

CRISIS

PREPAREDNESS

GAP

ANALYSIS

CPGA

User Manual



What is the CPGA?

The Crisis Preparedness Gap Analysis (CPGA) is a diagnostic tool designed to identify and assess gaps in crisis preparedness. It highlights opportunities to strengthen the capacity of national systems to better prepare for, manage, and respond to crises in an effective and timely manner.

The CPGA serves three core purposes. It acts as: (i) a baseline for a high-level diagnostic assessment of crisis preparedness across relevant sectors; (ii) a tool to identify gaps as well as opportunities and entry points to strengthen crisis preparedness in a country, helping to inform World Bank country engagement products and (iii) a platform to inform policy dialogue as well as technical and financial support on crisis preparedness as part of country and regional programming. The CPGA provides a framework based on a modular, demand-led, and scalable approach to enhance crisis preparedness in International Development Association (IDA) countries and monitor its progress over time.

Who is the User Manual meant for?

The User Manual is intended for use by Task Team Leaders (TTLs), who lead the implementation of the CPGA framework. Guidelines are also relevant for team members supporting delivery of the CPGA.

How should the User Manual be used?

The purpose of this User Manual is to provide step-by-step guidance on how to implement the CPGA framework. It covers all procedural, technical, and methodological aspects involved in the delivery of a full country assessment.

While the User Manual provides a brief outline of the CPGA approach and its core structures, readers are expected to have already familiarized themselves with content in the CPGA Approach Note which provides details on the background, rationale and methods of the CPGA.

What additional CPGA resources are available?

For a comprehensive overview of the background, rationale and methods of the CPGA, refer to the CPGA Approach Note. Additional summary information on the CPGA can be found in the following forms:

- CPGA 1-pager (*a high-level overview of the CPGA*)
- CPGA Training PowerPoints (*a highlight of key steps in the CPGA methodology*)
- CPGA FAQs (*answers to common questions on the delivery of the CPGA*)
- CPGA Intranet page (*a repository of key CPGA resources*)

CPGA Contacts

For more information on the CPGA please contact Sara Karimbhoy (skarimbhoy@worldbank.org) or the CPGA Secretariat (cpga@worldbank.org).

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Acronyms and Glossary

CMU: Country Management Unit
CPGA: Crisis Preparedness Gap Analysis
CPF: Country Partnership Framework
CPRT: Crisis Preparedness and Response Toolkit
GCRP: Global Crisis Risk Platform
GP: Global practices
GQ: Guiding Questions
IDA: International Development Association
ML: Maturity levels
PL: Practice leader
SCD: Strategic Country Diagnostics
TTL: Task Team Leader

1. Introduction

Not all crises can be prevented. Governments that invest in crisis preparedness are better equipped to deploy the technical and financial resources needed to reduce the impacts of future crises, enabling timely and effective response activities. Support for crisis preparedness requires dedicated capacity building, allocation of resources and ex-ante planning. It also requires a detailed understanding of gaps and weaknesses in key country systems across a range of relevant sectors. To address this challenge, the World Bank is enhancing its Crisis Preparedness and Response Toolkit, building on IDA20's focus on crisis preparedness as a policy priority to better equip countries for managing shocks. IDA21 will leverage this toolkit to help governments allocate essential technical and financial resources, thereby reducing risks and improving crisis response. It is here that the Crisis Preparedness Gap Analysis (CPGA) seeks to add value. Working together with technical teams across Practice Groups, the Global Crisis Risk Platform (GCRP) Secretariat developed the CPGA as a means of identifying gaps and opportunities to strengthen crisis preparedness in IDA countries.

The CPGA framework provides a high-level overview of crisis preparedness across different types of shocks¹, as a complement to more detailed sectoral assessments. It highlights entry points for supporting crisis preparedness with a view toward informing World Bank country engagement products like Strategic Country Diagnostics (SCDs) and Country Partnership Frameworks (CPFs). In addition, CPGAs provide opportunities to promote dialogue with client governments regarding prioritization of technical and financial resources needed in strengthening crisis preparedness in targeted countries.

This User Manual provides step-by-step guidance in conducting a CPGA in a given IDA country. The User Manual should be used in conjunction with the CPGA Approach Note and related materials that are available on the CPGA intranet page. The CPGA task team is encouraged to reach out to the CPGA Secretariat in resolving procedures or steps that remain unclear after perusing the User Manual.

¹ Such as pandemics, droughts, floods, earthquakes, other natural hazards, climate change and socio-economic hazards. It does not cover external macro-economic shocks and conflict.

2. Overview: The CPGA analytical framework


What is the CPGA?

The CPGA is a diagnostic tool intended to assess *crisis preparedness*. Crisis preparedness refers to the capacity of governments, businesses, and communities to effectively anticipate, respond to and cope with the economic, social and wider impacts of a potential future crisis. It is knowing what to do when a threat occurs, identifying those responsible for responding to it, and coordinating timely and effective cross-sectoral communication and actions to limit detrimental outcomes on societies and economies. Preparedness is linked to a range of anticipatory activities including early warning systems, stockpiling of equipment and supplies, contingency plans, and coordination of relevant institutions to prepare and respond in advance of a given threat.

Crisis preparedness is a component of broader crisis risk management activities that include prevention, response and recovery. While there are conceptual overlaps between the various concepts, each is associated with distinct timelines and activities (for further clarity on the definition and scope of crisis preparedness refer to the CPGA Approach Note).

The CPGA is built around an analytical framework that comprises five components. These are aligned with five core elements of crisis preparedness (see Figure 1). The components include: (i) Legal and Institutional Foundations; (ii) Understanding and Monitoring Risk; (iii) Financial Preparedness; (iv) Primary Response; and (v) Social Support Services. Selection of these components draws on common elements applied across relevant sector-specific preparedness diagnostic tools as well as lessons learned from the World Bank's Group (WBG)'s operational engagements in support of crisis risk management.

Figure 1: Overview of the CPGA core components



The CPGA further unpacks the five components into sub-components and indicators. Each indicator is assessed based on guiding questions and provided with a maturity rating based on answers to the guiding questions. Maturity ratings allow easy identification of core gaps and strengths in a country, thus also informing the selection of entry points for strengthening crisis preparedness.

Guiding questions and Tiers

Guiding questions are used to assess a country's level of preparedness against a specific indicator. Table 1 provides an example of the linkages between a component and guiding question.

Table 1: Example of linkages between a component and guiding question

Component	Sub-component	Indicator	Guiding Question
3. FINANCIAL PREPAREDNESS	3.1 Crisis risk financing	3.1.1 Government has put in place a dedicated strategy for the delivery of crisis and disaster risk financing	T1) Does the government have a national crisis and disaster risk financing strategy/policy (or equivalent) in place

Guiding questions are grouped into three tiers. Tiers range from *fundamentals* (Tier 1) that cover traits that need to be in place in order to support crisis preparedness, through to enhanced investments and capacities that can be considered *advanced attributes* for IDA countries (Tier 3). Many of the tiered questions are linked. For example, a Tier 1 Guiding Question related to the existence of a relevant strategy is often followed up with a Tier 2 Guiding Question regarding the implementation capacity or resourcing of the given strategy.

Table 2: Definition of tiers

TIER	DESCRIPTION
Tier 1 "Fundamentals"	<p>The focus is on the minimum building blocks of crisis preparedness, without which it is difficult to achieve crisis preparedness in any given sector.</p> <p>Examples include the existence of relevant legislation and policies promoting core elements of preparedness across sectors.</p>
Tier 2 "Core Operations"	<p>The focus is on operationalizing laws and regulations and implementing preparedness related actions across relevant sectors. They measure resources and capacities associated with crisis preparedness.</p> <p>Examples include the allocation of adequate resourcing and capacities needed to implement preparedness plans and strategies, as well as coordination of preparedness activities.</p>
Tier 3 "Advanced Attributes"	<p>The focus is on inclusive approaches to crisis preparedness and the scope of its risk coverage.</p>



Examples include improved targeting and holistic delivery of preparedness activities, amongst others.

Calculation of maturity levels

The CPGA assigns levels of maturity to indicators using ratings that apply to all guiding questions. Maturity levels allow easy identification of gaps and strengths related to crisis preparedness within a given country. Maturity levels are primarily qualitative in nature and designed to be readily applicable across different types of indicators using a common set of high-level criteria (see Table 3). The CPGA defines five levels of maturity ranging from *Unmet* (essentially little-to-nothing has been done to actively promote crisis preparedness) to *Advanced* (reflecting a comprehensive and multi-sectoral approach with significant resources and capacity).

Table 3: Maturity Levels

ML	KEY CHARACTERISTICS
Advanced	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Comprehensive efforts have been made to promote preparedness with few gaps.▪ Preparedness is prioritized and mainstreamed in key government documents and plans▪ A (relatively) advanced plan, system or institution is in place. While it may still have some shortfalls, it covers all planning and operational aspects needed to ensure holistic uptake of preparedness activities.
Good	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Clear and dedicated efforts related to preparedness have been promoted. Solid gains have been made, though efforts to promote preparedness may not be fully comprehensive.▪ Balance of priorities still favour response.▪ Has well-thought through and dedicated plans, systems or institutions in place. Most areas are well resourced and have decent capacity, though not across the board.
Basic	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Decent efforts have been made to promote preparedness, with a vision laid out in relevant policy or planning documents. Progress in implementation may be uneven or disjointed.▪ Priority is still often given to ex-post response over preparedness.▪ Has a plan, system or institution in place. However, it may face shortfalls in capacity or resourcing. Design features are often good, though inadequate to have meaningful effect.
Nascent	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Some (or minimal) efforts have been made to promote preparedness, though typically with little ability to follow through.▪ Ex-post relief and response are typically the focus of government intervention▪ Has a plan, system or institution may be in place though it does not address crisis preparedness as a priority. System suffers from resource and capacity constraints, resulting in limited implementation/operationalization.
Unmet	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Nothing (or very little) has been done to address aspects of preparedness OR country has little-to-no ability to promote preparedness activities.▪ No plans, systems or institutions in place AND little-to-no ability to follow through / operationalize.

Based on information entered in the CPGA spreadsheet, maturity levels (MLs) are automatically generated for each indicator. The CPGA does so by making use of answers to the various guiding questions assigned to each indicator. Progress in relation to guiding questions can be either be marked

as 'Complete', 'Partial' or 'Null' using benchmarked criteria to ensure consistency across answers. These are then converted into a numeric score (with Complete corresponding to 100, Partial to 50 and Null to 0). Based on the average rating for guiding questions in each Tier, a maturity level is assigned to individual indicators following the scheme laid out in Table 4.

While maturity levels are assigned at the indicator-level, they can be further aggregated to provide high-level ratings for sub-components and components. These are calculated using an equal-weighted average for all indicators (i.e. sub-component rating = average all constituent Indicators; component rating = average of all indicators across all sub-components. Ratings are then rounding to the nearest integer.

Table 4: Maturity level assignment criteria based on average ratings across tiered guiding questions.

Tier 1 average is greater than or equal to ...	Tier 2 average is greater than or equal to ...	Tier 3 average is greater than or equal to ...	Maturity Level
100%	75%	75%	Advanced (4)
	75%	75%	Good (3)
75%	50%	0%	Basic (2)
	0%	50%	
50%	50%	25%	
	25%	50%	
	0%	0%	Nascent (1)
0%	0%	0%	Unmet (0)

3. Conducting the CPGA


The structure of the User Manual follows three distinct phases of the CPGA.

Phase A relates to preparation and planning needed to get the CPGA up and running. It includes initiating the CPGA task in the system, completing the write up for the country risk profile, CN review meeting and obtaining guidance concerning client engagement.

