implementation of Uganda's DRM Plan, especially as it pertains to crisis response. (Long-term)

Such an SOP could establish clear and practical processes that reinforce the roles and functions of different stakeholders at the national and sub-national levels.

Understanding & Monitoring Risks – Aggregated score: 1.0 (Nascent)

Component	Subcomponent	Indicator	ML
2. UNDERSTANDING & MONITORING RISKS	2.1 Risk assessment	2.1.1 National cross-sectoral and sector-specific risk assessments have been carried out, using current and historical datasets	0
		2.1.2 Government is able to identify vulnerable people without discrimination	1
	2.2 Risk monitoring and early warnings	2.2.1 Government has the capacity to monitor and analyze active threats in real-time to inform national and sub-national level decision-making	2
		2.2.2 Risk information is communicated in accessible and relevant formats to all relevant groups	1

23. There have been several significant initiatives to improve the GoU's ability to understand and monitor hazard risks in Uganda. For example, the World Bank supported the development of a National Risk Profile for Uganda, which provides information and data on the main hazard risks facing the country (e.g. drought, flood, and landslide). The profile provides an overview of which hazards, sectors and regions are most at risk of disasters, and contributes to a national level understanding of hazard risk.¹⁴ To complement, Uganda's National Risk and Vulnerability Atlas, which was developed with support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), helps enhance the understanding of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability risks in all the 136 Districts of Uganda. The main goal of the risk atlas is to provide information about disaster occurrences, vulnerabilities and risk reduction measures so as to guide decision-making processes at the national, regional and local levels as well as by the private sector and other stakeholders. The Risk Atlas contributes to translating risk assessment information, such as an integrated hailstorm hazard zonation map of Uganda, in a manner that can aid decision-makers in preparing early warning mechanisms for hailstorm management and mitigation.¹⁵

24. There are currently significant levels of investment across Uganda into systems that collect and share early warning information on a range of hazards. However, they are incomplete and uncoordinated. The GoU has established various monitoring mechanisms for floods, droughts, diseases and conflicts. Of particular note is Uganda's national laboratory network which includes an EWS for

indicator-based surveillance (IBS) and event-based surveillance (EBS). In fact, there has been a proliferation of Early Warning Systems (EWSs) in Uganda; however, each EWS monitors different, or in some cases the same hazards and issue their own warnings targeted at various audiences. The result is that many of the current EWSs in Uganda are piecemeal in nature and not complete. Additionally, many do not appear to be sustainable from both a financial and technical point of view. The number of different, sometimes parallel, initiatives reflect a lack of coordination between government ministries, donors and NGOs with respect to existing EWSs and relevant tools.

25. **The current mission of NECOC in relation to other relevant stakeholders for the management of EWSs in Uganda needs to be clarified.** To contribute to the greater communication of risk information, the OPM launched the NECOC in part to provide *“timely and early warning information on disasters, climate modelling and forecasting, and also to help coordinate emergency responses.”* OPM has designated the Uganda National Meteorological Authority (UNMA) as a supporting organization for droughts. However, since weather-related hazards have the greatest impact on loss of life and livelihoods, the UNMA should have an important role to play in EWSs related to floods, famine/food security, landslides, heavy storms, certain human epidemics (e.g., cholera and malaria) and certain types of pest infestations.¹⁶ Bringing greater clarity to the roles and responsibilities in relation to EWSs will help enhance coordination among relevant agencies and the implementation of different systems.

26. **If different EWSs are not coordinated by NECOC, early warnings may not be received or identified by vulnerable communities, even if the monitoring and forecasting systems are in place.** For many hazards (e.g., droughts), early warning information is transmitted to ministries, NGOs and other agencies. In some cases, different actors select and plan with parts (but not all) of the early warning information. This makes triggering early warning information for coordinated early action impossible across all departments, for a coordinated and timely response. For example, two different organizations may individually have important information, but it may only become an early warning signal if these two information sources are put together. In Karamoja, an Open Data Kit is used by various organizations to collect data relevant to food security in the sub-region. There is potential to coordinate data collection related to droughts, food security and disaster risk financing.¹⁷

27. **There is a gap between information provided by the EWSs about impending hazards in Uganda and the ability of the government to act to reduce these threats in advance.** The current warnings for all major hazards need to be improved so that they are focused on achieving the appropriate responses from relevant stakeholders. Warnings for different hazards should be improved with input from various levels of stakeholders. Communication, trust and credibility in the sources of warnings need to be looked at to avoid investing in accurate EWSs whose warnings are ignored.¹⁸

28. **Few of the EWSs in Uganda have a forecasting element which makes it difficult to engender early action.** For many hazards, pertinent data for early warnings are often not available in real-time and warnings are not always generated in an efficient and timely manner that meet end users’ requirements. Few of the EWSs incorporate a forecasting aspect and little use appears to be made of internationally, freely available short- (i.e., <10 days) and medium- term (i.e. <40 days) climate forecasts. Given that most hazards in Uganda are weather related, the substandard quality of hydro-meteorological networks has a significant impact on the forecasting and monitoring of many important hazards (e.g., floods and droughts). The result is that most of the EWSs currently used in Uganda are based on situational analyses which are, at best, founded on the situation the previous day. The incorporation of climate forecasts could help encourage early action rather than responding to a crisis once it has unfolded, which is usually significantly more costly and less effective than responding in advance. For example, there are a number

of droughts EWSs focusing on Karamoja but only one of these, the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET), attempts to forecast the effects of droughts in advance of their occurrence.¹⁹ To empower the government with early warning systems for population inflows, the World Bank is piloting the Displacement Crisis Response Mechanism (DCRM) through the Development Response to Displacement Impact Project (DRDIP) which monitors and forecasts population change. This mechanism identifies factors that are associated with population change in different locations and informs prioritization of development activities thereby enhancing planning and development impact.

ENTRY POINTS FOR UNDERSTANDING & MONITORING RISKS

- 1. Develop a comprehensive EWS Strategy for Uganda that brings cohesion to disparately created systems, clarifies roles & responsibilities for enhanced inter-institutional coordination, and identifies critical gaps for investment and technical capacity strengthening. (Short-term)**

Currently, different EWS systems exist for different crisis risks (e.g. drought, famine, flood, etc.), there is a need for a coherent overarching strategy that helps to coordinate these currently disparate systems, which will help clarify institutional roles and responsibilities, coordination of resources and information, enable investments gaps to be addressed systematically, and allow for strategic strengthening of technical capacity from both an EWS systemwide perspective and according to specific hazard/crisis risks.

- 2. Strengthen weather and climate data (monitoring), and climate forecasting capabilities in Uganda (e.g. in terms of geographic coverage and through the use of radar, and leveraging available observational and surveillance networks). (Long-term)**

Most of the EWSs in Uganda are based on situational analysis which are typically based on the situation of the previous day. The incorporation of climate forecasts could help encourage early action, rather than responding to a crisis once it has unfolded, which is usually significantly more costly and less effective than responding in advance. Additionally, strengthening climate forecasting capabilities can lead to improved confidence in the accuracy of forecasted information and strengthened capacity to disseminate early warning messages through the civil protection agency will support greater uptake of the necessary behavioral actions once those messages have been issued.

Financial Preparedness – Aggregated score: 1.3 (Nascent)

Component	Subcomponent	Indicator	ML
3. FINANCIAL PREPAREDNESS	3.1 Crisis risk financing	3.1.1 Government has put in place a dedicated strategy for the delivery of crisis and disaster risk financing	0
		3.1.2 Government has access to a range of sovereign financing instruments	0
		3.1.3 Government ensures an enabling environment for insurance and other risk finance instruments	2
	3.2 Public Financial Management	3.2.1 Government has put in place crisis-related budget execution rules and procedures	2
		3.2.2 Anti-corruption mechanisms are in place to ensure transparency, efficiency, and accountability in the provision of emergency services and financing at national and sub-national levels	2
		3.2.3 Coordination and close engagement takes place with international development and humanitarian stakeholders, including the management of post-crisis inflow of resources	2

Crisis Risk Financing

29. **Recent crises have eroded Uganda’s development gains.** Annual GDP performance declined by 3.5 percent on average between 2010-2014 due to climatic shocks. Coronavirus Disease-19 (COVID-19) had a similar effect on FY20 GDP which recorded a decrease of 3.3 percent compared to pre-COVID-19 forecast.²⁰ In 2020, disasters caused direct economic losses of UGX 563.24 billion (equivalent to US\$ 152.2 million),²¹ up 14 percent compared to the previous year and equivalent to 0.42 percent of Uganda’s nominal GDP. Climatic shocks heavily impact other productive sectors like transport and energy, which exacerbates food insecurity and challenges resilience. The social unrest and displacement risk that Uganda faces as well as the COVID-19 pandemic make the country more vulnerable to disasters. Such multidimensional risks reduce the already constrained capacity of government, households, and businesses to absorb and recover from disasters.²²


30. **The ability to effectively manage crises is more essential than ever to reduce vulnerabilities to shocks and mitigate adverse impacts, especially on poor households.** This management function has been anchored in the OPM of Uganda. Yet, such high-level institutional anchoring and provisions on disasters management in the country development policy and plans stands in sharp contrast with the

absence of a DRM law. The passage of the DRM Bill, which has been under preparation since 2016, presents an opportunity to include and differentiate between a state of disaster (natural) from a state of emergency (social), which is essential to facilitate access to disaster risk finance instruments such as contingent credit and to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the MoFPED and other relevant stakeholders such as the private sector. With an incomplete legal and regulatory framework and few pre-arranged risk financing instruments whose design and allocations are not risk informed, Uganda's ability to mobilize and deliver relief in a cost-effective manner may be compromised.²³

31. **Given government's limited fiscal space, it is important to prioritize systems that are shock-responsive and focused on the poor and vulnerable. A shock responsive social protection system would address impacts of covariate shocks related to climate-risks, displacement, epidemics among others.** An assessment of the socioeconomic impacts of the 2010-2011 drought found that the most severe effects occurred in districts with the lowest human development conditions. Higher values of damage and losses occurred in districts where the human development index (HDI) is lowest. Most poor households often do not have the means to cope with the shocks they experience. Insurance penetration stands at 1 percent while the coverage and design of social protection programs in Uganda reaching only 3percent of the population, are currently insufficient to meaningfully address the range and scope of vulnerabilities to shocks the country faces.²⁴

32. **Financial inclusion has remained to be a challenge in Uganda, especially for the poor, yet it has proven to an effective strategy enabling households and communities to build assets and cope with shocks.** According to the last FinScope survey (2018) 22 percent of adult Ugandans are financially excluded and only 58 percent of people that are financially included use formal financial services. Most of those in poverty have limited access to financial service providers while they are particularly vulnerable to shocks. Mobile money is the main driver of financial inclusion of the poorest 40 percent. Limited financial literacy (awareness and understanding), costs, distance from an access point are among the most prevalent constraints preventing individuals from accessing formal financial services. Improving financial inclusion and facilitating access to financial services (savings, payment, credit and insurance) could contribute to strengthen the poor and vulnerables' resilience to shocks. Risk management solutions (formal and informal) contribute to building resilience and the ability to mitigate, cope, and recover from shocks and stresses without compromising future welfare. Evidence suggests well-designed financial products and services can play a role in increasing low-income families' resilience by helping them be prepared for risks, reduce risks, increase investments in the face of risks, and respond when a shock occurs (Figure 2). In Uganda, savings groups/Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLAs) are the main the saving method used by the poorest 40 percent of the population.