Phase B focuses on research and evidence collection. This phase includes completing the research and collecting evidence for guiding questions based on desk-based reviews of available literature and interviews. This phase also entails entering data into the CPGA spreadsheet, scoring answers to guiding questions and deciding on maturity levels for each indicator.

Phase C comprises final analysis, write-up and delivery of the CPGA. This phase includes identification of entry points for strengthening crisis preparedness. It concludes with the delivery of the CPGA in line with ASA procedures.

Figure 2: Phases and steps involved in delivering a CPGA



Timelines

The estimated time needed to complete the assessment will vary across countries. Timelines will vary depending on the teams' availability, existing analytical base and possible alignment with ongoing diagnostics (e.g. CCDR or R2R) or engagement products (e.g. SCD, CPF). Relationships with the client also need to be factored in. As a general guide, the CPGA Secretariat advises task teams to plan between 4-6 months to complete the CPGA from start to finish.

4. Roles and Responsibilities

The CPGA task team is responsible for delivering all core aspects of the CPGA in a given country. This includes *coordinating* inputs to the CPGA together with the relevant GPs and *liaising* with the CMU and other key stakeholders. The task team is also responsible for *data gathering and research* needed to *implement* the full CPGA methodology (as laid out in detail in the sections below).

The CPGA task team is made up of members of the extended Country Team. The roles and responsibilities of different CPGA task team members are described in Table 5 below, including those related to the TTL, Analyst(s), Sectoral GP focal point(s) and CMU liaison. There are no set requirements for the size and composition of the team as inputs will vary depending on country context and strengths of various GPs. TTLs should consider the skills required, available budget and time availability of potential team members in deciding on the nature of country task teams. For example, in some cases TTLs may want to prioritize heavy involvement of analysts, particularly where there is considerable background documentation available. In instances where the status of risk management activities in a country is complex or rapidly evolving, TTLs may instead want to draw more heavily on the involvement of GP experts (despite the higher cost implications).

TIP: How to ensure that the task team has the right people working on the right tasks

Getting the right team balance is key to successfully delivering a CPGA. As team leaders for the CPGA, TTLs will have expertise in one or more sectors linked to the CPGA. TTLs should select team members who have knowledge of additional sectors or technical skills that they may be less familiar with. It is also worth finding people who know the country well and have experience running diagnostic analyses.

CPGA Task Teams are supported by the CPGA Secretariat which plays a dual role as both the “corporate home” of the CPGA and as a technical advisory body. As the *WB corporate home* for the CPGA, the Secretariat serves as a repository for all conceptual, methodological, and technical knowledge related to the gap analysis. It also monitors and ensures consistency in the application of the CPGA methodology across IDA countries. As an

advisory body, the Secretariat provides training and technical support to CPGA task teams in carrying out the CPGA. For a further breakdown of roles carried out by the CPGA during the three main phasis of the analysis see Table 6.

Figure 3: Roles of the CPGA Task Team and CPGA Secretariat




Table 5: Responsibilities and roles across the CPGA Task Team

	RESPONSIBILITIES	ROLES
COORDINATION	<p>TTL</p> <p>TTL is the designated lead of the CPGA assessment, with ADM responsibility for putting together the CPGA task team, shaping the way forward, and delivering the CPGA. Given the cross-sectoral nature of crisis preparedness, CMUs may consider co-TTLship arrangements.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assigns tasks to team members, overseas and coordinates their efforts • Provides technical guidance and subject-matter expertise • Ensures quality control of CPGA spreadsheet and draft country reports • Contributes to/leads interviews with key informants • Liaises with the CMU and client
RESEARCH	<p>Analyst(s)</p> <p>Analyst(s) should have a background in crisis preparedness or risk management in at least one of the sectors involved in the CPGA framework. Familiarity with World Bank processes and operational procedures is strongly recommended.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gather(s) and analyze(s) background information for CPGA spreadsheet • Compile(s) preparedness assessments and assigns draft maturity ratings • Support(s) interviews with key informants • Drafts CPGA spreadsheet and country reports
VALIDATION	<p>Sectoral GP focal point</p> <p>Sectoral GP focal points oversee data gathering and analysis related to their respective components, advise on maturity ratings and entry points, and provide written inputs to final CPGA outputs as needed.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify sectoral-level key informants • Oversee assessment of component-level inputs to the CPGA, together with country analysts • Review data gathering and maturity-level assignments for allocated components • Provide written inputs to CPGA outputs
LIAISING & PRIORITIZATION	<p>CMU liaison person</p> <p>CMU liaison person advises the CPGA task team on appropriate levels of engagement with stakeholders, including the client government and (when applicable) partners, and facilitates those contacts.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Help identify GP experts and key informants to be interviewed • Liaise between CPGA task team and client government • Coordinate efforts to present CPGA outputs to the client and prioritize suggested entry points • Determine the possibility and modality of disclosure of the CPGA outputs

Table 6: Break down of CPGA Secretariat roles under each phase of the CPGA

Phase A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Advisory</i>: Provide training to CPGA task team on the core methodology. Advise CPGA TTLs on task team composition, delivery timelines, and methodological questions • <i>Corporate</i>: Participate in the CN review meeting and provide feedback on the CN
Phase B	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Advisory</i>: Direct the task team to relevant resources for developing the country risk profiles • <i>Advisory</i>: Provide additional guidance on the desk review and key informant interview processes • <i>Advisory</i>: Advise on the integration of inputs from desk-based reviews and key informant interviews into the CPGA spreadsheet • <i>Advisory</i>: Provide troubleshooting tips and any guidance not already outlined in the User Manual, including clarity on assigning and validating maturity levels
Phase C	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Advisory</i>: Assist to leverage country risk profile and maturity level to identify key entry point for country-level programming • <i>Corporate</i>: Provide formal comments and guidance for Decision Review Meeting

Phase A: Preparation and Planning

The preparation and planning phase of CPGA results in *three key outputs or deliverables*:

Concept Note (CN)

Country Risk Profile

Kick-off workshop with client government

Preparing a Concept Note (CN)

The CPGA will need to undergo standard procedures applicable to all Track II ASAs, starting with the preparation of a Concept Note and the review and approval of the Concept Package.

Once the Concept Note has been developed, the next step is to obtain approval of the Concept Package through a Concept Review Meeting. The Concept Review Meeting should be chaired by the Country Manager and include a number of peer reviewers. The TTL is responsible for identifying at least two peer reviewers. They will be selected for their technical expertise, country experience, and/or involvement in similar tasks. It is recommended that the TTL uses ongoing World Bank engagements as a compass to orient the selection of the peer reviewers, as these GPs will have relevant engagements in the country, which in turn increases the likelihood for peer reviewers to provide appropriate feedback to improve the technical quality and relevance of the Concept Note.

Developing the Country Risk Profile

The country risk profile provides an overview of which sectors and regions are exposed to given threats, as well identifying people and assets that are most vulnerable. Risks will vary across countries, and may include natural disasters, macro and financial shocks, conflict, food security crisis, and disease outbreaks such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The risk profile will explore core elements of a country's exposure, sensitivity and coping capacity to key hazards. Teams should look to review

Useful resources for compiling country risk profiles

- The Compound Risk Monitor
- [ThinkHazard! Database](#)
- [GFDRR Disaster Risk profiles](#)
- [Global Health Security Index](#)
- [Joint External Evaluation Country Reports](#)
- [World Bank Climate Risk profiles](#)
- FCV Risk and Resilience Assessments
- [INFORM Risk Index](#)
- [The Global Risk Data Platform](#)
- [DesInventar Database](#)
- [Integrated Food Security Phase Classification \(IPC\)](#)
- World Bank Country Overview Pages
- [World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment](#)

information on the underlying determinants of risk. This includes data on the frequency and severity of past shocks as well as their impacts on poverty and growth trajectories. Where possible, risk profiles should identify the main structural and institutional factors that contribute to vulnerability of people and sectors. Particular focus should be paid to existing issues of poverty, such as chronic food insecurity and health indicators and socio-economic weaknesses, which might be exacerbated by weak preparedness or in the face of a crisis.

The country risk profile is carried out by reviewing relevant documents, reports and other available resources. CPGA task teams

are not expected to carry out primary data collection as part of the country risk profile (though teams may choose to do so if few resources are available). Review of government and World Bank documents should be complemented by data from other reputable sources, including from trusted multi-lateral, academia and civil society actors. The CPGA task team should also take advantage of toolkits and diagnostics (see sample sources for country risk profiles). Reliance on more recent documents or tools will help ensure an up-to-date country risk profile.

Countries facing challenges related to fragility, conflict and violence should include additional information in their risk profiles. This includes further insights on: (1) the spatial distribution of FCV-related concerns and impacts across country – this will help to identify areas where FCV dynamics may aggravate existing risks and that require special attention in planning crisis response; and (2) lessons learnt from the impact of FCV challenges in responding to earlier (or ongoing crises) such as pandemics, food crisis or natural disaster, as relevant.

Risk profiles will explore the underlying drivers of vulnerability, identifying the main structural and institutional factors that may dictate the vulnerability of people and sectors within a given country. Particular focus should be paid to existing issues of poverty, such as chronic food insecurity and health indicators and socio-economic weaknesses, which might be exacerbated by weak preparedness or in the face of a crisis.

Engaging with the Client Government

Once the CPGA task team is formed, the third step is to start engaging the client government in the CPGA assessment process. Deciding on the nature of client engagement is a process that will need to be undertaken together with the CMU and will vary depending on country context.

The CMU will play a key role in initiating and supporting the engagement process. As the administrative unit responsible for dialogue with the country government, the CMU acts as the primary liaison between the client and the CPGA task team. The CMU will help determine the level, nature, and timing of coordination with the client. Decisions are likely to factor in the government's capacity and willingness to be involved in the assessment (whether hands-on or limited to review and consultation roles), as well as any sensitivities that may affect the CMU's relationship with the client.

The following criteria and questions should be considered to determine the desired type, level, and intensity of client engagement during the CPGA process:

Level of government engagement in CPGA

- *Scope of engagement.* Will the client be asked to engage throughout the entirety of the CPGA process? Most CPGAs will involve minimal input from the government, with targeted interventions limited to sensitization at the start and validation of the findings towards the end. However, TTLs are free to request more meaningful engagements. For example, clients can be requested to identify relevant key informants to take part in CPGA interviews and focus group discussions. They may also have a hand in providing targeted written contributions or clarifications, where relevant. However, government involvement in the CPGA will not require sign-off on CPGA products and maturity ratings (an issue we will return to in Phase C).
- *Level of engagement.* One of the main selling points of the CPGA is that it allows engagement of the client government at higher levels of political administration. While most risk management diagnostics are linked to sectoral Departments and Agencies – such as those responsible for Natural Resource Management or central Disaster Risk Management Committees – the CPGA is well suited to engaging Ministries of Finance, Economic Development or National Planning. This could also include offices mandated with coordinating national preparedness activities – typically those sat under the Office of President/Prime-minister. With that in mind, the TTL has the discretion to decide on a relevant focal point based on the country context and existing institutional relationships.
- *Intensity of engagement.* The TTL, together with the CMU, will decide on whether the client is expected to supply substantive and regular feedback during the CPGA process, or whether the client's involvement will be narrower and more limited.

One option that has proven useful in consolidating client engagement at the start of the CPGA process is hosting a kick-off workshop. The workshop provides the opportunity for the TTL to: introduce the CPGA diagnostic tool and assessment; describe the goals and the reasons for undertaking the assessment; illustrate the expected benefits and deliverables; and introduce the CPGA task team. Interaction and up-front participation will help generate support and necessary buy-in from the client, which are crucial when rolling out the activities. Decisions on if and how to host a kick-off workshop, including whether to host a separate launch event limited to the WB country team and a second one involving the client government, should be made by the TTL based on country circumstances.

Preparation and Planning Checklist

1. The Concept Note has been finalized

- ☐ Developed a Concept Note document
- ☐ Reviewed and obtained approval of the Concept Package

2. Country risk profile has been developed

- ☐ Data on key country risk components gathered and validated
- ☐ Country risk profile developed

3. Engagement with the Client Government has been launched

- ☐ Held a kick-off workshop (advisable)

Phase B: Data and Evidence Collection

The data and evidence collection phase of the CPGA is made up of *two activities* (data review and interviews) that result in one *key output – populating the CPGA spreadsheet*.

ACTIVITIES	OUTPUTS
Desk-based review Interviews with key informants	Completed CPGA data spreadsheet

Desk-Based Review

The objective of the desk-based review is to collect information as per the CPGA guiding questions.

The desk-review is mostly done by CPGA country analysts, under the supervision of the TTL and GP

Data Verification Tip

While most data will be independently verifiable, it is important to keep a record of data that has not been verified, for validation or verification during the key informant interview stage.

Focal Points. The desk-review will focus on the following trusted sources: primary policy and legal texts; government and academic publications; and websites of relevant government authorities, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations (see box below). Country analysts should also draw on a variety of crisis-related resources, including public information repositories, World Bank reports, as

well as external diagnostics from other reputable sources. The desk-based review will identify any critical gaps that need follow up with key informants and Sectoral GP Focal Points. In conducting the desk-based review, and later interviews, the CPGA task team should make sure to use the guiding questions to assess preparedness in relation to key country risks, as identified in the country risk profile.

Sample Data Sources for Assessing Crisis Preparedness

- Relevant Country Policy and Legal Texts (sector-specific and cross-sectoral)
- [GFDRR Country Reports](#)
- [Broader World Bank Project Reports](#)
- [United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction Reports](#)
- [United Nations Development Programme Country Reports](#)
- Information repositories ([PreventionWeb](#) and [ReliefWeb](#))
- [Country Post Disaster Needs Assessments](#)
- [Disaster Risk Finance Diagnostics](#)
- [WHO IHR Joint External Evaluation Reports](#)
- Local and International News Media Reports

It is essential to combine and compare the data gathered for any duplication, and to assemble the data into a usable format. To enable this, a CPGA spreadsheet has been designed for data entry – ensuring that inputs are logged systematically for each guiding question. The spreadsheet is organized according to components that reflect the CPGA framework and is the primary data entry tool for the crisis preparedness gap analysis. The CPGA spreadsheet

provides the team with a process for identifying, analyzing, and deriving useful information from existing documents for inclusion.

Desk-based review: Troubleshooting tips

No relevant sources to draw from. Sometimes, it will be difficult to find relevant sources of data for the guiding questions. Task teams may also come across relevant documents in other languages. In such cases, the CPGA task teams should:

- Use techniques such as citation searching or snowballing to search through bibliographies for additional sources that may be of relevance.
- Look for more data sources covering the topic and determine the most widely held conclusion.
- Flag this as an issue to cover in interviews.
- Leverage the Bank's translation services for non-English documents, or collaborate with country teams to identify English versions of relevant documents

Conflicting information. When conducting the desk-based review, it is not uncommon to come across data sources that disagree or conflict with each other. To help overcome this problem, task teams should:

- Establish if the concerned source of the data is a primary or a secondary source. If it is simply quoting a number or statistic, it may not be accurate, and should be taken with caution.
- Look for additional sources to check if those will also be conflicting. If two independent data sources agree, the information is probably more believable.
- Limit sources within a finite time period (such as 3-5 years) to only include more recent or relevant sources.
- Flag this as an issue to cover in interviews.

Interviews with key informants

Information garnered through desk-based reviews is complemented by interviews. Interviews play a key role in providing detailed, timely and contextual insights into aspects of preparedness that may not be apparent based on documents only. In particular, interviews should help address information gaps and validate information garnered through the desk-based review. Interviews should also be used to identify potential entry points for strengthening crisis preparedness.

Think Ahead: Scoring

Indicators in the CPGA spreadsheet are scored based on the information collected. The initial scoring is done based on the desk review. Initial scores can be modified based on interview information and the team review.

The TTL, in consultations with the CMU liaison person and Sector Leaders, will identify key informants or interviewees. Key informants should be able to cover aspects related to all five components in the framework, with internal inputs drawn from relevant GPs—particularly PURL/GFDRR, HNP, SPJ, FCI, AGF, GOV and MTI. Once teams begin to validate CPGA findings through consultations with the client, external inputs will be sought from government representatives and development partners. The total number of interviewees needed to carry out the CPGA will vary depending on informational needs and informant availability, though in most cases between 15-20 key interviews should be envisioned.

Once disclosure parameters for the CPGA have been established, TTLs will utilize the key informant interview format for engaging consultatively with the government and development partners. This process will require a slightly different approach to internal stakeholder interviews, where TTLs can rely on Bank-specific mechanisms for the nomination and identification of potential informants. For the external engagement process, TTLs can leverage contextual knowledge and will be best placed to identify and engage key stakeholders across government and development partners. The CMU should be closely involved in deciding on the nature, scope and timing of any engagement with external partners.

Key informants are grouped together to optimize sectoral expertise.

In general, CPGA interviews tend to work best with 2-3 interviewees at a time, covering a similar topic. This allows for a variety of perspectives to be explored in a focus group format, and for the collection of information in a systematic and structured way.

It is recommended that interviews start with a brief outline of the CPGA process to outline core details of the framework, expectations as part of the interview process and provide the opportunity for questions. To support this, a short overview presentation can be shared outlining key aspects of the CPGA process. A similar process can be followed for key informants consulted during the validation and outreach stages of the CPGA exercise. The CMU should be consulted for inputs on how external key informants can be grouped for focused discussions.

Interview Tips

- A list of key informants should be included in the technical annex and CPGA spreadsheet.
- At the end of each interview, prepare its summary, and use it for populating the CPGA spreadsheet.

Interviews should be structured so to maintain their focus on collecting information to answer guiding questions, and to identify and begin prioritizing possible entry points.

Conducting interviews: Troubleshooting tips

What if relevant sector experts can't be identified? In such cases, the CPGA task teams should:

- Seek support from Sector leaders to identify relevant experts.
- Try to identify potential experts through a review of relevant World Bank reports and project documents.
- Check with the CPGA Secretariat in case it is able to direct teams to relevant experts.

Interview summaries are a useful input into the data consolidation process and will help with drafting and finalization of CPGA country notes (consent should be sought in advance if the interview is recorded). Here, identifying recurrent themes will also be helpful when conducting a qualitative assessment of crisis preparedness in the country. Key data points from the interviews should also be integrated into the country spreadsheet and color-coded to differentiate between inputs from the desk review and inputs from interviews.

At this stage, it is important to conduct a detailed review of the desk-review data contained in the CPGA spreadsheet and interview transcripts. Possible existing inconsistencies in any of the spreadsheets need to be clarified at this stage. It also needs to be ensured that sources and reliability have been established for each piece of evidence.

Data Consolidation and Analysis Tip

Guiding questions provide the framework for data entry in the CPGA spreadsheet, leading to overall assessments of country preparedness which is done at the sub-component and component levels. Findings garnered by answering guiding questions will help to highlight strengths and weaknesses on country preparedness. These insights will feed into the entry points within the CPGA country reports.

Completing the CPGA spreadsheet

1. What is the CPGA spreadsheet?


The CPGA spreadsheet constitutes the basis for two of the three the key strategic outputs from the CPGA exercise: The briefing note and technical annex. The resultant maturity levels guide the framing of the technical analysis, substantiating the scores, and defining the way forward. The data spreadsheet serves to document evidence collected in responding to the guiding questions and calculating maturity levels. As such, it provides a database for clarifying and explaining scores. The data in the CPGA spreadsheet also serves as reference point and baseline that can be used for subsequent CPGA updates.

2. What are the main tabs in the CPGA spreadsheet?

The CPGA spreadsheet is designed to be easy and intuitive to use for task teams. It is comprised of a range of tabs including 'dashboard,' instruction' and component-specific tabs. To begin with, the dashboard provides a snapshot of component and sub-component performance across the CPGA's five technical areas. It is essentially a summary of all scores that are entered into the CPGA spreadsheet, providing average maturity levels for both components (black bars) and sub-components (colored bars) – see Figure 4.

Note that bars will only appear once scores in the component-specific tabs have been entered. Task teams are also encouraged to complete the summary information cells at the top of the tab to highlight the country, date and contact information of analysts responsible for filling out the data spreadsheet.

Figure 4: Screenshot of summary dashboard in CPGA data spreadsheet



The next section of the spreadsheet is the instruction tab (Figure 5). It provides guidance on the spreadsheet's core functionalities. This includes how and where to enter information, as well as reference criteria for tiers, progress levels and maturity ratings. Analysts should refer to this tab in case of any troubleshooting questions related to the CPGA spreadsheet. In instances where the instructions do not address a concern or query, analysts should contact the CPGA Secretariat.

Figure 5: The 'instructions' tab of the CPGA data spreadsheet [SCREENSHOT]

	A	B	C
1			
2		User Entry Instructions	
3			
4		This workbook is to be used for completing the Crisis Preparedness Gap Analysis.	
5			
6		Throughout the workbook, cells requesting user entry are highlighted blue. When data has been entered, the text will be blue.	
7		Input Requested	
8		Input Entered	
9			
10		Guiding Questions	
11		To complete the evaluation, please enter the progress rating for each guiding question. Maturity levels for indicators, subcomponents and components will then be automatically calculated.	
12			
13		An assessment team may add additional guiding questions to an indicator. If doing so, simply add a question in the empty rows below each indicator, and assign the question a tier and a progress rating. A question without an assigned tier will not be aggregated. No more than four additional questions will be included for each indicator.	
14			
15		Alongside the progress rating column are columns for information and source . These provide evidence to support the evaluation and also facilitate discussion and future consideration of the evaluation. In the information column, add data from the desk review and key informant interviews, as well as rationale for the provided score. In the source column, add the source or sources of the information.	
16			
17		Progress Ratings	
		A guiding question may be assigned one of three progress ratings. See comments on	
		Dashboard	Instructions
		1. Legal & Institutional	2. Understand. & Monitor. Risks

The component-specific tabs are used by the CPGA task team for documenting evidence. This is where the main data entry for the CPGA takes place and is a source of all documentation gathering. Each tab is broken down into the core constituents of the CPGA framework, including display of all relevant sub-components, indicators and guiding questions.

Figure 6: Breakdown of the component-specific tab [SCREENSHOT]

8			
9	Subcomponent	Indicator	Tier Guiding Question
10	1.1 Legislative frameworks, strategic plans and policies	1.1.1 Dedicated crisis preparedness laws and regulations are in place and well enforced, with preparedness plans mainstreamed	1 Does <u>dedicated</u> legislation exist to support national crisis preparedness and response?
11			2 Does legislation include clear provisions to declare and terminate a state of emergency?
12			2 Are procedures in place to ensure delegation of authority and jurisdiction over government resources during states of emergency?

As seen in Figure 6, data entry is organised around a dedicated indicator. Under the ‘Guiding Question’ column, cells highlight the guiding questions delineated by separate rows. The ‘Tier’ column clarifies what tier each guiding question is listed as (ranging from Tier 1 to Tier 2).