Figure 2: Emerging evidence on building resilience through financial inclusion



Source: CGAP


33. **The funding gap after large shocks is managed mainly ex-post through supplementary budget allocation, budget reallocation and donors' support.** This leaves the GoU exposed to a significant crisis relief funding gap that requires shifting resources away from ongoing or planned projects in the budget. This can result in a lengthy process that undermines development objectives that have been established. Based on available data, World Bank estimates the average annual cost of disaster relief at US\$30.7 million. By considering the available resources of prearranged risk finance instruments and the estimated annual cost of disaster relief, the GoU faces an annual funding gap of about US\$14 million for disaster response. To fill such a gap, the GoU relies heavily on donor funding for emergency response whose funding volume and timing are unpredictable.²⁵

34. **To better manage crisis risks, Uganda has piloted several risk financing instruments but has limited prearranged funds, which are insufficient to meaningfully address the scope of vulnerabilities and financing needs.** For example, Uganda has a contingency reserve which is legally provided for by Section 26 of the 2015 Public Finance Management Act, with annual funding of 0.5 percent of the previous year's total appropriated national budget.²⁶ However, since inception in 2018 it has received less than 0.2 percent (US\$17 million). Under the NPDPM's institutional arrangement framework, the roles and responsibilities of the MoFPED in responding to disaster risks is limited. However, the MoFPED is called upon to prepare jointly with OPM/ Department of Relief, Disaster Preparedness and Management a bill for the establishment of a dedicated National Disaster Preparedness and Management Fund to support disaster preparation and management. Such a fund is not yet operational. There is, however, a contingency fund in the national budget which can be used for natural disasters as well as other economic shocks. This contingency fund is managed by the MoFPED and represents an asset. However, given the fact that the contingency fund is not dedicated solely to natural disasters, and that the scope of disasters is not clearly defined, the mobilization and allocation of resources are not determined considering the losses and damages arising from disasters. Finally, a national response fund was established in 2020 to raise additional funds from the private sector and other well-wishers for response to COVID-19. This fund is not underpinned by any legal framework and may not be a sustainable or reliable financing instrument for GoU.²⁷

35. **The main disbursement mechanisms used by the GoU to protect farmers as well as poor and vulnerable households against shocks are agricultural insurance and adaptive social protection.** Uganda

Agricultural Insurance Scheme (UAIS) is the main risk transfer instrument currently in place and the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) 3 is the primary instrument for shock-responsive social protection.²⁸ The UAIS is a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) that was established in 2016 to mitigate financial losses suffered by farmers due to various causes including natural disasters and to attract agricultural finance.²⁹ The scheme is nation-wide and provides cover for strategic crops, livestock and fisheries in the form of Multi-Peril Crop (MPC) and Livestock Insurance, Area Yield Index Insurance (AYII) and Weather Index Insurance (WII).³⁰ Government provides UGX 5 billion every year, which is used to finance premium subsidies of 30 percent, 50 percent and 80 percent respectively for large scale farmers, small-scale farmers, and farmers in disaster-prone areas. Between 2016 and 2019, the GoU piloted shock-responsive social protection under the NUSAF 3, using remote sensing data to trigger a scale-up to respond to poor and vulnerable households impacted by shocks. Since the inception of the pilot project, scale-ups were triggered in 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020 and provided support to a total of 75,457 beneficiaries. The GoU also resorts to supplementary emergency releases from the MoFPED that are authorized by the Cabinet of up to 3 percent of the total approved budget for the financial year. NUSAF 3's disaster risk finance (DRF) mechanism has performed well in building households' resilience to disasters, enabling households to acquire food reserves to cushion against and mitigate the effects of droughts. By doing so, the mechanism allowed the government to save on emergency food aid that would have been needed in the absence of the scalable disaster response under the NUSAF 3 project.³¹

Figure 3: Performance of UAIS, 2016-2020




Source: Word Bank Analysis based on data from Uganda Insurance Regulatory Authority

36. **Uganda is implementing the world's first risk financing approach to human displacement** - the DCRM. The DCRM aims to develop and finance a mechanism to support rapid government scale-up of assistance to host communities that are poor and vulnerable in response to a refugee-related displacement shock. The response is directed through development activities related to provision of community infrastructure to build host and refugee community resilience by augmenting basic service delivery and sustaining human capital.

37. **Currently, there is no clear DRF strategy that builds on Uganda's risk profile.** To better manage the aforementioned instruments as well as financial and social crisis risks, the GoU could develop a comprehensive risk financing strategy that would help determine the most suitable sources of finance and instruments to deal with the diverse types and severities of disasters (risk layering) to increase the


efficiency, timeliness, and coherence of different financial mechanisms, as well as the transparency of disaster response interventions.

Figure 4: Ex-post coping mechanisms for selected events in Uganda



Source: FinScope Uganda, 2010

Figure 5: Status of disaster risk financing instruments in Uganda



Source: World Bank analysis

Public Financial Management

38. **Uganda's Public Financial Management (PFM) system has a relatively reliable track record across the budget cycle – notably on reporting and external audits³² – which extends to the use of funds for crisis preparedness and response.** Uganda has dedicated budget lines for disaster preparedness and refugee management, and it provides a predictable platform for exploring allocations and expenditure at the national and local level.³³ Published Audits of COVID-19 related expenditures in FY19/20 and FY20/21 demonstrate Uganda's ability to independently review key financial management processes, even in the midst of an ongoing crisis.³⁴

39. **The COVID-19 crisis prompted several enhancements to PFM in Uganda, notably on procurement.** In 2021, the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets (PPDA) Act of 2003 was amended to shorten the administrative review period and enable electronic records and communication.³⁵ Guidelines for Procurement under Emergency Situations were issued in the same year, providing more detailed guidance on best practices.³⁶ In 2022, the GoU extended the practice of collecting and publishing beneficial ownership of companies awarded COVID-19-related procurement to all procurement contracts.³⁷ Work continues to establish a centralized registry for beneficial ownership –an IMF Structural Benchmark for June 2022.³⁸

40. **While too soon to assess the success of recent initiatives, compliance with PFM regulations has often been weak, resulting in “wasteful expenditure, build-up of arrears, inadequate accountability and, in some cases, the risk of fraud or misappropriation.”**³⁹ The GoU overestimates the strength of mainstream accountability mechanisms and relies too heavily on punitive measures serving as a deterrent.⁴⁰ For example, the Anti-Corruption Act of 2009 focuses on defining offences and penalties as well as the roles of the Inspector General and Director of Public Prosecutions, but does not define mechanisms for prevention.⁴¹

41. **Another key challenge is a lack of contingency financing for disaster and crisis response, as the government primarily relies on ex-post budget reallocations, domestic or international borrowing, and donor assistance.** Although important and widely used to avert impending crises, these instruments present some disadvantages. Without a dedicated contingency financing, the government’s response to crises such as COVID-19 has “cannibalized” scarce resources from other government programs and basic services, which hampers progress on national development objectives.^{42, 43} Although the government continues to prioritize concessional lending, it has increasingly resorted to semi- or non-concessional debt in recent years to finance its ambitious infrastructure initiatives as well as the response to COVID-19.⁴⁴ Public debt reached 49.1 percent of GDP at the end of FY20/21 and is projected to surpass the debt ceiling of 50 percent of GDP set by the East African Community (EAC) and Uganda’s risk of debt distress is currently ranked as moderate by the IMF.⁴⁵ Grants make up a small proportion of the government’s budget (6.3percent of total revenue in FY20/21),⁴⁶ as development partners channel a majority of their assistance outside of country systems. Once a donor darling, budget support to Uganda has declined since 2015 due to “more frequent instances of the misuse of donor funds and breaches of social and environmental safeguard agreements.”⁴⁷

ENTRY POINTS FOR FINANCIAL PREPAREDNESS

- 1. Develop a comprehensive Disaster Risk Finance Strategy under the leadership of the MoFPED in collaboration with Department of Relief, Disaster Preparedness and Management (DRDPM) of OPM. This could be informed by the World Bank Disaster Risk Finance Diagnostic conducted in 2021. The Strategy can serve as a policy anchor that can guide sustained & strategic risk financing efforts going forward. (Short-term)**

While some risk financing mechanisms exist in Uganda, there is no overarching strategy. A comprehensive strategy would help avoid fragmentation and ensure the different mechanisms complement each other and support other relevant policy initiatives. It would also strengthen the government’s ability on planning and financial preparation for disaster shocks by determining ex-ante, the priorities and the optimal risk-layering approach to address natural disasters and crises of different severities and frequencies. The DRF strategy would lay out which financing sources would be used for which disaster response types, ultimately improving efficiency, timeliness and transparency of disaster response. To develop such a comprehensive DRF strategy, the government could consider establishing a multi-sector working group consisting of different ministries and agencies. This is key to ensure wide stakeholder buy-in and strengthen coordination. The DRF strategy could support linking disbursement mechanisms to pre-arranged funds to support the implementation of shock responsive social protection and displacement efforts (e.g. NUSAF and DRDIP).

2. Strengthen existing pre-arranged risk financing instruments, use IDA to crowd in donor funding for investments in crisis preparedness (e.g. Global Shield Financing Facility), and consider additional instruments for moderate to severe shocks. (Medium-term)

This recommendation focuses on filling gaps to enable implementation of a comprehensive risk-layering strategy. The fiscal gap analysis in this report demonstrates that a risk layered strategy with prearranged funding for moderate to extreme shocks would be more cost effective for GoU than the current approach. However, donor support remains easier to secure for crisis response rather than preparedness activities. There is significant potential for IDA support to establish and support contingency funds into which other donors could also contribute support as an alternative to budget support, which has lost favor amongst donors in Uganda in recent years. Strengthening social protection systems to be shock responsive is also key; entry points on this issue, however, are included under the entry points for social and livelihood support. They are not included here to avoid repetition.

- a. **Strengthen the contingency fund.** The use of contingency funds is increasing in Sub-Saharan Africa, providing governments with access to funds to respond to shocks that are generally high frequency, low intensity events. Strengthening the existing contingency funds in Uganda may include clarifying operational procedures of the fund, estimating adequacy of allocations to the fund based on the contingent liabilities (link to data infrastructure recommendation), better earmarking of funds for disaster response and exploring potential linkages to other disaster risk financing mechanisms in the country. Countries like Mozambique and Madagascar have an effective national contingency funds with the technical support from World Bank as well as financial support to top-up the government's resource allocation to the fund.
- b. **Consider a contingent line of credit.** This would strengthen the resilience of the budget to shocks and provide liquidity in the event of an emergency with minimal impact on the country's credit rating. The funds could be used to respond to any risks as per state of emergency and could be disbursed through existing mechanisms, like social safety nets, or the displacement crisis mechanism. Alternatively, the funds could be used for disaster response programs led by DRDPM or other ministries. Adoption of this instrument would require a clear legislative definition of a state of emergency, which would be used to trigger disbursement and appropriate macroeconomic policy framework

3. Improve the capacities of MoFPED and DRDPM on DRF and the DRDPM on data collection, management and audit of disaster losses, damages, and expenditures. (Long-term)

DRDPM started publishing the Annual State of Disasters Report in 2020. To complement this exercise, the GoU could consider developing a national database in partnership with academia to collect, process, and update geospatial information from private and public authorities to better understand what assets and people are exposed to disasters, the losses and damages, and expenditures made to provide relief and recovery. In addition, for refugee management, OPM could

employ conflict risk modeling. This Artificial Intelligence (AI) - driven approach draws on data representing topic-specific online language sentiment, the economy, weather, Geographic Information System (GIS), and satellite imagery to inform advanced settlement planning and scale-up of public services.

Primary Response – Aggregated score: 1.5 (Nascent)

Component	Subcomponent	Indicator	ML
4. PRIMARY RESPONSE	4.1 Public health systems	4.1.1 The public health system has the capacity and resources to respond to key health threats and to function fully during crises	2
		4.1.2 Government has capacity to detect and carry out surveillance of emergent and ongoing health threats in real-time	2
	4.2 Critical infrastructure	4.2.1 Government maintains an inventory of critical assets and infrastructure	0
		4.2.2 Systems are in place to ensure infrastructure operation, maintenance, and post-incident response across infrastructure types	1
	4.3 Civil protection and Emergency Management Systems	4.3.1 Emergency management legislation and related policy instruments exist, allowing the emergency management services to function at the national and sub-national levels	2
		4.3.2 Emergency service systems are well resourced, maintained and sufficient in responding to major threats	2

Outbreak/Pandemic Preparedness and Response

42. **Uganda is considered a ‘hot spot’ for emerging and re-emerging zoonotic disease outbreaks because of its biological diversity and high population pressure, which is increasing human-animal interaction presenting high chances of zoonotic pathogens disease spill over.**⁴⁸ In the recent past, the country has experienced several epidemics including Ebola, Marburg, plague, avian influenza, Rift Valley Fever (RVF), yellow fever and Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF). In addition, several zoonotic diseases such as brucellosis, rabies, trypanosomiasis and anthrax are endemic in Uganda. Recently, the country experienced an increase in frequency and intensity of extreme weather variability and epidemics ranging from vector borne to other zoonotic disease outbreaks. There is an ongoing outbreak of Anthrax, RVF, brucellosis and Malaria.⁴⁹

43. **Uganda has made progress in implementing a national strategy for health security in line with International Health Regulations (IHR) that includes emergency preparedness and response planning** for public health emergencies including outbreaks of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases e.g. COVID-19 and Ebola Virus Disease. The National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS, 2019-2023) aims to improve the country's capacity to prevent, detect and respond to public health emergencies⁵⁰ In a 2021 multi-sectoral self-assessment, the GoU reported progress on 18 indicators, relative to its performance in

a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in 2017.^{51,52} The plan acknowledged Uganda's relative strengths in immunization, laboratory systems, workforce development, real time surveillance, response operations, and risk communication. However, the country faces challenges in updating/enacting national legislation/policy, providing financing, sustaining preparedness activities, and points of entry health services. It also acknowledged that it was struggling to address all of the identified capacity gaps due to several factors, including the plan's level of ambition, i.e. its large number of activities, high costs, and inadequate accountability mechanisms.⁵³

44. **Although government financing is insufficient to reach the level of ambition articulated in the NAPHS, there are dedicated budgetary allocations to support IHR implementation.** The NPDPM allows for immediate reprogramming and reallocation of resources from other sectors when a state of disaster is declared.^{54, 55} The GoU is able to reallocate funds to local governments (districts, municipalities and cities) for emergency response, as demonstrated most recently by the national response to COVID-19. According to a thematic audit of the government's COVID-19 response in FY2019/20, UGX 22.1 billion was distributed to 134 local authorities from the supplementary budget, approximately 7.8 percent of the overall supplementary budget of UGX 284 billion.⁵⁶ While the country's agility in reallocating funds during an emergency is important, global studies (e.g., by the International Working Group on Financing Preparedness) underscore the importance of investing in outbreak prevention and preparedness as a critical mitigant to the high costs (financial, mortality, morbidity) associated with response and recovery. Such reallocation of resources adversely impacts the delivery of routine services and create potential challenges for other aspects of health service delivery. In view of Uganda's declining overall health expenditures, it is critical to ensure that funds are available to respond to emergencies and public health threats.⁵⁷

45. **Feedback mechanisms between public health surveillance operations and emergency response are robust and well-functioning.** Uganda has laws, regulations, administrative requirements, and tools for public health surveillance and response in place.⁵⁸ However, some of these legal instruments are not yet in full alignment with the IHR or updated to reflect the current epidemiological and socio-political context.⁵⁹ For example, the Public Health (Amendment) Bill has yet to be enacted, which would provide much needed updates to the Public Health Act of 1935. The Public Health Emergency Operations Center (PHEOC) serves as the Secretariat of Health's focal point to organize, coordinate, conduct, and manage all aspects of public health, while policy oversight is provided by the Ministry of Health's department of Integrated Epidemiology, Surveillance, and Public Health Emergencies.^{60, 61} To mitigate problems that may arise from this dynamic, the GoU⁶² National reference, regional referral, and other specialized⁶³ laboratories have the capacity to rapidly detect diseases of concern to both humans and the livestock/wildlife sectors using a wide range of diagnostics.⁶⁴ However, their coverage as well as availability of key equipment and operational capacity, is constrained by inadequate budgetary allocations. They also require sustained support to maintain accreditation, which is essential to facilitate accurate and rapid diagnostics, efficiency of treatment, and reduction of errors in the laboratory process.⁶⁵

46. **Uganda's supply chain for the health system and healthcare workers is insufficient and ranked only slightly above the global average according to the 2021 Global Health Security (GHS) Index.**⁶⁶ Uganda faces a volatile supply situation for medicines and medical supplies leading to persistent shortages. Through the Uganda Reproductive, Maternal and Child Health Services Improvement Project (P155186),⁶⁷ and the Uganda COVID-19 Response and Emergency Preparedness Project (P174041), the World Bank is supporting the government's efforts to improve the availability of essential drugs, equipment and health infrastructure at primary and secondary healthcare facilities. Uganda has a

dedicated Human Resource for Health Strategic Plan 2020-2030 to address its severe shortage of human resources for health with fewer than one skilled health professional for every 1,000 inhabitants (physicians^{68, 69} providing salary increases for health workers from FY 2022/23 introducing performance-based wage increases in the new fiscal year in 2022. While the overall filled vacancy rate in the health sector stands at about 76 percent, the staffing structure has been in existence for over 2 decades and hence outdated. The government is reviewing the public sector staffing structure to align it with the changing health profiles and nature demand for services, but adoption of the new structure is likely to be affected by fiscal pressures arising from the COVID-19 pandemic and a chronic underfunding of the health sector.⁷⁰

47. **Whereas its broader health workforce is too small to meet its needs, Uganda's epidemiological workforce stands out globally with a score of 100, compared with the global average of 46.5, according to the 2021 GHS Index.**⁷¹ Uganda has a strong capability in training staff for public health including a robust Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETPs).⁷² Uganda's Public Health Fellowship Program (PHFP) offers advanced epidemiology and targets human health officers, nurses, veterinary, environment, and public health cadres.⁷³ Uganda is home to the One Health Central and East African Consortium (OHCEA) that focuses on multiple cadres and sectors, including Nurses as well as Animal Health, Environmental and Public Health staff.⁷⁴

48. **The country has an above average national laboratory system that is capable of detecting priority diseases and conducting key core tests.**⁷⁵ In the 2021 GHS Index, Uganda scored above the world average in both "Screening and Reporting" and "Strength and Quality of Laboratory Systems."⁷⁶ Uganda's capabilities and achievements regarding a functional national system for sample referral and confirmatory diagnostics include an EWS for indicator-based surveillance (IBS) and event-based surveillance (EBS); and national reference laboratories are well-equipped to rapidly detect all IHR priority pathogens and provide technical assistance to other African countries.⁷⁷ Investments in laboratory networks have been supported through significant development partner support and therefore present risks of sustainability. Furthermore, community-based surveillance remains sub-optimal, but recent efforts to revitalize Uganda's community health services present a great opportunity to address this weakness.⁷⁸

49. **Uganda has the capability to adequately respond to zoonotic events in both its veterinary and public health sectors as orchestrated through the One Health Coordination Office (ZDCO) which coordinates the control and prevention of zoonoses and the implementation of the One Health approach.**⁷⁹ ZDCO was formed in November 2016 through a Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministries responsible for human, livestock, wildlife and environmental health. The ZDCO currently operates nationwide in close proximity to PHEOC, but with little or no coordination or liaison with subnational level. According to the 2017 JEE, animal health surveillance and response system remain the weakest link in the implementation of the One Health Approach.

50. **Uganda has developed significant surveillance capacity, particularly in the area of human health. Capabilities and achievements include an early warning system.**⁸⁰ The country has a list of notifiable human and animal health diseases at all levels from community to national. The sources used for IBS and EBS for humans and animals used are well established.⁸¹ While reporting and feedback mechanisms exist for human and animal health, information regarding their interoperability and interconnectedness is contradictory and vague.⁸² While Uganda lacks an electronic reporting surveillance system at the sub-national level and does not collect ongoing or real-time laboratory data, annual and monthly human health reports and analyzes are conducted at the district and national levels.

Critical Infrastructure and Services

51. In 2020, the GoU initiated the NDP III, which will cover the period 2020/2021 to 2024/2025. One of the objectives of the NDP III is to consolidate and increase the stock and quality of productive infrastructure. To successfully implement the NDP III, the government has chosen to focus on institutionalizing infrastructure maintenance, among others. This merely serves to flag that, at present, the government does not have a complete inventory of critical assets and infrastructure. However, over the next three years, the government intends to establish an agency to collect and maintain asset inventories. Through the NDP III, the GoU will seek to reinforce and maintain its critical infrastructure, specifically with regards to energy, transport and water.

52. As the government is currently only beginning this exercise, prioritization should be on the development of standards rather than tabulating inventory, as standards and guidelines can set the definition and framework for critical infrastructure management, in accordance with the principles of “building back better.” A mapping exercise can provide a foundation for what exists and where gaps lie, particularly as many of the public infrastructure projects led by external stakeholders are well-mapped. Moreover, this would address a critical gap in public infrastructure, such as bridges and roads which are often not correctly demarcated.

53. Another good starting point for this endeavor would be to focus on crisis-related infrastructure and assets, such as critical public buildings, like health facilities. Currently Uganda has a building incident inventory, which establishes a database of existing and collapsed buildings. Initiated with the World Bank providing technical assistance, this inventory is governed by the Building Regulatory Board and could provide a launchpad for a more comprehensive critical infrastructure inventory.

Civil Protection and Emergency Management Systems

54. The NPDPM is a legislation that covers emergency management, establishing the NECOC, responsible for early warning and the coordination of emergency and crisis response and recovery action. It aims to provide and disseminate early warning information, establish mechanisms for the effective coordination of emergency response, and support the assignment of responsibilities and establishment of procedures to safeguard the lives and properties of the population.⁸³

55. While the national policy outlines the provision of resources and coordination mechanisms to respond to crises, this is more aspirational than grounded in reality. The national legislation delineates the roles and responsibilities at the national level and the linkages to the sub-national level. It clearly states the policies for activation and coordination of the emergency operations centers with the various ministries and the trickledown from the NECOC to the district level operations centers. However, despite a high level of willingness on the part of the OPM Directorate of Relief, Disaster Preparedness and Refugees (DRDPR), there is a lack of leadership on the issue.

56. The system, as it currently stands, is very centralized with whatever limited available resources concentrated at the top, necessitating a strengthening of national capacity and resources in order to move the needle at the district level.⁸⁴ It is no surprise that the same situation plagues the district centers as well. They too are woefully under-resourced, lacking both equipment and staffing. This is particularly evident in the case of Kampala Municipality, where the emergency operations center lacks the basics to function, despite Kampala being the capital of Uganda and the largest metropolis.⁸⁵

57. **The lack of resources has resulted in the fallback being to use the military whenever a crisis occurs, to the point that the commander of the NECOC is from the military.**⁸⁶ While this might be an obvious solution, it does not do anything to strengthen or build civil capacity. One key example of the dependence on the military is with regards to emergency communication systems, and search and rescue. Through its relationship with the military, the NECOC has been able to depend on communications systems, whenever necessary. Search and rescue capabilities are still developing, particularly maritime.⁸⁷ These nascent skills will take time before they can be implemented as current training is not related to priority hazards, but rather to basic functions.

58. **Where national civil protection services do succeed is in the coordination between police and fire services, with the former serving as the umbrella.** Through a centralized number, both services can be reached, and the relevant departments engaged.⁸⁸ More importantly, both have the basic equipment necessary to respond to emergencies.

59. **Under development are ambulance and emergency medical services, which are currently provided by individual private hospitals. As a result, there is very little coordination between the hospitals, and more importantly, no transfer of patients, if necessary.** Most problematic is the necessity of contacting multiple agencies in order to attain comprehensive services.⁸⁹ Significant out of pocket expenses for ambulances and emergency medicine also prove major barriers for the poor in major urban areas.

60. **In 2021, the GoU launched the National Emergency Medical Services Policy. The policy seeks to streamline emergency response services in the country.** The aim is to reduce avoidable mortality, morbidity and disability by ensuring that all people in need of emergency care can gain access to it. Tied to this is the provision of safe and quick transportation of the sick to hospitals.⁹⁰ The initiation of the emergency services policy recognizes that most accidental deaths in Uganda are avoidable and the result of unnecessary delays in attaining basic health services.