Under the ‘Information’ and ‘Source’ columns, cells allow for the input of evidence and sources gathered during the desk reviews and key informant interviews – see Figure 7. Collectively, the two columns:

- Provide evidence that supports evaluation. This helps the TTL, and Analysts themselves, understand whether the assigned scores are appropriate to guiding questions.
- Provide a platform to organize discussion and overcome potential disagreements within the CPGA task team around answers to GQ.
- Remind the CPGA task team about reasons for decisions made, facilitate revisions and adjustments in progress levels (when and where needed), and help inform and/or facilitate further decisions at a later stage.
- Provide a foundation to the analysts’ conclusions by grounding progress ratings on the empirical data gathered. In turn, this helps manage and reduce the inherent subjectivity involved in assigning progress levels.

It is helpful to develop concise, coherent summaries of the data for each indicator in the spreadsheet as this will be an input into drafting the final CPGA report.

Figure 7: Documenting information and sources for guiding questions [SCREENSHOT]

Guiding Question	Progress Information	Source
Does <u>dedicated</u> legislation exist to support national crisis preparedness and response?	<p>Malawi's Disaster Preparedness and Relief Act outlines provisions for institutional arrangements, procedures, and funding mechanisms related to disaster management and response. The DPR Act includes provisions for an office of the Commissioner for Disaster Preparedness and Relief (mandated to coordinate all disaster preparedness and disaster relief activities in Malawi) and a National Disaster Preparedness and Relief Committee.</p> <p>A National Disaster Risk Management (NDRM) Policy was articulated and approved in 2015 to address implementation and coordination of disaster risk management issues. The policy covers Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. After undertaking a Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) in 2015, new institutional and policy needs were identified that fed into the formulation of a Disaster Risk Management Bill. The draft bill has yet to be approved. The Bill was passed through cabinet, but has not yet passed through parliament.</p>	IFRC report on International Disaster Response Law in Malawi (pg 23-26), Disaster Preparedness and Relief Act, National Disaster Risk Management Policy and Interviews

Data gathered from the key informant interview and desk reviews is then used to assign levels of progress against each guiding question: a core part of the CPGA assessment. Levels are marked directly in the CPGA spreadsheet via a dropdown menu as seen in Figure 8. Each option in the dropdown includes a list of progress levels ranging from ‘null,’ to ‘partial,’ to ‘complete’.

Figure 8: Progress level assignment in CPGA spreadsheet [SCREENSHOT]

Guiding Question	Progress Information
Does <u>dedicated</u> legislation exist to support national crisis preparedness and response?	<p>Malawi's Disaster Prepared and Relief Act outlines provisions for institutional arrangements, procedures, and funding mechanisms related to disaster management and relief. The DPR Act includes provisions for an office of the Commissioner of Disaster Preparedness and Relief (mandated to coordinate disaster preparedness and disaster relief activities) and a National Disaster Preparedness and Relief Committee.</p> <p>A National Disaster Risk Management (NDRM) Policy was articulated and approved in 2015 to address implementation and coordination of disaster risk management issues. It covers Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), preparedness, response, and recovery. After undertaking a Post-Disaster Assessment (PDNA) in 2015, new institutional and policy measures were identified that fed into the formulation of a Disaster Management Bill. The draft bill has yet to be approved. It was passed through cabinet, but has not yet passed parliament.</p>
Does legislation include clear provisions to declare and terminate a state of emergency?	<div> <div> null partial complete </div> <div>2</div> </div>
Are procedures in place to ensure delegation of authority and	

3. How are Guiding Questions scored in the spreadsheet?

To determine progress levels for each guiding question, Analysts will rely primarily on data gathered from the desk-based review and key informant interviews. TTLs will obtain inputs from GP Focal Points for the review and validation of final progress level assignments.

Roles of CPGA Task team members in scoring guiding questions

Country Analysts. Assign progress levels against each guiding question.

TTL. Reviews draft progress level assignments and obtains inputs from sector focal point.

Sector Focal Point. Reviews and validates final progress level assignment.

Answers to GQ can be scored as complete, partial, or null:

Complete: Indicates that, for all intents and purposes, the country has achieved the core elements described in the guiding question. It is associated not only with the country's intention to deliver against the element of crisis preparedness posed in the guiding question, but the ability to follow through with it in full.

Example: *Does dedicated national legislation exist, supporting and balancing crisis preparedness with response?*

A 'complete' would be assigned in instances where there are **explicit references** to crisis preparedness provided in legislation and there is a delineation between preparedness and response activities

- **Partial:** Denotes that the country has, at the very least, begun activities related to the guiding question, though cannot be considered to have achieved all aspects described in the guiding question. This is linked to instances where there is clear intention to implement a given activity, though the ability to follow through may not be evidenced (either due to lack of capacity, resourcing or other complicating factors).

Example: *Does dedicated national legislation exist, supporting and balancing crisis preparedness with response?*

A Partial could be assigned in cases where crisis preparedness is referred to in legislation solely covering **one key sector**. Or where legislation exists supporting crisis preparedness, but not defining how activities fit with response.

- **Null:** States that a country has neither begun nor prioritised a particular activity of crisis preparedness. A score of “null” can also indicate a lack of intention (or ability) to implement a particular activity of crisis preparedness.

Example: *Does dedicated national legislation exist, supporting and balancing crisis preparedness with response?*

A Null would be assigned in instances where **no references** (direct or indirect) to crisis preparedness feature in legislation covering **any relevant sector**

Lines between null, partial or complete can sometimes be blurred. In such cases, it is important to be transparent and consistent in marking across guiding questions. It is also important that Sectoral GP Focal Points and the CGPA Secretariat are consulted in instances when the Country Analyst is unsure.

Deciding between different ratings

In considering whether to assign a null, partial or complete score, it is useful to break the guiding question into its core parts. Using the following guiding question as an example:

“Has the country developed and implemented a national public health strategy in line with International Health Regulations, including emergency preparedness and response plans?”

In this instance, there are a number of aspects to the question: whether the country has developed AND implemented a national public health strategy; whether it is in line with International Health Regulations; and whether it includes emergency preparedness AND response plans.

Partial denotes that at least part of the question is answered positively, but that there is insufficient evidence to suggest that all (or most) of the parts have been addressed. “Complete” is selected in instances where the majority (i.e. 2 of three 3) have been satisfactorily addressed.

Null is selected when no part of the question can be answered positively fully or where there is no intention (or capacity) to fulfill the element of crisis preparedness posed in the question.

A list of scenarios and scores using the same guiding question are presented below to help differentiate below.

“Has the country developed and implemented a national public health strategy in line with International Health Regulations, including emergency preparedness and response plans?”

Null:

The country has not developed nor implemented a national public health strategy.

The country has developed a public health preparedness plan, but not the strategy.

The country does not intend to develop a public health strategy.

Partial:

The country has developed a national public health strategy but has not yet implemented it.

The country has begun discussions with stakeholders to develop a national public health strategy.

The country has developed and implemented a national public health strategy but is lacking the emergency preparedness and response plan components.


Complete:

The country has developed, and is in the process of implementing, a national public health strategy that addresses aspects related to emergency preparedness and response.

The country has a national public health strategy in place alongside all the component parts.

In order to help task teams in distinguishing between partial and complete ratings, prompts are assigned to each guiding question in the CPGA spreadsheet. These can be used as reference guides in cases where it may not be evident whether a country has made partial or complete progress. Evaluators will be able to access them by hovering over the relevant guiding question in the spreadsheet – see Figure 9. Importantly, prompts are unique to each guiding question.

Figure 9: Guiding question prompts in the CPGA spreadsheet [SCREENSHOT]



Completing the CPGA Spreadsheet: Troubleshooting tips

What if evidence for two or more guiding questions leads to conflicting interpretations and judgements on an indicator?

To overcome this, task teams should:

- Check data for errors and reliability
- Consider country context when analyzing data. In particular, evidence related to capacities on preparedness will be difficult to establish. Consider assessing against available evidence for countries exhibiting similar capacities on preparedness and consulting other country teams.

What if evidence gathered makes it difficult to assign a progress level on preparedness?

To overcome this, teams should:

- Conduct a comparison of available data against the risk profile to assess progress on the guiding question. The value of the country risk profile is that it adds a layer of depth to responses to the guiding questions, nuancing progress. This can be of benefit when there is a lack of evidence.
- Indicate that the guiding question is in-between two levels, with a justification for the level chosen. As a rule of thumb, higher score should be given, so to give the country the benefit of the doubt.

What if desk review and interviews provide conflicting evidence?

In such cases, teams should:

- Log both pieces of evidence in the CPGA spreadsheet. Having confirmed the validity of the desk review data, triangulate and compare evidence from other experts on the topic.

4. Assigning maturity levels

A key advantage of using the CPGA spreadsheet is that maturity levels are automatically calculated based on progress ratings for each guiding question. The method used for assigning scores is detailed in Section 2 (refer to the Approach Note for further information).

To make the process transparent and easy to follow, the CPGA spreadsheet lists the percentage of positive responses for each tiered guiding question. More precisely, guiding questions rated as null are assigned a score of 0; partial, a score of 50; and full, a score of 100. Tiers are then given as the average of scores for all guiding questions in each tier. Tier-level percentages can be seen under the 'T1,' 'T2' and 'T3' columns within the spreadsheet.

As outlined in Section 2 (and the Approach Note), the percentage of tiered responses are then used to assign a maturity level. Maturity levels range from *unmet* (0) to *advanced* (4) and will be displayed in cells under the 'Maturity Level' column for each indicator – see Figure 10.

Figure 10: Proportion of positive answers by each tier [SCREENSHOT]

T1 %	T2 %	T3 %	Maturity Level
67%	50%	100%	2 Basic

5. Validating inputs and scores

Once preliminary maturity levels have been generated, Country Analysts will share the data with the TTL and other members of the Country Task Team to validate maturity levels. Given their involvement in the CPGA process as key informants, GP colleagues may also be given the opportunity to review assigned MLs and provide feedback before drafting reports. During the review process, it is recommended that inputs be sought with regards to Maturity Level ratings for *indicators* – rather than scores for individual *guiding questions*.

There are a number of reasons why task teams may want to upgrade or downgrade maturity levels based on inputs from GP experts and others. This includes scenarios where:

- **Important country-specific aspects related to crisis preparedness are not fully covered by the guiding questions.** *Guiding questions are meant to be indicative and cannot cover all preparedness-related traits in a given indicator. Task teams should draw on the knowledge of GP experts that can assess whether the assigned maturity level is a good reflection of the status of preparedness – or whether upgrades/downgrades are needed.*
- **Plans or resources are in place (and hence scored highly), but are wholly ineffective and lack implementation capacity.** *While the CPGA methodology seeks to address mismatches between what features on paper and what exists in place through use of the null/partial/complete rating system, there may be cases where further nuance is needed to evaluate a country's performance. Evaluators should draw on further qualitative insights from GP experts.*
- **GP experts suggest that a different maturity rating better reflects the status of an indicator.** *There may be cases where GP experts suggest that a higher/lower maturity level is warranted based on their knowledge of the sector.*

In all three scenarios Task Teams should make sure that they have documented sufficient evidence to clearly justify why a change in maturity level is warranted (see below). Teams should draw on inputs from GP Sector Focal Points and refer to the high-level criteria used to distinguish between different maturity levels (see Table 3 and the Approach Note). Above all, any changes to pre-assigned maturity levels should be clear, transparent and consistent across the CPGA framework. Task Teams are also advised to consult with the CPGA Secretariat in instances where teams are unsure whether a change of maturity level should apply.

Maturity Levels: Troubleshooting tips

What if indicator maturity levels don't reflect (qualitative) expert judgement?

Review the guiding question scores to assess where differences might be. If progress levels seem accurate, but do not result in a maturity level that holistically reflects a given indicator, then input the suggested up/downgrade in the last column of the marking grid and provide a rationale for the suggested maturity level. Make use of the qualitative maturity level characteristics to justify the change.

How are maturity levels adjusted in the CPGA spreadsheet?