61. **A major challenge is ensuring that the National Emergency Medical Services Policy allocates resources proportionate to need.** Population change and utilization of services would ensure that resources are appropriately distributed to services that are most utilized as well as to the most impacted districts.

62. **In conclusion, it is clear that Uganda is making conscious efforts to build its civil protection and emergency management services.** Cognizant of the importance of linking and combining services, the National Emergency Medical Services policy ties into the National Disaster Preparedness and Management policy. It seeks to develop mechanisms regarding the sharing of emergency service equipment and linkages in personnel skill sets.⁹¹ These aspirations, founded on a recognition of the importance of crisis preparedness, need to be nurtured and translated into reality. Support is needed to translate these policies into operational realities that are accessible to all.

ENTRY POINTS FOR PRIMARY RESPONSE

Public Health Systems

1. Leverage lessons and capitalize on momentum from the ongoing COVID-19 and Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreaks to engage government, through a package of Analytical and Advisory Services (ASAs), on broader discourse around options for ensuring long-term health system resilience to shocks. (Short-term)

The ability of a country to respond effectively to disease outbreaks and pandemics is largely determined by its level of preparedness to prevent, detect, and respond – a capacity built over time as part of a robust public health system. In order to identify appropriate options for long-term Bank support on this agenda in Uganda, the Bank needs to, in the short-term, lay the groundwork through a package of analytical and advisory studies (ASA's) on a range of demand-driven issues including, cost-effectiveness analysis on and lessons learned from recent outbreak (e.g. COVID-19, EVD) response; financing gaps in public health and emergency preparedness/response; prioritization of key actions and high-impact interventions; roadmap for scaling support in PPR and broader health resilience to complement other investments in the sector.

In addition, there is scope for the World Bank to support multisectoral efforts to tackle public health risks, including efforts to strengthen the application of the One Health approach (in collaboration with partners like CDC and WHO), as well as engaging more actively in addressing the multisectoral determinants of non-communicable diseases, which remain a 'silent' epidemic in the country and region. In this regard, the Bank can leverage the ongoing Human Capital Development and Growth Review to address some of these multisectoral dimensions and build upon cross-sectoral partnerships to forge alliances. Beyond working across sectors within the government, there is also an opportunity to foster more multi-sectoral engagement through cross-GP collaboration, especially on the intersection of health, water and environment, animal health/agriculture.

2. Identify opportunities for financing health system resilience through a combination of lending instruments and co-financing options, including grants and credits. (Medium-term)

Uganda presents an opportunity for the Bank to invest in pandemic preparedness and response and health system response broadly because of its vulnerability to outbreaks as well as the weakness of his health system. Importantly, though, through projects like the East African Public Health and Laboratory Networking Project (closed), and the Uganda COVID-19 Response and Emergency Preparedness Project (active, P174041) the Bank has experience working with the health sector and partners on PPR and, thus, can more easily build upon investments made in this area. In this regard, the Bank should—in the short-term—support the government's efforts to secure additional resources through opportunities like the Pandemic Fund, which is a new financial intermediary fund (FIF) for pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response (PPR). This Fund can provide resources that can serve as additional financing to the UCREPP and expand the scope of support into core public health functions. Similarly, the country can pursue—in the medium-term—follow-on operations through country stand-alone projects (through credits) or participate in new

regional operations such as the pipeline Health Emergency Preparedness, Response and Resilience Multiphase Programmatic Approach (P180127).

Critical Infrastructure; Civil Protection and Emergency Management Systems

1. Support the roll-out of the National Emergency Medical Services Policy. (Short-term)

The National Emergency Medical Services policy is unique in that it is intertwined with the NPDPM. As of now, the DRM bill has not gone through. However, this should not stymie the advancement of the emergency services policy. The operationalization of the policy should be supported, particularly in the following areas: establishment of a centralised platform for services to reach people in a timely and coordinated way; establishment of information-sharing and response coordination mechanisms between the Directorate of Disaster Relief, Preparedness and Refugees and the Ministry of Health Emergency Medical Services; development of a shared inventory of emergency equipment and skill sets between the two departments.

3. Develop a comprehensive package of activities that links civil protection and emergency management systems together, building the capacity of the National Emergency Coordination and Operations Centre, and establishing a central hub for coordinating emergency operations. (Long-term)

Capacity-building the NECOC, while reinforcing any linkages between the National Emergency Medical Services and the National Disaster Preparedness and Management policies, will ensure that the embedding of a holistic view of crisis preparedness within systems. To achieve this, any investments must be based off a legal framework, the DRM bill. This will provide the basis for the establishment of a contingency fund or a reserve fund (which could be supported through seed money). Concretely, this would require an R2R, on the part of the WBG, that would lead to a costed and itemised investment plan, detailing the types of support required to strengthen the NECOC. Further in the future, the NECOC would be able to provide a platform for early warning, thereby fostering the link between early warning and risk financing.

Social & Livelihood Support – Aggregated score: 1.6 (Nascent)

Component	Subcomponent	Indicator	ML
5. SOCIAL AND LIVELIHOOD SUPPORT	5.1 Coverage and scalability of social protection	5.1.1 An adaptive social protection policy or strategy is in place with adequate financial commitments, clearly defined roles and responsibilities, and coordination between SP and DRM for crisis response	2
		5.1.2 Social protection programs and systems are in place, with adaptive design features to scale up and/or out timely and effectively during and after crisis events	2
	5.2 Food security and livelihoods	5.2.1 The government has the capacity to safeguard the availability of food through comprehensive policies/plans alongside effective monitoring and forecasting of food-related outcomes.	2
		5.2.2 The government has the capacity to ensure access to food supplies through the operationalization of policies and coordination mechanisms.	0
	5.3 Continued access to education	5.3.1. Educational resources, infrastructure and learning outcomes are safeguarded during crises	2
	5.4 Crisis induced displacement	5.4.1 The needs of existing and newly internally displaced populations are taken into consideration in planning and responses	1
		5.4.2 Refugees and asylum-seekers are included in crisis preparedness plans and responses	2

Coverage and Scalability of Social Protection

63. **Strengthening social protection (SP) is essential for reducing vulnerability, promoting inclusive growth, and supporting households to respond to shocks.** However, SP mechanisms in Uganda are underleveraged and under resourced, especially in the context of crisis preparedness and response. Coverage is insufficient, given the scale of needs. Half of the population was considered vulnerable to poverty in 2019/20,⁹² whereas SP programs covered just 3% of the population.⁹³

64. Uganda's 2015 National Social Protection Policy (NSPP) recognizes the role of SP in Disaster Risk Management (DRM) response but lacks a strong acknowledgement or policy approach to Adaptive Social Protection. To accomplish its policy goals, the NSPP outlines clear institutional arrangements, with the Ministry of Gender, Labour, and Social Development (MGLSD) in the lead of social protection implementation. By its own acknowledgement, the MGLSD struggles with coordination and clear delineation of roles among different ministries, departments, and agencies. The linkages between SP coordination and broader DRM coordination mechanisms are unclear. While the MGLSD has a clear role within the NPDPM, there is little evidence supporting strong institutionalized links between SP and DRM agencies in practice.

65. **Social protection systems in Uganda lack several shock-responsive functions.** Given that a majority of Ugandan households have experienced at least one shock since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the need for adaptive or shock-responsive social protection is increasingly urgent.^{xciii} They lack three critical elements necessary for it to be shock responsive: *i)* a national registry that can enable dynamic identification of vulnerable groups, including refugees, across the country; *ii)* a robust and flexible payment approach to enable faster, secure cash transfers with expanded coverage; and *iii)* contingency financing or sovereign risk transfer instruments to allow for faster response in anticipation of, or shortly after, a shock.⁹⁴ The existing social protection programs in Uganda have low coverage, with the two main programs—the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) and the Senior Citizens Grant (SCG) program reaching only 3 percent of the population.⁹⁵ Without dedicated contingency financing, the GoU can only be reactive, as funds must be re-allocated, borrowed or provided by donors.

66. **Uganda lacks a single dynamic national registry that can be used to identify vulnerable groups in times of shocks.**⁹⁶ The system would need to enable hazard/shock-specific targeting, as the needs and vulnerabilities to shocks vary based on many different factors (e.g. geography, gender, age, etc.). Currently, the national single registry only contains data on active beneficiaries of the NUSAF 3 and SCG programs.⁹⁷ However, this existing system and related initiative⁹⁸ provide foundations for an expanded system, which the World Bank is planning to support as part of the next phase of support for SP systems strengthening.

67. **Social protection programs still rely heavily on informal cash payment channels, although the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated efforts to migrate to digital payments.** In 2022, the World Bank has conducted an assessment of the digital financial services ecosystem and the digital capabilities of financial service providers necessary for the scale up of social protection grants.⁹⁹ The assessment highlighted that digital payments can rapidly accelerate crisis response efforts, while strengthening financial inclusion of low-income and marginalized populations. They can also reduce overhead costs both for the provider and beneficiary alike, reducing the need to physically travel to deliver/collect cash, food or other inputs. In remote, rural areas, digital payments are proving to a successful way of reaching populations that have traditionally been unbanked. They are particularly beneficial for women, enabling them “to tackle their challenges of safety, convenience and mobility” by receiving payments to their digital device.¹⁰⁰

68. **Uganda aims to implement non-contributory Direct Income Support (DIS) programs across the country.** The country signaled this intent by becoming a signatory to the Livingstone Call to Action (2006), which obliges African states to implement budgeted plans for the implementation of Direct Income Support (DIS) programs. As of 2018/2019, however, only 1 percent of the population in Uganda had received direct income support. Since the NSPP was only adopted in 2015, the MGLSD maintains that it is still early days in the development of the comprehensive social protection system envisaged by the

69. **The lack of dedicated contingency financing for social protection reduces the ability of the GoU to respond quickly in anticipation of or in response to a crisis, as funds must be re-allocated, borrowed or provided by donors.** The use of social protection programs to respond to shocks have been rolled out piloted successfully through a dedicated component under NUSAF 3 and the DRDIP, but has yet to be rolled out nationally. The government is committed to scaling up the DRF component in the next phase of social protection systems strengthening investments. This program enabled the GoU to support households affected by localized shocks through satellite data. The DRF component of NUSAF 3 has been triggered for three consecutive years in 2017, 2018, and 2019, effectively eliminating food security crises where the program was implemented.¹⁰¹ However, over the last year, when needs were greatest, the program has been unable to respond due to a gap between NUSAF 3 and next phase of World Bank support for SP systems strengthening, highlighting the risk of overreliance on external financial resources for SP.

70. **Linkages between SP and Disaster Risk Management (DRM) policies are inconsistent and coordination mechanisms are unclear.** Uganda's 2015 National Social Protection Policy (NSPP) recognizes the role of social protection in Disaster Risk Management (DRM); however, the 2010 National Policy for Disaster Preparedness and Management (NPDPM), makes no reference to social protection.¹⁰² By its own acknowledgement, the Ministry of Gender, Labour, and Social Development (MGLSD) – the government lead on social protection – struggles with coordination and the clear delineation of roles among different ministries, departments, and agencies.¹⁰³ Whereas the MGLSD has a defined role within the NPDPM, the objective for this Ministry is focused on integrating “gender concerns into disaster preparedness, emergency planning, decision making and implementation at all levels.” There is no reference to their role as the lead on SP implementation. There is also little evidence supporting strong institutionalized links between social protection and DRM agencies in practice.

71. **The GoU has asserted its commitment to scaling up the DRF component in the next phase of social protection systems strengthening investments.** Yet, it remains to be seen whether the GoU will deliver on these commitments. In 2006, Uganda signed the Livingstone Call to Action (2006), which obliges African states to implement budgeted plans for the implementation of Direct Income Support programs.¹⁰⁴ As of 2018/2019, only 1 percent of the population in Uganda had received direct income support.¹⁰⁵ Since the NSPP was only adopted in 2015, the GoU maintains that it is still early days in the development of the comprehensive social protection system envisaged by the national policy.

Food Security and Livelihoods

72. **Despite the mandate of the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries and Fisheries (MAAIF) to strengthen food security and household incomes, the ministry does not currently have any crisis preparedness plans in place to safeguard the availability of food supplies during crises.** However, with the exception of the Karamoja region, acute food insecurity is not a major issue in Uganda based on historical data. What ails Uganda is the impact of climate change on food security and agricultural production. This longer-term slow-onset crisis has impacted agricultural production with diminishing returns. Notably, Uganda has been impacted by reduced rainfall and/or drought every 5-6 years, which has been offset by periodic flooding, for the past 30 years. The cumulative impact of these dynamics is increased food insecurity. This critical issue will need to be addressed through longer-term agricultural reform and climate change programming,¹⁰⁶ and is outside the scope of this assessment.

73. **For more immediate hazards, such as floods, the DRDPR, under the OPM, is responsible for the provision of food assistance to affected populations in the event of a crisis.** While the Directorate has responded to such crises, it has been in terms of one-off, small-scale food distributions, managed and coordinated at the local level.¹⁰⁷ At the same time, the Directorate has coordinated with other stakeholders, such as the World Food Program (WFP),¹⁰⁸ on food distributions in more crisis-affected areas, such as the Northern and Northeastern regions of Uganda, as well as with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) on the provision of assistance to refugee populations.

74. **While the DRDPR has the stated objective of coordinating the timely response to disasters and providing food and non-food relief to disaster victims, this has not been systematized.** As per the Directorate's website, preparedness plans have been developed, and food aid and non-food items have been procured and distributed to crisis-affected populations. However, there is a lack of clarity as to the timeframe (i.e. prior to or after the onset of the disaster)¹⁰⁹ and whether the response was in accordance with a crisis preparedness plan.

75. **The lack of clarity on preparedness plans makes it difficult to assess the involvement of other sectors and ministries, including the delineation of roles and responsibilities.** What is clear, however, is the involvement of other stakeholders, such as WFP and UNHCR, and their roles under the auspices of the Interagency Uganda Country Refugee Response Plan and Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). Under this plan and framework WFP coordinates and implements its food-related preparedness activities with the Directorate. This structure will be discussed in more detail in the section on crisis-induced displacement.

76. **While acute food insecurity does not constitute a high-level of threat in Uganda, looming chronic food insecurity does.** With climate change, the onset of drought has become more frequent, last occurring in 2016. Since 2020, Uganda has been faced with four seasons of reduced rainfall leading to a situation in which between 25 percent and 30 percent of the population is undernourished.¹¹⁰ To address this underlying crisis in food security, the so-called "hidden hunger", the Government of Uganda Office of the Prime Minister has launched the Uganda Nutrition Action Plan (UNAP II). The plan seeks to build awareness on micronutrient-dense foods and dietary diversity, in an effort to stage off long-term hunger.

77. Under these increasingly vulnerable circumstances, it is imperative in the short-term that farmers are able to secure their crops against hazards; and in the long-term, that activities such as improving agricultural output and adapting farming to climate change take precedence. Despite the superficial evidence of green landscapes and low acute malnutrition rates, Uganda is faced with constant food vulnerability. Against this backdrop, there lies an added impetus to strengthen and reinforce early warning and forecasting systems.

78. **FEWSNET, the global leading provider of early warning and analysis of food insecurity, included Uganda as part of its food security surveillance systems.** This public information is developed in collaboration with the government and disseminated to all stakeholders. It is important to note, that in Uganda, FEWSNET only covers food security, malnutrition data is limited to the Karamoja region, due to its high level of vulnerability to food insecurity (often in Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) 3, crisis level).

79. **These efforts are complemented by the UNMA which is mandated to promote, monitor weather and climate as well as provide weather predictions and advisories to Government and other**

stakeholders for use in sustainable development of the country.¹¹¹ The UNMA gathers country-wide information on rainfall, temperature, and wind patterns – information of importance to farmers.¹¹² This data enables the identification of hotspots in case of inadequate rainfall and drought.

80. **For weather forecasting to be of value to farmers, the analysis must reach them in a timely and understandable way.** While the UNMA disseminates forecasting data to MAAIF, it does not do so consistently, making it challenging for the MAAIF to transmit relevant information to farmers and other end-users. Moreover, by the time, the information does reach the farmers, it is often obsolete. A means to address this would be to strengthen extension services and outreach to farmers, while reinforcing the linkages between UNMA and MAAIF.¹¹³

81. **Given the weaknesses in the UNMA, various stakeholders have taken on the onus of developing EWSs as integral components of their agricultural projects.** Nonetheless, the need remains for the development of a higher-level system based on farmers' needs.¹¹⁴ The Bureau of Statistics monitors the price of essential commodities, such as matoke, sorghum, beans, cassava and millet, in each of the main markets. Again, the challenge lies in translating the information into concrete action. A potential approach might be including the data in the MAAIF databases for analysis and decision-making.¹¹⁵

82. **At this moment, Uganda is faced not only with reduced rainfall but also with the global price increases in wheat and fertilizer due to the war in Ukraine.** Already the price of food is increasing, as evidenced by the 73 percent increase in the cost of cooking oil this year.¹¹⁶ This is exacerbated by the increase in demand in maize by Kenya, which is faced with severe drought, and South Sudan, which is experiencing catastrophic food insecurity. The current situation necessitates the government's capacity to ensure food security continues at current levels and does not deteriorate. The increase in food prices, combined with inadequate rainfall and the localized presence of African armyworm,¹¹⁷ is reminiscent of 2016 when Uganda was faced by substantial food insecurity. In light of the increased demand for maize from Kenya and South Sudan, government capacity to manage trade flows could potentially alleviate stresses on vulnerable households, while protecting farmers.

83. **In the past 20 years, the government has engaged in an active effort to open markets to increase exports and strengthen the agriculture sector – a change in approach from prior to the late 1990s, when the GoU exercised control over trade flows.** This has meant removing barriers to trade and providing input subsidies to farmers to support the cultivation of key commercial crops, particularly coffee and maize. The subsidies have primarily been on seeds and seedlings.¹¹⁸ The added value of these crops as related to food security lies in having good terms of trade for food crops or in ensuring that borders remain open.

84. **The GoU has demonstrated its intentions to maintain trade flow by removing barrier to trade and keeping borders open.** Any limitation on food trade has been related to borders being closed by surrounding countries. More critically, at this juncture, it is not certain if the government has the capacity to manage commodity prices through subsidies or price controls. This is demonstrated by the lack of willingness to impose fuel subsidies despite the 19 percent increase in price in 2022,¹¹⁹ in addition to the lack of mitigation of the price of cooking oil mentioned previously.

85. **A potential mitigation measure could be ensuring access to pre-emptive (ex-ante) financing.** This can help to ensure that funds can be mobilized early to support food-related relief efforts, such as cash transfers among others. However, the GoU does not have this in place. Aside from pre-planned

financing being difficult for most International Development Association (IDA)-countries, in the case of Uganda, food security is under the remit of the DRDPR. This has led to potential investments/funding being allocated to other sectors.

86. **To its credit, the Directorate has implemented small-scale food distribution periods of crisis.**¹²⁰ However, this has not translated into the more systematic planning and delineation of financial and technical resources.¹²¹ Tangibly, this means that the government does not have any strategic food reserves in place. Government systems have also proven weak to ensure clear governance, management and oversight of many of these distributions. Systematic management, monitoring and oversight is needed to ensure that these food distribution exercises efficiently meet those most in need of assistance.

87. **The impact of this might be managed through Uganda's unique role as regional food supplier to the WFP.** Uganda farming companies provide WFP with maize for its programs in South Sudan and other countries in the region.¹²² This large-scale production, with its related supply chains, could potentially be leveraged to address any sudden-onset food crises in the country. For this possibility to be successful, the GoU would need to have an agreement in place with WFP to ensure primary usage of food supplies within the country, in the event of a food crisis. Moreover, there would need to be stringent quality control measures and strengthening of delivery contracts, in addition to other barriers to implementation that need to be reviewed.

88. **Despite the self-reported existence of preparedness plans, there is no evidence that the DRDPR has undertaken any of the planning required for a food distribution.** This can be an impediment in the event of a sudden-onset crisis that impacts food security, like flooding. In order to address this, the Directorate might designate temporary collection points for food distribution.

89. **In line with the preparedness planning, the Directorate could compile a registry to identify crisis-affected populations quickly.** This could be derived from data from the National Identification Registration Agency, which is charged with managing and operationalizing a national identification registry. However, work on this is only just beginning.¹²³ Recognizing the importance of a shock-responsive social registry, the GoU established a DRF component under NUSAF 3, that triggered support to households affected by localized shocks.¹²⁴ The component is being scaled up in the next phase of World Bank support for SP systems strengthening. Uganda has a strong national penetration of digital finance platforms (eg. MtnMoMo, Airtel), a more systematized approach to a national register that can respond to shocks can more effectively provide digital finance to crisis-affected populations instead of more logistically complex food distributions.

90. **While this is a step in the right direction, it does not detract from the problem that at present there are a myriad of project-based registries, but none speak to each other.** This is being addressed through World Bank support, starting with the ongoing assessment of SP data systems.¹²⁵ Advanced approaches to monitoring change in population, such as the use of satellite-generated imagery highlighting changes in number of dwellings can significantly enhance registry representativeness and financing mechanism responsiveness.

Continued Access to Education

91. **Uganda has a history of crises which has long affected children's access to education.** Conflict and inter-ethnic tensions have not just displaced children and teachers, depriving children of the ability

to learn, they have also resulted in the damage or appropriation of schools, depriving children of the space to learn. Natural disasters, particularly flooding and heavy rains, have caused schools to shut temporarily or made it dangerous for children to travel to schools.¹²⁶

92. **The outbreak of COVID-19 has challenged children's access to education, particularly in rural or poor parts of the country.** Uganda has seen the longest school closures in the world, with children losing two years of schooling.¹²⁷ As 2022 moves on, the slow reopening of schools, combined with the current global economic stresses, risk impacting children's learning in the long-term, depriving Uganda of a generation of workers. Accelerated education programs in refugee hosting districts will only provide a minor mitigation measure.

93. **It is against this backdrop that Uganda, prior to the onset of COVID-19, had already made crisis preparedness a priority for its educational system.** The NPDPM calls on the education sector to mainstream disaster risk management in the education curriculum at all levels.¹²⁸ In response, the Ministry of Education and Sports has embedded conflict and disaster risk management into its planning.

94. **A Guide to Conflict and Disaster Risk Management in Educational Institutions in Uganda (2015) formulates conflict-sensitive policies that contribute to disaster risk reduction.** It seeks to address the risk of conflict and disaster in its strategy to ensure quality education. Developed with the support of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the guidelines are built on the model of "safe schools", whereby all members of the community contribute to protecting the educational environment. The guide, effectively a crisis preparedness policy, aims to help educational stakeholders analyze and monitor conflict indicators, anticipate disaster risks, prevent injury and minimize property damage.¹²⁹ Most importantly the guide aims to ensure safe educational institutions by reducing risk, and to prepared for an immediate response. The guide also clearly outlines the role of each stakeholder in mitigating and responding to risks and disasters.¹³⁰

95. **As part of Uganda's NPDPM, each district has a DRM committee that is linked to school-level DRM committees.** These are linked to the education sector's own disaster risk management committee, which is then has roles and responsibilities divided amongst the key stakeholders and is in turn linked to school-level DRM committees. There are coordination mechanisms in place to ensure the flow of information and management of response between the district DRM committees and those of the educational sector.

96. **Weak operationalization of the DRM guide has stymied these efforts, however.** This is due to lack of education-specific funding to respond to crises and competing priorities in an underfunded sector. Moreover, there exists a time-lag in addressing damages to schools, following a disaster.¹³¹ These challenges at the national level are exacerbated at the district level, through lack of local emergency preparedness and response plans. This is in part impeded by district educational officials' insufficient capacity to develop local preparedness and response strategies, in addition to poor coordination among stakeholders.¹³²

97. **Part of the challenge lies in the structure of the educational system overall.** Despite efforts, education remains grossly underfunded in Uganda; as an example, public spending for primary and secondary education is currently below three percent of GDP (and 10 percent of the public budget).¹³³

The result has been an education sector that struggles with both capacity and resources and is, therefore, unable to plan or fund preparedness measures, that might be perceived as costly or extraneous.