A modified score can be manually inputted into dedicated columns. After agreeing on the nature of any changes, analysts should assign a modified score in the 'Manual ML' column (see Figure below). This manually overrides the previously assigned maturity level; differences between the two are automatically shown in the 'Discrepancy' column shown (e.g. whether +1 or -1). Finally, the 'Discrepancy Justification' columns should be used to provide a detailed justification for why the newly assigned maturity level is a better reflection of crisis preparedness, drawing on inputs from GP experts and any other relevant information that can be gathered. The modified ML will then be used in the final CPGA outputs – there is no need to manually adjust the summary Dashboard.

Figure 11: Inputting discrepancies in the CPGA spreadsheet [SCREENSHOT]

T1 %	T2 %	T3 %	Maturity Level	Manual ML	Discrepancy	Discrepancy Justification
17%	50%	100%	0 Unmet	1 Nascent	+1.0	...Text justifying why the assigned maturity level should be upgraded/downgraded based on inputs from GP experts...

What role will the CPGA Secretariat play in deciding maturity level scores?

In case of discrepancies in maturity levels, the secretariat can support Task Teams in advising on whether adjustments in MLs are warranted as well as providing wider troubleshooting and technical advice.

Do Maturity Levels need to be cleared by the client government?

MLs do not need to be cleared or signed off by the client. However, task teams may choose to inform clients of assigned maturity levels (likely towards the end of assessment). Additionally, Task Teams may decide whether or not to include (numerical) ML scores in CPGAs Briefing Notes to be shared externally with government or partners. The ML scores are primarily intended as indicators to guide internal WBG programming and prioritization of CP activities.

Data and Evidence Collection Checklist

1. Conduct a desk-based review

- ☐ Evidence summaries for guiding questions compiled
- ☐ Data sources listed and validated
- ☐ Data inputted into CPGA spreadsheet

2. Conduct key informant interviews

- ☐ Key informants identified, listed and confirmed
- ☐ Interviewer designated and guide prepared
- ☐ Interview summaries compiled
- ☐ Relevant interview data points added to CPGA spreadsheet (in alternative format)

3. CPGA spreadsheet completed and maturity levels assigned

- ☐ Progress levels, evidence and sources entered into spreadsheet
- ☐ Maturity levels validated by TTL and CPGA secretariat

Phase C: Analysis and Conclusion

The Analysis and Conclusion phase of the CPGA results in *three key deliverables*:

Briefing and Technical Notes

Action Plan

Dissemination and Publication

CPGA Briefing and Technical Notes

1. Identification and prioritization of entry points

Entry points indicate actions that a country may take to enhance its crisis preparedness. The selection of entry points is guided by the country risk profile and identified gaps. In addition to offering a line of sight to actions that may help to progress across maturity levels, entry points should also highlight actions that may be more immediate or urgent, should a country be experiencing a worsening situation.

The following guiding principles will facilitate country analysts in identifying entry points:

- The selection of entry points is guided by the country risk profile and identified gaps.
- Entry points should be high-level, focusing and grouped into issues within a given component.

Once the CPGA spreadsheet is completed and the maturity levels agreed upon, the task team begins the identification of entry points. Entry points should be identified through the maturity scores at the component level. Components that are weak (for example weak financial system) or have gaping issues at the sub-component level (such as lack of preparedness in health systems) should be flagged. This will serve as a starting point from which to build potential entry points.

TIP: How many entry points are enough?

There is no fixed maximum or minimum number of entry points to be determined for each component. A good rule of thumb would be to examine which sub-components or indicators are weakest and where targeted investments would strengthen the overall component.

When examining the low-scoring components or sub-components, it is important to look for commonalities, such as lack of policy development or lack of resources. These can help shape a cross-sectoral approach when formulating entry points. Moreover, they can help orient the time frame for implementation of the entry points and prioritization.

In addition, entry points should come from a number of different sources. Once gaps and issues have been identified, they need to be triangulated. A main input will be the key informant interviews. At the end of the interviews, informants should be asked whether they have suggestions for strengthening preparedness in their respective sectors of interest. As thematic experts working in country, key informants, particularly those external to the government, will have objective views on where weaknesses lie and how to improve them.

The prioritization of entry points will be done in conjunction with the sectoral leads and GPs. Based on their experience in the country and their knowledge of GP priorities, they will be able to provide structure to the framing of entry points.

The formulation of entry points should be done with the country risk profile in mind. Entry points should be tied to the country risk profile in order to ensure their relevance and ability to have the most impact. Thus, for example, if a country is weak on refugee or displacement issues, but does not have the potential to receive refugees, then it would not be necessary to have an entry point in that regard. If a country is not likely to be faced with drought or food insecurity, it would not be relevant to have entry points related to food security crisis preparedness.

Criteria to guide selection of entry points:

- **Foster a whole – of – government approach:** A whole-of-government approach helps prepare for the increased likelihood of overlapping and simultaneous crises. Inter and intra-agency coordination and cooperation strengthens the abilities of various agencies and ministries to operate as one system, providing the advantages of synergies and improving the effectiveness of crisis response, rather than addressing preparedness as a collection of separate, potentially duplicative, components. A whole-of-government approach establishes a unified effort between government agencies to maximize all available resources—personnel, funding, and equipment and supplies—in a collaborative effort.

- **Balance short, medium, and long-term priorities.** Entry points that entail lengthy or complex processes may prove more suitable for providing strategic vision and supporting crisis preparedness in the medium or long term. Other entry points may have a shorter time horizon and offer quick wins. In choosing different entry points, the CPGA Task Team is encouraged to consider multiple time horizons and achieve a balanced combination of short, medium, and long-term suggested actions to help develop a coherent roadmap.

TIP: Policy dialogue

A key criterion for entry points is that they should build policy dialogue or engagement between the government and other stakeholders (most likely to be external in IDA countries). As such, good entry points will be cross-sectoral and easily identified as high priority to secure buy-in from all parties.

- **Linkages to the Crisis Preparedness and Response**

Toolkit: The World Bank is enhancing its Crisis Preparedness and Response Toolkit (CPRT) to better equip countries for crises. Within the context of the CPRT, CPGA entry points can help to inform dialogue between the Bank and clients on crisis preparedness. Additionally, a forward-looking approach to entry point selection would consider how entry points can be leveraged for the design and implementation of new contingent financing or risk transfer instruments.

- **Encourage closer links between government and external stakeholders contributing to the preparedness agenda.** In-country preparedness activities are not limited to central governments and are often spread across a range of stakeholders including various development and humanitarian partners – particularly in countries affected by FCV. Entry points should promote greater coordination of planning objectives and resources targeting crisis preparedness.

The key entry points for each of the five components are summarized towards the end of respective sections. While all entry points identified in the CPGA are critical actions to strengthen crisis preparedness, it is useful to further classify them considering their level of readiness and priority through based on the matrix below. This will facilitate sequencing and prioritization of actions and guide the selection of entry points that then become the basis for the action plan.

Figure 11: Prioritization Matrix for Crisis Preparedness Entry Points




	Priority	
Readiness	High: Needs immediate action to address critical crisis preparedness gaps and prevent additional risks	Medium: Needs action to address crisis preparedness gaps
High: Identified in existing plans, with good level of technical and financial readiness	High priority actions should not be postponed for crisis preparedness	Actions with high level of readiness and moderate priority for crisis preparedness
Medium: Requires additional resources/dialogue to be ready for implementation	Urgent actions with risk of delayed implementation that require additional dialog and resources	Moderate priority actions that need additional resources to be implemented

Using this matrix, entry points are prioritized based on both their readiness (prior work undertaken or the availability of resources that would support the actioning of identified activities for the entry point) as well as priority level (whether the entry point identifies activities must be actioned urgently). The prioritized activities are then identified as actions that target CP Policies, strategies, institutions or CP investments, as in Figure 12 below.

Figure 12: Example of the prioritization matrix applied to entry points

Entry Points for Understanding and Monitoring Risks towards Crisis Preparedness

	Priority	
Readiness	High	Medium
High		
Medium		

	Complete remaining district-level multi-hazard risk assessments.
	Integrate multi-hazard risk assessments with detailed, sector-specific risk assessments at the national and sub-national levels, in collaboration with relevant ministries.
	Digitize and centralize all available risk assessment data. An open data policy framework should govern the creation, management, and dissemination of a centralized data platform.

- **Encourage closer links between government and external stakeholders contributing to the preparedness agenda.** In-country preparedness activities are not limited to central governments and are often spread across a range of stakeholders including various development and humanitarian partners – particularly in countries affected by FCV. Entry points should promote greater coordination of planning objectives and resources targeting crisis preparedness.

2. Formulation of Briefing Note and Technical Annex

Building on the entry points and the CPGA spreadsheet, the CPGA's main deliverables are the CPGA briefing note and technical report. A CPGA **Action Plan** further prioritizes entry points and identifies a roadmap for operationalization of CPGA recommendations. Both the briefing note and the technical annex provide strategic analyses of the CPGA, while the action plan translates that analysis into tangible outcomes. The briefing note and technical annex are high-level and examine the CPGA results at the component level. The emphasis should be on the big picture implications of crisis preparedness for the country. As such, neither document should focus on a line-by-line breakdown of the results by CPGA indicator.

The briefing note is a high-level overview of the findings of the CPGA spreadsheet and provides a summary of the entry points and the suggested way forward. The briefing note targets the CMU, the country team, and the government. It outlines how the entry points would strengthen the level of crisis preparedness in the country and mitigate the risks the country might face if a crisis were to erupt immediately.

The technical annex provides a detailed description of core findings from the CPGA assessments as well as elaboration on entry points to strengthen crisis preparedness in the country. It addresses cross-component issues that are common across all components in the CPGA framework, delving into key structural preparedness gaps. It also flags component-specific issues that provide insights for each of the framework's five components, identifying how preparedness can be strengthened sector by sector.

TIP: Focus on Analysis

The briefing note and technical annex should provide a qualitative, expert-led analysis of the main themes emerging from the CPGA spreadsheet. They should emphasise the extremes in the findings: the strongest suits as well as the weakest points.

The bulk of the technical annex focusses on the entry points across the short-, medium-, and long-terms, detailing the potential incorporation into the CPF. Where possible, it highlights potential coordination with other stakeholders. The technical annex is also where the CPGA task team can list any challenges that arose during the CPGA process and any issues that may arise in strengthening crisis preparedness within the country. The target audience for the technical report is the Global Practices, Sector Experts, and the Country Teams.

When drafting the briefing note and the technical annex, **task teams must ensure that the government is consulted on the outcomes of the CPGA process and the way forward.** It is at this juncture that entry points may be discussed as part of the engagement process. By keeping the analysis focused on avenues to strengthen crisis preparedness, potential challenges to achievement might also be raised. This will also feed into the reports.

3. Formulation of the Action Plan

The Action Plan provides a clear pathway for transforming entry points to actionable activities within the Country Program, ensuring alignment and continuity between the CPGA and the country engagement process. A primary objective of the Action Plan, typically developed after the CMU and client government validate and prioritize the entry points, is to foster practical, coordinated strategies for implementing CPGA entry points across sectors. The task team, in conjunction with the CMU and relevant GPs, lead the development of the Action Plan - a process that is initiated starting with a **Portfolio Review**.

Portfolio Review: The portfolio review guides the identification of preparedness activities that may already exist as part of the country program. It also examines the portfolio for projects that may be adapted to include crisis preparedness measures based on the entry points. This entails a scan of the country portfolio for projects and technical assistance (TA) that address various types of crises across sectors. This involves a systematic screening of project documents, like Project Appraisal Documents (PADs) and Project Information Documents (PIDs), for project components that address the key entry

points identified and clearly distinguish between activities targeting preparedness goals vis-à-vis broader considerations like resilience.