98. **Despite this, the Ministry of Education and Sports is formulating an ambitious strategic plan, covering 2020-2025,¹³⁴ which aims to not only reinforce and improve the education system, but seeks to explicitly address crisis preparedness.** Disaster risk management has been prioritized as a cross-cutting area, with the identified need to clearly articulate a conflict and disaster risk management (CDRM) policy. Building on the education sector's already existing disaster risk management committees, emphasis is now on creating a CDRM training and building the capacity of teachers through such training.

99. **To alleviate this, the Ministry of Education is working with UNICEF and UNESCO to operationalize the education sector's guidelines for DRM/CDRM.** These efforts have also extended to other donor-funded programs like Strengthening Education Systems for Improved Learning (SESIL), which is a four-year program that has "children are safe in and around schools" as part of its theory of change.¹³⁵ These and other external stakeholders are working with the Ministry of Education to realize its ambitious strategic plan to support and maintain high quality education services.¹³⁶

100. **One neglected aspect, and potential source of support, is the role of the private sector in institutions.** In Uganda, the definition of private sector education is quite broad and includes community-led, NGO and church-based schools. While the education sector strategic plan does recognize the private sector as an important participant in strengthening educational outcomes,¹³⁷ they are not considered outright as a partner in crisis preparedness. However, this relationship might be strengthened to ensure that appropriate levels of human and infrastructure resources are available to deliver education services during and after a crisis.

101. **The current COVID-19 pandemic has forced education systems globally to rethink their approach to education and to plan for alternate means of education.** This is no less true in Uganda, where the Ministry of Education, in partnership with SESIL, has implemented distance learning through radio lessons, community-led learning and community engagement. What remains unclear is the sustainability of these efforts and their adoption into education sector crisis preparedness plans in the longer term.

Crisis-induced Displacement

102. **Uganda has long been at the forefront of the global refugee discourse, beginning in 2006 when it passed a refugee law that was regarded as a model, recognizing the right of refugees to live, move and work freely.** This open-door approach provides refugees with access to national services, such as health and education. In 2016, Uganda signed on to the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, with the accompanying Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) and Global Compact on Refugees (GCR). The GCR built upon the New York Declaration to ease pressures on host countries, enhance refugee self-reliance, expand access to third country solutions, and support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.

103. **To manage Uganda's commitments, it has established the DRDPR within the OPM.** Headed by a Minister and a Minister of State, the Directorate aims "to lead and enhance the national response capacity to refugee emergency management". In accordance with the CRRF and Uganda's own refugee laws, the Directorate grants asylum to refugees. It is also responsible for developing and implementing

humanitarian interventions for refugees, enhancing their livelihoods and improving infrastructure around refugee settlements.¹³⁸

104. **This support to refugees is fundamental to Uganda's ethos, given that it hosts the third largest number of refugees in the world, and the most in Africa.** The almost 1.6 million refugees, coming from regions as disparate as Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia, have an indelible impact on the country, its resources and structures. Given the instability in its surrounding neighbors, Uganda faces frequent ongoing inflow of refugees over its borders, challenging social service and infrastructure in refugee hosting areas.

105. **Until recently, Uganda was also subject to large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs).** With the end of the civil war in 2006, the majority have returned to their communities of origin, with only approximately 70,000 maintaining displacement status. While Uganda does not have long, or even medium, term displacement issues, the possibility does exist for crises, such as larger-scale flooding, to provoke sudden-onset temporary displacement.

106. **Under OPM and UNHCR's Uganda has a joint Inter-Agency Refugee Response Plan (RRP)¹³⁹ which largely covers the humanitarian response.** Through the CRRF Strategic Direction and National Plan of Action which covers refugees and host communities, Uganda provides a more development-focused approach to integrated planning. Under these frameworks, the GoU has detailed multi-partner plans by which to coordinate protection, the settlement of refugees, and to ensure that they receive essential services and are integrated into longer-term development solutions. These frameworks have been challenged in the past five years with the rapid and sudden inflow of refugees from South Sudan and the DRC. From 2015 to date, Uganda's refugee population increased from 430,000 to almost 1.6 million.¹⁴⁰

107. **To its credit, despite the overwhelming number of refugees and COVID-19 pressures, Uganda continues to implement the GCR and Uganda's CRRF. An evaluation of the CRRF conducted in late 2021 demonstrated that Uganda was on track with its commitments towards the CRRF.** While there are legitimate concerns with regards to its capacity to handle further inflows and the growing discrepancies in the provision of services between host and refugee communities, there is a clear willingness and effort being made to incorporate early solutions and longer-term goals into refugee hosting districts.¹⁴¹

108. **The CRRF includes emergency response as one of its pillars, providing humanitarian assistance to refugee populations while laying the building blocks for transition to longer-term development programming.** In addition to the CRRF, which outlines the broader parameters for the development management of refugee and host community populations, the government, through the OPM, co-leads the Uganda RRP and the refugee contingency plan with UNHCR focusing on refugee care and maintenance. The CRRF and the RRP in Uganda are complementary with the RRP focusing on new arrivals and shorter-term action plans that focus on the immediate management of refugees in settlements within refugee hosting districts.¹⁴² The contingency planning under the RRP is strongly supported by UNHCR, with close government engagement. It is the planning tool for responding to new inflows of refugees. Updated annually, the RRP and the contingency plan were updated again in March 2022, due to the sudden upsurge in refugees from South Sudan and the DRC.¹⁴³

109. **Despite the RRP outlining the ongoing needs of existing refugee populations and the contingency plan addressing the influx of population, neither the GoU nor UNHCR have developed a crisis preparedness plan that speaks to the needs of existing refugees, should a crisis, such as flooding or landslide, occur.**¹⁴⁴ To a certain extent, this is mitigated by the majority of refugees residing in

concentrated districts or in settlements (93 percent are hosted across 13 formal settlements¹⁴⁵), where UNHCR and other international actors can step in and respond to any localized crisis promptly. At the same time, there are some refugees who have entered Uganda informally and are not hosted in settlements. The particularities and lack of data on these groups (lack of identity cards, lack of access to financial resources, lack of access to assistance) leaves them vulnerable in the event of a crisis.

110. **Despite its extensive experience with displaced populations, both refugees and IDPs, the GoU, led by the DRDPR, does not possess any crisis preparedness plans that anticipate displacement and the impact of displacement on the provision of services.**¹⁴⁶ While internal displacement has not been a significant concern in Uganda in recent years, there is potential for compound risks to grow as fire and other hazards become more likely through climate change. This is particularly problematic as floods, hailstorms and landslides triggered 47,000 displacements in 2021. At the end of 2021, around 26,000 people were living in internal displacement as a result of disasters.¹⁴⁷

111. **This lack of planning for internal displacement means that the government does not take into consideration that internally displaced populations may remain in place and not return home, or that displacement, even for a short time, can have profound impacts on human development indicators.** While the number of IDPs is currently negligible, in 2019, 130,000 people were displaced, albeit temporarily, thereby demonstrating the extent of variability.

112. **The April 2022 emergency appeal of the Uganda refugee response plan highlights the paramount importance of monitoring and recording new displacement.** With the support of the World Bank, a pilot project is being initiated under the existing Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project. The DCRM aims to facilitate the government to assess and modify programs when there are significant refugee inflows into the country. It builds on metrics gathered by UNHCR and the government. In an effort to strengthen government capacity to gather information and utilize it for programmatic responses, the DCRM is driven by data that is objective, can be collected independently, and most importantly, is readily available to rapidly inform a response.¹⁴⁸ By extension, the DCRM will augment the government's capacity to prepare for crises.

113. **Another feature of the DCRM is that it relies on coordination structures between the government and external stakeholders, thereby reinforcing existing mechanisms.** The existing refugee response plan has ensured that there are platforms in place to coordinate displacement-related crises. Moreover, under the country's refugee coordination structures, there are clear mechanisms in place to trigger the activation of said platforms by the OPM, UNHCR and other stakeholders. These platforms lay the groundwork for displacement monitoring, sector-specific responses and coordination between OPM, UNHCR and other external partners.¹⁴⁹

114. **It is to be noted that all government-led coordination on refugees is managed at the national level.** At the sub-national level, coordination is led by humanitarian stakeholders and is primarily managed by regional and sub-regional UNHCR and OPM offices that coordinate with district administrations and settlements. While this structure ensures a coordination structure between external and internal humanitarian actors, it sometimes limits the involvement of district-level authorities to engage on refugee issues, build local government capacity, and foster coordination with national development systems.¹⁵⁰

115. **Despite being at the vanguard of refugee legislation globally, Uganda has not been inclusive of refugees in its crisis preparedness and response planning in national systems, preferring the parallel**

systems managed by OPM Department of Refugees and UNHCR. On the one hand, this is not surprising, given the general weakness in crisis preparedness planning; on the other hand, this is concerning as refugees are not consistently included in sectoral response planning figures.¹⁵¹ The CRRF evaluation undertaken at the end of 2021 examined the provision of assistance between refugee and host communities in refugee hosting districts (RHDs). It determined that refugee and host communities do receive the same types of assistance as per the conditions of the CRRF. However, outside the RHDs, refugees fall under the remit of UNHCR, whereas the general population lies under the Directorate of Disaster Relief, Preparedness and Refugees. As a result, assistance may be provided with time delays between the two groups. Moreover, the assistance provided by UNHCR is more likely to be more comprehensive, whereas that of the Directorate is limited to GFDs.¹⁵²

116. An emerging issue has been the potential for this dichotomy to cause conflict and distrust between refugee populations and host communities. Already there are concerns being raised about emergency assistance being overly focused on refugee needs. This is being exacerbated by the already existing geographic inequalities within the country. One route of addressing this disparity is by changing the parameters of assistance. For example, currently, international assistance in RHDs under the CRRF is outlined as including 70-30, refugee to host. It is now being suggested by district-level governments that aid should change to either encompass all vulnerable populations regardless of status or should be equally split. This, alongside clear and well disseminated public communication about the proportionality and inter-group equity of approaches, could mitigate the risk of inequitable refugee assistance becoming a source of conflict.

117. Of consideration would also be to revisit the physical attributes of emergency plans and how to most effectively implement them in protracted refugee settings (i.e. SPHERE standards² against national development standards). Tangibly, this translates to the ratio of schools, health centers, waterpoints to population. SPHERE standards provide a high benchmark, being founded on humanitarian principles, whereas development standards are more closely linked to nationally defined capacity and achievable goals that lend themselves to more municipally focused settlement models. By implementing a blend of the two approaches, it might be possible to build pathways to self-reliance in RHDs, while preserving protection needs and ensure more equitable targeted assistance for populations in need.

118. In the short-term, a means of supporting crisis preparedness, while strengthening government capacity and reducing the potential for conflict, would be better coordination between the different parts of OPM dealing with refugees and national emergencies and UNHCR. If a plan were to be developed on where to resettle refugees, it could be reinforced with a scaled up DCRM, as it would provide the government with access directly to data on where populations were coming across the border. Further, capacities to forecast levels of refugee flows and population change in refugee hosting districts may also be developed.

119. For all this to occur, government ownership must be reinforced across its emergency and refugee departments. A longer-term government-led approach to integrated emergency management including refugee inflows is needed and refugee partners can support the capacity building of such a system. The DRCM provides a good point of entry for this, as it provides the opportunity for the

² The Sphere community sets standards for humanitarian action and promotes quality and accountability. <https://spherestandards.org/>

government to build its capacity for preparedness and assume a stronger leadership role on refugee management – a goal it has strived for since 2006 with the first refugee law.