Operationalization of entry points: Following the portfolio review, the task team should prioritize activities within the country portfolio that inherently support or can be modified to enhance crisis preparedness across the entry points. This requires breaking down the entry points into activities that can then be incorporated into existing or pipeline projects. It then necessitates assessing existing or pipeline projects for their contribution to crisis preparedness and identifying opportunities for modification to better address preparedness goals. Activities that can be seamlessly integrated with ongoing or planned initiatives, including through technical assistance, should be prioritized. This alignment helps leverage existing resources, avoid duplication of efforts, and create synergies within the Country Program.

Identification and validation of crisis preparedness activities: Sector experts across GPs may assist the task team to identify and/or validate relevant crisis preparedness activities within the portfolio. This collaborative approach ensures that proposed CP actions are developed from a cross-sectoral lens and align with practical and context-specific considerations. Workshops or interviews with relevant GPs can facilitate coordination and ensure that activities are aligned and mutually reinforcing across sectors. Prioritization criteria should focus on the impact and urgency of the activities, their readiness for implementation, and their ability to foster a whole-of-government approach, as outlined in the prioritization matrix for crisis preparedness entry points (Figure 11).

Output and documentation: The completed Action Plan should document prioritized activities, implementation timelines (short, medium and long-term actions), resource allocation, and strategies for addressing potential obstacles. Guidelines for developing the Action Plan are included as a part of the CPGA package.

The CPGA outputs are summarized in table 7.

Table 7: CPGA outputs

Output	Description
CPGA Country Spreadsheet Target Audience: GPs, Sector experts, Country teams	Spreadsheet compiling guiding question ratings and all source material, and insights that fed into the CPGA. Inputs are outlined in relation to each of the CPGA's guiding questions, providing detailed insights as well as sources and materials relevant to future assessments)
CPGA Briefing Note Target Audience: CMUs, Country teams, Government	Summarizes high-level insights from the CPGA including the country risk profile (description below), key capacity gaps and entry points. The brief also includes a series of infographics highlighting maturity levels as well as a quick snapshot of available diagnostics, strategies, and financing instruments relevant to crisis preparedness in the country.
CPGA Technical Annex <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cross-component - Component-specific 	Detailed description of core findings from the CPGA assessments as well as elaboration on entry points to strengthen crisis preparedness in the country. Findings are split into two main sections: i) Cross-component issues cover high-level traits that are common across all components in the

Target Audience: GPs, Sector experts, Country teams	CPGA framework and ii) Component-specific issues that provide insights for each of the framework's five components. The report also integrates the Country Risk Profile, which provides an overview of the scale and distribution of crisis risk, focusing on the frequency and intensity of hazards, exposure to these hazards, and the vulnerability of people and assets. It also considers socio-economic and institutional factors, as well as chronic issues like food insecurity and health threats.
CPGA Action Plan <i>Target Audience: GPs, Sector Experts, Country Teams, Government</i>	Outline of CP activities with guidance on their implementation through existing or pipeline projects in the short to medium term. The activities draw from the entry points identified in the CPGA Technical Report.

Dissemination and Publication

The CPGA process concludes, in accordance with Track II ASA procedures, through a Decision Review Meeting. This last step provides an opportunity to discuss the findings of the CPGA and determine a way forward with the client government. The outcome of the DRM is a decision note, which includes the decision to share the CPGA technical annex with the client government, and most importantly, potential dissemination strategies, including levels of confidentiality. The intention, if sharing the CPGA technical annex, is not to flag the client government's weaknesses, but to highlight ways to strengthen crisis preparedness systems. As the CPGA is linked to SCD and CPF, outcomes of the CPGA process can be incorporated into these documents and leveraged for future funding or projects.

The decision for the dissemination of the reports and recommendations to the client government and other partners, is conducted in conjunction with the CMU. This provides an opportunity for validation of the CPGA country team's findings and prioritization of the proposed entry points, in close consultation with the CMU and the client government. The prioritization exercise should focus on: (i) the relevance of the proposed entry point to create the enabling environment for better crisis preparedness; and (ii) the expected "return on investment" of the proposed entry point, in terms of reduction of potential negative impacts resulting from a shock.

The options for dissemination are several. It can be done simply by sharing the reports and recommendations with the government, and potentially publishing the briefing note to make it publicly available. Alternatively, the findings from the CPGA can be presented through a workshop with the government and partners respectively, thereby permitting a discussion on the proposed entry points. The latter would help build buy-in and ownership by the client of the proposed recommendations and therefore support country dialogue and programming.

Disclosure of the CPGA outputs to the public (whether partial or in full) is also something for the CMU to determine. Public release amongst the international development community may help in contributing to growing momentum behind the crisis preparedness agenda within the country. It would also support greater accountability and provide incentives for future government action on preparedness, as well as shape other organizations' crisis preparedness funding priorities. Discretion would be needed in considering what to share, particularly in instances where sensitivities exist between the CMU's relationship with the client government. One option is for all (or part) of the

Briefing Note to be made into a public document, with a decision on disclosure of the full set of outputs left to the discretion of the CMU in consultation with the client government.

Analysis and Conclusion Checklist

1. CPGA package compiled

- ☐ Entry points identified
- ☐ Briefing note and technical report drafted
- ☐ Action plan developed

2. CPGA package validated

- ☐ Decision Review Meeting held
- ☐ Findings presented to client government
- ☐ Decision made on dissemination

Annex 1: CPGA alignment with Country Engagement Products and Country Diagnostics Tools

As part of IDA20, International Development Association (IDA) management has committed to developing an approach to monitor countries' progress toward crisis preparedness and use it to inform country engagements. IDA20 places significant emphasis on supporting countries to strengthen their approach to crisis preparedness for deeper resilience. Among others, all new Country Partnership Frameworks /Strategic Country Diagnostics (SCDs) for IDA countries will be informed by appropriate crisis preparedness assessments, depending on the country's profile and circumstances.

As the CPGA is linked to SCD and CPF timelines, outcomes of the CPGA process can be incorporated into these documents and leveraged for future funding or projects. More relevantly, if guided by the CMU, the CPGA consultation process, conducted through the key informant interviews and the post-assessment workshops, can feed into the SCD and CPF consultation process. This can further integrate crisis preparedness into country engagement.

CPGA and Country Diagnostic Tools

In some country contexts the CPGA is informed by and can inform WB country diagnostics. In particular the CPGA will look to align with the roll-out of the R2R, Food Security Crisis Preparedness Plans (FSCPP) and the CCDR. As with the country engagement products, this approach will allow feeding in CP to the consultation process of these diagnostics and better CP integration.

Annex 2: CPGA implementation in FCV countries

While the CPGA is designed to be used across a variety of country contexts, applications in FCV locations will require additional considerations. The CPGA framework has been designed with mechanisms that cater for FCV-specific needs, while ensuring core aspects of the methodology and crisis preparedness assessments remain consistent across countries.

FCV contexts are often associated with low government capacity and heavy dependence on external actors – such as UN agencies, NGOs and other development partners - in delivering essential public services. For this reason, the development of the CPGA in FCV contexts should be informed by a thorough understanding of the political, economic, and security landscape, including the causes and consequences of FCV dynamics. The CPGA must identify sectors related to crisis preparedness with pronounced dependence of authorities on external actors for planning and implementing crisis response and offer potential entry points for reducing such dependence.

Effective CPGA delivery in FCV contexts requires broader engagement with development partners and local actors, including decentralized institutions, community-based organizations, and traditional authorities. Given the limited government capacity and heavy involvement from UN, NGOs, and other development agencies, CPGA task teams should draw on a higher proportion of non-government key informants during the interview process. Understanding the role of each stakeholder in crisis preparedness and addressing potential coordination challenges due to overlapping mandates is essential.

In FCV contexts, ensuring data reliability can be challenging due to the scarcity of dependable sources, making the triangulation of information from multiple sources crucial. During CPGA implementation, country teams should evaluate the reliability of the available data and identify potential biases, especially regarding politically sensitive issues like marginalization and forced displacement. When necessary, alternate sources of information, including from civil society and NGOs, should be sought to corroborate the data.

While all IDA countries may face financial constraints that impede their crisis preparedness efforts, this reality is particularly severe in FCV contexts, where these constraints are exacerbated by competing urgent priorities such as territorial integrity, national security, and political stability. Therefore, it is crucial that the CPGA considers these constraints by assessing whether the government can manage an effective crisis response without compromising other essential expenditures. Additionally, the CPGA should explore the availability of external funding for specific events, such as refugee inflows or natural disasters.

Lastly, all CPGA entry points should be screened through a conflict-sensitive lens to minimize the risk of exacerbating drivers of FCV and avoid further marginalizing vulnerable groups. This approach ensures that recommendations are relevant and realistic for each FCV context specifically.

Annex 3: Concept Note Template

Outlined below is the core content that should be considered in filling out dedicated sections of the Concept Note.

1. Content/Statement of problem

The TTL will need to lay out the need and justification for delivering a CPGA in the selected country. The TTL should draw on existing resources, including inputs from the client government, which describe key risks across a range of sectors.

This section should describe the country's experience in preparing for crises by looking at past shocks. It may also be useful to include background information on the impact of past crises on poverty and socio-economic growth to assess the importance of crisis preparedness on the country's overall development.

The problem statement should establish links to IDA20 policy commitments by highlighting the CPGA's intended role in supporting crisis preparedness as a cross-cutting issue. The CPGA Briefing Note and Technical Annex templates include standard language that can be utilized and expanded upon accordingly. TTLs can further outline how the CPGA can be leveraged as a diagnostic input into the country engagement cycle. The country risk profile should input into the problem statement. A number of tools are available, including the Compound Risk Monitor (CRM) and ThinkHazard!, and provide useful information to develop a preliminary overview of the country's risk profile and extract relevant data to fill out this section of the Concept Note.

2. Development Objective

The objective of the CPGA assessment is to provide the government with a high-level diagnostic assessment of preparedness for key risks facing a country. It also assists with the identification of entry points needed to further strengthen crisis preparedness.

3. Activity Description

The objective of the exercise is to conduct a CPGA assessment using the methodology developed by the CPGA Secretariat. The assessment seeks to: (1) provide a baseline for assessment of preparedness for key country risks; (2) identify gaps in preparedness, establish and explain preparedness maturity levels and propose entry points for strengthening preparedness; and (3) inform upcoming SCDs or CPFs.

The CPGA task team will need to outline the following attributes:

Scope and Coverage of the CPGA Assessment: (1) define what level of government will be covered by the assessment, (2) identify the period that will be covered, (3) and highlight risks that will be addressed as part of the assessment.

Consultations: explain (1) the main objective of CPGA consultations, (2) who will be consulted (govt, partners, other stakeholders), (3) what process will be used for the consultation and (4) proposed timings for consultations.

Core activities: Explain the core activities expected in delivering the CPGA. To complete this section, the TTL can draw heavily on steps outlined in the CPGA User Manual and Approach Note for guidance. Reference should be made to other relevant sectoral diagnostic tools that are being

implemented or have recently been implemented by other GPs. It will be necessary to provide details on how the task team plans to coordinate and integrate the CPGA assessment with existing or ongoing diagnostic tools.

Deliverables: (1) The Country Risk Profile; (2) the CPGA Briefing Note; (3) the Technical Annex, and (4) the Data Spreadsheet.

4. Risks

The section identifies specific risks that may threaten the delivery of the CPGA. This could include access to data across relevant sectors, challenges with accessing key informants (e.g., due to COVID-19 or political considerations) or difficulties in managing relationships with the client.

5. Dissemination and Outreach Strategy

Dissemination takes place once the CPGA is completed. This section should propose: (1) What will be made public from the assessment; (2) How the CPGA will be disseminated; (3) To whom it will be disseminated. The dissemination and outreach strategy should take into consideration the level of engagement of the government and the impact dissemination might have on other stakeholders.

6. Expected Results and Outcomes

The section should list the core results and outcomes that will be generated under the CPGA. The CPGA Task Team should include that the CPGA exercise will (1) enhance government understanding of key gaps in its preparedness and identify entry points for addressing those, and (2) help inform the SCD or CPF.

Annex 4: CPGA Framework

	SUB-COMPONENT	INDICATORS	GUIDING QUESTIONS		
			T1: Fundamentals	T2: Core Operations	T3: Advanced Attributes
1. LEGAL & INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS	1.1 Legislative frameworks ² , strategic plans and policies ³	1.1.1 Dedicated crisis preparedness laws and regulations are in place and well enforced, with preparedness plans mainstreamed into policy frameworks	T1) Does dedicated legislation exist to support national crisis preparedness and response?	T2) Does legislation include clear provisions to declare and terminate a state of emergency? T2) Are procedures in place to ensure delegation of authority and jurisdiction over government resources during states of emergency?	
			T1) Is crisis preparedness referred to in dedicated legislation covering key sectors (such as land use and environmental planning, infrastructure design, public health, education)?		<i>T3) Does crisis-related legislation (either within sectoral or national) balance between ex-ante preparedness measures and response/ coordination of ex-post activities?</i>
			T1) Do hazard-specific preparedness plans and/or policies exist for key hazards, depending on the country's risk profile (i.e. natural hazards; pandemics and public health emergencies; food crises, etc.)	T2) Is there a multi-hazard national plan and/or policy guiding crisis preparedness and response?	<i>T3) Do preparedness plans take into consideration vulnerable groups and addresses the specific impact of key hazards on their risk profile? (ie: marginalised groups, women, displaced populations)</i>
	1.2 Governance and institutions ⁴	1.2.1 Governance and institutional arrangements are in place, with defined	T1) Do national crisis preparedness and response plans clearly delineate roles and responsibilities for financing,		

² UNISDR, 2005, "Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters," United Nations, 2005; Llosa, S. and Zodrowm I, 2011, "Disaster risk reduction legislation as basis for effective adaptation," *Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction*.

³ WHO, 2006; WHO, 2007; Staupe-Delgado, 2017.

⁴ Staupe-Delgado, 2017

		mandates, roles and responsibilities	delivery and oversight between key government agencies (both national and sub-national)?		
			T1) Does a national Crisis Preparedness and/or Response authority (or similar body) exist?	T2) Does it have the regulatory and convening power necessary to manage and respond to crisis events?	<i>T3) Does it have appropriate, timely and consistent access to resources (human and financial) to coordinate and manage crisis preparedness/response?</i>
			T1) Do sub-national or local levels of administration have preparedness and response plans?		<i>T3) Are these plans adequately supported at the sub-national level through the timely, effective and appropriate provisioning of resourcing and technical capacity from national government?</i>
		1.2.2 Preparedness activities are coordinated across sectors and levels within government and external stakeholders	T1) Are there mechanisms in place to coordinate crisis preparedness and response between different government ministries and agencies?	T2) Are there mechanisms in place to coordinate crisis preparedness and response between the international community and national government?	<i>T3) Do coordination mechanisms include relevant national and local civil society and NGO actors in a meaningful and inclusive way?</i>
					<i>T3) Does the government lead sectoral coordination for crisis preparedness/response?</i>
2. UNDERSTANDING & MONITORING RISKS	2.1 Risk assessment ⁵	2.1.1 National cross-sectoral and sector-specific risk assessments have	T1) Do national sector-specific risk assessments exist for key sectors across government?		<i>T3) Do sub-national sector-specific risk assessments exist for key sectors with strong links to national risk assessments?</i>
			T1) Does a national cross-sectoral risk assessment exist?	T2) Do national risk assessments (either sector-specific or cross-sectoral) quantify the impact of	<i>T3) Do national risk assessments (either sector-specific or multi-hazard) capture population</i>

⁵ Alexander, D, 2009, "Principles of emergency planning: Standardisation, integration and sustainability," In U.F. Paleo (Ed.), *Building safer communities. Risk governance, spatial planning and responses to natural hazards*, Amsterdam: IOS Press; WHO, 2007.

		been carried out ⁶ , using current and historical datasets		<p>priority hazards on the population (hazards for which vulnerability/exposure is high)?</p> <p>T2) Do national risk assessments (either sector-specific or cross-sectoral) enable a thorough understanding of the geographical distribution of risk in the country (including identification of hotspots)?</p> <p>T2) Do national risk assessments make use of historical risk datasets with adequate geographic coverage?</p>	<p><i>differences in vulnerability and impacts of key threats?</i></p> <p><i>T3) Do national risk assessments make use of robust qualitative inputs related to core drivers of vulnerability?</i></p>
		2.1.2 Government is able to identify vulnerable people without discrimination	T1) Does the government have access to external databases or systems to identify vulnerable populations?	<p>T2) Does the national government have the capability to identify vulnerable populations without heavy reliance on external stakeholders?</p> <p>T2) Is this information disaggregated by gender, ethnicity, income, disability, age?</p>	<p><i>T3) In identifying vulnerable populations, does the government follow best practices regarding privacy and sensitive personal information?</i></p>
	2.2 Risk monitoring and early warnings ⁷	2.2.1 Government has the capacity to monitor and analyze active threats in real-time to inform national and sub-national level decision-making	T1) Does the government collect real-time data to monitor threats related to key sectors and risks?	<p>T2) Do observational and surveillance networks have good geographic coverage providing a comprehensive overview of sub-national variation.</p> <p>T2) Do real-time risk monitoring activities feed directly into crisis</p>	<p><i>T3) Does the government have the capacity to conduct rapid needs</i></p>

⁶ Alexander, 2009

⁷ Alexander, D, 2002, *Principles of emergency planning and management*, Abingdon: Oxford University Press.

				preparedness and response activities?	<i>assessments to inform response activities?</i>
			T1) Does the government have access to forecasting services related to key hazards?		<i>T3) Does the government have the capability to produce and analyze its own hazard forecasts?</i>
			T1) Do sector-specific early warning systems exist?	T2) Do EWS cover a broad range of relevant threats facing the country?	<i>T3) Do multi-hazard early warning systems exist?</i>
		2.2.2 Risk information is communicated in accessible and relevant formats to all relevant groups	T1) Has the country established a fully operational national risk communication system	T2) Is risk information (including forecasts and EWSs) related to key hazards issued in a timely manner when disseminated to the public?	<i>T3) Does the national risk communication system have the capacity to scale-up in terms of personnel and resources, if necessary?</i>
			T1) Has the government made efforts to ensure that risk information is communicated in a manner that is clear to the general public (i.e. is coordinated, consistent and utilizes familiar references)?	T2) Is risk information disseminated in a way that can reach all segments of the population (use of local languages, different types of media)	<i>T3) Are efforts made to tailor and target risk information to reach the most vulnerable communities (ie: marginalized, isolated, displaced groups, women, persons with disabilities)?</i>
3. FINANCIAL PREPAREDNESS ⁸	3.1 Crisis risk financing	3.1.1 Government has put in place a dedicated strategy for the delivery of crisis and disaster risk financing	T1) Does the government have a national crisis and disaster risk financing strategy/policy (or equivalent) in place	T2) Does the strategy have clear guidelines, and delineate roles and responsibilities for triggering	<i>T3) Does it present a layered approach to risk financing⁹?</i>

⁸ Asia Development Bank and World Bank Group, 2017, "Assessing Financial Protection against Disasters: A Guidance Note on Conducting a Disaster Risk Finance Diagnostic," May 2017; World Bank, 2019, "Disaster Response"; Weingärtner, L. and Wilkonson, E., 2019, "Anticipatory crisis financing and action: concepts, initiatives, and evidence," London: Overseas Development Institute; WHO, 2006

⁹ A layered approach to risk financing is "financing disaster response is through a range of tools in a common framework to address different layers of risk". Asia Development Bank, 2018, "RRP: Disaster Risk Financing Tools and Approaches", ADB, <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/52018-001-sd-02.pdf>

				the disbursement of funds and implementation?	
				T2) Does the country have access to a contingent credit instrument (such as a CAT-DDO or Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility)?	T3) Has the government purchased any sovereign market-based financing solutions?
		3.1.2 Government has access to a range of sovereign financing instruments	T1) Are emergency public financing mechanisms in place for immediate mobilization of crisis and disaster risk financing in advance of and during an emergency? (ie: CAT-DDO, Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility)	<p>T2) Does the government have access to a diverse range of crisis and disaster risk financing instruments that address key risks facing the country?</p> <p>T2) Does the country have the capacity to rapidly access, absorb and disburse ODA or other forms of external financial assistance, should a crisis occur?</p>	T3) Are mechanisms in place to ensure that the sub-national government has access to funds from sovereign crisis and disaster risk financing instruments?
		3.1.3 Government ensures enabling environment for insurance and other risk finance instruments	T1) Is dedicated legislation in place to create an enabling environment for insurance and other risk financing instruments (targeting households and businesses)?	<p>T2) Are there government programs to enable access to risk financing products, such as consumer education and communication campaigns, etc. (beyond subsidies which are considered below)?</p> <p>T2) Has the government sought to increase accessibility of risk financing instruments to poor and vulnerable groups (e.g. supporting rollout and subsidies for index-based insurance)?</p>	<p>T3) Does the overall population have access to affordable and comprehensive risk financing products?</p> <p>T3) Are there specific risk financing products tailored to different target groups, including: household, micro, small and medium-sized and large enterprises; etc?</p>

3.2 Public Financial Management	3.2.1 Government has put in place crisis-related budget execution rules and procedures ¹⁰	T1) Does the national government have dedicated budget lines for crisis preparedness and response?	T2) Does it have clear guidelines for budget allocation/execution?	
		T1) Do mechanisms exist to disburse recovery and reconstruction funds in a timely manner following a crisis?	T2) Do mechanisms include flexible and transparent reallocation of funds within the budget to respond to post-crisis needs?	
		T1) Do legal and regulatory frameworks clarify dedicated emergency procurement measures?	T2) Do standard operating procedures and protocols exist to streamline and expedite emergency procurement?	<i>T3) Are mechanisms for accountability and transparency built into the frameworks?</i> <i>T3) Does the country have agreements in place with external stakeholders for emergency supplies/procurement?</i>
	3.2.2 Anti-corruption mechanisms are in place to ensure transparency, efficiency, and accountability in the provision of emergency services and financing at national and sub-national levels	T1) Are mechanisms for accountability in the use of crisis response funds, goods and services clearly defined?	T2) Does the government have the capacity to track and report on emergency response expenditure? T2) Are internal controls in place to verify key financial management processes during emergency response? T2) Are anti-corruption safeguards in place to ensure and monitor efficient and transparent delivery of emergency goods and services in the aftermath of a crisis	<i>T3) Are post-disaster expenditures systematically and independently reviewed?</i>

¹⁰ Staupe-Delgado, 2017.