ENTRY POINTS FOR SOCIAL AND LIVELIHOOD SUPPORT

1. For the next phase of World Bank SP investments, build in a sustainability plan to prevent interruptions in SP delivery and strengthen shock responsive elements (DRF component, dynamic single registry and expanded options for digital transfer) (Short-term)

The World Bank is already working with the government to design social protection systems that include shock responsive elements. This will be done through an expanded DRF component with labor intensive public works in the next phase of investment, support for the single registry to enable dynamic identification, and support for expanding options for digital transfers. However, over the last year, when needs were greatest, the program has been unable to respond due to a gap between NUSAF 3 and the next social protection operation, highlighting the risk of overreliance on external financial resources for SP. Whereas significant government financing for social protection may not be realistic at this time, the World Bank may want to explore other options with the government to avoid an interruption in SP delivery.

Evidence has demonstrated that shock-responsive social protection mechanisms are more effective than food distributions. With World Bank support, Uganda is currently social protection system. At this juncture, it would be crucial to include shock-responsive mechanisms, to ensure that the system is adaptative. Including digital finance components into the social protection system and linking it to the national registry would ensure that the social protection mechanism can scale-up quickly, reaching more vulnerable people in a crisis.

2. Scale-up the Displacement Crisis Response Mechanism (DCRM) to include transit districts, as well as refugee hosting areas. (Medium-term)

The current DRDIP, of which the DCRM forms an integral part, seeks to build resilience among refugee-hosting communities. Since its inception, the dynamics of the refugee arrivals have changed, and they are no longer only residing in settlements, but also in refugee-transit areas. This shift necessitates an adjustment to the DCRM triggers and the implementation of the appropriate measurements for the transit populations. As the DRDIP II is prepared to launch in 2024, the DCRM needs to be adapted to reflect the new realities. It needs to be scaled up to include refugee-hosting areas and transit areas.

3. Strengthen the utilization dimension of food security through support to the Uganda Nutrition Action Plan, increasing vulnerable women and girls' access to micronutrient dense foods and dietary diversity. (Long-term)

Cognisant of the growing risks of chronic food insecurity and “hidden hunger”, Uganda has launched its second Nutrition Action Plan. The plan aims to raise the consumption of micro-nutrient dense foods and strengthen dietary diversity, particularly among vulnerable women and girls. To increase awareness of the importance of nutrient-rich foods, behaviour change is critical. The targeted populations can be reached primarily through the education and health systems. By creating

awareness around dietary diversity and addressing the utilisation dimension of food security, Uganda can lay down the foundations to build overall food security in the country.

4. Support the Ministry of Education to operationalize the education DRM guide, through the reinforcement of DRM linkages between the education sector and the OPM. (Long-term)

The DRM guide was launched to enable improved coordination between the school, district and national DRM committees, among others. However, these linkages are complex and do not play in the favor of those who might lack the skills to develop crisis preparedness plans or utilize limited resources. This has led to a time-lag in responding to crises, with an impact on education indicators. By strengthening linkages between the Ministry of Education and the OPM, through the reinforcement of coordination flows from the district to national levels, there is potential to reduce the impact of crises on access to education. The simplification of coordination mechanisms and greater capacity-building for response planning would facilitate the means by which the Ministry of Education receives emergency funding.

Appendix A: Summary of characteristics associated with each maturity level in the CPGA

MATURITY LEVEL	KEY CHARACTERISTICS
Advanced	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Comprehensive efforts have been made to promote preparedness with few gaps. Preparedness is prioritized and mainstreamed in key government documents and plans A (relatively) advanced plan, system or institution is in place. While it may still have some shortfalls, it covers all planning and operational aspects needed to ensure holistic uptake of preparedness activities.
Good	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Clear and dedicated efforts related to preparedness have been promoted. Solid gains have been made, though efforts to promote preparedness may not be fully comprehensive. Balance of priorities still favor response. Has well-thought through and dedicated plans, systems or institutions in place. Most areas are well resourced and have decent capacity, though not across the board.
Basic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Decent efforts have been made to promote preparedness, with a vision laid out in relevant policy or planning documents. Progress in implementation may be uneven or disjointed. Priority is still often given to ex-post response over preparedness. Has a plan, system or institution in place. However, it may face shortfalls in capacity or resourcing. Design features are often good, though inadequate to have meaningful effect.
Nascent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some (or minimal) efforts have been made to promote ex-ante preparedness, though typically with little ability to follow through. Ex-post relief and response are typically the focus of government intervention Has a plan, system or institution may be in place though it does not address crisis preparedness as a priority. System suffers from resource and capacity constraints, resulting in limited implementation/operationalization.
Unmet	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nothing (or very little) has been done to address aspects of preparedness OR country has little-to-no ability to promote preparedness activities. No plans, systems or institutions in place AND little-to-no ability to follow through / operationalize.

Note: for full details on distinctions between maturity levels and grading criteria see CPGA Approach Note

Appendix B: CPGA data collection process

In the first stage of the assessment, a targeted search of gray and academic literature as well as websites of international and other organizations focused on Uganda's crisis preparedness was conducted. The review of gray and published literature focused specifically on the five pillars of crisis preparedness as defined within the Crisis Preparedness Gap Analysis (CPGA): legal and institutional foundations; understanding and monitoring risks; financial preparedness; primary response systems; and, social and livelihood support.

Findings from the desk-based review were supplemented by qualitative data gathered through consultations with World Bank Task Teams (TTs) and experts who hold critical engagements in the five areas of crisis preparedness. More than 25 consultations have been held, with 20 experts having been interviewed. Consultations were conducted through semi-structured interviews, based on high-level questions followed by section-specific questions. Key Global Practices (GPs)/themes have included: Agriculture; Education; Environment and Natural Resources; Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation; Fragility, Conflict, and Violence; Health, Nutrition and Population; Poverty; Social Protection and Jobs; and Urban; Disaster Risk, Resilience and Land.

The inputs received during interviews were integrated into the framework and pre-existing information was revised based on the resulting insights. Consultations were an important methodological addition to the overall process, as they provided key insights into preparedness issues that were not addressed by the secondary literature reviewed.

For a full set of methodological guidelines refer to the GPGA Approach Note.

Appendix C: List of experts consulted

Practice Group	Global Practice	Focal Points	Additional Persons Consulted	Topics
EFI	Finance, Competitiveness & Innovation		Qhelile Ndlovu	Crisis Risk Financing
	Governance	Barbara Kasura Magezi Ndamira	Paul Kato Kamuchwezi	
			Grace Nakuya Musoke Munanura	
			Annette Tamale Katuramu	
	Poverty		Aziz Atamano	
HD	Education		Shawn Powers	
	Health, Nutrition, and Population	Rogers Ayiko	Collins Chansa	
			Julia Mensah	
	Social Protection & Jobs	Fatima Naqvi		
GT	Fragility Conflict Violence	Benjamin Christopher Reese	Christopher Brian Mahony	Forced Displacement, Crisis Management
SD	Agriculture	Joseph Oryokot	Pushina Kunda Ng'andwe	
	Environment and Natural Resources		Stephen Ling	Climate and Environment
			Ross Hughes	Natural Resources
	Urban, Disaster Risk, Resilience, and Land	Ana Campos Garcia	Stephen John Ajalu	Urban Development
			Ko Takeuchi	Disaster Risk Management
			Scott Ferguson	Early Warning Systems

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- ¹ Government of Uganda. National Policy for Disaster Preparedness and Management. 2011.
- ² Government of Uganda. National Policy for Disaster Preparedness and Management. 2011.
- ³ Uganda Red Cross Society. Disaster Law in Action – Case Study. https://disasterlaw.ifrc.org/sites/default/files/media/disaster_law/2020-09/CaseStudy- Uganda_Final.pdf
- ⁴ World Bank. Disaster Risk Finance Diagnostic (Draft Version 3). March 2022.
- ⁵ World Bank. Disaster Risk Finance Diagnostic (Draft Version 3). March 2022.
- ⁶ World Bank. Kampala Disaster Risk and Climate Change Resilience Strategy. 2021.
- ⁷ World Bank. Kampala Disaster Risk and Climate Change Resilience Strategy. 2021.
- ⁸ World Bank. Key Informant Interview. 2022.
- ⁹ World Bank. Disaster Risk Finance Diagnostic (Draft Version 3). March 2022.
- ¹⁰ World Bank. Kampala Disaster Risk and Climate Change Resilience Strategy. 2021.
- ¹¹ World Bank. Kampala Disaster Risk and Climate Change Resilience Strategy. 2021.
- ¹² World Bank. Disaster Risk Finance Diagnostic (Draft Version 3). March 2022.
- ¹³ World Bank. Kampala Disaster Risk and Climate Change Resilience Strategy. 2021.
- ¹⁴ GFDRR, World Bank. Disaster Risk Profile, Uganda. 2019. <https://www.gfdr.org/en/publication/disaster-risk-profile-uganda-2019>
- ¹⁵ Government of Uganda, Office of the Prime Minister. Prime Minister launches the first ever national risk and vulnerability atlas of Uganda. 2021. <https://opm.go.ug/pm-rugunda-launches-the-first-ever-national-risk-and-vulnerability-atlas-of-uganda/>
- ¹⁶ DFID. Building the concept and plan for the Uganda National Early Warning System (NEWS): Final Report. 2016.
- ¹⁷ DFID. Building the concept and plan for the Uganda National Early Warning System (NEWS): Final Report. 2016.
- ¹⁸ DFID. Building the concept and plan for the Uganda National Early Warning System (NEWS): Final Report. 2016.
- ¹⁹ DFID. Building the concept and plan for the Uganda National Early Warning System (NEWS): Final Report. 2016.
- ²⁰ World Bank. Disaster Risk Finance Diagnostic (Draft Version 3). March 2022.
- ²¹ OPM, Government of Uganda. Annual State of Disaster Report. 2020.
- ²² World Bank. Disaster Risk Finance Diagnostic (Draft Version 3). March 2022.
- ²³ World Bank. Disaster Risk Finance Diagnostic (Draft Version 3). March 2022.
- ²⁴ World Bank. Disaster Risk Finance Diagnostic (Draft Version 3). March 2022.
- ²⁵ World Bank. Disaster Risk Finance Diagnostic (Draft Version 3). March 2022.
- ²⁶ Prior to the 2015 Amendment, the PFM Act provided for an appropriation of 3.5% and required 15% of the Fund to be ringfenced to finance response to natural disasters while 85% was earmarked for supplementary expenditure.
- ²⁷ World Bank. Disaster Risk Finance Diagnostic (Draft Version 3). March 2022.
- ²⁸ NUSAF is the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund, a US\$130 million International Development Association (IDA) lending operation. It builds on findings by the World Bank Group's Social Protection and Labor Global Practice showing that safety net systems can provide additional support in times of crisis, help to defend the welfare of vulnerable households, and enable them to develop strategies to build their resilience (Monchuk 2014).
- ²⁹ Perils covered include drought, earthquake, excessive rainfall, flood, fire, hailstorm, landslide, lightning, malicious damage, uncontrollable diseases, uncontrollable pests, windstorm.
- ³⁰ Limited to crops and livestock under the Agricultural Sector Strategic Plan 2015/16- 2019/20 & Uganda National Development plan III including Coffee, Tea, Maize, Rice, Cassava, Beans, Fruits and Vegetables, cattle, pigs, poultry and fish in addition to the 4 strategic commodities, namely, cotton, Palm oil, Oil Seed and Cocoa.
- ³¹ World Bank. Disaster Risk Finance Diagnostic (Draft Version 3). March 2022.
- ³² SCD Update. P. 64
- ³³ MoFPED Dashboard: <https://budget.finance.go.ug/dashboard/>
- ³⁴ Thematic Audit Report on Covid-19 Pandemic Government Interventions, February 2021 <https://finance.go.ug/publication/thematic-audit-report-covid-19-pandemic-government-interventions-february-2021>
- ³⁵ ALP Legal Alert <https://www.alp-ea.com/post/procurement-law-in-uganda>
- ³⁶ Guidelines on procurement in emergency situations <https://www.ppda.go.ug/download/Guideline-No.-1-on-Procurement-in-Emergency-Situations.pdf>
- ³⁷ IMF CR 22/77 p. 26.
- ³⁸ IMF CR 22/77 p. 27.
- ³⁹ SCD Update. P. 64
- ⁴⁰ CPGA interviews.
- ⁴¹ Anti- Corruption Act, 2009 <https://ulii.org/akn/ug/act/2009/6/engpercent402015-11-11>
- ⁴² The National Policy for Disaster Preparedness and Management policy enables the immediate re-programming and re-allocation of resources when faced with an emergency.
- ⁴³ CPGA interviews.

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- ⁴⁴ IMF CR 22/77. P. 4
- ⁴⁵ IMF CR 22/77. P. 58
- ⁴⁶ IMF CR 22/77. P. 10
- ⁴⁷ SCD Update. P. 2
- ⁴⁸ Esther Buregyeya, Edwinah Atusingwize, Peninah Nsamba, David Musoke, Irene Naigaga, John David Kabasa, Hellen Amuguni, William Bazeyo. Operationalizing the One Health Approach in Uganda: Challenges and Opportunities. *J Epidemiol Glob Health*. 2020 Dec; 10(4): 250–257. doi: 10.2991/jegh.k.200825.001
- ⁴⁹ MoH. The Weekly Epidemiological Bulletin. Week 18: 2nd — 8th May 2022. <https://veoci.com/api/v2/p/files/rgqydu8owz8lcgu/content>
- ⁵⁰ Republic of Uganda. National Action Plan for Health Security: 2019 – 2023
- ⁵¹ Republic of Uganda. Report on the 2021 Uganda Multi-Sectoral Self-Assessment and Operational Planning
- ⁵² World Health Organization. Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Uganda, Mission Report: June 26-30, 2017.
- ⁵³ Republic of Uganda. Report on the 2021 Uganda Multi-Sectoral Self-Assessment and Operational Planning
- ⁵⁴ World Health Organization. Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Uganda, Mission Report: June 26-30, 2017.
- ⁵⁵ Republic of Uganda. The National Policy for Disaster Preparedness and Management
- ⁵⁶ Office of the Auditor General. 2021. Thematic Audit of COVID-19 Pandemic Government Interventions.
- ⁵⁷ As noted in the National Health Accounts (2016-2019), while the per capita public health expenditure has been increasing since 2010/11, its share of GDP has not been moving proportionally. Government Health expenditure as a proportion of GDP was 0.8percent for FY 2016/17 and 2017/18 and declined to 0.7percent in 2018/19. Additional resources are required within the health sector to meet national goals of Universal Health Coverage, as well as enable the country strengthen its overall preparedness. The country has explored the options establishing contingency funding for all-hazard preparedness and response, though a definitive way forward has not been reached.
- ⁵⁸ World Health Organization. Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Uganda, Mission Report: June 26-30, 2017.
- ⁵⁹ Republic of Uganda. 2019. National Action Plan for Health Security 2019-2023, p. 22
- ⁶⁰ World Health Organization. Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Uganda, Mission Report: June 26-30, 2017.
- ⁶¹ World Health Organization. Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Uganda, Mission Report: June 26-30, 2017.
- ⁶² World Health Organization. Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Uganda, Mission Report: June 26-30, 2017.
- ⁶⁴ World Health Organization. Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Uganda, Mission Report: June 26-30, 2017.
- ⁶⁵ CPGA interviews.
- ⁶⁶ 2021 Global Health Security (GHS) Index
- ⁶⁷ <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/965231605199627041/uganda-reproductive-maternal-and-child-health-services-improvement-project-additional-financing>
- ⁶⁸ World Health Organization. Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Uganda, Mission Report: June 26-30, 2017.
- ⁶⁹ CPGA interviews.
- ⁷⁰ CPGA interviews.
- ⁷¹ 2021 Global Health Security (GHS) Index
- ⁷² World Health Organization. Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Uganda, Mission Report: June 26-30, 2017.
- ⁷³ World Health Organization. Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Uganda, Mission Report: June 26-30, 2017.
- ⁷⁴ World Health Organization. Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Uganda, Mission Report: June 26-30, 2017.
- ⁷⁵ World Health Organization. Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Uganda, Mission Report: June 26-30, 2017.
- ⁷⁶ 2021 Global Health Security (GHS) Index
- ⁷⁷ World Health Organization. Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Uganda, Mission Report: June 26-30, 2017.

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- ⁷⁸ CPGA interviews.
- ⁷⁹ World Health Organization. Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Uganda, Mission Report: June 26-30, 2017.
- ⁸⁰ World Health Organization. Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Uganda, Mission Report: June 26-30, 2017.
- ⁸¹ World Health Organization. Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Uganda, Mission Report: June 26-30, 2017.
- ⁸² World Health Organization. Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Uganda, Mission Report: June 26-30, 2017.
- ⁸³ The National Emergency Coordination and Operations Centre website.
- ⁸⁴ KII, Paul Hayden
- ⁸⁵ Ibid.
- ⁸⁶ Ibid.
- ⁸⁷ African Development Bank. Lake Victoria Maritime Communications and Transport Project.
- ⁸⁸ Ugandan Police Force Website, <https://www.upf.go.ug/directorate/>
- ⁸⁹ Ningwa, A and K. Muni, F. Oporia, J. Kalanzi, E. Bayiga Zziwa, C. Biribawa & O. Kobusingye. The state of emergency medical services and acute health facility care in Uganda: findings from a National Cross-Sectional Survey. July 2020.
- ⁹⁰ National Emergency Medical Services Policy. <https://www.gou.go.ug/ministry/ministry-health>.
- ⁹¹ Ibid.
- ⁹² World Bank Group. 2022. "Uganda Poverty Assessment: Strengthening Resilience to Accelerate Poverty Reduction," <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/37752>.
- ⁹³ World Bank. 2020. "Uganda Economic Update 14th Edition: Strengthening Social Protection to Reduce Vulnerability and Promote Inclusive Growth," <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/571011581515307951/pdf/Uganda-Economic-Update-14th-Edition-Strengthening-Social-Protection-to-Reduce-Vulnerability-and-Promote-Inclusive-Growth.pdf>.
- ⁹⁴ World Bank. 2022 (draft). Advancing Digitization of Social Protection Payments - Uganda.
- ⁹⁵ World Bank. 2020. "Uganda Economic Update 14th Edition: Strengthening Social Protection to Reduce Vulnerability and Promote Inclusive Growth,"
- ⁹⁶ Republic of Uganda. Social Protection Review 2019.
- ⁹⁷ Ibid.
- ⁹⁸ The government created the National Identification and Registration Authority (NIRA) to create, manage, maintain and operationalize the National Identification Register by registering all citizens of Uganda, non-citizens of Uganda who are lawfully residents in Uganda and registering births and deaths, assigning a unique National Identification Number to every person registered. Although this system does not contain detailed data and information to link individuals and their households with social protection entitlements, it provides an opportunity to build an integrated system.
- ⁹⁹ World Bank. 2022 (draft). Advancing Digitization of Social Protection Payments - Uganda.
- ¹⁰⁰ World Bank. 2022 (draft). Advancing Digitization of Social Protection Payments - Uganda.
- ¹⁰¹ World Bank. 2020. "Uganda Economic Update 14th Edition: Strengthening Social Protection to Reduce Vulnerability and Promote Inclusive Growth."
- ¹⁰² Government of Uganda. National Policy for Disaster Preparedness and Management. 2011.
- ¹⁰³ Republic of Uganda. Social Protection Review 2019
- ¹⁰⁴ World Bank. 2020. "Uganda Economic Update 14th Edition: Strengthening Social Protection to Reduce Vulnerability and Promote Inclusive Growth."
- ¹⁰⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁶ Closing the Potential-Performance Divide in Ugandan Agriculture, p 8.
- ¹⁰⁷ <https://opm.go.ug/disaster-preparedness-management/>
- ¹⁰⁸ <https://www.wfp.org/countries/uganda>
- ¹⁰⁹ <https://opm.go.ug/disaster-preparedness-management/>
- ¹¹⁰ Closing the Potential-Performance Divide in Ugandan Agriculture, p 32
- ¹¹¹ <https://www.unma.go.ug/our-strategic-objectives/>
- ¹¹² <https://www.unma.go.ug/seasonal-forecasts/>
- ¹¹³ Key Informant Interview, Pushina Kunda Ng'andwe
- ¹¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁵ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁶ Ibid.

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- ¹¹⁷ The African armyworm is a species of moth, the larvae of which attack vegetation, particularly during periods of reduced rainfall.
- ¹¹⁸ Closing the Potential-Performance Divide in Ugandan Agriculture. p 48.
- ¹¹⁹ <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-05/uganda-rules-out-fuel-subsidies-as-prices-jump-as-much-as-19>
- ¹²⁰ As per its website, it distributed 1,000 MT of food to famine victims in Karamoja and other parts of the country (date unstated)
- ¹²¹ KII, Ana Campo Garcia
- ¹²² Closing the Potential-Performance Divide in Ugandan Agriculture. p 12.
- ¹²³ Assessment of current data systems on social protection programs for National Single Social Registry. p 3.
- ¹²⁴ Ibid.
- ¹²⁵ Ibid.
- ¹²⁶ Seeger, A and L. Pye. Uganda: Strengthening education sector planning capacities for conflict and disaster risk management, IIP- UNESCO, 2017. p 13.
- ¹²⁷ Addendum to Business Case: Strengthening Education Systems for Improved Learning (SESIL), UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2022. p 2.
- ¹²⁸ Directorate of Relief, Disaster Preparedness and Refugees. National Policy on Disaster Preparedness and Management. p 59.
- ¹²⁹ Ministry of Education and Sports. A Guide to Conflict and Disaster Risk Management in Educational Institutions in Uganda, 2015. p 2.
- ¹³⁰ Ibid.
- ¹³¹ Seeger, A and L. Pye. Uganda: Strengthening education sector planning capacities for conflict and disaster risk management, IIP- UNESCO, 2017. p 18.
- ¹³² Ibid.
- ¹³³ Wodon, Q and E. Ninan, I. Mulindwa, M. Rakotomalala, C. Tsimpo. Uganda Note #5: Levels and efficiency of spending for education, SABER Equity and Inclusion Program. p 47; Addendum to Business Case: Strengthening Education Systems for Improved Learning (SESIL), UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2022. p 6.
- ¹³⁴ Ministry of Education and Sports, Sector Strategic Plan 2020-2025 is still in draft form, but emphasises conflict disaster risk management.
- ¹³⁵ Business Case: Strengthening Education Systems for Improved Learning (SESIL), UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2016. p 2.
- ¹³⁶ Ministry of Education and Sports, Sector Strategic Plan 2017-2021
- ¹³⁷ Ibid.
- ¹³⁸ Office of the Prime Minister, Uganda, <https://opm.go.ug/refugees>
- ¹³⁹ <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/92447>
- ¹⁴⁰ Evaluation of the Implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees and its Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) in Uganda, March 2022. p 17.
- ¹⁴¹ Ibid.
- ¹⁴² Uganda Country Refugee Response Plan 2022.
- ¹⁴³ Uganda Contingency Plan March-December 2022; Uganda Country Refugee Response Plan, Emergency Appeal April-June 2022.
- ¹⁴⁴ KII, Benjamin Reese and Christopher Mahony.
- ¹⁴⁵ Evaluation of the Implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees and its Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) in Uganda, March 2022. p 3.
- ¹⁴⁶ KII, Benjamin Reese and Christopher Mahony.
- ¹⁴⁷ IDMC website. <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/uganda>
- ¹⁴⁸ Mahony, C and B. Maher. Data-Driven Development Response to Displacement Crisis in Uganda: The Displacement Crisis Response Mechanism. p 3.
- ¹⁴⁹ UNHCR, Ad-hoc IA Coordination Group Emergency Response Coordination
- ¹⁵⁰ Evaluation of the Implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees and its Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) in Uganda, March 2022. p 57
- ¹⁵¹ Ibid.
- ¹⁵² Ibid.