		3.2.3 Coordination and close engagement takes place with international development and humanitarian stakeholders, including the management of post-crisis inflow of resources	T1) Does the government have a system for tracking external assistance commitments and/or aid inflows related to crisis events?	T2) Are there procedures to manage inflow of external funds for crisis response and are they implemented? T2) Is responsibility for financial coordination of preparedness and response under the auspices of the government, rather external donors/stakeholders?	<i>T3) Is the government able to set the priorities for the use of aid inflows, without external involvement?</i>
4. PRIMARY RESPONSE	4.1 Public health systems ¹¹	4.1.1 The public health system has the capacity and resources to respond to key health threats and to function fully during crises	T1) Has the country developed and implemented a national public health strategy in line with International Health Regulations, including emergency preparedness and response plan?	T2) Is a dedicated budget (or other source of external financing) allocated for the implementation of all IHR capacities? T2) Is there a feedback mechanism between public health surveillance and emergency response? T2) Does the health system have access to critical supportive care, diagnostic equipment, medications and mental health services?	<i>T3) Are mechanisms in place for reallocating or mobilizing health resources from national and sub-national levels to support local level response?</i> <i>T3) Is there a mechanism in place to mitigate epidemic risks at the intersection of animals, humans, and the environment?</i> <i>T3) Are there nationally endorsed case management guidelines for relevant biological hazards at relevant health system levels?</i>
			T1) Is a multidisciplinary human resource (HR) capacity available across all levels of the public health system for response to emergencies?	T2) Has a public health workforce strategy been developed and implemented consistently?	<i>T3) Are there training programmes in place to enhance capacities required for both clinical and public health professionals?</i>

¹¹ Staupe-Delgado, 2017.

	4.1.2 Government has capacity to detect and carry out surveillance of emergent and ongoing health threats in real-time	T1) Does the country have a national laboratory system that is capable of detecting priority diseases and conducting core tests?	T2) Does the country have a functioning national system for sample referral and confirmatory diagnostics in place?	T3) Does the country document and fully implement diagnostic strategies at the primary, secondary and tertiary health levels?
		T1) Is there a comprehensive policy, strategy or plan for addressing zoonotic events across veterinary and public health sectors?	T2) Does the country monitor relevant animal populations for priority zoonotic diseases through an established surveillance system?	
		T1) Does the country have indicator and event-based surveillance systems able to detect public health threats at all levels?	T2) Are the public health and veterinary surveillance systems' reporting mechanisms interoperable and interconnected?	T3) Is surveillance data integrated, analyzed and disseminated through regular reports (weekly or monthly) reports published?
	4.2 Critical infrastructure ¹²	4.2.1 Government maintains an inventory of critical assets and infrastructure	<p>T1) Has the national government developed an inventory of critical public infrastructure and assets?</p> <p>T2) Is there an agency responsible for collecting and maintaining asset inventories?</p> <p>T2) Is the inventory comprehensive, identifying critical public infrastructure and asset values, replacement costs, current condition and maintenance history?</p>	<p>T3) Does the agency have access to adequate financial and human resources to fulfil its role?</p> <p>T3) Does the agency conduct inventory controls with a consistent periodicity? I.e: every 2-3 years?</p>

¹² Hémond, Y. and Robert, B, 2012, "Preparedness: The state of the art and future prospects. *Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal*, 21(4), 404-417.S

		4.2.2 Systems are in place to ensure infrastructure operation, maintenance, and post-incident response across infrastructure types	T1) Are public resources and financial incentives available to promote and maintain critical infrastructure services during and after crisis events?	<p>T2) Are monitoring systems in place to ensure infrastructure operation, maintenance, and post-incident response across infrastructure types?</p> <p>T2) Are back-up systems in place for key infrastructure (alternative sources for water, shelter, energy, etc)</p>	<p><i>T3) Do critical public service and infrastructure providers have plans to ensure service continuity in the event of a crisis (including pre-contracting of maintenance services)?</i></p> <p><i>T3) Are there plans in place to coordinate the use of critical public and private infrastructure (energy, telecommunications, etc.) during and after crises?</i></p>
	4.3 Civil protection and Emergency Management Systems	4.3.1 Emergency management legislation and related policy instruments exist, allowing the emergency management services to function at the national and sub-national levels	T1) Does the national government have emergency management legislation and policies in place, assigning specific responsibilities and accountabilities to ministries or relevant authorities?	<p>T2) Are emergency management policies and legislation linked to plans that ensure the provision of resources and staffing of civil protection capabilities?</p> <p>T2) Do sub-national governments have emergency management legislation and policies in place with clear roles and responsibilities?</p> <p>T2) Are there dedicated emergency operations centres with clear policies for activation and coordination with ministries?</p>	<p><i>T3) Are required civil protection capacities and capabilities clearly outlined?</i></p> <p><i>T3) Are emergency operations centres adequately resourced and staffed for response whenever necessary?</i></p>
		4.3.2 Emergency service systems are well resourced, maintained, and sufficient in responding to major threats	T1) Do government emergency services possess specialized equipment and staff necessary to respond to key priority hazards?	<p>T2) Are provisions in place to ensure these resources can rapidly be deployed to respond to crises and to minimize or mitigate impact across the country?</p> <p>T2) Are emergency communication systems able to</p>	<i>T3) Are there mechanisms to ensure accountability in the use and maintenance of emergency service equipment?</i>

				continually operate despite the harshest possible conditions?	
5. SOCIAL CUBAN	5.1 Coverage and scalability of social protection	5.1.1 An adaptive social protection policy or strategy is in place with adequate financial commitments, clearly defined roles and responsibilities, and coordination between SP and DRM for crisis response	T1) Does the national social protection policy or strategy adopt the principles of ASP and/or recognize the role of (A)SP in DRM and response?	T2) Does the policy or strategy provide a clear institutional framework for (A)SP and is it supported by appropriate legislation and financial commitments to insure its operationalization?	
			T1) Is there a government agency formally tasked with coordinating and/or implementing (A)SP interventions during and after crisis events?	T2) Are there institutionalized linkages between SP and DRM agencies to ensure coordination and data and information sharing for shock/crisis response?	<i>T3) Does the government play a lead role in planning, coordinating, and implementing (A)SP response efforts?</i>
		5.1.2 Social protection programs and systems are in place, with adaptive design features to scale up and/or out timely and effectively during and after crisis events	T1) Does the social protection registry/database allow identification and targeting of beneficiaries in times of shocks?		<i>T3) Is the registry/database risk-informed and integrated and/or interoperable with other databases (e.g., Telecom, ID system, civil registry, humanitarian databases, etc.)?</i>
			T1) Are there government-run non-contributory programs that are operated nationally?	T2) Is the amount of benefit provided adequate to maintain household consumption and welfare levels and to prevent beneficiaries from falling deeper into poverty if a shock or crisis occurs?	<i>T3) Are programs linked to triggering mechanisms (e.g., weather indexes, DRF mechanisms) or thresholds to allow effective and timely provision of benefits during and after a crisis?</i>

¹³ Cubas, D., Gunasekera, R. and Humbert, T., 2020, "Disaster Risk Finance for Adaptive Social Protection," World Bank, Washington, DC

5.2 Food security	5.2.1 The government has dedicated plans, coordination mechanisms and risk monitoring systems in place to safeguard availability and access of food during crises	T1) Does the government have a dedicated national food security crisis preparedness plan in place to ensure early action and safeguard continued availability and access of food during crises?	T2) Do national food-related preparedness plans define clear roles and responsibilities for relevant sectors and Ministries?	
		T1) Do mechanisms exist to coordinate food-related preparedness and response activities between government and relevant external stakeholders (including regional bodies/actors, international community)?	T2) Is there an office or agency designated with leading food security crisis preparedness efforts?	<i>T3) Does the designated office or agency lead engagement with external partners with regards to food-related preparedness and response?</i>
	5.2.2 The government has the ability to finance and deliver on food security preparedness and response measures	T1) Does the country have access to early warning and forecasting systems related to core food-related outcomes (including commonly used measures of food security and malnutrition)?	T2) Do food-related forecasting and monitoring and early warning systems link to government-led preparedness and response activities?	<i>T3) Do monitoring systems ensure density of geographic coverage able to highlight sub-national hotspots?</i> <i>T3) Do monitoring systems extend to real-time tracking of food prices across key markets and staples?</i>
		T1) Does the government have access to pre-planned (ex-ante) financing that helps to ensure funds can be mobilized rapidly to support early action and food-related relief efforts		
		T1) Does the government have the financial resources and technical capacity to implement its food security crisis preparedness	T2) Has the government implemented measures to ensure continued food trade flow, including efforts to keep	<i>T3) Does the government have the capacity to effectively exercise price controls, tariffs, subsidies</i>

			plans (or other food-related plans)?	international and regional borders open during crises?	<i>and other measures to mitigate food price shocks?</i>
				T2) Has the government ensured the adequacy of strategic food reserves including pre-positioning of food stocks and have supply chains in place?	<i>T3) Has the government designated locations of temporary collection points and food distribution?</i>
					<i>T3) Is the government capable of sourcing and distributing food supplies without reliance on external stakeholders?</i>
				T2) Is there a registry in place to quickly identify crisis-affected and vulnerable populations during food-related emergencies?	<i>T3) Is the registry well integrated with existing social protection/safety net registries?</i>
	5.3 Continued access to education	5.3.1. Educational resources, infrastructure and learning outcomes are safeguarded during crises	T1) Are plans and mechanisms in place to adequately safeguard the continuity of learning during crises?	<p>T2) Do plans clearly outline the roles and responsibilities for the delivery of educational services during a crisis?</p> <p>T2) Are appropriate levels of financial, human and infrastructural resources earmarked and available in a timely way to ensure the continued delivery of education during (and after) a crisis?</p>	<p><i>T3) Do plans seek to address out of school children and prevent dropout?</i></p> <p><i>T3) Does the government include the private education sector in its preparedness planning?</i></p> <p><i>T3) Do educational response plans include alternate means of education? (ie: remote learning, temporary learning spaces, nonformal education)</i></p>

5.4 Crisis induced displacement	5.4.1 The needs of existing and newly internally displaced populations are taken into consideration in planning and responses	T1) Does the government have a national response plan to coordinate settlement activities (camp vs host) and ensure essential service delivery amongst newly displaced communities?	T2) Does the government anticipate potential displacement in its national crisis preparedness and response plans? (including those related to emergency risk management, climate, food security with provisions for mental health services)?	
		T1) Do national crisis preparedness plans take into consideration the particularities of existing displaced populations (landlessness, lack of identity cards, lack of access to financial resources) and their mental health needs?	T2) Does the government have the ability to record and monitor displacement related to ongoing crises?	T3) Are mechanisms in place to rapidly activate platforms to liaise with external partners in the event of displacement-related crises?
		T1) Does the country have a policy in place for protracted displacement, including for early solutions?	T2) Is the government balancing early solutions, alongside crisis response, in their national crisis preparedness plans?	T3) Is the country supporting the socio-economic inclusion of displaced populations? Through access to education, livelihoods, employment, food security, shelter and mental health services? T3) Does the government approach crisis preparedness and response in a way that ensures that the impact of a crisis doesn't hinder or increase the vulnerabilities of IDPs or refugee populations over time?

		5.4.2 Refugees and asylum-seekers are included in crisis preparedness plans and responses	<p>T1) Does the country have national policies, frameworks and plans to assist asylum seekers and refugees during crises</p>	<p>T2) Do policies and frameworks have roles and responsibilities for implementation delineated at national and sub-national levels?</p> <p>T2) Do crisis preparedness plans take into account asylum-seekers and refugee populations' locations, living conditions, vulnerabilities and needs, together with the obstacles they may face in accessing assistance?</p>	<p><i>T3) Do crisis preparedness and response plans have procedures in place to ensure that asylum seekers and refugees are protected from exploitation, discrimination, abuse and violence throughout the crisis management cycle (prevention, preparedness, response and recovery)?</i></p> <p><i>T3) Do crisis preparedness and response plans have procedures in place to ensure a policy of "do no harm" and ensure that asylum seekers and refugees receive the same assistance as the general population at the same time?</i></p>
			<p>T1) Does the country have a ministry responsible for managing displacement issues, including for IDPs, with supporting legislation on refugee issues.</p>		



